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SUMMARY 
Modern corporate governance recognises independent directors as 
“monitors” of managers so as to protect the interests of the 
shareholders of companies. Although the concept of “independent 
directors” originated in the United States (U.S.) in the 1950s 
voluntarily as a good measure of corporate oversight, it has now 
become a mandatory requirement of corporate law, at least in the case 
of public listed companies. Gradually, the phenomenon has been 
imbibed into the United Kingdom (U.K.). Over the turn of the century, 
several other jurisdictions have embraced independent directors as an 
integral part of their corporate governance codes. These include 
emerging economies such as China and India. 
The U.S. and the U.K., which have been at the vanguard of the 
independent director movement, follow the classic “outsider” model of 
corporate governance, with dispersed shareholding. This gives rise to 
agency problems between managers and shareholders arising out of 
the separation of ownership and control. The institution of independent 
directors has seemingly been introduced as protection for shareholder 
interests against actions of managers in public companies with 
dispersed shareholders. However, other jurisdictions (to which the 
independent director concept was transplanted) follow the “insider” 
model of corporate governance where ownership and control are 
relatively closely held by cohesive groups of insiders. Companies here 
are controlled by family groups or the state, and they do not face the 
classic agency problem between managers and shareholders; indeed 
they face a different agency problem – one between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Furthermore, under these 
“insider” systems of corporate governance, there is a greater role that 
corporate law plays to protect the interests of the non-shareholder 
constituencies. 
This research analyses the implications of legal transplantation of the 
independent director concept from the outsider system to the insider 
system of corporate governance and examines whether or not such 
transplantation of a corporate governance mechanism that works to 
address one type of agency problem would work at all to address 
altogether different types of agency problems. The findings of the 
research indicate that the effect of independent directors in the insider 
systems of China and India is different from that in the outsider 
systems. The transplantation of the concept does not take into account 
the intrinsic differences between these two types of systems, and this is 
evident from a survey of the corporate governance norms in these 
jurisdictions as well as an analysis of the available empirical evidence. 
 ix
There are several reasons due to which such a position ensues. 
Specifically, it is due to the admixture of several constraints – 
structural, legal, cultural, political and perceptional – that prevent 
effectual institutional change in the insider systems so as to enable the 
independent director concept to seamlessly blend into their own 
systems. Therefore, what is required is a complete overhaul of the 
independent director norms as well as practices in China and India. 
This dissertation contains some normative measures required to 
embolden independent directors in these systems.  
 x
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“In proposing to apply the juristic rules of a distant time or country 
to the conditions of a particular place at the present day regard must 
be had to the physical, social, and historical conditions to which that 
rule is to be adapted.”1 
 
                                                 
1
  Srinath Roy v. Dinabandhu Sen 42 I.A. 221, 241, 243 (Privy Council) cited from M.P. Jain, 
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1.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
This dissertation begins with an introduction to the concept of an independent 
director in corporate governance. Although the concept emerged in the developed 
economies of the U.S. and the U.K., it was transplanted to several other corporate 
law systems over the turn of the century. This Chapter identifies the problems 
involved in transplantation of the concept to the two emerging economies of 
China and India, sets out the hypothesis this dissertation seeks to address, and 
outlines some key questions for consideration. After setting out the importance of 
this research, it details the methodology adopted for accomplishing the research.  
1.2 Background to the Research 
I begin by outlining the importance of corporate governance in modern business 
and the role of the board of directors in general and independent directors in 
particular. Corporate governance relates to the “system by which companies are 
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directed and controlled”.2 It is also pertinent to note that corporate governance 
extends beyond just managing the business well and earning handsome profits; it 
represents the set of checks and balances within the corporate structure that helps 
create long-term value enhancement for stakeholders in a company.3 In that sense, 
good governance is more than mere good management. While good management 
may make a business profitable, good governance ensures that the commercial 
benefit derived by a corporate entity is directly reflected in the value to the 
stakeholders of the entity. Delving a bit deeper into this aspect, we find that 
corporate governance, in its simple terms, “concerns the relationships between a 
company’s owners, managers, board of directors (BOD), and other 
stakeholders.”4 The study of the inter-relationship among these four 
constituencies strikes at the heart of corporate governance. In the ultimate 
analysis, no single constituency (for example, management) ought to extract value 
for itself at the cost of other constituencies (for example, shareholders). 
                                                 
2
  U.K., Financial Reporting Council, Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance, online: European Corporate Governance Institute 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf> at para. 2.5(1992) [Cadbury Committee 
Report]. It is also defined to mean the way in which businesses are run. See Jonathan P. 
Charkham, Keeping Good Company: A Study of Corporate Governance in Five Countries 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) at 1. 
3
  See Robert A.G. Monks & Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, 3rd ed. (Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2004) at 2 (observing that “[i]n essence, corporate governance is the 
structure that is intended to make sure that the right questions get asked and that checks and 
balances are in place to make sure that the answers reflect what is best for the creation of 
long-term, sustainable value”). 
4
  Ferdinand A. Gul and Judy S.L. Tsui, “Introduction and Overview” in The Governance of 
East Asian Corporations: Post Asian Financial Crisis (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2004) at 3. The authors observe: 
Agency theory provides a theoretical perspective in which to discuss these relationships. 
Specifically, in order for owners to get what they want (i.e., increased value of their 
investment), they must contract with non-owner managers to run the company, and with 
the BOD to oversee the management of the company. … The development of corporate 
governance is an attempt to oversee these relationships, …, to regulate behavior so as to 
achieve the desired outcome and appropriate rewards for all parties involved. 
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Among the tetrarchs described above, the board of directors plays a 
ubiquitous and indispensable role in a company’s governance.5 The board is that 
organ of the company which holds the principal authority for a company’s 
governance, and hence the structure and composition of the board would 
necessarily have an impact on the manner in which the company is governed. 
Among the various structural changes that have occurred in recent years to 
improve the way in which companies are governed, the introduction of the 
concept of an independent director occupies a prominent position.6 As an 
important aspect of legal reform in the field of corporate governance, policy 
makers are increasingly pinning hope as well as responsibility on independent 
directors to ensure that companies demonstrate high levels of corporate 
governance.7 
                                                 
5
  See John Carver, Boards That Make a Difference, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: John Wiley & Sons, 
2006) at 1. The author notes: “It is virtually impossible to escape contact with boards. We are 
on boards, work for them, or are affected by their decisions. Boards sit atop almost all 
corporate forms of organisation—profit and non-profit—and often over governmental 
agencies as well.” See also, Margaret M. Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-First Century (Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 1995) at 77 [Ownership and Control] (noting that “[i]n principle, the board of 
directors is the single most important corporate governance mechanism. … Directors have the 
legal authority to perform almost every function that even the most strident advocates of 
corporate governance reform would like to see”). 
6
  See Donald C. Clarke, “Three Concepts of the Independent Director” (2007) 32 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 73 at 73 [Three Concepts] (observing that “[i]ndependent directors have long been viewed 
as a solution to many corporate governance problems”). See also Laura Lin, “The 
Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and 
Evidence” (1996) 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 898 at 899-900 (finding that in response to highly 
publicised allegations of corporate governance problems, reformers have identified 
independent outside directors as a possible solution); Colin B. Carter & Jay W. Lorsch, Back 
to the Drawing Board: Designing Corporate Boards for a Complex World (Boston, Mass.: 
Harvard Business School Press, 2004) at 44 [Back to the Drawing Board]. 
7
  Victor Brudney, “The Independent Director – Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?” (1982) 95 
Harv. L. Rev. 598 at 599 (where Professor Brudney notes that of the “panoply of structural 
changes being discussed, few come with such broad support as the notion of the “outside” or 
“independent” director”). 
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That brings me to the threshold question: who exactly are independent 
directors? Independent directors are those members of the board of directors who 
are not executives of the company (at present or in the recent past), and are 
otherwise independent of management and free from any business or other 
relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of their 
independent judgment.8 Such directors should not have any material relationship 
with the company or its management, other than in their capacity as directors or 
members of any of the board committees. This is to encourage the independence 
of thought and judgment of such directors.9 The fact that directors should not be 
beholden to any constituency other than the shareholders is enunciated in 
Professor Donald Clarke’s definition as follows:  
… “independent director”: one who has no need or inclination to stay in 
the good graces of management, and who will be able to speak out, inside 
and outside the boardroom, in the face of management’s misdeeds in order 
to protect the interests of shareholders.10 
The concept of independent directors was ushered into the corporate system 
voluntarily as a good measure of governance, and was initially not something that 
was mandated by law. The history of independent directors can be traced to the 
1950s in the United States (U.S.) when certain directors who were not part of the 
                                                 
8
  Cadbury Committee Report, supra note 2 at para. 4.12.  
9
  Blair, Ownership and Control, supra note 5 at 81 (stating that “[t]he idea behind adding more 
outside and independent directors is that they are likely to be objective critics of 
management”). 
10
  Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 6 at 84. In other words, a director who is truly 
independent will possess unhindered powers to govern and take decisions on behalf of the 
company in an objective manner. See Jay W. Lorsch & Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or 
Potentates: The Reality of America’s Corporate Boards (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business 
School Press, 1989) at 13 [Pawns or Potentates]. 
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company’s management were appointed to the board.11 Gradually, the number of 
independent directors on corporate boards began to increase.12 Director 
independence assumed greater importance when the judiciary and regulatory 
authorities began deferring to judgments of independent boards. On the judicial 
front, Delaware courts placed reliance on decisions of disinterested independent 
directors in legitimising several actions pertaining to self-dealing transactions, 
derivative suits and demand futility claims, and defensive measures against 
hostile tender offers.13 In addition, stock exchanges began to look at companies 
favourably when they had established board independence, as the listing manuals 
of the key stock exchanges exhorted companies to have boards with independent 
directors.14 Eventually, independence of directors acquired the status of a 
                                                 
11
  Jeffrey N. Gordon, “The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices” (2007) 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465 at 1473 [The Rise 
of Independent Directors]. 
12
  Ibid. at 1478. 
13
  For a detailed discussion, see infra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(C). See also Lin, supra note 6 at 
904-910. It is to be noted, however, that there is a difference between “disinterestedness” of 
directors and “independence” of directors; a disinterested director is one who has no interest 
in the transaction in question, but an independent director is one who is not otherwise 
affiliated to the company (in addition to being disinterested in the transaction in question). 
While disinterestedness is concerned primarily with a particular transaction in question, 
independence is a wider concept that governs board structure as a whole. However, this 
difference is not altogether relevant for this present analysis, which focuses on independent 
directors rather than disinterested directors. 
14
  The New York Stock Exchange [NYSE] and Nasdaq Stock Exchange [NASDAQ] have 
emphasised the importance of independent directors on boards of listed companies. See 
NYSE, “Listed Company Manual (2003)” [NYSE Listed Company Manual], online: NYSE 
<http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/>; NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc., “Market Place Rules 




mandatory provision contained in a statute. This occurred with the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S.15  
The phenomenon of independent directors was not confined to the U.S. It 
occurred in the United Kingdom (U.K.) too, but more recently than in the U.S. In 
the U.K, the trend towards independent directors was set in motion in 1992 with 
the Cadbury Committee Report.16 This report forms the basis of corporate 
governance in the U.K.17 Now, board independence has become an integral part 
of corporate governance in the U.K. by virtue of the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance.18 Although the Combined Code is not mandatory, it 
follows the “comply or explain” approach whereby companies are required to 
comply with the provisions of the Combined Code, or alternatively explain their 
governance approach. Since the Combined Code imposes disclosure obligations 
on companies with reference to corporate governance compliance, it persuades 
companies to comply with corporate governance norms (such as the appointment 
of the requisite number of independent directors), rather than invite the 
                                                 
15
  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, s. 301. Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not stipulate 
independence requirements for the entire board, it requires that members of the audit 
committee be independent. This postulates that at least such of the directors as are on the audit 
committee should satisfy the requirement of independence. 
16
  Supra note 2 at para. 4.11. The Cadbury Committee required all boards to have a minimum of 
three non-executive directors, with two of them being independent. 
17
  Furthermore, the broad principles laid down in the report have also been used as the 
foundation for developing corporate governance norms in other jurisdictions as well. See R.P. 
Austin, H.A.J. Ford & I.R. Ramsay, Company Directors: Principles of Law and Corporate 
Governance (Chatswood, NSW: LexisNexis, 2005) at 14. 
18
  See Financial Services Authority, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance [Combined 
Code], Para. A.3.2 (providing that at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should 
comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent).  
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displeasure of shareholders as the companies explain their failure to comply with 
those requirements. 
At this stage, it may be useful to examine the reason for considering the 
U.S. and U.K. for this part of the present research. It is pertinent to observe that 
not only have the U.S. and U.K. been at the vanguard of the evolution of the 
institution of independent director, but that both these jurisdictions possess a 
unique characteristic in that they follow the classical “outsider” model of 
corporate governance.19 These regimes are dominated by companies with 
dispersed equity holdings with large institutional ownership.20 They follow the 
idea of separation of ownership and control of companies, which was originally 
                                                 
19
  See Stilpon Nestor & John K. Thompson, “Corporate Governance Patterns in the OECD 
Economies: Is Convergence Under Way?”, online: OECD  
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/10/1931460.pdf>.  
20
  Nestor & Thompson, ibid. at 5-9. See also Brian R. Cheffins, “Putting Britain on the Roe 
Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom” [Putting 
Britain on the Roe Map] in Joseph A. McCahery, Piet Moerland, Theo Raaijmakers & Luc 
Renneboog, eds., Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) at 151, where the author states as follows:  
An important corporate governance link between the US and the UK is that the two 
countries share an ‘outside/arm’s length’ system of ownership and control. In Britain, as 
in the US, the ‘outsider’ terminology is appropriate because share ownership is widely 
dispersed. 
This position has received wide support from other commentators as well. See Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, “A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance” (1999) 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 at 133 [Path Dependence] (concurring that “[a]t 
present, publicly traded companies in the United States and the United Kingdom commonly 
have dispersed ownership, whereas publicly traded companies in other advanced economies 
have a controlling shareholder”); John C. Coffee, Jr., “The Future as History: The Prospects 
for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and its Implications” (1999) 93 Nw. U.L. 
Rev. 641 at 641 [The Future as History] (adding that “contemporary empirical evidence finds 
that, even at the level of the largest firms, dispersed ownership is a localized phenomenon, 
largely limited to the United States and Great Britain”); Troy Paredes, “A Systems Approach 
to Corporate Governance Reform: Why Importing U.S. Corporate Law Isn’t the Answer?” 
(2004) 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 at 1056 (acknowledging that the Anglo-American 
pattern of finance is characterised by “dispersed share ownership and the separation of 
ownership and control in the United States and the United Kingdom”). 
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propounded by Berle and Means.21 Dispersal of shareholding in public companies 
results in the collective action problem,22 preventing shareholders from taking 
active part in key decisions involving the company that are otherwise within the 
shareholders’ domain under corporate law, and also impeding their basic 
decision-making power of electing the directors who are delegated management 
rights by the shareholders. This creates a conflict in the form of an agency 
problem between the shareholders and the managers.23  The role of corporate law 
in the outsider systems is primarily to address this agency problem, and in that 
context, the institution of independent directors has seemingly been introduced as 
protection for shareholder interests against actions of managers in public 
companies with dispersed shareholders.24 
 The evolution of the independent director institution did not remain 
confined to the economies of the U.S. and the U.K. where it originated. Owing to 
the corporate governance wave that emerged in response to the corporate 
governance scandals of the last decade, it witnessed rapid proliferation to other 
                                                 
21
  Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New 
York: Macmillan, 1940 [c1932]) at 66. 
22
  Collective action problems exist “whenever it is in individuals’ self-interest not to contribute 
to a group activity even though all of the individuals would be better off if everyone were to 
contribute. In a resulting irony, each individual is made worse off by pursuing her own self-
interest”. Christopher R. Leslie, “The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems 
and Class Action Settlements” (2007) 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71 at 72-73. 
23
  For a detailed discussion on the concept of the agency problem in a company, see Michael 
Jensen & William Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and 
Ownership Structure” (1976) 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 at 310 [Theory of the Firm].  
24
  Reinier R. Kraakman, et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) at 50 [The Anatomy of Corporate Law] 
(envisioning independent directors as trustees to protect shareholders against opportunistic 
managers). 
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economies as well.25 Among the countries to which the concept was transplanted, 
there are jurisdictions that follow the “insider” model of corporate governance. 
These regimes are dominated by companies where ownership and control are 
relatively closely held by identifiable and cohesive groups of insiders who have 
longer-term stable relationships with the company.26 These include emerging 
economies such as China and India, where companies have historically been 
largely controlled (by virtue of high shareholding levels) by business families or 
the state. Such a shareholding pattern continues even in publicly listed companies, 
although there are some rare exceptions where companies in insider systems have 
gradually moved to an outsider model of corporate governance.27 This presents a 
different agency problem altogether. As there is no dispersion of shareholding, the 
agency problem between shareholders and managers is much less important. 
However, this regime exacerbates the agency problem between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders are usually in a 
position to shape the composition of the board of directors, in that all directors 
owe their allegiance to the controlling shareholders as their appointment,  renewal 
and continuance in office (without removal) are subject to the wishes of the 
                                                 
25
  Eddy Wymeersch, “Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western 
Europe?” in McCahery, et. al, supra note 20 at 238 (stating that the appointment of 
independent directors is among the “most conspicuous instruments advocated in most 
systems” when it comes to corporate governance). For a somewhat detailed account of the 
manner in which the independent director concept has been embraced in various jurisdictions 
around the world, see Tong Lu, “Development of System of Independent Directors and the 
Chinese Experience”, online: <http://www.cipe.org/regional/asia/china/development.htm> 
[Independent Directors and Chinese Experience].  
26
  See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership 
Around the World” (1999) 54 Journal of Finance 471 at 474 [Around the World]. 
27
  Since the exceptions are only rare, and companies still continue to be dominated 
predominantly by family groups or the state, China and India are considered to be insider 
systems. 
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controlling shareholders. These powers of controlling shareholders extend to the 
appointment, renewal and removal of independent directors as well.  
These circumstances have resulted in a curious position whereby the 
concept of independent directors that was devised in the context of outsider 
systems for the purpose of protecting the shareholders from managers has been 
directly transplanted to an entirely different corporate system, being the insider 
system where the agency problem is distinct (being one between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders). It is not clear what the theoretical 
underpinnings of such transplant are, or whether the proliferation of the concept 
to various countries is merely an over-reaction to corporate governance failures 
around the world (such as Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat and the like).28 
Furthermore, there is no clarity on what the benefit of an independent director in 
an insider system would be in the shadow of the dominance of a controlling 
shareholder. It is precisely this anomaly that the present research seeks to unravel, 
as we shall see in greater detail. 
                                                 
28
  To be sure, this is not the first instance of transplantation involving directors of companies. 
There have been other instances that are the subject matter of studies at varying levels of 
detail: (i) Japan’s importation of the directors’ duty of loyalty from the U.S., Hideki Kanda & 
Curtis Milhaupt, “Re-examining Legal Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in 
Japanese Corporate Law” (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 887; and (ii) China’s importation of a 
directors’ duty of diligence, again primarily from the U.S., see Donald Clarke, “Lost in 
Translation? Corporate Legal Transplants in China”, The George Washington University Law 
School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 213, online: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=913784?> at 14-16 [Lost in 
Translation]; Rebecca Lee, “Fiduciary Duty Without Equity: “Fiduciary Duties” of Directors 
Under the Revised Company Law of the PRC” (2007) 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 897. 
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1.3 Problem, Hypothesis and Questions 
A. Problem 
The concept of independent directors has originated in the context of outsider 
systems of corporate governance. These systems are affected by the agency 
problem between managers and shareholders, and the institution of independent 
directors has seemingly been introduced to address that agency problem. 
However, the concept has been transplanted to insider systems. In insider systems, 
companies are dominated by controlling shareholders, and these systems suffer 




The appointment of independent directors on boards of companies in the insider 
systems (that suffer from the agency problem between controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders) will entail a result or effect that is different from the 
result or effect of their appointment on boards of companies in the outsider 






The appointment of independent directors in insider systems will produce an 
outcome (with respect to enhancement of corporate governance) that is less 
effective compared to the outsider systems, to the extent that such comparison can 
be empirically verified. 
C. Key Questions 
1. Is the transplantation of a concept in corporate governance, such as 
independent directors, from one type of system (the outsider system) 
to another (the insider system) feasible? 
2. What is the effectiveness of an independent director in an insider 
system when the controlling shareholder has influence over the 
appointment or removal of such director? In other words, can 
independent directors be expected to remain objective when their 
continuance in that position is dependent on the wishes of the persons 
(controlling shareholders) that they are required to monitor in the first 
place? 
3. Whose interests are independent directors required to protect in an 
insider system – all shareholders or just the minority shareholders? 
4. What is the effect of transplantation of a legal concept such as 
independent directors from one legal system to other countries that 
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display different economic, social and political factors and contain a 
different legal framework? 
1.4 Relevance and Importance of the Research 
Now, I identify the reasons for the relevance and importance of my thesis 
question. First, the role of independent directors in corporate governance is yet 
unclear, despite being a field which has been occupied for several decades now. 
There is no persuasive (let alone clinching) evidence that independence of 
directors has been an effective tool in the direction of maximising corporate 
performance or improving corporate governance. There is no uniformity in the 
definitional aspects of independence either; laws and scholarly articles refer to 
various types of independent directors, including outside directors, disinterested 
directors and non-management directors.29 No clear direction is in sight. The 
result is that while scholarly writing is unsettled on the aspect of board 
independence, legislatures, regulators and courts the world-over are proceeding at 
a rapid pace to institute board independence as a mandatory requirement of 
corporate governance, thereby creating a wide chasm between theory and 
practice. 
Several leading authors in the field of corporate governance have 
commented that the role of independent directors in corporate governance 
continues to be a fertile area for research. Professor Kraakman and his co-authors 
                                                 
29
  Even within each of these expressions, studies have used different parameters to measure 
independence. This possibly explains in part the inconclusive nature of the empirical studies 
in this area. 
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conclude their influential work with an observation that the functioning of boards 
presents an area where further work needs to be done.30 So far, independence of 
directors has been looked at in isolation. Bhagat and Black point to the need to 
look for factors that, when combined with independence, might improve board 
and corporate performance.31 Further, independence of directors has been 
considered as a substitute to regulation by the state,32 an aspect that has received 
considerable criticism from commentators. Professor Brudney’s characterisation 
of the problem is lucid—he says “[m]uch work remains to be done to collect 
evidence on how effectively the independent director curbs overreaching and to 
compare the costs and benefits of independent directors with those of a 
categorical prohibition or other public regulation to restrain overreaching in self-
dealing.”33 This comment cannot be more apt in the context of emerging 
economies that still rely heavily on state regulation rather than market-based 
regulation. 
                                                 
30
  Kraakman, et. al., supra note 24 at 224. The authors recommend further research on 
fundamental issues such as the impact of peer pressure and group dynamics on board 
behavior. Furthermore, the authors also mention another avenue for research, which is how 
the analytical framework of corporate law can be used to deal with issues concerning 
emerging jurisdictions. 
31
  Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, “The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance” (1999) 54 Bus. Law. 921 at 955 [Bhagat & Black (1999)]. See Lin, 
supra note 6 at 957, 967 (concluding that more studies would be clearly useful, and that it is 
difficult to conclude at present that independent outside directors would be a good thing for 
every firm). See also Note, “And Now, the Independent Director! Have Congress, the NYSE, 
and NASDAQ Finally Figured Out How to Make the Independent Director Actually Work?” 
(2004) 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2181 at 2205. 
32
  Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1539 (arguing that the stepped 
up efforts on independent director reform after Enron are a result of pressures from 
managerial elites to seek an alternate to more intrusive regulation). 
33
  Brudney, supra note 7 at 616-17. 
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While the importance of research in the area of independent directors as a 
whole is relevant as discussed above, the core of my research goes further and 
into areas that have hitherto not been addressed. Whether independent directors 
would work in insider systems (such as China and India) as well (or as little) as 
they have in outsider systems is a question wide open for debate.34 Evidently, and 
as discussed in Section 1.2 above, insider systems have fundamentally different 
characteristics compared to the outsider systems. Not only are ownership 
structures in insider systems radically different, they have less developed capital 
markets and less sophisticated market players. They also demonstrate different 
social, political, economic and legal structures.35 Lastly, the state and its 
mandatory regulation continue to play an important role in the corporate sectors. 
These differences in the insider systems make the study of a market-based 
institution such as independent directors more interesting. The introduction of a 
concept (such as an independent director) devised and meant for an outsider 
system into an insider system poses several legal and systemic problems and 
hurdles.  
Several important questions are unanswered in the literature pertaining to 
independent directors as it does not explicitly address theoretical issues pertaining 
                                                 
34
  Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 6 at 110-11 (noting that jurisdictions already using the 
institution of independent director should clarify its purpose and adjust legal definitions). See 
also Li Jingjing, “The Independent Director System in China” (2004) 17 A.J.C.L. 120 
(observing that a high concentration of shareholding means that the board is dominated by the 
controlling shareholder); Margaret Wang, “The Independent Directorship System in China”, 
(2004) 17 A.J.C.L. 243 at 245 (arguing that the need for independent directors arises when 
there is separation of ownership from control, and also when there is a controlling 
shareholder). 
35
  For instance, they do not have well-developed court systems that can enforce rules and 
regulations as well as courts in the outsider systems do. 
 16
to insider systems. By way of illustration, there is no clarity on whether 
independent directors are required to protect the interests of the shareholder body 
as a whole or whether they are required to consider only the minority 
shareholders’ interests. If the answer is that they are to protect the interests of the 
shareholder body as a whole, then is their role not redundant as controlling 
shareholders can protect themselves (even better than independent directors) 
because of their dominant position in the company? If the answer is the protection 
of minority shareholders (against actions of the controlling shareholders), then the 
position is completely devoid of any theoretical basis in existing literature. 
Logical problems emerge as well. How can the independent directors, whose 
appointment and removal are entirely within the power of the controlling 
shareholders (by virtue of their voting power), realistically be expected to protect 
the minority shareholders?36 Are the independent directors at all likely to act as 
watchdogs over the very authority who determines their existence on the 
company’s board? This area is dismally under-theorised as current law and theory 
do not proffer any answers.37 It is in this direction that I have focused my enquiry, 
i.e., to determine whether or not the concept of independent directors can be 
effective in insider systems, which I have done by studying two emerging 
                                                 
36
  Furthermore, as reiterated later in this dissertation, both China and India do not have 
mandatory requirements for companies to establish nomination committees so as to remove 
nomination of independent directors outside the purview of the controlling shareholders and 
the managers. 
37
  One significant piece of research that has come to my attention in this field is that of Professor 
Clarke, see Donald C. Clarke, “The Independent Director in Chinese Corporate Governance” 
(2006) 31 Del. J. Corp. L. 125 [Independent Director in China]. However, while his work 
examines the specifics of Chinese corporate governance very closely, it does not elaborate on 
the underlying theoretical considerations of the operation of the independent director concept 
in jurisdictions with controlling shareholders. This dissertation proposes to address those 
basic theoretical considerations in great detail. 
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economies, namely China and India. I have also examined the merits of 
transplanting a concept to emerging economies when its success in developed 
economies itself is in doubt. 
This research is relevant and important as emerging economies have only 
recently been initiated into evolved corporate governance practices (especially the 
concept of independent directors), and the impact of these on the corporate sector 
in those economies requires assessment from a legal standpoint so as to enable 
policy makers, regulators, companies as well as other market players in those 
economies to deal with issues arising out of the implementation of these 
principles and practices. This research is unique in that it conducts a comparative 
analysis of the effect of mandating board independence on developed markets on 
the one hand and emerging markets on the other. This is particularly relevant in 
the context of “westernization” of corporate governance requirements in emerging 
economies. This research questions whether the strategy followed by these 
jurisdictions of borrowing Western concepts in imposing independent director 
requirements would not fail as the agency problems that the director 
independence solution seeks to address may not be homogenous across the 
developed and emerging markets. 
Apart from dealing with the specific issue of independent directors, this 
dissertation seeks to draw greater relevance in the area of comparative corporate 
governance generally.38  To begin with, the academic debate in corporate 
                                                 
38
  This aspect is considered in greater detail in Chapter 2 below. 
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governance has largely been confined to the U.S. and, to a somewhat lesser 
extent, the U.K., thereby leading some academics to refer to this debate as being 
largely “introspective”.39 Until recently, the focus was entirely on the widely held 
corporation, being the “outsider " model of corporate governance. There was no 
focus whatsoever on the "insider" model. This was essentially based on the 
understanding that all companies followed the Berle and Means structure of 
corporate ownership.40 It is only in the late 1980s and the early 1990s that 
comparative corporate governance scholarship transcended beyond the boundaries 
of the U.S. and the U.K. During this era, the focus was primarily on Germany and 
Japan,41 because it was thought that these two economies constituted a significant 
threat to the developed economies, particularly to the U.S., and hence a study of 
the success of these economies was considered important. Such comparative 
scholarship, that involved the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Japan, took the most 
part of the last decade of the 20th century. 
This debate is now being shifted to another plane. Not only have the 
economies that formed the earlier points of comparison (Germany and Japan) 
been recently finding themselves on a plateau as far as economic growth is 
concerned, but recent findings show that the comparative corporate governance 
debate is flawed to the extent that it narrowly focuses only on these countries. It is 
                                                 
39
  Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, “Corporate Governance and the Importance of 
Macroeconomic Context” (2008) 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 201 at 202. 
40
  See Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, eds., Convergence and Persistence in Corporate 
Governance (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 6 [Convergence 
and Persistence]. 
41
  Dignam & Galanis, supra note 39 at 203. 
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almost as if this debate effectively ignored the rest of the world, making it 
substantially incomplete and biased. In this context, Professor Douglas Branson 
makes this pertinent observation: 
[C]onvergence advocates posit convergence based upon their study of 
capitalism in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and 
perhaps Japan. They ignore most of the world’s remaining 6 billion 
people, the largest nations on earth (the People’s Republic of China, India, 
Indonesia), and the culture beneath law and economic systems that is as or 
more important than law or capitalism itself. Cultural diversity militates 
against convergence42 
More recently, there has been a steady development of corporate governance 
scholarship across various countries around the world.43 In particular, the focus is 
being turned towards emerging markets and also towards transition economies. 
This dissertation is an effort in furthering the movement of the research in 
corporate governance as it pertains to emerging economies. As I will discuss later, 
the focus of this dissertation is on two of the largest emerging economies, which 
not only have significant financial resources at hand but also cater to the lives of a 
whopping 37% of the people on this planet,44 with the actions of the companies in 
                                                 
42
  Douglas M. Branson, “The Very Uncertain Prospect of “Global” Convergence in Corporate 
Governance” (2001) 34 Cornell Int’l L.J. 321 at 325 [The Very Uncertain Prospect]. 
43
  Diane K. Denis & John J. McConnell, “International Corporate Governance”, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=320121> at 1 (stating that the "result is an extensive and still 
growing body of research on international corporate governance"). 
44
  Judith Banister, “China and India: Demographic and Economic Transformations in Progress”, 
online <http://iis-
b.stanford.edu/evnts/5348/Banister_China_and_India_Stanford,_Oct__16,_2008.pdf> at 3. 
This is further categorised into China representing 20% of the world’s population and India 
representing 17%. See ibid. 
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these nations affecting these huge numbers of lives.45  Hence, the issues 
pertaining to the governance of these companies acquire great relevance. 
 Finally, the importance of various social and cultural factors on the 
performance of independent directors has not received the amount of deliberation 
that it deserves, particularly in the context of the emerging economies where these 
factors take on a more prominent role. This dissertation seeks to address these 
questions in greater detail. 
1.5 Methodology and Research Approach 
 In this dissertation, I have employed a combination of methodologies for 
the research. 
A. Theoretical Component 
First, the research contains a theoretical component in as much as it analyses and 
explains principles for phenomena in corporate governance, such as the agency 
problem, insider and outsider models and the role of players such as independent 
directors. It also utilises various theories in the realm of law as well as those in 
                                                 
45
  In the past, studies in corporate governance have placed great emphasis on economic 
outcomes. For instance, the precise reason why corporate governance debates previously 
focused on the U.S., U.K., Germany and Japan was because they were the largest markets in 
terms of financial and economic size. It was a different matter altogether that they covered a 
small portion of the world's population. However, I argue that the size of the population of the 
countries being part of the corporate governance debate is equally, if not more, important 
because corporate governance ought not to be measured purely in financial terms, but ought to 
be considered in the context of the greater good that businesses in the corporate form brings to 
society.  This approach is also consistent with the view, which I shall propound in greater 
detail later in this dissertation (see infra Chapter 2, Section 2.2(C)), that in emerging markets 
corporate governance follows the stakeholder theory (taking into account a greater number of 
constituents) as opposed to the shareholder theory which focuses predominantly on the 
interests of the shareholders without paying much heed to the wider interests that are affected 
by the functioning of a company. 
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associated fields such as political economy, behavioural economics and 
econometrics so as to explain some of the ideas and theses propounded in this 
dissertation. 
B. Comparative Study 
Second, the research is comparative as it studies a combination of jurisdictions to 
determine and explicate the likenesses and differences of the impact of 
independent directors in each of these jurisdictions. The jurisdictions have been 
categorised into two systems, with the outsider system on one side comprising the 
U.S. and the U.K. and the insider system on the other comprising China and India. 
While the former set of countries forms part of the developed world, both China 
and India are regarded as leading emerging economies.46  
At this stage, the choice of jurisdictions for comparison merits 
explanation. As regards outsider systems, the choice is relatively uncontroversial 
as the U.S. and the U.K. are recognised as the classical systems of that kind.47 
Furthermore, it is in these jurisdictions that the independent director concept 
initially evolved. Moving on to the insider systems, the selection of jurisdictions 
is not that straightforward and hence requires further explanation in order to avoid 
                                                 
46
  The expression “emerging economy” is devoid of any legal meaning, but it has however 
acquired popular significance. While it is sometimes equated to mean any “developing 
economy”, it is associated more with economies that are in transition from a developing state 
to a developed state and those that are expected to attain developed state in the near future. 
See Philip M. Nichols, “A Legal Theory of Emerging Economies” (1999) 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 
229 at 232 (attempting a more precise scope: “an emerging economy is a polity in which 
commercial institutions are changing from a relational orientation to a formal orientation. A 
formal orientation allows businesses and businesspersons in emerging economies to enter into 
commercial relations with persons and entities outside of that polity”). 
47
  For a more detailed discussion on this matter, see supra notes 19 and 20 and accompanying 
text. 
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a selection bias.48 I set forth below the reasons for my choice of China and India 
as insider systems for the study of impact of independent directors on corporate 
governance in such systems: 
(a) Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRICs) are leading emerging economies 
as their present growth trajectory is expected to put them amongst the 
world largest economies within a few years;49 
(b) Among the BRICs, this study has been confined to China and India as they 
exhibit most similarities as far as their economic growth pattern is 
concerned.50 Not only are both these nations neighbours and part of the 
greater Asian continent, but they are also in the similar stages of economic 
                                                 
48
  This is particularly in view of the fact that most jurisdictions other than the U.K. and the U.S. 
are characterised as insider systems, although there continues to be a debate about the 
orientation of countries such as Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
49
  Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99, Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050 
(2003), online: <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf> 
(predicting that, if things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could 
be larger than the G6 in US dollar terms; currently they are worth less than 15%).   
50
  At one level, it would have been possible for a study such as this to include all four BRICs 
economies rather than just two of them. But, that would have been a complex exercise 
requiring far more additional resources such as access to literature and market participants, 
which may not be warranted in the circumstances. Moreover, the findings of the research with 
reference to China and India are likely to be generally applicable to Brazil and Russia as well, 
subject to local adaptations at a more micro level. 
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development,51 having transitioned over the last few years from state-
controlled economies to more market-based economies;52 
(c) Both China and India follow the family/state insider model whereby a 
large number of publicly listed companies continue to be owned by 
business families or the state.53 While India predominantly follows the 
system where business families are controlling shareholders in companies 
(in addition to some state-owned companies as well), China predominantly 
follows the system where the state is the controlling shareholder in 
companies (where state-owned enterprises continue to play a significant 
role in the economy). 
(d) These two economies also face similar problems with regulation of 
companies, primarily on account of the lack of fully-developed capital 
markets and sophisticated market players, the unavailability of quick and 
trouble-free enforcement of laws and regulations as well as protection of 
legal rights. One key difference in the legal systems, though, is that China 
                                                 
51
  On account of their large population, China and India are said to possess the weight and 
dynamism to transform the 21st century global economy. “China and India—The Challenge: 
A New World Economy”, Business Week (22 August 2005). Business literature is otherwise 
replete with comparisons between China and India on the economic front.  See Pete Engardio, 
ed., Chindia: How China and India are Revolutionizing Global Business (New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill, 2007); Robyn Meredith, The Elephant and the Dragon: The Rise of India and 
China and What it Means to All of Us (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007). 
52
  Moreover, among the BRIC countries, corporate governance reforms in Russia have already 
been the subject matter of detailed academic research, see Bernard Black & Reinier 
Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, (1996) 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1912 [Self-
Enforcing Model]; Yevgeniy V. Nikulin, “The New Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law: 
Myth or Reality” (1997) 6 J. Int’l L. & Prac. 347, while the academic literature in Brazil is of 
recent vintage, see John William Anderson, Jr., “Corporate Governance in Brazil: Recent 
Improvements and New Challenges” (2003) 9 L. & Bus. Rev. Am. 201; Erica Gorga, “Culture 
and Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study of Brazil” (2006) 27 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 803. 
53
  See infra Chapter 2, Section 2.2(D).  
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follows the civil law tradition while India follows the common law 
tradition.54 Furthermore, while China adopts a dual board structure (with a 
supervisory board and a managing board) consistent with some civil law 
countries in Europe, India adopts the unitary board structure consistent 
with all common law countries. These differences have in fact worked as 
an advantage in the context of this research as they assist in testing my 
hypotheses with reference to both the civil law system (with dual board 
structures) as well as common law system (with unitary board structures), 
thereby inducing an element of comprehensiveness in the study.  
The comparative study has been somewhat complicated in the case of companies 
that are dually listed on either the Indian or Chinese stock exchanges on the one 
hand and a recognised developed market stock exchange on the other hand. This 
study has been controlled to take into account the fact that such companies may 
have to comply with corporate governance norms of multiple jurisdictions, which 
may result in varying impacts on such companies.55 
C. Analytical Component 
Third, the research is analytical as I have collected data qualitatively and studied 
them to explain principles and practices. As regards the outsider systems of the 
U.S. and the U.K., I have relied on existing literature (that is fairly substantial) 
                                                 
54
  Some studies have identified differences in common law countries and civil law countries 
when it comes to investor protection. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance” (2000) 58 
J. Fin. Econ. 3 [Investor Protection]. 
55
  The specific perspectives that emerge from dual-listings involving Chinese and Indian 
companies have been discussed in Chapter 5. 
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and have drawn strands of theory, policy and practices from those. For insider 
systems of China and India, in addition to relying on existing literature (which is 
sparse in comparison with outsider systems), I have collected data through a 
qualitative survey. Even between China and India, I found that there is some 
literature that has already evolved with reference to independent directors in 
China, while this literature for India has been negligible. Hence, due to the 
absence of academic literature in India in relation to independent directors, I place 
greater emphasis on the qualitative survey for India relative to the survey for 
China.  
The qualitative survey involved extensive interviews of about 20 
individuals who are well-versed in Chinese and Indian corporate and business law 
and practice. The interviewees included independent directors, chairpersons of 
boards, chief executive officers (CEOs), chief financial officers (CFOs), 
controlling shareholders or promoters, partners of law firms, auditors and 
academics. A list of persons interviewed in connection with the present research 
is set forth in Appendix 1.  
The interviews were conducted on the basis of a general questionnaire, 
which is set forth in Appendix 2. The questions were not meant to be rigid, but 
rather for them to be open-ended. This survey conducted is not the type which 
involved checking a box, answering a yes-or-no, or providing ratings on a fixed 
scale to each question. There was no specific format for obtaining answers, and 
interviewees were free to provide the answers in any manner they like. All of the 
data was collected through personal interviews. The average time taken for each 
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interview was about 30 to 45 minutes. Interviewees were asked to provide their 
views not only in relation to companies with which they are associated, but also 
generally in relation to the state of corporate governance in the relevant country. 
While all questions were posed to most interviewees (which were duly answered), 
in a few cases only some questions were posed specifically with reference to the 
context and background of the individual concerned. For example, while most 
independent directors who were part of the qualitative survey were asked all 
questions, other advisors and academics were asked only certain specific 
questions. 
The purpose of this qualitative data collection exercise has been to obtain 
a clearer perspective about the laws, regulations, systems and practices that apply 
in the field of corporate governance in these countries that will help analyse the 
impact of independent directors in corporate governance there. At this point, it is 
to be noted that the qualitative survey is only incidental to the principal study 
which is essentially theoretical and comparative in nature. It has been carried out 
only with a view to supplement the primary study. This research is not meant to 
be an empirical one, although it derives support from the qualitative study as well 
as an analysis of the existing empirical studies conducted by other researchers.    
From a comparative perspective, it is also to be noted that while this 
dissertation focuses on two insider systems (that are also emerging economies), 
viz., China and India, the outcome of the present research will likely have wider 
application to other insider systems and emerging economies as well. Of course, 
this will apply to the broader principles, while specific circumstances of each such 
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system or economy will have to be taken into account while applying the results 
arrived at herein. 
D. Normative Component     
Fourth, the study is evaluative and normative in that it analyses the impact of 
independent directors on corporate governance in emerging economies (that 
follow the insider model) and concludes with requisite recommendations and 
suggestions for enhancing the effectiveness of independent directors in corporate 
governance in these economies. The recommendations include measures to 
strengthen the nomination and appointment process for independent directors, 
clarification of their roles and the establishment of legal and structural processes 
that will enable independent directors to function more effectively in the 
emerging economies of China and India, and more generally in other insider 
systems as well. 
1.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
This Chapter defines the scope of the research and the manner in which it has 
been accomplished (detailing the methodology employed). The research addresses 
a number of questions hitherto unexplored and seeks to contribute to existing 
knowledge in the field of comparative corporate governance. 
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2. COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: SETTING THE 
TONE 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
2.2 Different Models of Corporate Governance 
2.3 Reviewing the Models in Context of the Agency Paradigm 
2.4 Driving Forces Behind the Different Models 
2.5 A Review of the Convergence vs. Divergence Debate 
2.6 Transplant Effect 
2.7 Conclusion to the Chapter 
 
2.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
While the specific focus of this dissertation is on the role of independent directors, 
that focus comes within the broader context of different types of regimes in the 
field of corporate governance. Essentially, the purpose is to examine the 
implications of extracting the concept of independent directors from one type of 
corporate governance system and transplanting the same into another type. Hence, 
it is imperative to study certain aspects and theories of comparative corporate 
governance that bear direct relevance to the focus of this dissertation, which is the 
efficacy of such a transplant. These theories will then be applied to the specific 
topic of independent directors. They represent the tools or implements that will be 
employed for the more focused study, and the lenses through which the topic of 
independent directors in emerging economies will be analysed. 
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 While there are rich and extensive debates and literature in the area of 
comparative corporate governance, my effort in this Chapter is to confine the 
discussion to certain core principles that act as a framework within which the 
topic of independent directors can be studied more carefully. The goal here is 
twofold: (i) to identify these principles in a precise and cogent manner; and (ii) to 
provide a suitable critique of the principles and theories so as to set the tone for 
the discussion on independent directors. 
 First, this part of the study seeks to determine the various systems of 
corporate governance that are currently in vogue, along with a description and 
discussion of these various systems. This would answer the question: what is the 
current position in the area of comparative corporate governance? Second, I 
explore some of the underlying reasons for the current position being what it is. 
These reasons include matters pertaining to law, history and political economy. 
This would answer the question: why are there differences in various systems of 
corporate governance? Third, I consider if these systems are likely to remain in 
status quo or whether the systems are likely to undergo changes and result in a 
convergence at some point. The question here is: what does the future hold for 
comparative corporate governance, and when, if at all, will there be any 
convergence? On the contrary, is there likely to be further divergence? Finally, I 
look at the theory and concept behind legal transplants, which may perhaps be one 
mechanism that is used (by its proponents) to achieve convergence. This then 
seeks to answer the question: how will corporate governance systems change in 
order to bring about convergence, or the alternative of further divergence? 
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2.2 Different Models of Corporate Governance 
As we have seen, independent directors originated primarily in the U.S. and the 
U.K., and were thereafter exported to other countries. A key question that arises 
for consideration is whether this concept can be implemented across various 
jurisdictions with ease or whether there are any fundamental differences in the 
jurisdictions so as to make it conducive for implementation in some (primarily the 
countries where it originated), but not in others. This naturally leads me to a study 
of the differences in corporate governance systems in various countries. 
 Traditionally, corporate governance systems have been divided into two 
categories, viz. the “outsider” model and the “insider” model.56 
A. The Outsider Model of Corporate Governance 
The outsider model of corporate governance can be found mostly in the developed 
world. At the outset, it would be appropriate to describe the core features of an 
outsider system of corporate governance, which are “1) dispersed equity 
ownership with large institutional holdings; 2) the recognised primacy of 
shareholder interests in the company law; 3) a strong emphasis on the protection 
                                                 
56
  See Nestor & Thompson, supra note 19. The expression “model” is used primarily with 
reference to the type of corporate structures and governance followed, viz., the insider or 
outsider, while the expression “system” is used with reference to a jurisdiction or country that 
follows a particular model. 
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of minority investors in securities law and regulation; and 4) relatively strong 
requirements for disclosure”.57 Let us now consider these in greater detail. 
Ownership Structure 
The primary determinant of each model relates to the ownership structure. The 
outsider model displays dispersed share ownership with large institutional 
shareholdings.58 This largely tracks the Berle and Means corporation59 where 
dispersion in the ownership of companies is inherent in the corporate system,60 
due to which “the position of ownership has changed from that of an active to that 
of a passive agent”.61 The model is referred to as the “outsider” model because 
shareholders typically have no interest in managing the company and retain no 
relationship with the company except for their financial investments—the 
separation of ownership and control is at its best.62 This model is also sometimes 
referred to as the “arm’s-length’ system of ownership and control. As one 
corporate scholar aptly notes: 
 The ‘outsider’ typology is used to describe the situation that exists because 
share ownership is dispersed among a large number of institutional and 
individual investors rather than being concentrated in the hands of a small 
number of families, banks or firms. The term ‘arm’s-length’ signifies that 
investors … are rarely poised to intervene and take a hand in running a 
                                                 
57
  Ibid. at 5. 
58
  Ibid. 
59
  The theory propounded by Berle and Means and its implications on modern corporate 
governance is discussed in detail later, see infra Chapter 3, Section 3.2(A). 
60
  Berle & Means, supra note 21 at 47. 
61
  Ibid. at 64. 
62
  Nestor & Thompson, supra note 19 at 5. See also Brian R. Cheffins, Putting Britain on the 
Roe Map, supra note 20 at 151. 
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business. Instead, they tend to maintain their distance and give executives 
a free hand to manage.63 
Due to the existence of diffused shareholding and the separation of ownership and  
control, the primary effort of corporate law in jurisdictions that form part of the 
outsider model of corporate governance is to curb the “agency costs arising from 
self-serving managerial conduct”,64 by acting as a check on the activities of 
managers and by enhancing their accountability towards shareholders.  
Focused Constituency 
That naturally leads me to the second essential characteristic of outsider systems, 
where the focus of corporate law is on the protection of shareholders’ interests, 
which are considered core.65 This is otherwise also known as the ‘shareholder’ 
model. Corporate law revolves around shareholders, and no others. The sole goal 
of the law is to enhance long-term shareholder interest. This is however achieved 
through a more expansive approach to shareholder supremacy, as noted below: 
The shareholder-oriented model does more than assert the primacy of 
shareholder interests, however. It asserts the interest of all shareholders, 
including minority shareholders. More particularly, it is a central tenet in 
the standard model that minority or non-controlling shareholders should 
receive strong protection from exploitation at the hands of controlling 
shareholders.66 
                                                 
63
  Brian Cheffins, “Corporate Governance Reform: Britain as an Exporter”, in 8 Hume Papers 
on Public Policy: Corporate Governance and the Reform of the Company Law (David Hume 
Inst. Ed., 2000), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=215950> at 9 [Britain as Exporter]. 
64
  Ibid. at 11. 
65
  Dignam & Galanis, supra note 39 at 202; Arthur R. Pinto, “Globalization and the Study of 
Comparative Corporate Governance” (2005) 23 Wis. Int’l L. J. 477 at 477-479. 
66
  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, “The End of History for Corporate Law” (2001) 89 
Geo. L.J. 439 [The End of History]. 
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There is no tendency to consider the larger interests of various actors involved in 
the functioning of companies. If at all other interests such as those of creditors, 
employees, consumers and the public are considered, they are secondary to those 
of shareholders, who are primary owners of the company. This is otherwise 
known as the ‘property conception’ of the corporation.67 At one level, it may be 
argued that ownership structure has nothing to do with the shareholder model of 
corporate governance. However, it is found that the ‘shareholder’ model is often 
prevalent in economies that follow diffused shareholding pattern,68 and hence 
both these characteristics go hand-in-hand in the context of the outsider system of 
corporate governance. 
Other Systemic Factors 
Other key characteristics of the outsider model relate to the emphasis it places on 
the efficiency of the securities markets and on disclosure and transparency. The 
outsider model involves a market-based system (with lesser reliance on 
mandatory rules, and greater emphasis on default rules) that provides a significant 
role to market players as opposed to regulators and the state. This regime, which 
focuses heavily on capital markets, can be characterised as information-forcing69 
whereby high disclosure standards require companies to disclose information and 
leave decision-making on investment matters to the various players in the market. 
                                                 
67
  William T. Allen, “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation” (1992) 14 
Carodozo L. Rev. 261 at 264-65 [Our Schizophrenic Conception]. 
68
  Pinto, supra note 65 at 478. 
69
  Information-forcing rules are default rules that compel parties with superior information to 
divulge that information to other parties they deal with so that the problem of information 
asymmetry is obviated, or at least reduced. See Yair Listokin, “Learning Through Policy 
Variation” (2008) 118 Yale L.J. 480 at 501-02. 
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It also presupposes the existence and predominance of proper market systems and 
sophisticated players (such as knowledgeable professionals, being lawyers, 
accountants and investments bankers, a competent judiciary and other important 
fiduciaries such as a cadre of independent directors with a strong foundation in 
corporate laws and practices).70 In fact, since “diffuse ownership yields 
managerial agency costs as a problem, … it is associated with institutions like 
independent and transparent accounting, which mitigate these costs”.71  
The depth of the markets and sophistication of market players enable a 
market-oriented approach towards regulation and governance and less 
involvement by the state through regulation, except by laying down default rules 
as opposed to mandatory rules. Due to these pre-requisites in an outsider system 
of corporate governance, such a system can thrive only in developed economies 
which can boast of advanced systems of self-regulation with maximum disclosure 
and transparency, coupled with the availability of experienced and sophisticated 
players such as an expert cadre of independent directors, accountants, rating 
agencies and other gatekeepers who can ensure proper conduct on the part of the 
managers. Such a system also relies minimally on state regulation that is of a 
mandatory nature. 
                                                 
70
  See Black & Kraakman, Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 52; Bernard S. Black, “The Legal 
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets” (2001) 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781 
[Legal and Institutional Preconditions]. 
71
  Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence, supra note 40 at 11. 
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B. Constituents of the Outsider Model 
Ownership Structure 
The assertion that the U.S. and the U.K. are leading countries that follow the 
outsider model of corporate governance receives near-unanimous support in 
existing literature.72 First, looking at the ownership structures in these countries, it 
is found that in the U.S. and the U.K., “and unlike most of the rest of the world, 
most large corporations are public and not family-controlled”.73 In these 
countries, shareholding is diffused74 and it is not common to find companies that 
have a dominant or controlling shareholder.75 
                                                 
72
  As this matter does not require detailed elaboration, this Part only briefly deals with the issue. 
73
  Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, “Hail Britannia? Institutional Investor Behavior under 
Limited Regulation” (1994) 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 at 2001. Brian Cheffins, “Current Trends 
in Corporate Governance: Going from London to Milan to Toronto” (2000) 10 Duke J. Comp. 
& Int’l L. 5 at 7 [London to Milan to Toronto], noting that a: 
common feature in the United Kingdom and the United States is diffused ownership. In 
Britain, very few large companies are controlled by families, and fewer that one-fifth of 
the country’s publicly quoted firms have an owner who controls more than twenty-five 
percent of the shares. Likewise, in the United States, large shareholdings, and especially 
majority ownership, are uncommon. 
74
  Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, “What do we Know About Capital Structure? Some 
Evidence from International Data” (1995) 50 J. Fin. 1421 at 1449. 
75
  See Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map, supra note 20 at 151. There are indeed 
exceptions in both the U.S. and the U.K. The U.S. does have companies that are family-
owned, while the U.K. has companies that are predominantly owned by financial institutions, 
but that does not take away the general character of ownership in these economies where 
shares are diffusely held.  
In recent times, there is an emerging body of literature that suggests that the Berle & Means 
corporations do not exist even in outsider systems such as the U.S. See Leslie Hannah, “The 
Divorce of Ownership from Control from 1900: Recalibrating Imagined Global Historical 
Trends”, (2007) 49 Business History 404 at 423; Joao A.C. Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, 
“The American Keiretsu and Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on 
Nonfinancials’ Corporate Boards” (2006) 80 J. Fin. Econ. 419 at 436; Clifford G. Holderness, 
“The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States” (2009) 22 Review of Financial Studies 
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Focused Constituency 
The second aspect of shareholder primacy is also present in the U.S. and U.K, 
albeit to a marginally lesser extent in the U.K. than in the U.S. It is usually found 
that “corporations in the United States and United Kingdom operate primarily for 
the benefit of shareholders”.76 Here, the focus is on protection of shareholders’ 
interests from the actions of managers. For example, “[c]onsistent with such 
reasoning, Britain’s Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees have … sought 
to influence managerial behaviour by enhancing the role of the non-executive 
directors and by improving links between pay and performance”.77 Similarly, 
even U.S. corporate governance recognises the superiority of shareholder interests 
over other interests.78 Although there have been some fairly recent departures 
from this principle both in the U.S. through the constituency statutes79 and the 
                                                                                                                                     
1377. However, this movement has not gained sufficient support and has also been the subject 
matter of immediate challenge. See Brian Cheffins, “Is Berle and Means Really a Myth?” 
UCLA School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 09-05, 
available online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1352605. 
76
  Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Dimensions of 
Global Corporate Governance” (1999) 84 Corn. L. Rev. 1133 at 1134. 
77
  Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, supra note 63 at 11.  
78
  This principle has been established almost a century ago in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), where the Michigan Supreme Court remarked: 
There should be no confusion … A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be exercised in the choice of 
means to attain that end, and does not extend to … other purposes. 
Ibid. at 684. 
79
  In the 1980s, several states in the U.S. enacted constituency statutes, which differ in a number 
of ways in the detail, but have a common approach, which is to authorise the board of 
directors to take into account the interests of all stakeholders in a company. William T. Allen, 
Our Schizophrenic Conception, supra note 67 at 276. It is, however, arguable that these 
constituency statutes were occasioned by the need of incumbent managers to hold on to their 
positions within the company in the wake of hostile takeover offers, rather than with any 
altruistic sense of obligation or voluntarism towards society. See George W. Dent Jr., 
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U.K. under the new Companies Act 2006,80 the basic principle of shareholder 
supremacy has not been eliminated, or even eroded. 
Other Systemic Factors 
 Lastly, the U.S. and the U.K. possess well-developed securities markets 
with stringent disclosure and transparency requirements.81 These markets have 
strong securities regulatory authorities as well as self-regulatory mechanisms that 
impose disclosure norms so as to mitigate the information asymmetry problems in 
securities markets.82 They also possess several reputational intermediaries such as 
accountants, lawyers and rating agencies, who stake their reputation to protect 
investors that rely on their judgment and opinion.83 These countries also impose 
detailed and up-to-date accounting standards. All these make the U.S. and the 
U.K. comparatively transparent and liquid as far as their securities markets are 
concerned. 
 There is therefore no doubt that the U.S. and U.K. are part of the outsider 
system of corporate governance. In fact, they epitomise the outsider model 
without a doubt. It is for this very reason that they have been chosen for this study 
                                                                                                                                     
“Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate 
Governance” (2008) 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1213 at 1227. 
80
  The Companies Act 2006, s. 172(1) enshrines the principle of enlightened shareholder value 
(ESV) which requires the board of a company to pay some regard to stakeholder interests. For 
a detailed discussion on this aspect, see infra Chapter 3, Section 3.4(B).  
81
  Bernard S. Black, “The Core Institutions that Support Strong Securities Markets” (2000) 55 
Bus. Law. 1565 at 1565 [Core Institutions]. 
82
  Ibid. at 1568. It is a different matter that fundamental questions have been raised with regard 
to the utility of this approach and the institutions involved owing to their inability to prevent 
the recent (and ongoing) global financial crisis. 
83
  Ibid. at 1569. 
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as constituents of such a system, and to enable comparison with systems that 
follow the insider model of corporate governance. 
C. The Insider Model of Corporate Governance 
Ownership Structure 
The insider model is characterised by cohesive groups of “insiders” who have a 
closer and more long-term relationship with the company.84 This is true even in 
the case of companies that are listed on the stock exchanges,85 let alone privately 
held companies. The insiders (who are essentially the controlling shareholders) 
are the single largest group of shareholders, with the rest of the shareholding 
being diffused and held by institutions or individuals constituting the ‘public’.86 
The insiders typically have a controlling interest in the company and thereby 
possess the ability to exercise dominant control over the company’s affairs. In this 
regime, the minority shareholders do not have much of a say as they do not hold 
                                                 
84
  Nestor & Thompson, supra note 19 at 9. See also Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “Law and Finance” (1998) 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113 
[Law and Finance]. Another description of insider systems is that they are “characterized by 
the significance of the state, families, non-financial corporations, employees and banks as a 
source of funding and/or control”. See Dignam & Galanis, supra note 39 at 202. See also La 
Porta, et. al., Around the World, supra note 26 at 471 (where the authors find that contrary to 
the general understanding of the Berle and Means corporation, in most economies (except 
those with good shareholder protection) relatively few of the firms are widely held). But see 
Ronald J. Gilson, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy” (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (pointing to the fact that there could 
also be cultural factors that could lead to maintenance of control in insider systems, such as a 
desire to retain control within a business family). 
85
  See Erik Berglof and Ernst Ludwig von Thadden, “The Changing Corporate Governance 
Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries” (1999), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=183708> at 17. 
86
  Here again, as in the case of outsider systems, there could be exceptions where some 
companies demonstrate diffused shareholding. However, that does not dilute the general 
position that companies in the insider systems have concentrated shareholdings. 
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sufficient number of shares in the company so as to be in a position to outvote or 
even veto the decisions spearheaded by the controlling shareholders.  
 As to the identity of the controlling shareholders, they tend to be mostly 
business family groups87 or the state.88 This tends to be particularly true of Asian 
countries, which are “marked with concentrated stock ownership and a 
preponderance of family-controlled businesses while state-controlled businesses 
form an important segment of the corporate sector in many of these countries”.89 
This is also otherwise referred to as the “family/state” model.90 In some European 
countries, commercial banks play a dominant role in the control of companies 
thereby becoming ‘insiders’ in a bank-centric form of governance.91 This bank 
model is different from the family/state model of concentrated ownership.92 
                                                 
87
  There is a preponderance of family-owned businesses in developing countries. Jayati Sarkar 
& Subrata Sarkar, “Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing 
Countries: Evidence from India” (2000) 1:3 International Review of Finance 161 at 168. 
88
  Rampant state ownership in several countries is unsurprising on account of the fact that 
privatization is yet to be completed in those countries. See La Porta, et. al., Around the World, 
supra note 26 at 496. 
89
  Rajesh Chakrabarti, “Corporate Governance in India – Evolution and Challenges” (2005), 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=649857>  at 11 [Evolution and Challenges]. 
90
  See Nestor & Thompson, supra note 19 at 12. 
91
  Ibid. at 11. 
92
  In the bank model of corporate governance, banks play an important role in corporate 
governance. Such a regime is to be found in continental European countries such as a 
Germany and in other countries such as Japan. See Denis & McConnell, supra note 43 at 14-
15; La Porta, et. al., Around the World, supra note 26 at 474; Mark J. Roe, “Some Differences 
in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan and the United States” (1993) 102 Yale L. J. 1927 
[Some Differences]. However, it is necessary to clarify that the purpose of this dissertation is 
to undertake a comparative study of the role of independent directors in the outsider systems 
(with diffused shareholding) and the insider systems (that follow the family/state model). It is 
not intended to undertake a study or comparison of the bank model of corporate governance 
as systems that follow that model face an entirely different set of issues, many of which may 
not be not germane to the questions raised in this dissertation. 
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Another common feature of the insider systems is that the dominant 
shareholders often improve their position in the company by seeking control and 
voting rights in excess of the shares they hold. In other words, their controlling 
rights far exceed their economic interests in the company. This is achieved 
through cross-holdings, pyramid structures, tunnelling and other similar devices.93 
The concept of pyramid structures is described as follows: 
Control in excess of proportional ownership can also be achieved through 
pyramid structures or by cross-holdings. In a pyramid structure, one firm 
owns 51% (for example) of a second firm, which owns 51% of a third 
firm, and so on. The owner at the top of the pyramid thereby has effective 
control of all the firms in the pyramid, with an increasingly small 
investment in each firm down the line. Cross-holdings exist when a group 
of companies maintain interlocking ownership positions in each other. To 
the extent that the interlocking of their ownership positions makes group 
members inclined to support each other, voting coalitions are formed.94 
Such pyramid structures are utilised by controlling shareholders to indulge in 
tunnelling, which is the process by which such shareholders move profits or 
tunnel them across firms so that the profit finally resides in firms in which they 
have high cash flow rights (by virtue of a greater percentage of shareholding) as 
opposed to firms in which they have low cash flow rights.95 This scheme ensures 
that controlling shareholders receive a greater share of the profits than the 
minority shareholders, thereby creating discrimination among economic rights of 
shareholders.96 
                                                 
93
  La Porta, et. al, Around the World, supra note 26 at 474. 
94
  Denis & McConnell, supra note 43 at 23. 
95
  M. Bertrand, P. Mehta & S. Mullainathan, “Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application to 
Indian Business Groups” (2002) 117(1) Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 at 121. See also 
Chakrabarti, Evolution and Challenges, supra note 89 at 7, 12. 
96
  See La Porta, et. al., Around the World, supra note 26 at 502. 
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By virtue of their control rights (which are supplemented by additional 
mechanisms such as pyramiding and tunnelling), these dominant shareholders are 
able to exercise complete control over the company.97 They are virtually able to 
appoint and replace the entire board and, through this, influence the management 
strategy and operational affairs of the company. For this reason, the management 
will likely owe its allegiance to the controlling shareholders. The controlling 
shareholders nominate senior members of management, and even more, they often 
appoint themselves on the boards or as managers. It is not uncommon to find 
companies that are controlled by family groups to have senior managerial 
positions occupied by family members. Similarly, where companies are controlled 
by the state, board and senior managerial positions are occupied by bureaucrats.  
Another common feature of the insider system is that the dominant 
owners, whether they are business families or the state (in the latter case 
represented by the bureaucrats), are politically influential and well-connected.98 
This interconnectivity between the corporate system and the political system is a 
crucial factor in such markets, as companies use these connections in order to 
perpetuate their role in the functioning of the markets.99 All corporate governance 
requirements in these jurisdictions ought to take this factor into account. 
                                                 
97
  The problem here arises because there are no significant outside interests in the company. See 
Berglof & von Thadden, supra note 85 at 12. 
98
  Ibid. at 7. 
99
  Such a nexus between corporate governance and the political economy owes its significance 
to “high entry barriers, hidden subsidies to the local industry, and obstacles to foreign 
investment”. Ibid. at 13. For example, in India, the license-raj and industrial capacity quota 
system ensured that only a few businesses thrived. Although that system has been largely 
abolished now, some of the vestiges of that old system continue to date. See Rajesh 
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Focused Constituency 
Apart from the ownership aspect, it is important to note that the insider systems 
are not entirely shareholder-centric, but also do take into account the interests of 
other stakeholders.100 Such stakeholders include the creditors (such as banks and 
financial institutions), employees, consumers and the general public who may be 
affected by the actions of companies in these systems. In other words, companies 
in these countries are thought to operate “for the common good—for the benefit 
of shareholders, workers, creditors, and communities”.101 Here again, as discussed 
earlier in the context of the outsider systems,102 there is some correlation between 
ownership structure and the shareholder-stakeholder focus. Interesting political 
explanations have been proffered for this phenomenon. Professor Roe notes that 
“when we line up the world’s richest nations on a left-right political continuum 
and then line them up on a close-to-diffuse ownership continuum, the two 
correlate powerfully”.103 
                                                                                                                                     
Chakrabarti, William L. Megginson & Pradeep K. Yadav, “Corporate Governance in India” 
(2008) 20(1) J. App. Corp. Fin. 59 at 62 [Corporate Governance in India]. 
100
  Dignam & Galanis, supra note 39 at 202 (stating that “insider systems are more responsive to 
stakeholder concerns because they often form part of a wider protective social 
infrastructure”). Professor Cheffins observes that the insider regime: 
 is characterized by a comparatively high degree of state intervention and by a consensus-
minded approach to potentially contentious issues. Moreover, the maximization of profits 
for investors is not an overriding priority. Instead, there is a desire to strike a balance 
between various constituencies linked with companies and the main concern is said to be 
sustainable, stable and continuous economic growth. 
Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map, supra note 20 at 153. 
101
  Cunningham, supra note 76 at 1134. 
102
  See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
103
  Mark J. Roe, “Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control” 
(2000) 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539 at 539. In other words: 
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Other Systemic Factors 
Further, the insider systems display other characteristics that are specific to them. 
They possess neither robust capital markets nor sophisticated market players; if at 
all, these are in an early stage of evolution in some countries that have 
experienced significant capital markets explosion in the last decade.104 For this 
reason, the state continues to perform a greater role in regulation of corporate 
activity by imposing mandatory standards and bright-line rules. There is a 
perceived reluctance on the part of the state in relying on market participants or a 
market-based regulation, perhaps owing to their lack of sophistication as 
compared to the outsider systems. Almost all countries other than the U.S. and the 
U.K. follow the insider system of corporate governance.105 These include various 
European countries that demonstrate the bank system of governance as well as 
most emerging economies that demonstrate the family/state controlled system. 
Several Asian countries such as China and India, the latter two being the subject 
                                                                                                                                     
broadly speaking, the more left-wing a government is, the more likely it is that the 
corporate governance system will be an insider system and, the more right-wing a 
government is, the more likely it is that the system is an outsider one. 
Dignam & Galanis, supra note 39 at 202. This is consistent with right-wing governments’ 
tendency to be shareholder-centric, while left-wing governments tend to be stakeholder-
centric. This perhaps best explains the linkages between ownership concentration and the 
shareholder-stakeholder focus, which is primarily through political systems. 
104
  The BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, China and India) are apt examples of economies that 
have historically been bereft of developed capital markets, but that have more recently 
migrated at a rapid pace to adopt systems and practices from more developed economies so as 
to ensure robustness of their markets and to attract not only greater number of investors, but 
also those with high quality and credibility. 
105
  Joseph McCahery & Luc Renneboog, “Introduction” in McCahery, et al., supra note 20 at 1; 
La Porta, et. al., Around the World, supra note 26 at 474. There have been observations both 
ways as to whether countries such as Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand follow the 
insider model or the outsider model. See Nestor & Thompson, supra note 19 at 12. However, 
that debate is not relevant to the present discussion as this dissertation does not focus on those 
jurisdictions. 
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matter of my research, are classic insider systems where most public companies 
are controlled (by virtue of dominant shareholding) either by business families or 
the state.106 
D. Constituents of the Insider Model 
 The insider model of corporate governance is fairly ubiquitous,107 
particularly among the developing or emerging economies.108 Furthermore, 
leading Asian economies fall within the realm of the insider model of corporate 
governance.109 In this background, this dissertation is particularly concerned with 
the two such economies, i.e., China and India, which I shall examine in detail. 
What makes this study even more interesting is the fact that one economy (China) 
involves the dominance of the state in the corporate sector, while the other (India) 
the dominance of family business groups. 
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  For an analysis of China’s shareholding structure and controlling shareholder dominance, see 
Tan Lay Hong & Jiangyu Wang, “Modelling an Effective Corporate Governance System for 
China’s State Owned Enterprises and Challenges in a Transitional Economy” (2007) 7 J. 
Corp. L. Stud. 143 [Modelling for China]. For India, see Chakrabarti, Evolution and 
Challenges, supra note 89. 
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  See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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  Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, & Larry H.P. Lang, “The Separation of Ownership and 
Control in East Asian Corporations” (2000) 58 J. Fin. Econ. 81 at 110. 
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  Ronald J. Gilson, “Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring 






The two key aspects of ownership structure in Chinese companies are first, the 
predominance of state ownership, and second, the absence of liquidity in the stock 
markets due to the limited availability of free-float shares.110  
(a) Ownership concentration: Indeed, there are historical reasons for 
this position. In the past, all factors of production in the Chinese economy were 
controlled by the state. It is only pursuant to economic reforms that were 
introduced since the 1970s that the process of privatisation began.111 In this 
process, the erstwhile state owned enterprises (SOEs) were converted into joint 
stock corporations under the Company Law112 so that they could access the capital 
markets to cater to their financing requirements.113 Despite such privatisation, the 
state continues to own a substantial part of the vast majority of companies that are 
                                                 
110
  Wang Jiangyu, “Dancing with Wolves: Regulation and Deregulation of Foreign Investment in 
China’s Stock Market” (2004) 5 Asian-Pacific Law & Pol’y J. 1 at 10-11 [Dancing with 
Wolves]. 
111
  Wang Jiangyu, “Overview of the Chinese Company Law” in Company Law in China 
(forthcoming), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1222061> [Company Law in China]. 
112
  Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, as amended on 25 October 2005, ch. 4 
[PRC Company Law]. 
113
  See Clarke, Independent Director in China, supra note 37 at 131. 
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listed on the Chinese stock exchanges, being the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchanges.114 
 Several empirical studies support this assertion. Ownership concentration 
was rampant in the initial years of reform. A decade ago, Xu and Wang found that 
the “ownership concentration is high with the five largest shareholders accounting 
for 58 percent of the outstanding shares in 1995, compared to the 57.8 percent in 
Czech Republic, 42 percent in Germany and 33 percent in Japan”.115 Another 
study, referring to state ownership, notes that in the early part of this decade 
“[a]ccording to a Dow Jones Survey, the average government ownership in 
China’s stock market was 45 percent, as of January 31, 2002, with a maximum of 
49 percent. Such a high percentage of state ownership does not exist in any other 
stock market in the world”.116 One other study finds that “by the end of 2001, 
approximately 84% of companies listed on Chinese stock market are ultimately 
controlled by the state, compared with about 16% of non-state-controlled ones in 
our firm sample”.117 All these demonstrate not only concentrated ownership in 
Chinese listed companies, but dominant control exercisable by the state. 
                                                 
114
  See Clarke, ibid. at 131. See also Yuwa Wei, “An Overview of Corporate Governance in 
China” (2003) 30 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. 23 at 38-39. 
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  Xiaonian Xu & Yan Wang, “Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Corporate 
Performance: The Case of Chinese Stock Companies”, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=45303> at 3. 
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  Wang, Dancing with Wolves, supra note 110 at 11. 
117
  Guy S. Liu & Pei Sun, “Identifying Ultimate Controlling Shareholders in Chinese Public 
Corporations: An Empirical Survey” Asia Programme Working Paper, No. 2 (June 2003), 
online: <http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/3096_stateshareholding.pdf> at 2. 
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 Such state control gives rise to peculiar problems in corporate governance. 
With a dominant owner, it would normally be expected that such owner would 
exercise tremendous influence over decisions pertaining to the company. 
However, that does not appear to be the case in China. First, the dominant owner 
being the state is not a single entity or individual in a general sense, but it is “the 
State, or the people as a whole”.118 The state is an abstraction that acts through its 
agent in the form of bureaucrats and government officials, whose interests may 
not always be aligned with the controlling shareholder, being the state.119 Further, 
the state itself may not be acting through a unitary body. For instance, the state 
shares may be held by different departments within the government, who may not 
always act in unison, and instead may act at cross-purposes.120 For this reason, 
ownership concentrated with the state may give rise to a unique corporate 
governance problem due to the virtually non-existent actual control by the state, 
which is another model of “insider control, namely the so-called guanjianren 
konghzhi [key-person-control] in China’s listed SOEs”,121 with the key-person 
usually being the chief executive officer (CEO) of the SOE. The attitude of the 
state is akin to the case of absentee ownership. This exacerbates the agency costs 
in SOEs.122 
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  Yuwa Wei, supra note 114 at 32. 
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  Tan & Wang, Modelling for China, supra note 106 at 149-50. 
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  See Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 138. 
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  Tan & Wang, Modelling for China, supra note 106 at 150. For this reason, the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders are not entirely absent in such entities 
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  See Yuwa Wei, supra note 114 at 44. Separate from this discussion, it must be noted, 
however, that there are some arguments that favour majority state ownership, particularly 
when a company has been privatised in the recent past. See Lincoln Y. Rathnam & Viswanath 
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 (b) Lack of Liquidity: Compared to other jurisdictions in developed 
markets, small shareholders lack a free-flowing exit mechanism due to the 
illiquidity of the shares they hold, even though such shares are listed on the stock 
exchange. In order to appreciate this issue better, it would be useful to briefly 
consider the capital structure of Chinese listed companies. Even though the PRC 
Company Law treats all shares of a listed company on the same footing, 
differences arise as to their tradeability depending on the person who holds such 
shares.123 Shares are broadly divided into two categories, i.e., tradeable shares and 
non-tradeable shares.124 Under the tradeable category, there are further 
subdivisions. ‘A’ Shares are tradeable shares held by individuals, entities or 
specifically approved foreign institutional investors; these are listed and traded on 
the domestic stock exchanges. ‘B’ Shares, which are listed on these stock 
exchanges, are available for purchase and trading by foreigners using foreign 
currency only. Other types of tradeable shares are listed on foreign stock 
exchanges such as Hong Kong (‘H’ shares), London (‘L’ shares), New York (‘N’ 
shares, represented by American Depositary Receipts, or ADRs) and Singapore 
(‘S’ shares).125  
On the other hand, non-tradeable shares are held by the state and other 
legal persons, and these are not generally available for trading on the stock 
                                                                                                                                     
Khaitan, “Privatization: An Investor’s Perspective” (1994) 132 Public Utilities Fortnightly 13 
at 17. 
123
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 132. 
124
  These are also referred to as circulating shares and non-circulating shares respectively. See 
Clarke, ibid.  
125
  See Wang, Company Law in China, supra note 111 at 30-31. 
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exchange.126 Since a large portion of the companies' capital comprised non-
tradeable shares, that left very little liquidity in the market for small shareholders 
such as individuals to buy and sell tradeable shares.127 On an optimistic note, 
however, some of these differences have recently been streamlined by the 
government, whereby domestic Chinese investors can now invest in ‘B’ shares 
utilising foreign currency, and more importantly, the distinction between state 
shares, legal person shares and individual shares has now been eliminated thereby 
bringing about a reform in the "split share structure".128 Since these reforms are 
fairly recent, it is still unclear whether these differences will be obliterated in 
practice, and if so the exact time-frame within which that will be achieved. 
Pending that, it is likely that the differences will continue at least at some level, 
thereby impeding liquidity for small shareholders. 
The rather low liquidity in the Chinese stock markets has been empirically 
verified. The evaluation of one empirical study finds as follows: 
The free-float ratio represents a stock market’s liquidity and investability, 
and refers to the proportion of freely tradable shares available to investors. 
Due to widespread state ownership, the float ratio in China’s stock market, 
close to 30 percent since 1993, appears to be extremely low. Although 
things have been changing due to recent regulatory relaxation allowing 
foreign investors to have greater participation in SOEs, in most listed 
companies which were converted from SOEs, only one-third of the 
company’s shares are typically issued to the public, with the rest 
                                                 
126
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 132. 
127
  Tan and Wang note that “[t]radable A-shares and B-shares only constitute one-third of the 
total shares of the listed companies. The other two-thirds comprise non-tradable “state shares” 
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remaining in the hands of the government, the company itself, or other 
state-owned enterprises.129 
In concluding the discussion on ownership, we find that not only are listed 
company shares concentrated in the hands of a few shareholders (predominantly 
the state itself), but the relative illiquidity in the markets also impedes exit options 
for small shareholders. Such a shareholding structure necessitates better 
protection for minority shareholders. 
Focused Constituency 
Any discussion of corporate governance in China must necessarily be set in the 
backdrop of the country's socialistic origins.130 The country followed the principle 
of "planned economy" for several years, and several ideas and concepts that were 
engendered during that period continue to remain embedded in much of the 
current thinking as well, although there appears to be a concerted effort recently 
towards a more market-based approach. This socialistic approach seeks common 
good of society, as opposed to the betterment of individuals, which is the 
principle more consistent with the stakeholder-centric approach.131 The focus of 
company law extends beyond the frontiers of shareholder protection, and extends 
to cover the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors and even 
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  Ibid. at 10-11, citing Sheldon Gao, “China Stock Market in Global Perspective” Dow Jones 
Indexes (September 2002). 
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  See David Eu, “Financial Reforms and Corporate Governance in China” (1996) 34 Colum. J. 
Transnat’l L. 469 at 486. 
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the society at large, who also find favour under company law. The following 
instances reinforce this point: 
(i) The PRC Company Law recognises a form of codetermination. In 
addition to the board of directors, each company is required to 
establish a supervisory board, which shall include an appropriate ratio 
of the representatives of the company's staff and workers, with such 
ratio not being less than one third.132 
(ii) The law requires companies to protect the rights of staff and workers, 
sign labour contracts with them and provide social security and labour 
protection, and it further provides for trade unions and democratic 
management.133 
(iii) The concept of corporate social responsibility has been specifically 
legislated for. Company law requires companies to “abide by laws and 
administrative regulations, observe social morals and business ethics, 
act in good faith, accept supervision by the government and the public, 
and bear social responsibilities”.134 That apart, subsidiary legislation 
imposes more specific obligations on companies in the realm of 
corporate social responsibility. These include opinions and regulations 
issued by the Shenzhen stock exchange, the State-owned Assets 
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  This requirement of appointing representatives of staff and workers on the supervisory board 
applies to both the limited liability company (PRC Company Law, art. 52) and company 
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Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (which 
administers state assets in enterprises) and certain industrial bodies 
(particularly for labour welfare and worker protection).135  
Hence, owing to China's historical allegiance towards socialistic policies coupled 
with the current company law’s focus beyond shareholder primacy, it is clear that 
China follows the stakeholder theory. In this context, the role of company law is 
required to cater to the interests not only of shareholders but also those of non-
shareholder constituencies such as creditors, employees, consumers and society. 
Other Systemic Factors 
Although China follows the principle of state intervention in regulating markets 
(consistent with it being an insider system and an emerging economy), there are 
several shortcomings in the regulatory framework governing Chinese companies. 
It has been pointed out that “conflict of interests and ambiguous identity caused 
by multiple role of the regulators, in conjunction with lack of experience, have led 
to under-regulation and over-regulation, as well as ambiguous laws”.136 Other 
problems include the lack of a proper disclosure and transparency regime under 
securities regulation,137 the failure to provide minority shareholders with effective 
remedies such as judicial protection through derivative actions and other law 
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  See Wang, Company Law in China, supra note 111 at 34. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Wang, Dancing with Wolves, supra note 110 at 40-41. See also Tan & Wang, Modelling for 
China, supra note 106 at 160 (noting that “[i]n China, there has been a huge gap between law 
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suits.138 China has still not fully established “necessary market-based corporate 
governance mechanisms while those which have been established have largely 
failed to function”.139 On the other hand, China’s effort to induce governance 
through company law goes to the extreme of imposing all requirements through 
mandatory rules (rather than default rules).140 China also lacks a cadre of 
competent professionals such as auditors, independent directors and rating 
agencies who can potentially act as gatekeepers in the governance of 
companies.141 All these are symptomatic of the issues faced by developing 
countries or emerging economies while establishing for themselves a suitable 
corporate governance framework. These are not the types of issues faced by 
developed economies such as the U.S. and the U.K. 
2. India 
Like their Chinese counterparts, Indian companies too display ownership 
concentration in the hands of a few persons, and hence India is considered as part 
of the insider model of corporate governance.142 However, unlike in China, 
business families predominantly own and control companies (even those that are 
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listed on stock exchanges) in India.143 This is largely owing to historical reasons 
whereby firms were mostly owned by family businesses.144 In addition, it is quite 
common to find state-owned firms as well.145 Other categories in which 
ownership structures can be found are: (i) control by multinational companies; 
and (ii) diffused ownership. However, diffused ownership (in the sense of the 
Berle and Means corporation) can be found only in a handful of Indian listed 
companies, where such structures exist more as a matter of exception rather than 
the rule. Even though some companies have undergone metamorphosis from 
controlled companies to those with diffused shareholding structures over a period 
of time, primarily through repeated offerings of shares to the public to raise 
capital, it is expected that this would be a considerably slow process as a general 
matter. Further, despite the era of liberalisation that was ushered in by the 
Government in 1991 which extensively opened up Indian businesses to market 
forces, ownership structures continue to be concentrated for the most part. After 
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such liberalisation, only very few companies have restructured their ownership so 
as to make the shareholding pattern truly dispersed in the US sense of the term.146 
Examining the ownership aspect empirically, we find that even as late as 
2002, “the average shareholding of promoters in all Indian companies was as high 
as 48.1%”.147 A more recent study confirms this position, even in the case of 
listed companies.148 That study is based on information available on the websites 
of the two main stock exchanges in India, the Bombay Stock Exchange and the 
National Stock Exchange,149 and the shareholding pattern of “100 companies 
constituting the BSE 100, … with a total market capitalization of nearly $850 
billion, and the 500 companies of the BSE 500, which represents nearly 93% of 
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the total market capitalization of the entire Bombay Stock Exchange”.150 The 
study found that: 
the average BSE 100 company has a promoter who owns over 48% of the 
company. Only ten of the BSE 100 companies have promoters holding 
stakes below the critical 25% threshold …. Looking at the broader BSE 
500 set of companies produces similar results: the average promoter owns 
roughly 49%, and fewer than 9% of promoters have stakes below 25%. 
This high average concentration of promoter holdings was consistent with 
the prediction of practitioners”.151 
Table 1 sets out a summary of the shareholding pattern of companies reported in 
that study:152 
Table 1 
Summary of BSE 100 and BSE 500 Shareholding Data 
 BSE 100 BSE 500 
Average Promoter Stake 48.09% 49.55% 
Average Indian Financial Institution Stake 2.00% 1.73% 
Average Foreign Institutional Investor Stake 18.56% 12.31% 
Average Non-Institutional Public Stake 20.24% 26.33% 
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As to the exact nature of the promoters who hold these concentrated shareholding 
percentages, I conducted a study in 2006, which reports an overwhelming 
concentration of shares in the hands of business families, although they are 
closely followed by Government-owned companies and multinational 
companies.153 Table 2 sets out the details regarding predominance of different 
types of controlling owners in BSE 100 companies. 
Table 2 
Summary of Promoter Data in BSE Top 100 Companies 
















(1) This includes shares held directly by family members and also indirectly through other entities such as 
companies, partnerships, trusts wherein the beneficial ownership is held by the family. 
 
(2) This refers to companies where no individual promoter or promoter group held 20% or more shares in 
the company. 
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There is more to it than absolute ownership percentages. The power of 
concentrated ownership is bolstered by controlling shareholders through other 
mechanisms such as cross-holdings, pyramid structures and tunneling.154 These 
phenomena “mark the Indian corporate landscape”.155 They often lead to greater 
benefits to the controlling shareholders at the cost of the minority shareholders.156 
Such practices can also have an adverse effect on the development of capital 
markets as minority shareholders are considerably exposed to the actions of 
controlling shareholders.157 This is because controlling shareholders are in a 
position to shape the composition of the board of directors, in that all directors 
owe their allegiance to the controlling shareholders as their appointment,158 
                                                 
154
  For an introductory discussion of these concepts, see supra notes 93 to 96 and accompanying 
text. 
155
  Chakrabarti, Evolution and Challenges, supra note 89 at 1. 
156
  Ibid. at 12, noting that: 
Recent research has also investigated the nature and extent of “tunneling” of funds within 
business groups in India. During the 90’s Indian business groups evidently tunneled 
considerable amount of funds up the ownership pyramid thereby depriving the minority 
shareholders of companies at lower levels of the pyramids of their rightful gains. 
157
  Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, supra note 95, observing the concept of cross-holdings in 
Indian family business groups: 
As in many other countries, group firms in India are often linked together through the 
ownership of equity shares. In most cases, the controlling shareholder is a family; among 
the best-known business families in India are Tata, Bajaj, Birla, Oberoi, and Mahindra. 
Ibid. at 126. They then go on to discuss the benefits that family owners may extract from their 
companies through these mechanisms such as tunneling and observe that “Indian families 
typically control the firms they have financial stakes in by appointing family members or 
family friends to the board of directors and to top managerial positions”. Ibid. at 128. 
158
  In India, the appointment of each director is to be voted on individually at a shareholders’ 
meeting by way of a separate resolution. Each director’s appointment is to be approved by a 
majority of shareholders present and voting on such resolution. Hence, controlling 
shareholders, by virtue of being able to muster a majority of shareholders present and voting 
on such resolution, can control the appointment of every single director on the board. See 
Companies Act, 1956 (Act No. 1 of 1956) [Indian Companies Act], s. 263. The position of the 
controlling shareholders further gets reinforced due to the dispersed nature of the remaining 
shareholding in the company. In most Indian companies, institutional shareholders do not 
individually hold significant percentage shareholding, even though the aggregate shareholding 
of all institutional shareholders may be fairly substantial. Further, although establishment of 
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renewal and continuance in office (without removal)159 are subject to the wishes 
of the controlling shareholders.160 Managers who are not on the board also owe 
their allegiance to controlling shareholders as the board of directors that appoints 
managers is within the control of such shareholders. All these are evidence of 
ownership concentration in Indian listed companies, with significant powers to 
the controlling shareholders that are primarily business families. 
Focused Constituency 
As in the case of China, the Indian corporate governance and ownership prototype 
has been shaped by India’s socialistic origins. India’s policies and legislation in 
the post-independence era was overlaid with socialistic policies. It has been noted 
that “the government implemented a socialist reform agenda in encompassing all 
areas of commercial activity, including corporate finance”.161 
 Further, in an emerging economy like India, consistent with its socialistic 
origins, the role of company law extends beyond merely the protection of 
                                                                                                                                     
coalitions of institutional shareholders is generally not subject to restrictions under law 
(unlike in the U.S.), institutional shareholders in practice rarely form coalitions except in dire 
circumstances, such as where the company is on the verge of bankruptcy or the promoters or 
managers of the company have been involved in egregious conduct. This factor adds to the 
vast powers already available to controlling shareholders in determining the board 
composition of an Indian company. 
159
  Any director may be removed before the end of her term without cause by a majority of 
shareholders present and voting on such resolution. See Indian Companies Act, s. 284. 
160
  This rule applies equally to the appointment and tenure of independent directors that are 
likewise subject to a majority vote of the shareholders, and hence subject to concurrence of 
the controlling shareholders. 
161
  John Armour & Priya Lele, “Law, Finance, and Politics: The Case of India” (2008), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=11166808> at 14. 
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shareholders.162 It would extend to protection of employees, creditors, consumers 
and society (represented by the wide expression “public interest”). Indian 
corporate law and corporate governance regulation does recognise the 
stakeholder-centric approach, at least partially. For instance, employees obtain 
certain special rights under company law, such as preferential payment for dues in 
case of winding up of a company,163 and also the right to be heard in case of 
significant proceedings involving a company such as in a scheme of arrangement 
(merger, demerger or other corporate restructuring)164 or in a winding up165 of the 
company. As far as creditors are concerned, while company law does provide 
them with the standard rights and remedies,166 other special laws confer other 
                                                 
162
  Tarun Khanna & Krishna Palepu, “Globalization and Convergence in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from Infosys and the Indian Software Industry” (2004) 35 J. Int’l Bus. Studies 484 
at 500 [Evidence from Infosys], aptly laying out the debate in the context of protection of 
employees using the stakeholder theory: 
How should this discussion be modified to suit the realities of an emerging market like 
India? First, the idea that labor can protect itself against expropriation by shareholders is 
less plausible in such a country for several reasons. The prospect of controlling 
shareholders reaping private benefits from companies that they control is vast. Further, 
the court system does not function well enough to check this. Finally, the absence of 
smoothly functioning markets for human capital imply that exploited talent cannot simply 
vote with its feet in the face of shareholder-induced adversity. For all these reasons, a 
plausible case can be made that corporate governance should be sensitive to the interests 
of more than just shareholders. 
163
  Indian Companies Act, s. 529-A. 
164
  Indian Companies Act, s. 391. See also In Re, River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd., (1967) 2 
Comp. L.J. 106 (Cal.) (holding that in considering any scheme proposed, the Court will also 
consider its effects on workers or employees); In Re, Hathisingh Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 
(1976) 46 Comp. Cas. 59 (Guj.) and Bhartiya Kamgar Sena v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Ltd., 
(1992) 73 Comp. Cas. 122 (Bom.) (approving the proposition that while sanctioning a scheme 
of arrangement the court should consider not merely the interests of the shareholders and 
creditors but also the wider interests of the workmen and of the community). 
165
  Indian Companies Act, s. 443. See also National Textile Workers’ Union v. Ramakrishnan 
(P.R.), A.I.R. 1983 SC 75 (holding that workers of a company have a right to appear and be 
heard in support or opposition of a winding up petition). 
166
  These include the right to initiate a winding up of the company. Indian Companies Act, s. 
439(1)(b), which is a customary company law right conferred on creditors in most 
jurisdictions. 
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corporate law rights such as the ability of the creditors to convert their loans into 
equity of the debtor company and, more specifically from a corporate governance 
standpoint, to appoint nominee directors on boards of debtor companies.167 These 
rights are seemingly provided to protect the interests of the creditors. Finally, 
“public interest” constitutes an important element of Indian company law. 
Affected parties may exercise remedies in case the affairs of a company are 
carried out in a manner prejudicial to public interest,168 or if a scheme of 
arrangement is not in consonance with public interest.169 These provisions of 
Indian corporate law point towards the fact that Indian corporate governance leans 
(at least partially) towards a stakeholder-centric approach, which is consistent 
with the fact that it is a developing economy that follows the insider model.170 
Other Systemic Factors 
Like many other emerging economies, the legal and regulatory framework in 
India is not entirely conducive to corporate activity and investor protection, 
although significant improvements have been effected to the system after the 
liberalisation process began in 1991. For instance, the Indian Companies Act, 
which was enacted in 1956 and has subsequently undergone several amendments, 
is unduly complex and still contains vestiges of strong government control of 
                                                 
167
  See e.g., State Bank of India Act, 1955 (Act No. 23 of 1955), s. 35A. 
168
  Indian Companies Act, s. 397(2)(a). 
169
  Indian Companies Act, s. 394(1) proviso. 
170
  For the correlation between the stakeholder-centric approach and the insider model of 
concentrated corporate ownership, see previous discussion at supra note 103 and 
accompanying text. 
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companies.171 There are a number of procedures to be complied with for 
incorporating companies, and moreover, winding up of companies involves a 
cumbersome, costly and time consuming procedure.172 However, there is 
optimism at least on two counts. First, there has been tremendous progress in the 
area of investor protection since 1991. The Securities and Exchange Board of 
India [“SEBI”], India’s securities markets regulator, was established in 1992 to 
regulate the Indian capital markets, and SEBI has since enacted a plethora of 
subsidiary legislation governing the stock markets (both primary and 
secondary).173 Second, there does exist an increasingly robust body of law to deal 
with minority shareholder grievances.174 
 However, law on the statute books is one thing, and its enforcement 
another. Even where laws are available, they are sometime ambiguous and ridden 
with uncertainties, thereby causing problems in enforcement. Further, there are 
serious deficiencies in enforcement of laws and regulations due to the 
ineffectiveness of the enforcement machinery such as the courts and other 
                                                 
171
  India’s corporate insolvency regime is also notoriously weak. Armour & Lele, supra note 161 
at 15. 
172
  In the Doing Business Report 2009 published by the World Bank, India ranks 122 out of a 
total of 181 countries surveyed in relation to the ease of doing business. It ranks 121 for 
starting a business and 140 for closing a business. See World Bank Doing Business Report 
2009, online: <http://doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=89>. 
173
  The more important of such legislation relates to the establishment of a detailed disclosure 
regime for companies, a share depository for electronic trading of shares and a sophisticated 
trading and settlement system in the secondary markets. See Armour & Lele, supra note 161 
at 20. 
174
  Indian Companies Act, ss. 397 and 398, provides remedies to minority shareholders when 
affairs of the company are conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the company, 
the shareholders or public interest, or if it is oppressive to the shareholders. This is known as 
the remedy of “oppression and mismanagement”. Apart from a rich body of precedents 
having been established in this area of law, there is also a special tribunal in the form of the 
Company Law Board to deal with cases on this count. See Armour & Lele, ibid. at 31. 
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specialised tribunals. These courts and tribunals are overburdened resulting in 
significant delay in dispute resolution and justice delivery. This holds good even 
in the area of corporate governance and investor protection.175 
 Further, unlike in the more developed economies, it is hard to find a 
sufficient number of competent professionals such as auditors, independent 
directors and rating agencies who can potentially act as gatekeepers of corporate 
governance. For this reason, the affected parties and the legal system are 
compelled to rely on courts, tribunals and other regulatory bodies to seek 
remedies, and those may not be effective in law enforcement altogether.176 Here 
again, these are issues faced by most developing countries in common, which are 
also part of the insider model of corporate governance. 
E. Summary 
The preceding parts of this Section first compare and contrast the outsider model 
and the insider model in general, and then explore the specifics with reference to 
two constituencies in each model, with the U.S. and the U.K. being the outsider 
systems and China and India being the insider systems. This has been effected 
through a study of the features of these systems across three broad parameters, 
                                                 
175
  More generally, it has been observed empirically that “in securities law, we find that several 
aspects of public enforcement, such as having an independent and/or focused regulator or 
criminal sanctions, do not matter …”. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, “What Works in Securities Laws?” (2006) 61 J. Fin. 1 at 27-28 [What Works in 
Securities Laws].  
176
  In the Doing Business Report 2009 published by the World Bank, out of a total of 181 
countries surveyed in relation to the ease of doing business, India is only second from the 
bottom (after Timor-Leste) when it comes enforcement of contracts. See World Bank Doing 
Business Report 2009, supra note 172. 
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viz. ownership concentration, focused constituency and other systemic factors. In 
the case of the outsider systems, we find that (i) diffused shareholding in 
companies is the norm, (ii) the focus of corporate law is on the protection of 
shareholder interests (largely to the exclusion of all other interests), and (iii) 
market-based institutions and systems are sophisticated and developed, with 
heavy reliance on capital markets and disclosure. On the other hand, with the 
insider systems, we find that (i) concentrated shareholding is the norm (with 
concentration predominantly with the state in China and with family business 
groups in India), (ii) the focus of corporate law extends beyond shareholders and 
caters to the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors and the 
public or society, and (iii) they lack significant capital markets and rely more on 
mandatory regulation and bright-line rules as opposed to market-based regulation 
and disclosures only. 
2.3 Reviewing the Models in Context of the Agency Paradigm 
At this stage, it is appropriate to review the insider and outsider models against 
the “agency problems” paradigm.177 As explained in an influential book on the 
subject,178 the effort of corporate law is to “control conflicts of interest among 
                                                 
177
  These agency problems can be examined in the light of the various corporate actors described 
earlier. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. It is to be noted, however, that the agency 
concept is used by academics in corporate governance literature in a wider economic sense 
and ought to be distinguished from the legal (contractual) concept of agency. Brian Cheffins, 
“The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship” (2003), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=429624> at 26 [Trajectory of Scholarship]. 
178
  Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 24. 
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corporate constituencies”.179 These conflicts are referred to in economic literature 
as “agency problems”.180 
 Corporate law and corporate governance literature define three generic 
agency problems.181 The first agency problem relates to the conflict between the 
company’s managers and its owners (being the shareholders).182 Hereinafter 
referred to as the “manager-shareholder agency problem”, such conflict exists 
largely in jurisdictions which manifest diffused shareholding in companies. This 
is due to collective action problems and the resultant inability of shareholders to 
properly monitor the actions of managers. The second relates to the conflict 
between the majority or controlling shareholders on the one hand and minority 
shareholders on the other.183 Such conflict, which is referred to hereinafter as the 
“majority-minority agency problem” is largely prevalent in jurisdictions that 
display concentrated shareholding where the interests of minority shareholders are 
significantly diluted. The third agency problem relates to the conflict between the 
owners and controllers of the firm (such as the shareholders and managers) and 
                                                 
179
  Ibid. at 21. 
180
  For a detailed analysis of agency theory in economic literature, see Jensen & Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm, supra note 23. For a simpler expression of the agency analysis, see 
Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, ibid. at 21, noting that: 
an ‘agency problem’—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the 
welfare of one party, term the ‘principal,’ depends upon actions taken by another party, 
termed the ‘agent.’ The problem lies in motivating the agent to act in the principal’s 
interest rather than simply the agent’s own interest. Viewed in these broad terms, agency 
problems arise in a broad range of contexts that go well beyond those that would formally 
be classified as agency relationships by lawyers. 
181
  Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, ibid. at 21; Paul L. Davies, “The Board of 
Directors: Composition, Structure, Duties and Powers”, Paper on Company Law Reform in 
OECD Countries: A Comparative Outlook of Current Trends (2000), online: 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/30/1857291.pdf.> at 2. 
182
  Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, ibid. at 22; Davies, ibid. at 2. 
183
  Ibid. 
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other stakeholders (such as creditors, employees, consumers and public), with 
many of whom the company may enter into a contractual arrangement governing 
their affairs inter se.184 This conflict, referred to hereinafter as the “controller-
stakeholder agency problem” exists both in jurisdictions that have diffused 
shareholding as well as those that have concentrated shareholding, but its role is 
accentuated in those that have concentrated shareholding as we have previously 
seen.185 
 Advancing this discussion in the context of the insider and outsider 
systems, we find that the outsider systems are largely concerned with the 
manager-shareholder agency problem. This is true even in respect of the U.S. and 
the U.K., which are the subject-matter of study in this dissertation as outsider 
systems. The roles of corporate law as well as measures to enhance corporate 
governance are designed to address this agency problem. It is precisely in 
addressing this very problem that the concept of an independent board emerged 
initially in the U.S. and subsequently in the U.K. However, we find that the 
insider systems are not concerned with the manager-shareholder agency problem 
– that problem does not exist at all in those systems. There is no separation of 
ownership and control as the majority or controlling shareholders are well-
endowed with the power to hire and fire managers and therefore oversee 
managerial aspects of a company. The insider systems are instead inflicted with 
the majority-minority agency problem due to the concentration of corporate 
                                                 
184
  Ibid. 
185
  For a more detailed discussion on this aspect, see supra Section 2.2. 
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ownership. The controlling shareholders are in a position to enhance their control 
through mechanisms such as cross-holdings, pyramiding and tunneling, so as to 
dilute the interests (and returns) of the minority shareholders. Further, the insider 
systems do also suffer from, and pay particular attention to, the third agency 
problem, being the controller-stakeholder agency problem, more so than the 
‘outsider’ systems. This is because the stakeholders are compelled to rely on legal 
protection in order to secure their interests. To a large extent, as we have seen,186 
corporate laws in the insider systems do grant a certain level of protection to 
stakeholders.  
Hence, the insider systems suffer from the majority-minority and, to some 
extent, the controller-stakeholder agency problems (being the second and third 
agency problems) and not the manager-shareholder agency problem (being the 
first). I argue that corporate governance mechanisms that are designed to suit one 
type of agency problem may not be appropriate to deal with another type. 
Moreover, mechanisms that are designed to suit one type of system of ownership 
and corporate governance (e.g., outsider) may not be suitable in another system 
(e.g., insider). To be more specific, it is the main conceit of this dissertation that 
the mechanism of altering board structure and composition (by mandating a 
minimum number of independent directors) that has been introduced to deal with 
the manager-shareholder agency problem that is prevalent in the outsider systems 
(with the U.S. and the U.K. being examples discussed herein) will not produce the 
                                                 
186
  As regards China and India, being the subject matter of discussion in relation to ‘insider 
systems’, see supra Section 2.2(D)(1) and (D)(2) respectively. 
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same results in dealing with the majority-minority and the controller-stakeholder 
agency problems that are dominant in the insider systems (with China and India 
being examples discussed herein).  
2.4 Driving Forces Behind the Different Models 
In order to appreciate the differences between the models of corporate governance 
as well as ownership structures and the different agency problems that affect these 
models, it would be appropriate to consider some of the driving forces and 
reasons behind these differences. Various theories have been propagated in the 
study of comparative corporate governance. While the debate as to which theory 
is more feasible appears yet inconclusive, it is possible to identify some of the key 
factors that are under discussion. Several reasons have been proffered for 
differences in ownership structures, focused constituencies and other systemic 
factors between the outsider systems and the insider systems. There include legal 
reasons, political reasons as well as historical reasons. 
A. The “Law Matters” Explanation 
In an influential series of studies,187 a group of economists (hereinafter referred to 
as “LLSV”) conducted empirical research concluding that corporate ownership in 
various jurisdictions is dependent upon the level of legal protection available to 
                                                 
187
  These studies are encapsulated in a series of articles published in the late 1990s. These are 
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, “Legal 
Determinants of External Finance” (1997) 42 J. Fin. 1131 [Legal Determinants], La Porta, 
Law and Finance, supra note 84; La Porta, et. al., Around the World, supra note 26 and La 
Porta, Investor Protection, supra note 54. 
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investors.188 As for legal protection, emphasis was placed on two aspects: (i) the 
legal rules that apply to protect investors, and (ii) the quality of enforcement of 
those legal rules.189 Their thesis is that if a jurisdiction provides better legal 
protection to investors (both in terms of the law and its enforcement), that will 
lead to capital markets, which are broader and better valued as compared to 
economies with lower protection that may not enjoy liquid markets.190 Upon a 
comparison of the common law system and various civil law systems, they 
conclude that common law provides better access to equity finance than civil law 
countries.191 
 As a corollary to this, law also matters in the way ownership structures are 
shaped in various jurisdictions. Common law systems that encourage broader 
capital markets end up with diffused shareholdings as companies constantly 
access the markets for finance by diluting their equity stake. Shareholders are not 
hesitant in holding minority stakes owing to the protection that law offers them. 
On the other hand, the study finds that civil law systems provide weaker investor 
protection.192 As a result, there is not only a lack of broad and liquid capital 
markets in civil law systems generally, but shareholders seek ownership 
                                                 
188
  La Porta, et. al. present evidence that “legal rules protecting investors and the quality of their 
enforcement differ greatly and systematically across countries”. La Porta, et. al., Legal 
Determinants, ibid. at 1131. 
189
  La Porta, et. al., Investor Protection, supra note 54 at 21-22. 
190
  In other words, “legal environment has large effects on the size and breadth of capital markets 
across countries”. La Porta, et. al., Legal Determinants, supra note 187 at 1132. 
191
  La Porta, et. al., Legal Determinants, ibid. at 1137; La Porta, et. al., Law and Finance, supra 
note 84 at 1116. 
192
  La Porta, et. al., Law and Finance, ibid. at 1116. 
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concentration as a substitute to legal protection.193 Where law provides poor 
protection to investors, they tend to acquire controlling stakes in companies so as 
to protect themselves through exercise of control over management of the 
company.194 In other words, the “quality of legal protection helps determine 
ownership concentration”.195 Consequently, LLSV conclude that common law 
countries that offer greater investor protection witness diffused shareholding, 
while civil law countries that offer low investor protection witness concentrated 
shareholding in companies. 
 According to LLSV, other systemic factors too correlate with the common 
law system and the civil law system. They note that in the common law countries 
laws are attuned towards investor protection, and these are enforced by market 
regulators, the courts as well as by the market participants themselves.196 In 
common law countries, the judiciary plays an important role in enforcing investor 
rights, thereby enhancing the value of capital markets.197 In these countries, 
investor protection is ensured through a combination of rules and regulations, 
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  Ibid. at 1145. 
194
  La Porta, et. al., offer specific explanation for ownership concentration in countries where 
legal protection is weak. They state: 
There are at least two reasons why ownership in such countries would be more 
concentrated. First, large, or even dominant, shareholders who monitor the managers 
might need to own more capital, ceteris paribus, to exercise their control rights and thus 
to avoid being expropriated by managers. … Second, when they are poorly protected, 
small investors might be willing to buy corporate shares only at such low prices that 
make it unattractive for corporations to issue new shares to the public. 
Ibid. at 1145. 
195
  Ibid. at 1151. 
196
  La Porta, et. al., Investor Protection, supra note 54 at 7. 
197
  Ibid. Just by way of example, the concept of ' fiduciary duty ' is a significant contribution of 
judge made law in common-law countries, and this concept has been used extensively to 
protect investors against the actions of directors and managers in common law countries. 
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enforcement by the judiciary as well as through self-regulation by market 
participants. On the other hand, civil law countries tend to rely heavily on 
government intervention in regulating capital markets.198 This is usually achieved 
through bright-line rules, although the downside to this approach is that it enables 
defaulters to circumvent the rules imaginatively by structuring their affairs in such 
manner as to stay outside the proscription of the legal regulations.199 
 While the approach of LLSV has largely set the tone for the debate on 
comparative corporate governance,200 it has been subject to constant challenge 
from other scholars on various grounds.201 In the context of the present 
dissertation, the challenge can focus squarely on two aspects that specifically 
cover its subject matter. First, as regards China and India, the two countries 
studied herein, the theory professed by LLSV does not answer certain important 
questions. Both China and India have recently witnessed tremendous growth in 
their capital markets (at least over the last decade) although they are yet to attain 
the size and depth of the capital markets in the U.S. and the U.K. This runs 
contrary to the predictions of the LLSV thesis. As far as China is concerned, it is a 
civil law country and hence is subject to a lesser degree of investor protection. 
Consequently, it is expected to possess a smaller sized capital market. As far as 
India is concerned, although it is a common law country, there are considerable 
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  Ibid. at 9. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Pinto, supra note 65 at 493 (noting that “they set the agenda for much of the current 
significant comparative corporate governance scholarship”). 
201
  For a brief survey of this literature, see Armour & Lele, supra note 161 at 3-8. 
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difficulties in enforcement of the law in that country.202 Here again, for this 
reason, the LLSV theory portends that India is not expected to have a strong 
capital market. However, the reality is far from this. India too has a rapidly 
growing capital market despite problems with enforcement of the law.203 To a 
large extent, both China and India defy the LLSV thesis, due to which the efficacy 
of their thesis is certainly questionable in the context of these two emerging 
markets. 
 Second, on the issue of independent directors too, the LLSV theory emits 
some confusing signals. As discussed earlier,204 common law countries tend to 
rely on self-regulation by market participants, while other jurisdictions tend to 
impose governmental regulation on corporate governance. If that be the case, the 
role of corporate actors such as independent directors (who are market 
participants forcing self-regulation) should augur well in the context of common 
law countries such as the U.S. and the U.K., rather than other jurisdictions such as 
China (which is a civil law country) and India (which is a common law country, 
but with limited enforcement of corporate legal rights). The LLSV approach fails 
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  As seen earlier, supra note 189 and accompanying text, in the “law matters” thesis, the quality 
of the rule as well as its enforcement are both important. India’s poor law enforcement record 
has been noted by one corporate governance scholar as follows: 
The Rule of law index is another story. … India, for instance has a score of 4.17 on this 
index – ranking 41st out of 49 countries studies – ahead only of Nigeria, … Thus it 
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application and enforcement of those laws are lamentable. 
Chakrabarti, Evolution and Challenges, supra note 89 at 9-10. See also, World Bank Doing 
Business Report, supra note 176. 
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  Another theory that challenges LLSV in the context of India ascribes India’s enhancing 
capital market position to political factors. See Armour and Lele, supra note 161. 
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  Supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
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to explain the phenomenon whereby a greater number of countries are adopting 
the self-regulatory approach of corporate governance (followed in the U.S. and 
the U.K.) although those other countries lack the sophisticated laws and 
institutional framework that are prerequisites to self-regulation. If LLSV’s thesis 
is that concentrated ownership is the answer to corporate governance in countries 
that do not possess strong investor protection mechanisms, it does not explain the 
need for gatekeepers such as independent directors in those jurisdictions. 
Therefore, there is a mismatch between the LLSV thesis and the introduction of 
independent directors in jurisdictions such as China and India which are said to 
have limited legal protection (with adequate enforcement) for investors. This 
mismatch can be resolved in one of two ways: either the LLSV thesis cannot 
withstand scrutiny on this count, or the imposition of the requirement independent 
directors in jurisdictions such as China and India is incongruous. I would venture 
to take the latter position, a matter I shall elaborate upon later in this 
dissertation.205 
B. Other Explanations 
In addition to the “law matters” thesis, there are certain other theories that seek to 
explain the differences between various corporate governance systems. These 
explore matters beyond the law, such as history, politics, interest groups and even 
anthropology and culture. 
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  See infra Chapter 6, Section 6.3. 
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 Among these other theories, an influential series of work can be ascribed 
to Professor Mark Roe. He essentially examines the genesis of the U.S. model of 
corporate governance and provides political explanations for the lack of strong 
owners and the presence of strong managers instead.206 He asserts that “American 
politics deliberately fragmented financial institutions, their portfolios, and their 
ability to aggregate stock into influential voting blocks”.207 Such forced 
fragmentation of shareholding resulted in the diffused shareholding pattern of 
U.S. companies thereby resulting in agency problems between shareholders and 
managers. Most other jurisdictions have different corporate structures involving 
concentrated blocks of shareholders due to the “role of politics, history and 
culture”.208 Apart from ownership structures, Professor Roe offers similar 
explanations for the focused constituency. As regards Europe, an important factor 
is social democracy that tends to involve non-shareholder interests such as 
employees and sometimes creditors,209 unlike the U.S. which focuses primarily on 
shareholders as the principal constituency that corporate law seeks to protect.210 
Politics therefore has a role to play in why some countries such as the U.S. and 
the U.K. have diffused shareholding and focus on shareholder interests, while 
others such as China and India have concentrated shareholding and focus on 
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Finance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994) [Strong Managers Weak Owners]. 
207
  Roe, Some Differences, supra note 92 at 1935. 
208
  Ibid. at 1997. This is particularly true of Germany and Japan, the other two countries 
Professor Roe has studied in this work. 
209
  Mark J. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate 
Impact (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
210
  See further discussion, supra note 76 to 79 and accompanying text. 
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stakeholder interests as well.211 These political factors also play a significant role 
in perpetuating the prevailing systems in each of these countries, and such factors 
also oppose any change.212 
 Yet another theory looks at the role of interest groups in shaping the 
structure of corporate governance.213 According to this theory, several countries 
that supposedly followed the social democracy model did so with a view to 
protection of local interests and to keep the markets away from competition rather 
than with a view to protecting the interests of stakeholders. This theory furthers 
the argument of rent-seeking among interests within these economies. 
 A theory developed by Professor Amir Licht explores cultural and 
anthropological factors of corporate governance that seek to explain differences 
among various countries.214 Professor Licht states that national cultures are 
relevant to corporate governance and securities regulation as they may have a role 
in inducing path dependence among various systems. Using the framework of 
cultural value dimensions (CVD), he suggests producing testable hypotheses with 
                                                 
211
  For a discussion of China’s and India’s focus on stakeholder interest, see supra Section 
2.2(D)(1) and (D)(2) respectively. 
212
  This is consistent with Roe’s theory of “path dependency” in corporate governance. See 
Bebchuk & Roe, Path Dependence, supra note 20. The argument of path dependency and its 
implications to our current discussion on independent directors is explored in greater detail, 
infra Chapter 6, Section 6.5. 
213
  Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial 
Development in the Twentieth Century” (2003) 69 J. Fin. Econ. 5; Raghuram G. Rajan & 
Luigi Zingales, Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists: Unleashing the Power of Financial 
Markets to Create Wealth and Spread Opportunity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2004). See also, Pinto, supra note 65 at 495.  
214
  Amir N. Licht, “The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Toward a Cross-Cultural Theory of 
Corporate Governance Systems” (2001) 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 147 [Mother of All Path 
Dependencies].  
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regards to cultural features of corporate governance systems. This theory, which 
is perhaps under-utilised in existing literature, may explain reasons for disparity 
between corporate governance structures and systems between outsider systems 
and the insider systems. While one set of the economies (the outsider systems) 
adopts liberal cultural values, the other (the insider systems) tends to retain 
traditional values; while the former focuses largely on the individual, the latter 
offers importance to social groups such as the family. These differences do have a 
significant bearing on corporate governance aspects, such as the role of the 
independent director, as I shall discuss in detail subsequently.215 
C. Impact of Explanations on Models of Corporate Governance 
These various explanations for differences in corporate governance are important 
in understanding the reasons why structures vary from country to country. This 
also helps explain the relevance of law, history, politics and interest groups in the 
corporate governance system of each country. The role of independent directors, 
which is the subject matter of this dissertation, in the U.S. and the U.K. on one 
hand, and China and India on the other, has to be seen in the light of these 
differences. These differences also help determine whether the use of corporate 
governance concepts developed in one country can be suitably implemented in 
another country. More importantly, the question would be whether such 
implementation of corporate governance concepts across borders can be given 
                                                 
215
 See infra Chapter 6, Section 6.4. 
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effect to without considering these cross-country differences in corporate 
governance and the reasons for such differences. 
2.5 A Review of the Convergence vs. Divergence Debate 
After having seen that different systems of corporate governance do exist across 
various countries, it is apt to consider whether these different systems are likely to 
converge into one single model or whether it is likely that status quo will continue 
due to the forces of divergence. I now discuss two competing points on view on 
this issue and delve into the relevance of this debate with reference to the concept 
of independent directors. 
A. Factors for Convergence 
The primary force behind convergence of corporate governance systems is 
globalisation. Businesses and investments increasingly transcend national borders. 
When companies raise finance in the capital markets, they are forced to issue 
securities to investors in other countries. Furthermore, the need for additional 
capital forces companies to even list themselves on overseas stock exchanges. 
Due to this phenomenon, companies are required to comply with corporate 
governance norms that most investors understand. Companies therefore depart 
from their own norms and mimic standards prevalent in other countries. The 
result of internationalisation of capital markets with respect to emerging 
economies is that “investment flows may move against firms perceived to have 
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suboptimal governance and thus to the disadvantage of the countries in which 
those firms are based”.216 
 If there is bound to be convergence, which model of corporate governance 
would all economies converge upon? In an influential study, Professors 
Hansmann and Kraakman argue that such convergence would result in the 
supremacy of the shareholder model, whereby “corporate law should principally 
strive to increase long-term shareholder value”.217 Their argument is twofold: (1) 
American corporate governance has reached an optimally efficient endpoint by 
adopting the shareholder primacy and dispersed shareholding corporate model, 
and (2) the rest of the world will inevitably follow, resulting in a convergence of 
corporate governance around the world on the lines of the U.S. model.218 They 
also specifically examine convergence with regard to board structures in the 
context of existing options, viz., the single-tier board structure (with independent 
directors) that exists in the U.S. and the U.K. and the two-tier board structure 
(with a management board and supervisory board) that exists in continental 
Europe and other countries such as China. They note that there is movement in 
board practices: 
The result is convergence from both ends towards the middle: while two-
tier boards themselves seem to be on the way out, countries with single-
tier board structures are incorporating in their regimes, one of the strengths 
                                                 
216
  Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence, supra note 40 at 2. 
217
  Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 66 at 439. 
218
  See ibid. Since the U.K. model of corporate governance is fairly similar to the U.S. model, 
their argument is broadly likely to hold good for the U.K. model as well. 
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of the typical two-tier board regime, namely the substantial role it gives to 
independent (outsider) directors.219 
The emergence of the independent director concept in the U.S. and the U.K. and 
the imposition of that concept in other countries such as China and India is a sign 
of an attempt in convergence towards the U.S./U.K. model.220 To that extent, 
there is certainly a movement in various countries towards a single-tier 
independent board as a converged model of corporate governance. 
B. Divergence; Path Dependency 
The convergence argument has its fair share of detractors. Principal among them 
is the theory that “there are significant sources of path dependence in a country’s 
patterns of corporate ownership structure”.221 The “path dependency” approach 
advocated by Bebchuk & Roe states that “a country’s pattern of ownership 
structures at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had earlier”.222  
This approach is grounded on two arguments: (1) one of efficiency, that “the 
initial ownership patterns influence the relative efficiency of alternative corporate 
rules; the set of rules that would be efficient … might depend on the country’s 
existing pattern of corporate structures and institutions”;223 and (2) one of rent-
                                                 
219
  Ibid. at 70. 
220
  Dan W. Puchniak, “The Japanization of American Corporate Governance? Evidence of the 
Never-Ending History for Corporate Law” (2007) 9 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y J. 7 at 48, noting 
as follows:  
There is no question that the independent director has become a rallying cry for corporate 
governance reforms in America and around the world. Indeed, the independent director is 
sold as being an effective method for increasing shareholder voice, if not indirectly 
increasing shareholder control. 
221
  Bebchuk & Roe, Path Dependence, supra note 20 at 129. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ibid. at 70. 
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seeking and interest group politics, whereby “[t]hose who participate in corporate 
control under an existing structure might have the incentive and power to impede 
changes that would reduce their private benefits of control even if the change 
would be efficient”.224 The authors cite the example of controlling shareholders 
who might resist change towards a diffused shareholding model because of a 
reduction in private benefits of control.225 For these reasons, the argument goes, it 
would be difficult for convergence to occur towards the U.S. shareholding 
model.226 
 Another theory argues against convergence of corporate governance 
because “each national governance system is a system to a significant extent”.227 
                                                 
224
  Ibid. at 70-71.  
225
  Ibid. at 71. See also Coffee, The Future as History, supra note 20 at 662 (noting that 
“controlling blockholders are also able to engage in private rent-seeking that benefits 
themselves as management, but not other shareholders”).This would certainly be the case in 
China and India where business families and the state are controlling shareholders. The 
observations by two corporate governance scholars in the context of India explains it all: 
One feature that stands out in most studies of ownership and corporate control in 
developing countries is the close ties between business interests and government, often 
called crony capitalism – as Bhagwati (1993) has put it nicely for the case of India, the 
economy is enmeshed in a Kafkaesque maze of controls. This … affects corporate 
governance in our wider notion, because large family owners often use their influence to 
limit competition, obtain favorable finance from the government and in other ways alter 
the game in their favor. 
Berglof & von Thadden, supra note 85 at 18. 
226
  See Ronald J. Gilson, “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function” in Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence, supra note 40 at 147. See also 
Pinto, supra note 65 at 502 (observing that the “rise of shareholder primacy calls into question 
the role of other stakeholders, and the prevalence of concentrated ownership arguably pushes 
an American-style system, further suggesting decreased power of the State”). 
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  William Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, “Comparative Corporate Governance and the 
Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference” (1999) 38 Colum. J. Tran’l L. 
213 at 213, where the authors note as follows: 
Each system, rather than consisting of a loose collection of separable components, is tied 
together by a complex incentive structure. Interdependencies between each system’s 
components and the incentives of its actors create significant barriers to cross reference to 
and from other systems. The cross reference hypothesis, in contrast, presupposes divisible 
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This takes into account several domestic factors that are the reasons for the 
specific features of each corporate governance system, and these make cross-
referencing across jurisdictions a difficult, if not impossible, task. 
 Yet another theory adopts a milder approach towards convergence. In a 
study that is relevant to the role of independent directors in corporate governance, 
Khanna, Kogan and Palepu explain some nuances regarding functional aspects of 
convergence. They state:228 
An aspect of the convergence debate recognized but not emphasized in the 
literature is the distinction between de jure and de facto convergence. De 
jure convergence is the adoption of similar corporate governance laws 
across countries. De facto convergence, on the other hand, refers to a 
convergence of actual practices. Put simply, nations may formally adopt 
other countries’ corporate governance systems, but the acceptance of the 
enshrined principles may significantly lag their codification. This may be 
for several reasons, including a lack of understanding of what is implied 
by good corporate governance, absence of complementary institutions 
needed to implement the principles, or simply poor enforcement. 
In their empirical study, the authors find that there is de jure similarity in 
corporate governance among economically interdependent countries. However, 
they find no evidence of de facto convergence due to the continued operation of 
local vested interests. Hence, they conclude that “globalization may have induced 
the adoption of some common corporate governance standards but that there is 
little evidence that these standards have been implemented”.229 
                                                                                                                                     
corporate governance institutions—a world in which one system’s components can be 
adapted for use in the other system without significant frictions or perverse effects. 
228
  Tarun Khanna, Joe Kogan & Krishna Palepu, “Globalization and Similarities in Corporate 
Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis” (2006) 88(1) The Review of Economics and 
Statistics 69 at 71. 
229
  Ibid. at 84. 
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C. The Relevance of the Debate to Independent Directors 
There can be no doubt that the adoption of the independent director concept in 
various countries around the world signals a move towards convergence in 
corporate governance (at least in so far as board structure is concerned). 
Furthermore, it is also the case that this signals a move towards the model of 
corporate governance followed in the U.S. and the U.K., which essentially 
involves a shareholder-oriented approach in the context of diffused ownership in 
companies. That begs the question as to whether such convergence towards the 
U.S. and the U.K. models is likely to succeed. 
 Within the convergence-versus-divergence paradigm, I argue (for reasons 
I shall elaborate on subsequently) that the independent director concept presents 
only signs of de jure convergence and that de facto convergence is still elusive 
(and does not exist at present). De jure convergence exists due to the fact that 
several countries (including China and India) have adopted the concept of 
independent directors within their regulatory framework for corporate 
governance. But, how far that can be effectively implemented would depend on 
whether there is de facto convergence. I take the position in this dissertation that 
de facto convergence is unlikely to occur due to the forces of path dependency. In 
countries like China and India, the existing controlling shareholders (being the 
business families and the state) indulge in rent-seeking thereby preventing proper 
implementation of the independent director rule. Owing to this, there is still likely 
to be divergence in the application of the independent director concept to China 
and India from a functionality standpoint. Incorporating a requirement in the local 
 83
laws of a country is one thing, but effectively implementing that requirement to 
realise its legislative goal is another altogether. Hence, globalisation and the 
extension of the independent director concept to various countries negates the 
convergence theory and leans more towards the divergence approach. 
2.6 Transplant Effect 
Before concluding this Chapter, it would be necessary to identify certain 
principles behind the phenomenon of legal transplants. A legal transplant involves 
the adoption by one country of laws or legal concepts from another country; this 
could “range from the wholesale adoption of entire systems of law to the copying 
of a single rule.”230 Transplants have become common in the area of corporate 
governance, primarily due to globalisation and the exportation of capital markets 
to various jurisdictions.231  
There are several benefits of legal transplants. They are not only useful in 
setting common standards for legal rights and obligations across jurisdictions, but 
are also less costly and quick to implement.232 On the other hand, transplants are 
accompanied by several disadvantages. Mere importation of a legal rule without 
proper adaptation to local conditions is likely to result in failure. This is on 
account of the fact that several social, political and economic factors that are 
present in the country of origin may not be present in the country of import, or 
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  Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 28. 
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  Transplants have become a way of signalling to investors that a country intends to comply 
with the investors’ domestic legal standards. See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-
Francois Richard, “The Transplant Effect” (2003) 51 Am. J. Comp. L 163 at 164. 
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  Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 28 at 889.  
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may be present with substantial variations, all of which make the importation a 
fairly complex exercise.233 Unless these factors are taken into account, there will 
be a lack of motivation on the part of the market players as well as regulators to 
implement the rule.234 In other words, if the transplanted rule is unlikely to find a 
“fit” within the recipient legal system, the transplantation is bound to result in 
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  See Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 231 at 167-68 observing as follows: 
We develop a definition of the “transplant effect” as a proxy for the process of legal 
transplantation and reception. … Our basic argument is that for law to be effective, a 
demand for law must exist so that the law on the books will actually be used in practice 
and legal intermediaries responsible for developing the law are responsive to the demand. 
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law would be used. … However, if the law was not adapted to local conditions, or if it 
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Legal intermediaries would have a more difficult time developing the law to match the 
demand. Countries that receive the law in this fashion are thus subject to the “transplant 
effect:” their legal order would function less effectively than origins or transplants that 
either adapted the law to local conditions and/or had a population that was familiar with 
the transplanted law. 
Furthermore, Professor Otto Kahn-Freund has highlighted the importance of understanding 
the political context in which a rule was developed before it was transplanted to other 
countries. He notes: 
It is the enormously increased role which is played by organised interests in the making 
and in the maintenance of legal institutions. Anyone contemplating the use of foreign 
legislation for law making in his country must ask himself: how far does this rule or 
institution owe its existence or its continued existence to a distribution of power in the 
foreign country which we do not share? 
Otto Kahn-Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law”, (1974) 37 Mod. L. Rev. 1 at 
12. He then goes on to caution: 
This however is precisely the point I have attempted to submit to you in this lecture, the 
point that we cannot take for granted that rules or institutions are transplantable. The 
criteria answering the question whether or how far they are, have changed …, but any 
attempt to use a pattern of law outside the environment of its origin continues to entail the 
risk of rejection. … All I have wanted to suggest is that its use requires a knowledge not 
only of the foreign law, but also of its social, and above all its political, context. 
Kahn-Freund, ibid. at 27. 
234
  See Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence, supra note 40 at 6 (observing that 
“[t]ransplanting some of the formal elements without regard for the institutional complements 
may lead to serious problems later, and these problems may impede, or reverse, 
convergence”). 
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failure, as the rule may never be implemented.235 Implementation failures may 
occur on two counts. First, the rule may never be implemented at all. Second, the 
rule may be implemented in a formal sense, but not substantively thereby 
defeating the purpose of the transplant.236 
 The importation of the independent director requirement into emerging 
economies like China and India from the developed economies like the U.S. and 
the U.K. is a classic instance of legal transplants. However, the efficacy of the 
transplant is open for debate, particularly because there have been no studies that 
examine the impact of independent directors in emerging economies from a 
theoretical perspective.237 Any problems with regard to transplantation of the 
independent director rule are exacerbated by the differing political, social and 
economic considerations that operate in these two sets of jurisdictions, namely the 
U.S. and the U.K. (the outsider system) on the one hand, and China and India (the 
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  Ibid. Kanda and Milhaupt examine legal transplants through their study of the exportation of a 
single rule of corporate law, the director’s duty of loyalty from the US to Japan, and find that 
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  There is an interesting observation by Banaji and Mody who study the Anglo-American 
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[O]ne should note that Cadbury makes several assumptions. It assumes a corporate 
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shareholders, e.g. promoters, control management where the corporate governance 
problem is chiefly one of the protection of minority shareholder rights. … Cadbury’s 
assumption is dispersed ownership, and SEBI’s overdependence on Cadbury seems to 
have carried over some of the consequences of that assumption into a market where 
concentrated ownership is the chief source of the problem. 
Jairus Banaji & Gautam Mody, “Corporate Governance and the Indian Private Sector”, 
University of Oxford, Queen Elizabeth House Working Paper Number 73 (2001), online: 
<http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/qehwp/qehwps73.pdf> at 8 (emphasis in original). 
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insider systems) on the other.238 It is the conceit of this dissertation that the 
transplantation of the independent director concept is not implemented effectively 
as yet in certain jurisdictions which have adopted it (including China and India), 
and this implementation failure raises questions regarding the viability of the 
transplant itself. It is, of course, arguable that ten years presents too short a 
timeframe239 to assess the viability of a new piece of legislation.240 However, such 
a timeframe will likely provide preliminary evidence of the acceptability of the 
legislation, and any early assessment of its viability will help regulators mould 
their implementation strategy in a timely fashion. 
2.7 Conclusion to the Chapter 
In summary, this Chapter examines the different models of corporate governance, 
being the outsider model and the insider model. There are significant differences 
in the two models, and there are several theories proffered as to the reasons for 
these differences. As to the future though, there appears to be a move in favour of 
convergence towards the U.S. and the U.K. models of corporate governance 
                                                 
238
  See Paredes, supra note 20 at 1059 dealing in general with the employability of U.S. 
corporate governance in other parts of the world. He observes: 
The bottom line for most developing countries is that importing a corporate law regime 
along the line of the U.S. model, or otherwise depending on a market-based model of 
governance, is not a viable option. More to the point, importing U.S. corporate law falls 
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  The concept of independent directors has found its way into the corporate governance systems 
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specific efforts, see infra Chapter 4, Section 4.5(A). 
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  See Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 231 at 165 (noting that “[i]t obviously takes time 
for the law to gain more than a book-life and to influence household and firm-level decision 
making, for lawyers to be trained in the new rules and for cases to be brought to court for 
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involving diffused ownership and greater investor protection. However, there are 
equally strong factors that restrain such convergence and indicate a strong 
tendency towards divergence owing to path dependency. This problem can be 
summarised and theorised as the mismatch between formal convergence and 
informal divergence of systems of corporate law. In this context, the role of the 
independent directors that has been transplanted from the outsider systems to the 
insider systems presents a suitable case study to determine the impact of these 
factors, a matter I shall elaborate on in the subsequent Chapters. 
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3. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN OUTSIDER SYSTEMS: ORIGIN 
AND EVALUATION 
 
3.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
3.2 Theoretical Foundations for the Origin of Independent Directors 
3.3 Emergence of Independent Directors in U.S. Corporate Practice 
3.4 Emergence of Independent Directors in U.K. Corporate Practice 
3.5 Effect of Independent Directors in Outsider Systems 
3.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
 
3.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
The two-fold objectives in this Chapter are (i) to undertake a study to explore the 
origins of the concept of the independent director which, as discussed earlier, can 
be related to the outsider economies of the U.S. and the U.K, and (ii) to evaluate 
the empirical evidence (both quantitative and qualitative) on the effectiveness of 
independent directors in companies belonging to the outsider systems. While such 
a study will necessarily involve delving into the history of corporate governance, 
it is not meant to be a historical survey that stands on its own, but rather to 
analyse the problem that the concept of independent directors was evolved to 
address. This study will indicate that the seeds of the independent director concept 
were sown in the theory of the monitoring board that involves a combination of 
law and economics. Apart from that, whenever independent directors have been 
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looked upon as a monitoring mechanism in companies, whether by the legislature, 
judiciary or even self-regulatory organisations in the outsider systems, it has 
always been with a view to addressing the manager-shareholder agency problem. 
Both theory as well as practice point in the same direction. Based on this analysis, 
I argue in this chapter that the monitoring board as well as the independent 
directors were created to deal with the manager-shareholder agency problem. An 
understanding of the theories and practice in this Chapter will widely illuminate 
the analysis of whether the independent director concept will find its place in 
dealing with the majority-minority agency problem and, if so, to what extent. This 
understanding is extremely relevant in analysing the differences in the 
effectiveness of the independent director concept between the outsider systems 
and the insider systems. 
 Much of the discussion in this Chapter will relate to the U.S. position as 
the concepts of outside director241 and monitoring board relate back to more than 
half a century in that country. The U.S. position has also been extensively covered 
in legal literature during that period. However, as regards U.K., the concept of 
non-executive director is comparatively recent (with the emphasis on that 
institution commencing in the late 1980s and the early 1990s). Hence, while the 
general discussion herein relates to the U.S. position, references will be drawn 
specifically to the U.K. position where appropriate, but the broad conclusions are 
                                                 
241
  The concept of “outside” director emerged in U.S. academic literature before the concept of 
“independent” director. The expression “outside director” carries a wider connotation than 
“independent director”. While outside directors are usually independent of management, they 
may have other affiliations with the company as consultants, lawyers, accountants and the 
like. Such directors are also referred to as “affiliated” or “grey” directors. The concept of 
independence usually excludes affiliated or grey directors. 
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likely to be common across both jurisdictions due to similarities in their corporate 
governance systems. 
3.2 Theoretical Foundations for the Origin of Independent Directors 
I discuss some of the theories both in law and in economics that explain the origin 
of the concept of independent directors. These theories help explain why the 
concept was conceived as a mechanism to deal with the manager-shareholder 
agency problem. This was essentially due to the fact that the U.S. and the U.K. 
(where the concept originated) faced the manager-shareholder agency problem. 
Furthermore, nearly all of the theoretical literature on the topic (until a few years 
ago) was confined to a study of these jurisdictions only. In this literature, there 
was no contemplation whatsoever of the majority-minority agency problem 
because those economies, being part of the outsider model, did not face that 
problem. There was no contemplation of the controller-stakeholder agency 
problem either because the focus was on shareholder value maximisation rather 
than the inclusion of stakeholder interests in corporate decision-making. 
A. Berle & Means Study 
An appropriate place to begin this survey is to consider the analysis of Berle and 
Means that emanated from their seminal study of ownership patterns of U.S. 
corporations during the period between 1880 and 1930.242 Their study 
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  Berle & Means, supra note 21. See also Cheffins, Trajectory of Scholarship, supra note 177 
at 25. 
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concluded243 that there is a “separation of ownership and control” in which the 
individual interest of shareholders is made subservient to that of managers who 
are in control of a company.244 Due to the diffusion in shareholding, the 
shareholders are unable to maintain vigil over the managers,245 as widely 
dispersed shareholders lack sufficient financial incentives to intervene directly in 
the affairs of the company; and the managers, being unchecked, may abuse their 
position by acting in their own interests rather than the interests of the 
shareholders which they have a duty to promote.246 Berle and Means’ study has 
proved to be influential in shaping the corporate governance paradigm as it has 
been used as a platform by other scholars who have built upon it. Much of the 
effort in corporate law and governance over the years has been to address the 
agency problem identified by Berle & Means and, as we shall see in detail shortly, 
the board of directors as well as the independent directors constitute important 
mechanisms to redress that agency problem.247 
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  See also supra notes 59 to 62 and accompanying text. 
244
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Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants” (1975) 63 Cal. L. Rev. 375 at 407-09. 
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B. Economic Analysis of the Agency Problem 
As the separation of ownership and control leads to the manager-shareholder 
agency problem, it became the subject-matter of study by economists particularly 
in the context of the role of the board of directors in addressing that agency 
problem. This wave of scholarship emerged in the form of the “nexus of 
contracts” theory where the firm was seen through the lens of contractarian 
analysis.248 Applying principles of agency to the modern corporation,249 Jensen 
and Meckling argue that whenever a principal engages an agent do something 
which involves some decision-making authority given to the agent, the latter may 
not always act in the interests of the principal.250 This imposes significant agency 
costs as the principal is required to establish appropriate incentives for the agent 
and monitor the agent’s action.251  
                                                 
248
  Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, supra note 23 at 310; Eugene F. Fama, “Agency 
Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1988) 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288 at 290 [Agency Problems]. 
This wave of research is dominated by economists who addressed individual rights in terms of 
allocating the costs and rewards among various participants in a business organisation. See 
also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, “The Corporate Contract” (1989) 89 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1416. 
249
  The issues associated with the separation of “ownership and control” identified by Berle and 
Means in a diffusely held corporation can be intimately associated with the agency problem. 
See Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm, ibid. at 309. 
250
  Ibid. at 308. 
251
  Jensen and Meckling argue that it may be possible to reduce agency costs, but that it can 
never be brought down to zero. They define and describe agency costs as follows: 
We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to 
the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason to believe that the agent will 
not always act in the best interests of the principal. The principal can limit divergences 
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition in some 
situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he 
will not take certain actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that principal 
will be compensated if he does take such actions. However, it is generally impossible for 
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In such a structure, one obvious question pertains to who will monitor the 
monitors.252 Alchian and Demsetz explore this issue through team organisation 
theory.253 They argue that in any economic organisation, incentive to productive 
effort can be maintained if input productivity and rewards are metered properly.254 
In order to avoid ending up with a series of monitors who meter productivity, 
Alchian and Demsetz suggest that the constituent entitled to the final residual 
income of the firm would be the appropriate monitoring authority as the reward to 
that authority will be the highest if the monitoring is at its best thereby 
incentivising such authority to monitor the firm’s activities properly. 
Juxtaposing the agency theory in the context of the Berle and Means 
corporation, it becomes clear that shareholders (who are the principals) suffer 
from agency costs on account of the actions of managers (who are the agents and 
persons in control of the corporation), the consequences of which may diverge 
from the interests of the shareholders. The end result of this approach is the need 
for proper monitoring of the managers so as to protect the interest of the 
shareholders. In Alchian and Demsetz’s paradigm, shareholders will be the best 
monitors as they are the constituents that receive the residual income of the firm. 
                                                                                                                                     
the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions 
from the principal’s viewpoint. In most agency relationships the principal and the agent 
will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary), 
and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s decisions and those 
decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal. 
Ibid. 
252
  Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm” (1996) 21 
J. Corp. L. 657 at 672 [Participatory Management]. 
253
  Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, “Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization” (1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777. 
254
  Ibid. at 778. 
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However, their theory does not fit well in the context of companies with diffused 
shareholding due to the existence of collective action problems among 
shareholders, who therefore would be ineffective as monitors.255 This has 
ultimately led to the monitoring role being foisted on the board of directors of a 
company.  
There is still the residual question of the composition of the board. If the 
board of directors comprises insiders, being managers or persons affiliated to the 
managers, will the board serve the purpose to act as an effective monitor of the 
managers? The answer is surely to be in the negative. A board comprising of 
managers cannot be expected to monitor the managers’ own actions. Hence, the 
composition of the board acquires importance. Directors who are independent of 
the management are likely to serve the monitoring role more effectively than 
inside directors. The monitoring role is therefore the raison d'être for independent 
directors.256 Such role in the context of the existing literature confers authority on 
a monitoring board of directors to monitor the managers in the interests of the 
                                                 
255
  As Professor Bainbridge aptly notes: 
Unfortunately, this elegant model breaks down precisely where it would be most useful. 
Because of the separation of ownership and control, it simply does not describe the 
modern publicly-held corporation. As the corporation’s residual claimants, the 
shareholders should act as the firm’s ultimate monitors. But while the law provides 
shareholders with some enforcement and electoral rights, these are reserved for fairly 
extraordinary situations. In general, shareholders of public corporations have neither the 
legal right, nor the practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control 
necessary for meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s agents. 
Bainbridge, Participatory Management, supra note 252 at 672. 
256
  Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 6 (noting the main theme in corporate governance writing 
where non-management directors are to serve as a check on management in the interests of 
shareholders). Note, however that in the U.K., directors are required to provide 
entrepreneurial leadership of companies in addition to their monitoring role. Such a dual role 
has been the subject matter of academic critique. See also Richard C. Nolan, “The Legal 
Control of Directors’ Conflicts of Interest in the United Kingdom: Non-Executive Directors 
Following the Higgs Report” (2005) 6 Theoretical Inq. L. 413.  
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shareholders. Therefore, it is clear that the theoretical foundation for the 
emergence of independent directors relates to the monitoring function of the 
board whereby the board’s role is to protect the interest of the shareholders 
against abuse of authority by the managers. This, in effect, is structured to directly 
address the manager-shareholder agency problem.257 
While still on theoretical models, it would a glaring omission not to refer 
to the team production theory that has currently made some inroads as an 
alternative to the agency theory. Professors Blair and Stout, who are principal 
proponents of this approach, state that while team production theory is less well 
studied than the agency theory, they believe “the former may represent a more 
appropriate basis for understanding the unique economic and legal functions 
served by the public corporation”.258 According to them, the key role of the board 
                                                 
257
  Existing literature is replete with support for this proposition. N. Arthur, “Board Composition 
as the Outcome of an Internal Bargaining Process: Empirical Evidence” (2001) 7 J. Corp. Fin. 
307 at 310 (stating that “[m]uch of the existing literature examines board composition from an 
agency cost perspective and argues that representation by outside directors will increase with 
the conflicts of interests between management and outside shareholders”); Barry D. Baysinger 
& Henry N. Butler, “Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporate Law: The ALI’s Project and 
the Independent Director” (1984) 52 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 557 at 564 (stating that it would 
“appear intuitively that board independence should play a major role in the resolution of 
agency problems associated with large, dispersed-owner corporations”); Branson, The Very 
Uncertain Prospect, supra note 42 at 360 (identifying the independent director concept as a 
solution to the Berle & Means-type manager-shareholder agency problem: “[i]ndependent 
directors … reduce agency costs and represent the substitute monitor yearned for since Berle 
and Means published their book”); Dan R. Dalton, et. al., “Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board 
Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance” (1998) 19 Strategic Mgmt. J. 
269 at 270 (noting that a “preference for outsider-dominated boards is largely grounded in 
agency theory” which is “built on the managerialist notion that separation of ownership and 
control, as is characteristic of the modern corporation, potentially leads to selfinterested 
actions by those in control—managers”); Daniel P. Forbes & Frances J. Milliken, “Cognition 
and Corporate Governance: Understanding the Boards of Directors as Strategic Decision-
Making Groups” (1999) 24 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 489 at 491 (referring to the theoretical 
rationale that “a high proportion of outsiders will enhance some aspects of board functioning, 
such as board effort norms, as agency theory would suggest …”). 
258
  Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, “A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law” (1999) 85 Va. 
L. Rev. 247 at 250 [A Team Production Theory]. See also Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, 
 96
of directors of a public corporation is “not to act as agents who ruthlessly pursue 
shareholders’ interests at the expense of employees, creditors or other team 
members”,259 but rather that directors are “trustees for the corporation itself—
mediating hierarchs whose job is to balance team members’ competing interests 
in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays 
together”.260 The team production theory too encourages independence on the 
board.261 While both the agency theory and the team production theory meet 
common ground on this aspect, there is one fundamental difference. The agency 
theory looks to the independent board to bring about shareholder wealth 
maximisation; the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors, 
consumers, the community and the public are not within the purview of the board. 
On the other hand, the team production theory confers a prominent place to the 
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders. Hence, while the agency theory 
acknowledges only the manager-shareholder agency problem, the team 
production theory is sympathetic to the controller-stakeholder agency problem. 
But, for our purposes, it is crucial to note that neither theory renders any level of 
cognisance to the majority-minority shareholder problem. Even the team 
                                                                                                                                     
“Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board” (2001) 79 Wash. 
U.L.Q. 403 at 425. 
259
  Blair & Stout, A Team Production Theory, ibid. at 280. 
260
  Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
261
  Blair & Stout note as follows: 
[A]n independent board of directors may be able to encourage shareholders, executives, 
and employees to invest in corporate production not because these team members expect 
the board to determine which group gets what portion of the resulting economic surplus, 
but because the possibility that the board could make that allocation discourages the more 
egregious form of shirking and rent-seeking among team members. 
Ibid. at 282 (emphasis in original). 
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production theory expressly admits its applicability to public corporations with 
widely dispersed shareholding.262 Before concluding on the team production 
theory, it is necessary to note that the theory is relatively recent and is yet to gain 
wide acceptance in corporate governance literature, and hence stands on less 
stronger footing than the agency theory.263 Moreover, the team production theory 
visualises the board as well as the independent directors more as mediators rather 
than monitors. While this theory may be extended implicitly to show that 
independent directors can perform the task of mediating conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders, it cannot be stretched to include a 
monitoring role on independent directors in favour of minority shareholders (as 
opposed to a mere mediating role). 
 It is therefore evident that the theoretical underpinnings of the monitoring 
board and the independent director concept emanate from the agency cost theory 
that relates primarily to the manager-shareholder agency problem. There is no 
mention whatsoever in the literature of the majority-minority agency problem as 
                                                 
262
  Blair & Stout note: 
… the model applies primarily to public—not private—corporations. …, directors of 
public corporations with widely dispersed share ownership are remarkably free from the 
direct control of any of the groups that make up the corporate “team”, including 
shareholders, executives, and employees. Although directors have incentives to 
accommodate the interests of all these groups, they are under the command of none. In 
contract, in a closely held firm, stock ownership is usually concentrated in the hands of a 
small number of investors who not only select and exercise tight control over the board, 
but also are themselves involved in managing the firm as officers and directors. 
Ibid. at 281. 
263
  The team production theory has been the subject-matter of criticism from various academic 
quarters. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, “Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance” (2003) 97 Nw. U.L. Rev. 547 [Director Primacy]; Alan Meese, “The Team 
Production Theory of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment” (2002) 43 Wm. & Mary L. 
Rev. 1629. 
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academics were not confronted with the issue at all as they were primarily dealing 
with outsider systems of corporate governance. There is only some peripheral 
treatment of the controller-stakeholder agency problem in the team production 
theory, but since that theory has not received deep-rooted acceptance, the 
emphasis placed on this agency problem in the context of an independent 
monitoring board can only be said to be tangential.  
3.3 Emergence of Independent Directors in U.S. Corporate Practice 
Apart from repeated allusions in theory to the concept of independent directors as 
an answer to the manager-shareholder problem, it is interesting to note that the 
emergence of the independent director in practice can be attributed to that very 
same problem as well. American boardroom practice is replete with instances 
favouring independent directors as a solution to the manager-shareholder agency 
problem. As we shall see, the concept emerged as a voluntary mechanism with the 
belief that a board with some level of independence will introduce objectivity in 
decision-making, will add to the diversity and advisory capabilities of the board 
and would hence improve performance of the company (ultimately reflected in 
the company’s stock price). Various arms of the government rapidly bought into 
this idea: the judiciary to begin with, and then the legislature, with greater 
emphasis placed by self-regulatory bodies such as the stock exchanges and law 
review bodies such as the American Law Institute (ALI). What commenced as a 
voluntary movement in the 1950s took on a mandatory form following the various 
corporate governance scandals (such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and the like) 
that occurred at the turn of the century and resulted in the enactment of stringent 
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legislation in the form of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act264 in 2002 and amendments to 
the listing rules of key stock exchanges such as NYSE and NASDAQ. Similar 
changes occurred in the U.K. too, with the Cadbury Committee report and 
subsequent reports thereafter, but these developments are more recent than in the 
U.S. All these initiatives are aimed towards addressing the manager-shareholder 
agency problem, and it is to this aspect that I shall now turn in greater detail. 
A. Changing Board Composition; The Voluntary Phase 
Most academic studies review board composition from the 1950s.265 Prior to 
1950, boards largely consisted of “insiders” who were executives of the 
companies, and the essential role of the board was to manage the company, or to 
advise the management of the company. The primary function of the board was 
advisory in nature with very little monitoring, or more often none at all. At most, 
they included certain “outside” directors, who were not executives or employees 
of the company, but were otherwise affiliated with the company.266 However, 
since the 1950s, boards gradually began inducting more outside directors,267 
                                                 
264
  See supra note 15. 
265
  As far as independent directors are concerned, the most comprehensive study of the history 
and origin of independent directors in the U.S. is that of Professor Jeffrey Gordon. Gordon, 
The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11. 
266
  For a discussion of “affiliated” or “grey” directors, see supra note 241. 
267
  Professor Gordon notes: 
One of the most important empirical developments in U.S. corporate governance over the 
past half century has been the shift in board composition away from insiders (and 
affiliated directors) towards independent directors. This trend is consistent throughout the 
period and accelerates in the post-1970 subperiod. 
Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1472-73. 
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although in the initial years the numbers of outside directors were relatively few 
and the inside directors continued to constitute a significant majority on the board. 
 During this initial phase, there were two visible features. First, there was 
neither any legal requirement nor any form of regulatory exhortation for 
companies to induct outside directors. That was done purely as a voluntary 
measure, and as a matter of good corporate practice.268 Implicit in this good 
practice is a desire to improve the business prospects of the company and thereby 
increase shareholder value through enhanced profitability.269 Ultimately, in that 
sense, the voluntary nature of this effort is to promote the interest of shareholders. 
The second feature during this period is that there was no concept of 
independence as currently understood. Outside directors, whether affiliated or 
otherwise, were understood to be a useful substitute to inside directors, and hence 
there was no definition or clarity in the understanding of the concept of 
independent director. This is perhaps explained by the fact that directors (both 
inside and outside) were looked upon to engage in managerial or advisory 
functions with respect to a company. The monitoring role of directors was not 
envisaged during this period. However, things began undergoing changes within 
the next couple of decades, as we shall see in the sub-section below. 
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  Roberta Karmel, “The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?” (1984) 52 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 534 at 544. 
269
  This was intended to have a signalling effect whereby an independent board would imply to 
the market that the company is serious about following strict principles of governance thereby 
enhancing the reputation of the company in the market place. 
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B. Emergence of a “Monitoring Board” 
It was only during the 1970s that the concept of the independent director “entered 
the corporate governance lexicon … as the kind of director capable of fulfilling 
the monitoring role”.270 This introduced a significant change in the terminology, 
because “outside” directors, which until then were considered as a class 
comprising of persons other than insiders, were divided into a further category of 
“independent directors” and “affiliated” or “grey directors”. Together with the 
concept of independent directors, the need for a “monitoring board” was clearly 
identified.271  
At a conceptual level, the shift in the thinking towards a monitoring board 
can be attributed to the work of Professor Eisenberg.272 It was found in the 1970s 
that the board principally performs advisory functions and provides counsel to the 
company’s chief executive.273 Furthermore, even outside directors largely carried 
out the same role, thereby creating some consternation among the policy-
makers.274 Professor Eisenberg therefore recommended that corporate boards 
follow the “monitoring model”, whereby the board constantly monitors the results 
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  Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1477. 
271
  The recognition of the failure of monitoring on boards was precipitated by the collapse of 
Penn-Central and the Watergate-related illegal scandals. See Gordon, The Rise of Independent 
Directors, ibid. at 1514-15; Joel Seligman, “A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law 
Institute Principles of Corporate Governance Project” (1987) 55 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 325 at 
328-40. 
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  Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (Little, Brown 
and Company: Toronto, 1976) [The Structure of the Corporation]. 
273
  Ibid. at 155 
274
  Although neither any law nor policy clearly defined the role of the outside directors, Professor 
Eisenberg notes that the “outside director [was] not fulfilling the policy-making role 
contemplated by corporate law”. Ibid. at 154. 
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achieved by the managers (led by the chief executive) and hence determines 
whether the incumbents should stay or be replaced.275 A corollary to the 
monitoring function of the board is that it should be comprised of a substantial 
number of independent directors so that the monitoring may be carried out in a 
fair, objective and dispassionate manner. Professor Eisenberg therefore 
recommended the creation of mandatory rules for board composition which, until 
then, was left to the judgment of companies and their managements rather than as 
a matter prescribed by law. His exhortation for rule-making in this area is 
captured in the following statement: 
Given the importance of this cluster of functions, it therefore follows that 
the primary objective of the legal rules governing the structure of 
corporate management should be to maximize the likelihood that these 
conditions will obtain. Specifically, these rules must, to the extent 
possible: (1) make the board independent of the executives whose 
performance is being monitored; and (2) assure a flow of, or at least a 
capability for acquiring, adequate and objective information on the 
executives’ performance.276 
While the monitoring board represents a paradigm shift in board functions, it is 
clear that such a board too has been conceived in the context of the manager-
shareholder agency problem. The monitoring board has been created to monitor 
only one constituency, and that is the managers. Hence, the agency problem that 
                                                 
275
  Ibid. at 164-65. Professor Eisenberg further notes: 
Unlike the received legal model, which, as elaborated, stresses the policymaking function 
and therefore assumes the board is an integral part of the corporation’s management 
structure, the premise of a monitoring model is that management is a function of the 
executives, with ultimate responsibility located in the office of the chief executive. Under 
a monitoring model, therefore, the role of the board is to hold the executives accountable 
for adequate results (whether financial, social, or both), while the role of the executives is 
to determine how to achieve such results. 
Ibid. at 165. This statement clearly explains the perceptible change in approach of the boards, 
from the policymaking (advisory) function to the monitoring function. 
276
  Ibid. at 170. 
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the monitoring board and independent director have been created to control is that 
pertaining to managers. The majority-minority shareholder conflict is nowhere in 
the reckoning in this analysis. 
 Apart from the development in the 1970s of the monitoring board and a 
more nuanced form of the independent director, that decade is relevant for one 
other reason. It represents the first phase when board independence was 
introduced through exhortations by law and regulation (as opposed to voluntary 
practice). For instance, both the Securities and Exchange Commission [“SEC”] as 
well as the NYSE recommended the creation of audit committees of the board 
comprising independent directors.277 Even business and professional organisations 
began subscribing to the view that independent directors will enhance the 
monitoring functions of the board. For instance, in 1976, a subcommittee of the 
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law Committee of the American Bar 
Association issued the Corporate Director’s Guidebook that called for boards to 
be comprised of non-management directors,278 and the Business Roundtable 
recommended that “outsiders should have a substantial impact on the board’s 
decision making process”.279 
 One of the key outcomes of the monitoring board is the place it found in 
the American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance.280 The 
ALI was confounded with the problems raised by Berle and Means and hence 
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  See Karmel, supra note 268 at 545. 
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  Ibid. at 546-47. 
279
  Ibid. at 548. 
280
  See Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI, supra note 244 at 1034. 
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undertook an ambitious effort to address those problems.281 Tentative Draft No. 1 
of the ALI Principles required the boards of large publicly held companies to be 
comprised of a majority of independent directors.282 The draft also required 
companies to have committees such as audit committee and nomination 
committee.283 It was during this reform process that specific board composition 
rules were framed as a mandatory feature that required all large publicly listed 
companies to follow without any flexibility.284 This mandatory feature, however, 
came in for considerable criticism (particularly from law and economics scholars) 
on account of the fact that rigidity would hamper business activity and that a “one 
size fits all” approach may be counterproductive.285 As a result, the ALI 
Principles were converted into mere recommendations and corporate practices in 
subsequent drafts, as opposed to mandatory requirements.286 Despite a significant 
dilution in its approach over a period of time, the ALI Principles constitute an 
important step in the development of corporate governance norms in the U.S. and 
particularly in relation to the monitoring board and the independent director.287 
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  Ibid. at 1034-35. 
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  Ibid. at 1037. 
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  Ibid. at 1038. 
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  Professor Eisenberg, who was an advocate of the monitoring board and mandatory board 
composition, was also the Chief Reporter of the ALI Principles project. See Barry D. 
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, “Modes of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature: A Reply 
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  Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI, supra note 244 at 1040. 
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  Although the initial version of the ALI Principles were met with objection on account of its 
mandatory character, it is pertinent to note that the mandatory nature of board composition 
was found inevitable after the Enron cohort of scandals and the enactment of corporate 
governance reforms in the U.S. thereafter, as I discuss in detail subsequently. See infra 
Section 3.3(D). 
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What is relevant for our purposes in this key development is that ALI Principles 
(and the discussion and controversies surrounding them) is well-grounded in the 
theory of the agency problem emanating from managers and in a diffused 
shareholding context (defined by the Berle and Means corporations). Hence, this 
discourse, which forms a key part of the introduction of the independent director 
concept, does not deal with the majority-minority agency problem or the 
controller-stakeholder agency problem. The problem at hand was only the 
manager-shareholder agency problem, and that was precisely what ALI intended 
to tackle in the ALI Principles. 
C. Judicial Reliance on Board Independence 
While efforts were underway to reform board structure by instilling greater 
independence, judicial interpretation of state law began placing significant weight 
on decisions of independent boards while reviewing corporate actions. This was 
particularly the case in the state of Delaware,288 which is the subject matter of 
discussion in this Section. The deference by Delaware courts to independent 
boards can be examined under three distinct categories: (i) self-dealing 
transactions; (ii) derivative suits; and (iii) hostile takeover situations. 
                                                 
288
  Delaware is the dominant corporate law jurisdiction in the United States. See Usha Rodrigues, 
“Fetishization of Independence” (2008) 33 J. Corp. L. 447 at 464. Delaware courts have been 
progressive in dealing with corporate law cases and placing reliance on actions of corporate 
fiduciaries where necessary. The importance of board independence has been accentuated 
because of the activist nature of the Delaware courts in dealing with corporate law matters. 
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1. Self-Dealing Transactions 
A self-dealing or conflict-of-interest transaction usually occurs when a director or 
officer of a company stands on both sides of a transaction to which the company 
is a party. Under Delaware law, the focus is on “whether a director, officer, or 
controlling shareholder of a corporation has a financial interest in a transaction 
that is not shared by the other shareholders in a corporation”.289 Section 144 of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law provides for a safe-harbour that legitimises 
self-dealing transactions in certain circumstances. One such circumstance is 
where (1) the material facts pertaining to the conflict of interest and terms of the 
transaction are disclosed to the board of directors (or the appropriate committee 
thereof), and (2) the transaction has been approved by a majority of disinterested 
directors, even if such directors constitute less than a quorum.290 This provision 
induces companies to appoint outside directors on their boards so that they are 
able to pass decisions on conflicted transactions.291 This is particularly necessary 
because certain kinds of conflicted transactions are inevitable in modern 
businesses, with executive compensation being the prime example, and approval 
of such transactions by a set of outside directors who are disinterested in such 
decisions will help companies appoint and reward their managers suitably.292 On 
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  Rodrigues, ibid. at 467. 
290
  Delaware General Corporation Law, s. 144(a)(1). Note that the provision deals with 
“disinterestedness” of the directors rather than “independence”. For the difference between 
these two expressions, see supra note 13. 
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  Lin, supra note 6 at 905-06. 
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  Courts have generally deferred to decisions of fully informed, disinterested directors on 
matters involving compensation of executives. See Charles M. Elson, “Executive 
Overcompensation—A Board-Based Solution” (1993) 34 B.C. L. Rev. 937 at 973; Douglas 
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this issue, we find that courts are again confronted with the manager-shareholder 
agency problem, whereby courts defer to the decisions of disinterested directors 
who are expected to act in the interest of shareholders by supervising conflict-of-
interest transactions that may benefit managers to the detriment of shareholders. 
 Beyond the contours of Section 144 of DGCL and the conflict of interest 
involving officers and directors lies another type of self-dealing transactions. That 
pertains to conflict of interest transactions involving controlling shareholders.293 
Such transactions manifest themselves mostly in freezeout mergers.294 There is a 
conflict of interest because the controlling shareholders may act to buy the 
minority shareholders’ stake at a low price thereby acting to the detriment of the 
minority. In this context, the Delaware Supreme court placed reliance on the 
independent director institution as a solution to the controlling shareholder agency 
problem. In the seminal case of Weinberger v. UOP Inc.,295 the court made a 
suggestion that one method to solve the controlling shareholder conflict would be 
to employ independent directors who can consider the transaction at arm’s 
length.296 This suggestion was picked up by Delaware courts in subsequent 
                                                                                                                                     
C. Michael, “The Corporate Officer’s Independent Duty as a Tonic for the Anemic Law of 
Executive Compensation” (1992) 17 J. Corp. L. 785 at 805, 809. 
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  Note that in the analysis of various developments pertaining to independent directors in the 
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  A freezeout is defined as “a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the 
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Guhan Subramanian, “Fixing Freezeouts” (2005) 115 Yale L.J. 2 at 5. 
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  457 A. 2d 701 at 710 (Del. 1983) [Weinberger]. 
296
  In the Weinberger case, the Delaware Supreme Court lamented the absence of an independent 
process for negotiating the deal and laid the foundation for the role of independent directors in 
such situations: “Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have 
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cases297 holding that “the use of a well functioning committee of independent 
directors shifts the burden of proof in the context of mergers with a controlling 
shareholder”.298 This string of cases displays two characteristics: (i) for the first 
time, independence was determined with reference to the controlling shareholder 
rather than merely with reference to managers;299 (ii) independence was not 
considered a position to be determined ex ante through prescribed qualifying 
factors, but was to be determined by courts ex post based on the actual behaviour 
of such directors in decision-making on the conflicted transaction; it is not 
sufficient for directors to satisfy prescribed criteria for independence, but rather to 
clearly demonstrate that they have in fact acted independent of the controlling 
shareholders.300 
 The freezeout illustration shows the keenness of Delaware courts in 
regulating controlling shareholder transactions too, apart from transactions 
involving officers and directors. To that extent, it extends the role of the 
independent directors beyond the manager-shareholder agency problem to cover 
                                                                                                                                     
been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its 
outside directors to deal with Signal at arm’s length”. Ibid. at 709. 
297
  Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 at 1117 (Del. 1994); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 
694 A.2d 422 at 428 (Del. 1997); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 at 938 (Del. 
1985). 
298
  Rodrigues, supra note 288 at 477. 
299
  Hence, a director ought to have no financial relationships either with the managers or with the 
controlling shareholders in order to qualify as independent for this purpose. See ibid. at 478. 
300
  Rodrigues notes: 
…, the independence of directors is evaluated not just in terms of their lack of ties with 
the acquirer, but also in terms of their behavior. Delaware courts conduct a fact-intensive 
ex post inquiry into the special committee's actions. The key point is that courts assessing 
the situational interestedness of directors do not focus solely on relationships; they also 
inquire whether the directors' actions demonstrate “true” independence. 
Ibid. 
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even the majority-minority shareholder problem. This is indeed a unique instance 
considering that the U.S. courts are often left to deal with the manager-
shareholder agency problem. What are the lessons to be learnt from this episode, 
and how have they been considered in other jurisdictions? First, independence is 
to be reckoned not only with reference to managers but also with reference to 
controlling shareholders. This aspect of independence has indeed been 
transplanted to jurisdictions such as China and India where there are controlling 
shareholders in most companies.301 Second, independence ought not to be 
considered as a predetermined qualification for appointment of directors ex ante, 
but the actual performance of the directors is also an important factor in 
determining independence. This aspect does not seem to have found its way past 
the borders of the small state of Delaware. Neither the federal laws in the U.S. nor 
the stock exchange regulations in that country prescribe independence 
requirements in that fashion. Independence is considered on the basis of preset 
rules, and it is a status conferred on the person at the time of appointment and not 
based on the actions of such person after appointment and with reference to any 
specific conflicted transaction. Similarly, such ex post determination has not 
found its way into other jurisdictions such as China and India (or even the U.K. 
for that matter). Hence, while Delaware law on controlling shareholder 
transactions provides some useful lessons to deal with that problem (which is 
                                                 
301
  For a discussion on this issue, see infra Chapter 4, Sections 4.3(C) and 4.4(C). 
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rampant in emerging insider economies such as China and India), the prescribed 
solutions have not been considered in their entirety in the insider systems.302 
 While Delaware jurisprudence on the role of independent directors in 
curbing controlling shareholders provides a wider perspective on the utility of that 
institution, there are doubts on whether the Delaware model is replicable in other 
jurisdictions. To the extent that there is an extended definition of independent 
directors (to include independence from the controlling shareholders), that has 
been adopted in other jurisdictions.303 
2. Derivative Suits 
Under Delaware law, before a shareholder can initiate a derivative action on 
behalf of a company against its directors or officers, such shareholder must make 
a demand on the board of directors requesting it to initiate action on behalf of the 
company. Since the board may not be inclined to sue its own members or officers, 
it is quite possible that the board may reject such a demand. In order to prevent 
such a situation, such a demand on the board may be excused when the demand is 
                                                 
302
  Academics such as Rodrigues have argued that independence is situational and should be 
defined to deal with the specific conflicts at hand. Rather than having a preset definition of 
independence as a qualification, they suggest that independence should be considered on a 
case-by-case basis. See Rodrigues, supra note 288. However, it must be noted that 
implementation of such suggestions are bound to be met with practical difficulties. Ex post 
determination of independence requires courts to swiftly determine cases and lay down 
principles of law that provide certainty as to the concept of independence. While that may be 
practicable in a jurisdictions such as Delaware that possesses a fairly advanced system of 
corporate law adjudication, such approach would be fraught with difficulties in jurisdictions 
that lack such judicial infrastructure, and emerging countries such as China and India would 
surely point in that direction. As Lin notes: “Even if courts were capable of making such 
evaluations intelligently, the uncertainty of the resulting standard could both raise litigation 
costs and hamper business planning”. Lin, supra note 6 at 964. 
303
  See infra Chapter 4, Sections 4.3(C) and 4.4(C). 
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considered to be futile, whereby the shareholder may bring a suit without making 
a demand.304 Delaware law lays down the standard for determining demand 
futility as follows: “whether taking the well-pleaded facts as true, the allegations 
raise a reasonable doubt as to (i) director disinterest or independence or (ii) 
whether the directors exercised proper business judgment in approving the 
challenged transaction”.305 
 These requirements too encourage companies to have outside directors on 
their boards and committees.306 However, in this case, the concept of 
independence is not as clear as in the case of conflicted transactions discussed 
earlier.307 The test of independence is the lack of “domination or control”, which 
is “very fact specific, and the courts have differed as to what factors to take into 
consideration”.308 It appears, therefore, that the role of outsider or independent 
directors in rejecting demands for derivative actions essentially again deals with 
                                                 
304
  Although the demand requirement applies mostly in suits against the insiders, it is a matter of 
curiosity that the requirement originated in suits against third parties. See Paul N. Edwards, 
“Compelled Termination and Corporate Governance: The Big Picture” (1985) 10 J. Corp. L. 
373 at 398. 
305
  Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 at 186 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 at 814 (Del. 
1984) [Aronson]). 
306
  See Lin, supra note 6 at 907. 
307
  See supra Section 3.3(C)(1). 
308
  Lin, supra note 6 at 908. There is no clear indication as to the person who may exercise 
“dominance or control” in order to disqualify the independence of a director. Dominance or 
control may be exercised by the officers or directors (thereby creating the manager-
shareholder agency problem) or by the controlling shareholder (thereby creating the majority-
minority agency problem). See ibid. at 907-08. 
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the manager-shareholder agency problem, but to a lesser extent the majority-
minority agency problem.309 
3. Defensive Measures Against Hostile Takeovers 
The “deal decade” of the 1980s gave rise to defensive measures adopted by 
companies in response to hostile takeovers. The most notable among the 
defensive measures was the “poison pill”. While the pill and other defensive 
measures aided incumbent directors and managers from entrenching their 
positions in the company, it was often susceptible to challenge as being contrary 
to the interests of shareholders.310 Due to the inherent conflict of interest, 
“directors [were required to] show that they had reasonable grounds for believing 
that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed”311 because of a hostile 
acquisition. The court again placed reliance on an independent board’s decision 
                                                 
309
  In fact, courts have generally placed scant reliance on the beholdenness of a director to a 
controlling shareholder. As Rodrigues observes with reference to Aronson: 
Understanding how the independence inquiry arises in the derivative context, we can 
examine what it means for directors to be independent. Early articulations by Delaware 
courts stressed the idea of “domination and control”: plaintiffs had to allege 
particularized facts demonstrating “that through personal or other relationships the 
directors are beholden to the controlling person.” Obviously, one could argue that a 
director is beholden to the person who put her on the board. Nevertheless, the 
beholdenness that leads to a finding of domination and control requires more than a 
simple indebtedness for office. In Aronson, the court also made clear that allegations of 
stock ownership alone, at least when less than a majority, are not enough to prove non-
independence—even when coupled with the allegation that a proposed controller not only 
owned 47% of the outstanding stock of the corporation, but also had nominated the 
director at issue. As the court dryly observed: “That is the usual way a person becomes a 
corporate director.” 
Rodrigues, supra note 288 at 472 (footnotes omitted). 
310
  In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) [Unocal], the Supreme Court of 
Delaware made a pertinent observation that takeover defenses raise “the omnipresent specter 
that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation 
and its shareholders”. 
311
  Ibid. at 955. 
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on this count. It held that the proof of showing good faith and reasonable 
investigation “is materially enhanced … by the approval of a board comprising of 
a majority of outside independent directors …”.312 Although the court did not 
attempt a definition of “independence” in Unocal, that option was exercised 
subsequently in Unitrin Inc. v. American General Corp.313 This inference of 
director independence by courts in situations involving defensive measures 
encouraged companies to appoint independent outside directors on their boards. 
 However, hostile takeovers of the kind witnessed during the “deal decade” 
involved the interests of hostile acquirers and the incumbent boards and 
managers. Hostile takeovers often occurred in companies where there were no 
controlling shareholders.314 Hence, the mechanism of outside independent 
directors relied upon by the Delaware courts for hostile takeovers was meant to 
protect the interests of shareholders against actions of managers, and was 
essentially catered to resolve the manager-shareholder agency problem. 
 
 
                                                 
312
  Ibid. 
313
  651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995) [Unitrin]. Quoting Aronson, supra note 305, the court held that 
“independence “means that a director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the 
subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences”.” Unocal, supra 
note 310 at 1375. In such circumstances, the measures used to determine independence would 
also depend on the nature of the proposed sale, whether the company is in distress, and similar 
factors. 
314
  See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and 
Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Geo. L.J. 
1727 (describing that hostile takeovers are thought to play a key role in making managers 
accountable to shareholders in a dispersed shareholding system). See also Mathew, supra note 
148 (indicating that hostile takeovers will have a lesser impact in systems that display 
concentrated shareholding). 
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D. Regulatory Prescriptions on Board Independence 
While the trend set by the Delaware judiciary continued into the 1990s and 
thereafter, significant developments occurred over the turn of the century in 
relation to corporate governance generally and board composition in particular 
that had a profound impact on regulation of board matters. The corporate 
governance scandals involving Enron, WorldCom and other companies triggered 
a wave of reforms in the U.S. It is worth pausing for a moment to briefly 
understand what caused that corporate governance crisis. At the outset, boards did 
have a role (or failure thereof) to play in precipitating the corporate governance 
crisis. The 1990s witnessed a shift in executive compensation from cash payments 
to stock-based compensation (including in the form of stock options). This created 
perverse incentives to company managers as it enabled them to boost the short-
term stock performance of the company and then encash the options at a high 
price.315 As Professor Gordon notes: “Boards had simply failed to appreciate and 
protect against some of the moral hazards that stock-based compensation created, 
                                                 
315
  John C. Coffee, Jr., “Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid” (2002) 57 
Bus. Law. 1403 at 1413-14. See Carter & Lorsch, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 6 at 
48 (noting that Enron and other similar disasters confirm that “financial numbers can be 
seriously manipulated to paint an unrealistic picture of a company’s financial standing” and 
that when management and boards are given stock options that leads to “directors’ interests 
being aligned with management rather than with shareholders”) (emphasis in original). 
Charles Elson details the failure of independent directors to police management in the Enron 
case: 
But how does this emphasis on director independence and equity relate to the board 
failure at Enron? The answer is straightforward: the Enron directors lacked independence 
from management. They may have held company equity, but without the appropriate 
independence from Enron management, they lacked the objectivity needed to perceive 
the numerous and significant warning signs that should have alerted them to the alleged 
management malfeasance that led to the company's ultimate meltdown and failure. 
Charles M. Elson, “Enron and Necessity of the Objective Proximate Monitor” (2004) 89 
Cornell L. Rev. 496 at 499. 
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in particular, the special temptations to misreport financial results”.316 All these 
clearly indicate a failure of boards to monitor managers that led to serious 
misstatements in books of accounts and chicanery in financial statements. This 
was the manager-shareholder agency problem manifested at its best. Stock 
options to managers promoted short-termism that prompted them to inflate 
financial figures and that went unchecked by directors. While the managers 
benefited, shareholders suffered, and the board seemed to be waiting in the 
sidelines. It is indeed the manager-shareholder agency problem that triggered one 
of the most extensive and rapid set of reforms in American corporate history. The 
independent director, as we shall see, was proffered as the solution to that 
problem.   
The wave of corporate governance reforms was led by the enactment of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and revisions to the listing rules of NYSE and NASDAQ 
that introduced mandatory board composition requirements for the first time. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not mandate a general requirement regarding 
independence of the board. However, while dealing with audit committees, it 
provides that each member of the audit committee of a public company shall be 
an independent director.317 It is the revised rules of the NYSE and NASDAQ that 
require that all listed companies contain boards that have a majority of 
                                                 
316
  Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1536. 
317
  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, s. 301. This section also provides that “a member of an audit 
committee of an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit 
committee, the board of directors, or any other board committee—(i) accept any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer 
or any subsidiary thereof”. See also Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 6 at 86. 
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independent directors.318 Each of the exchanges defines an independent 
director.319  
Although the definitions of the two exchanges are largely similar, there are 
some differences in the approach and in certain details. Both provide for a broad 
definition of independence whereby a director does not qualify as independent 
unless the board affirmatively determines that the director has no material 
relationship with the listed company.320 In addition to the general test, a director 
would not be considered independent if she falls within one of the specific tests 
laid down.321  
Both the exchanges also require regular executive sessions among the non-
management directors without management being present.322 They also require 
the establishment of nomination committees for nomination and selection of 
                                                 
318
  NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14 at para. 303A.01; NASDAQ Rules, supra note 
14, r. 5605(b)(1).  
319
  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, ibid. at para. 303A.02; NASDAQ Rules, ibid., r. 
5605(a)(2). 
320
  Such relationship may be either direct or as partner, shareholder or officer of an organisation 
that has a relationship with the company. NYSE Listed Company Manual, ibid. at para. 
303A.02(a). The NASDAQ Rules require a determination by the board of directors as to 
whether the relationship of the director with the listed company would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director. NASDAQ 
Rules, ibid. r. 5605(a)(2). 
321
  These include: (i) employment by the individual or family member with the listed company as 
an executive officer within the last three years; (ii) receipt by the individual or a family 
member of compensation from the company of certain specified amounts; (iii) association 
with a firm that is the company’s internal or external auditor; (iv) employment as an executive 
officer of another company where any of the listed company’s present executive officers serve 
on that company’s compensation committee; and (v) employment as executive officer of a 
company that has payment transactions with the listed company for property or services in an 
amount which is beyond a specified amount. See NYSE Listed Company Manual, ibid. at para. 
303A.02(b); NASDAQ Rules, ibid., r. 5605(a)(2). 
322
  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, ibid. at para. 303A.03; NASDAQ Rules, ibid., r. 5605-2. 
This is to empower non-management directors to serve as a more effective check on 
management by promoting open discussions among them. 
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directors.323 It is the expectation that placing nomination or selection decisions in 
the hands of independent directors would enhance the independence and quality 
of the nominees that are being considered for directorship. This curbs the power 
of the inside directors or managers to influence the board composition, 
particularly when it comes to the appointment of independent directors. 
Interestingly, both the exchanges exempt controlled companies from 
provisions mandating independent directors.324 A controlled company is one 
where more than 50% of the voting power is held by an individual, a group or 
another company.325 This appears to be in recognition of the fact that 
independence of directors need not, or even cannot be expected to, act as a check 
on management as the controlling shareholders would be in a position to assume 
that role.326 The rationale for the exception appears to be that where there is a 
controlling shareholder, the other shareholders may not be afforded sufficient 
protection by independent directors. This is explicit recognition of the fact that 
independent directors are a solution to the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders and, by inference, not to agency problems between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders.  
Despite containing important features, this provision has received scant 
attention in academic literature in the U.S. This is perhaps explainable by the fact 
                                                 
323
  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, ibid. at para. 303A.04; NASDAQ Rules, ibid., r. 5605(e). 
324
  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, ibid. at para. 303A.00; NASDAQ Rules, ibid., R. 5615(c).  
325
  Ibid. 
326
  This also fits well into the theory that in the U.S. independent directors are considered as 
monitoring the managers and for solving the agency problem between the shareholders and 
managers. 
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that the incidence of such high level of control in U.S. companies is truly a rarity, 
and this provision is invoked only in a few cases. However, there is some 
academic support for the argument emanating from this provision that 
independent directors and the manager-shareholder agency problem go hand-in-
hand: 
[NYSE and NASDAQ] see independent directors as a protection for 
shareholders specifically against management, not against other 
shareholders. A shareholder who controls a company does not need an 
external rulemaker to protect him from a management team that he has the 
power to appoint. Minority shareholders may need protection from 
controlling shareholders, but the exchanges are apparently willing to leave 
this task to other bodies of law, such as federal securities law requiring 
disclosures, and state corporate law mandating certain fiduciary duties.327  
Moreover, this exception has been found necessary to protect the interests of 
controlling shareholders. Specifically, if controlled companies have majority 
independent boards, that would work against the interests of the controlling 
shareholders (such as business families and venture capitalists), which would 
result in unintended consequences.328 This exception has also invited some 
criticism as errant companies found this avenue to be attractive in staying outside 
the purview of board independence requirements prescribed by NYSE and 
NASDAQ.329 
In this background, two aspects are clear: (i) the mandatory independent 
director requirement was introduced in the Sarbanes-Oxley wave of reforms as a 
                                                 
327
  Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts, supra note 6 at 94 (emphasis in original). 
328
  Joseph P. Farano, “How Much Is Too Much? Director Equity Ownership and Its Role in the 
Independence Assessment” (2008) Seton Hall L. Rev. 753 at 768. 
329
  See Deborah Solomon, “Loophole Limits Independence--Dozens of Firms Use Exemption 
That Allows Them to Avoid Rules Mandating Board Structure” The Wall Street Journal (28 
April 2004) at C1. 
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reaction to corporate governance scandals that involved the manager-shareholder 
agency problem; and (ii) it is the express intention of the policymakers not to 
consider the independent director as a solution to the majority-minority agency 
problem and hence exceptions were carved out for “controlled companies”. 
Therefore, other corporate governance mechanisms (beyond independent 
directors) ought to be considered if the system does not involve the manager-
shareholder agency problems, as is the case in insider systems such as China and 
India. As I shall discuss in detail later,330 this exception that raises significant 
questions as to the applicability of independent directors in controlled companies 
has not at all been considered by policy-makers in the insider systems of China 
and India while transplanting the concept. This is arguably a glaring oversight. 
In essence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the revised standards prescribed 
by the NYSE and NASDAQ not only envisage an enhanced role for independent 
directors on boards of public listed companies, but also lay down stringent norms 
for determining independence. Since these reforms in the U.S. straddled the 
reforms in corporate governance occurring in emerging markets such as China 
and India, several aspects of these reforms were incorporated in the corporate 
governance norms of those jurisdictions, the efficacy of which we shall consider 
in detail in subsequent chapters.  
The rise of the independent director in the U.S. is entrenched in the search 
for an optimal board composition that can resolve the agency problem between 
                                                 
330
  See infra Chapter 6, Section 6.2. 
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managers and shareholders. The current U.S. policy prescribes a board with a 
majority of independent directors as capable of undertaking that task. Since the 
U.S. corporate structure was never confronted with the majority-minority 
shareholder problem, its corporate governance norms have not been guided by 
any concern towards addressing that problem. At least, independent directors have 
not been envisaged as a means of resolving that problem.331 If anything, the 
indication is that independent directors are not a necessary solution to the majority 
minority problem.332 That leaves us with the question as to whether the 
emergence of independent directors in the U.S. is in anyway associated with the 
third agency problem, being the one between controllers and stakeholders, as we 
shall see in the next sub-section. 
E. Independent Directors and the Stakeholder Theory 
The issue of whether board composition and director independence have any role 
to play in resolving the controller-stakeholder agency problem has confounded 
some academics, although it must be admitted that only sparse attention has been 
paid to the role of board independence towards this agency problem than it has 
been towards the manager-shareholder and majority-minority agency problem. 
The conservative notion of board independence would contend that independent 
directors are elected by shareholders alone and hence are accountable only to that 
                                                 
331
  The only exception that one can point to relates to the role of independent directors in 
approving transactions involving conflicts of interests of controlling shareholders, such as the 
case of freezeout mergers. This is a principle judicially recognised under Delaware law. For 
details, see supra notes 293 to 298 and accompanying text. 
332
  This is evident from the exemption available to “controlled companies” from appointing 
independent directors. See supra note 324 and accompanying text. 
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constituency (whether comprised of the shareholder body as a whole or to 
minority shareholders only).333 No other interest group commands the 
accountability of an independent director. The broader conception of board 
independence contemplates that independent directors “are not merely 
independent monitors of management on behalf of stockholders, but who have 
loyalties to specific constituencies, such as labor, consumers, women, minorities, 
or the public affected by environmental and other consequences of corporate 
activity”.334 Due to the diversity in approach towards non-shareholder 
constituencies, an appropriate method for analysing the role of independent 
directors would be to determine the extent to which corporate law provides 
protection to such constituencies.335 That would necessitate an examination of the 
constituencies to whom managers and boards of companies owe their 
responsibility and accountability. 
Professor Brudney, in his seminal work on independent directors, notes:336 
On more or less conventional assumptions, stockholders, as owners of the 
enterprises in which they invest, are the sole constituency to whom 
managers are responsible, and managers, as the stockholders’ delegates, 
are charged to maximize their wealth. On those assumptions, the 
theoretical power to displace management is designed to enable the board 
of directors, and particularly outside directors, to perform two essential 
functions: (1) to goad managers to perform adequately their wealth-
maximizing task, in both long-run and short-run terms; and (2) to ensure 
managers’ integrity in dividing corporate assets between themselves and 
stockholders. While those two functions are in a formal sense to be 
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  See Brudney, supra note 7 at 599. 
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  Ibid. 
335
  See ibid. at 605. 
336
  Ibid. at 602. 
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performed by the entire board, they are matters in which outside directors 
are expected to have particular influence and responsibility. 
On less conservative assumptions, the role in society of large, publicly 
held corporations compels them to take account not only of stockholders’ 
interests, but also of other social concerns. 
While Professor Brudney rightly identified a role for independent directors in 
catering to non-shareholder constituencies, he did not venture to provide an in-
depth analysis of that role. In fact, he preferred to address the concept of the 
“director who is asked on conventional assumptions to monitor management in 
the interest of stockholders, but in some indeterminate way to inject a concern for 
external claimants or the public interest into his decision-making and to mediate 
among the conflicting claims”.337 Brudney in fact concludes with a great sense of 
agnosticism about the success of independent directors as monitors of non-
shareholder constituencies. He notes that if corporate law itself is unclear about a 
solution to controller-stakeholder agency problem, the introduction of an 
institution such as the independent director is unlikely to help.338 Apart from this 
conceptual issue, there could be other issues of practical significance. For 
instance, if independent directors are appointed by shareholders, it is incongruous 
to expect them to be accountable to any constituency other than shareholders.339 
Furthermore, accountability of independent directors to non-shareholder 
constituencies is incapable of measurement. As far as shareholders are concerned, 
the significance of an independent board is capable of being reflected in corporate 
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  Ibid. at 607. 
338
  Ibid. at 653. 
339
  This problem is only likely to be exacerbated whenever there is a conflict between 
shareholder and non-shareholder constituencies (the likelihood of which is not altogether a 
rarity). 
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performance through stock price, but the benefits and costs of board independence 
to non-shareholder constituencies introduces a great level of subjectivity and 
hence is immeasurable, at least to any meaningfully determinative extent. 
 With this background about the possible association between board 
independent and non-shareholder constituencies, it is necessary to explore the 
development of the position in the U.S. on this issue. One significant factor, as 
Professor Gordon’s analysis demonstrates, is that the development of the 
monitoring board and the shift towards board independence correlates with the 
move in U.S. corporate thinking from protection of stakeholder interests to 
unbridled shareholder wealth maximisation. The obvious conclusion that can be 
extrapolated from Professor Gordon’s account of parallel developments on these 
two fronts340 is that greater independence is associated with greater shareholder 
value,341 which means that independent boards owe their allegiance towards 
shareholders and not to any other constituency. Any accountability of independent 
directors towards non-shareholder constituencies fades away in the same manner 
that corporate law’s protection to those constituencies has in the last few decades. 
Some elaboration of this assertion is warranted by borrowing some strands from 
the historical developments accounted for in detail by Professor Gordon.  
 The advisory board of the 1950s342 coincided with the “high-water mark 
of stakeholder capitalism in the United States”.343 During that period, the 
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  See Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1510-40. 
341
  As Professor Gordon notes: “In the general trajectory, there is an increasingly tight link 
between the independent board and the priority of shareholder value”. Ibid. at 1511. 
342
  For an account pertaining to the advisory board, see supra Section 3.3(A). 
 124
corporate sector regarded “untempered profit maximization as immoral”.344 Since 
boards had an advisory role, they were essentially an extension of management 
and in that capacity were required to consider the interests of stakeholders 
consistent with the philosophy of the time.345 While the 1970s witnessed the rise 
of the monitoring board,346 that coincided initially with the continued rise of 
stakeholder capitalism.347 This may indicate that the monitoring board would be 
compelled to lean towards non-shareholder constituencies, but that was not to be 
the case. The evolution of the role of independent directors towards these 
constituencies was anything but clear. As Professor Gordon observes: 
Thus the social responsibility movement and the “monitoring board” 
movement found common ground on the importance of the independent 
director, although there was no genuine meeting of the minds. Independent 
directors who monitored vigorously on behalf of shareholder interests 
would pursue an agenda quite different from a “constituency director” 
infused with a broader sense of corporate mission. One irony of the social 
responsibility movement was its kindred spirit to managerialist claims 
about the need for appropriate balance in the corporation’s objectives. One 
difference, of course, was the managers’ persistent desire for control and 
autonomy, the exclusive power to strike balance, without the noisome 
assistance of constituency directors. So if there was broad support in the 
1970s for an infusion of “independent directors” into board activity, there 
was no crisp consensus on exactly what ends these directors were to 
pursue.348 
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  Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1511. 
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  Raymond C. Baumhart, “How Ethical Are Businessmen?” Harv. Bus. Rev., July-Aug. 1961 at 
6, 10. 
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  During that time, companies were “asked to give due weight to the interests of those within 
the corporate family, most importantly, the employees and the communities in which they 
lived”. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1517. 
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  This early period represents the efforts of Nader, Green, and Seligman to bring about 
representation of various constituency groups. See Ralph Nader, Mark Green & Joel 
Seligman, Taming the Giant Corporation (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976). 
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  Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1518. 
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The 1980s witnessed the beginning of the resolution of this uncertainty. The 
hostile takeovers during the “deal decade” not only propelled “shareholder value 
as the ultimate measure of corporate success”,349 but the monitoring board gained 
wider acceptance.350 The pre-eminence of shareholder wealth maximisation has 
since stood on terra firma, and that continues to the present.351  Factors that 
contributed to this include the emergence of institutional investor activism (to 
enhance shareholder value) in the 1990s and the increasing reliance of the board 
on share price to benchmark managerial performance.352 This trend continued into 
the 21st century and the all-pervasive effect of the monitoring board has been felt 
with the set of reforms led by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act together with the goal of 
                                                 
349
  Ibid. at 1520. Professor Gordon further summarises the position as follows: 
The hostile takeover movement of the 1980s brought unprecedented emphasis to 
shareholder value as the ultimate corporate objective. In response, director independence 
came to be understood as a critical element in the intellectual and legal architecture 
necessary to preserve managerial autonomy against the pressure of the market in 
corporate control. A managerial elite that in prior decades had no use for independent 
directors now embraced them as an essential element of shareholder capitalism. The 
reformers’ case for independent directors in the 1970s pointed in several different 
directions. The takeover movement of the 1980s crystallized that the independent 
directors’ role would be crucially tied to shareholder value. 
Ibid. at 1526. 
350
  Ibid. at 1520. A contrary trend in the 1980s was the enactment of “constituency statutes” in 
various states in the U.S. that required managers to consider the interests of various 
constituencies such as labour, creditors and consumers while taking decisions on the 
acceptability of hostile takeover offers. See Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception, supra note 
67 at 276. But, these constituency statutes were structured so as to protect the interests of the 
managerial elites (to entrench themselves in the shadow of hostile takeovers) rather than to 
genuinely protect the interests of non-shareholder constituencies. See Dent, supra note 79. 
351
  This change in attitude is also visible in the approach of the Business Roundtable. Its 
approach in the 1970s was to identify “corporate social responsibility” as a separate function 
for the board of directors. Business Roundtable, “The Role and Composition of the Board of 
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation” (1978) 33 Bus. Law. 2083. On the other 
hand, in the 1990s, the approach has been to state that “the paramount duty of management 
and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders; the interests of other 
stakeholders are relevant as a derivate of the duty to stockholders”. Business Roundtable, 
Statement on Corporate Governance (September 1997) cited from Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1529. 
352
  Gordon, ibid. at 1528. 
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companies to maximise shareholder value (without significant duties towards 
non-shareholder constituencies). 
 This brief account of developments in the U.S. demonstrates the 
correlation between board independence and shareholder value maximisation in 
the U.S. context. Hence, an independent monitoring board has never been 
considered as panacea to solving the controller-stakeholder agency problem in the 
U.S. While calls for a monitoring board overlapped with stakeholder activism in 
the 1970s, the latter subsided before the role of the monitoring board towards non-
shareholder constituencies could be finessed. Hence, there was never really any 
opportunity to conduct analytical or empirical studies on the role of independent 
directors in the wake of the controller-shareholder agency problem. 
 To summarise the emergence of the independent director institution in the 
U.S. context in the wake of the several agencies problems identified earlier, it is 
possible to conclude with a great deal of conviction that the independent director 
concept in the U.S. is targeted almost entirely towards the resolution of the 
manager-shareholder agency problem. The majority-minority agency problem is 
non-existent in the U.S. context, save to the extent of self-dealing transactions 
such as freezeout mergers where independent directors have been conferred a role 
primarily under Delaware law. The concept of an independent board was not 
evolved enough in the U.S. to be tested against the controller-stakeholder agency 
problem, and its efficacy in that context continues to be hazy. However, as to the 
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last point asserted, there is scope for further analysis using the team production 
theory propounded by Blair and Stout.353 
3.4 Emergence of Independent Directors in U.K. Corporate Practice 
The history of the independent director institution is comparatively short in the 
U.K., with its life span being less than 20 years. Apart from that, the literature on 
the role of independent directors in U.K. companies is far limited compared to 
that in U.S. companies. Nevertheless, there is a great amount of similarity in 
corporate governance practices between the U.S. and the U.K. Of course, there 
exist some areas of divergence, but the similarities far outweigh the differences, at 
least on matters of principle (as opposed to matters of detail).354 Even where there 
are differences, they have a bearing largely in terms of “degree rather than 
kind”.355 Hence, my effort in this section is to briefly discuss the emergence of the 
independent director concept in the U.K., with greater emphasis on those areas 
where U.K. has followed a different trajectory from that of the U.S.356 
                                                 
353
  See supra notes 259 and 260 and accompanying text. 
354
  See Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map, supra note 20 at 148 (noting that “with respect 
to corporate governance, the USA has more in common with Britain than it does with other 
major industrial nations”); Geoffrey Miller, “Political Structure and Corporate Governance: 
Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England” 1998 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 
51 at 51 (observing: “While it is relatively easy to identify salient differences between the 
English and U.S. systems and the rest of the developed world, it is more difficult to identify 
major contrasts within the Anglo-American world itself.”). 
355
  Miller, ibid. at 51. 
356
  It is therefore not surprising that the discussion regarding U.K. can be expected to be less 
elaborate than the U.S. 
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A. Various Committees Culminating in the Combined Code 
The genesis of the independent director in the U.K. can be ascribed to the 
Cadbury Committee Report.357 That report introduced the concepts of non-
executive director and independent director. Non-executive directors have been 
foisted with the role of bringing “an independent judgment to bear on issues of 
strategy, performance, resources, including key appointments and standards of 
conduct”.358 More specifically, the Cadbury Committee Report assigns two 
principal responsibilities to non-executive directors, viz.: (i) to review the 
performance of the board and the executives; and (ii) to take the lead in decision-
making whenever there is a conflict of interest.359 Note that the role aptly fits that 
of the independent director in the Anglo-American context, which is to police the 
managers in the interest of the shareholders. In other words, the non-executive 
director is expected to act as a catalyst in the resolution of the manager-
shareholder agency problem. 
 Independent directors are a sub-set of non-executive directors. As regards 
independent directors, “apart from their directors’ fees and shareholdings, they 
should be independent of and free from any business or other relationship which 
could materially interfere with the exercise of independent judgment”.360 The 
board of the company is conferred sufficient discretion to determine whether the 
                                                 
357
  Supra note 2. This report is considered to be one of the most influential studies on corporate 
governance. See Austin, Ford & Ramsay, supra note 17 at 14. 
358
  Cadbury Committee Report, supra note 2 at para. 4.11. 
359
  Ibid. at paras. 4.4-4.6. 
360
  Ibid. at para. 4.12. 
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definition has been satisfied with reference to each individual director. Note again 
that independence is clearly linked to the lack of any relationship with the 
company or the managers. There is no reference whatsoever to a controlling 
shareholder’s role. Clearly, independence is connected with the manager-
shareholder agency problem.  
In terms of board composition, every company is required to have at least 
three non-executive directors, of which at least two are independent.361 In 
addition, boards are required to constitute nomination committees for nomination 
of board members362 and audit committees for ensuring integrity of financial 
reporting.363 The Cadbury Committee Report formed the basis for the 
development of corporate governance norms in the U.K. 
Subsequently, there were two committees that submitted reports on areas 
involving corporate governance. The Greenbury Committee recommended the 
establishment of remuneration committees of boards to determine the 
remuneration of company executives.364 The Hampel Committee reaffirmed the 
role of the non-executive directors.365 The end-result of these committee reports 
                                                 
361
  Cadbury Committee Report at para. 4.12. 
362
  Ibid. at para. 4.30. The nomination committee is to comprise of a majority of non-executive 
directors. 
363
  Ibid. at para. 4.35. The audit committee is to consist of only non-executive directors, with a 
majority of them being independent. 
364
  Richard Greenbury, et. al., Directors’ Remuneration: Report of a Study Group Chaired by Sir 
Richard Greenbury, Gee Co. Ltd. (17 July 1995), online: 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/greenbury.pdf>. 
365
  Ronnie Hampel, Final Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance (January 1998), 
online: <http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/hampel_index.htm>. 
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was the issuance of the Combined Code on Corporate Governance366 in 1999 
which forms part of the United Kingdom Listing Rules, that imposed several of 
these governance requirements on a “comply or explain” basis.367 
In a subsequent series of reforms focused principally on the role of non-
executive directors, the Higgs Report368 recommended that “at least half of the 
members of the board should be independent”.369 Furthermore, the concept of 
independence was defined in the Higgs Report in an extensive form.370 The Higgs 
Report recommended a specific role to non-executive directors that included 
contribution towards business strategy as well as scrutiny of the performance of 
management.371 In that sense, the role includes both advisory as well as 
monitoring functions. The Combined Code was amended to include the principal 
recommendations of the Higgs Report, including as to board composition.372 The 
                                                 
366
  The original Code on Corporate Governance issued in 1999 has since been revised 
periodically. See Nolan, supra note 256 at 438. 
367
  This approach requires listed companies either to comply with the provisions of the Combined 
Code, or alternatively, to explain the non-compliance. See Nolan, ibid. at 418. But there are 
some empirical issues that emerge from such an approach, considering that there are “serial 
non-compliers” that have been identified by studies. See Ian MacNeil & Xiao Li, “Comply or 
Explain: Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code” available online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=726664>. 
368
  Derek Higgs, Review of the Role and Effectiveness of Non-Executive Directors (January 
2003), online: <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23012.pdf> [Higgs Report].  
369
  Ibid. at para. 9.5. 
370
  Ibid., Suggested Code provision A.3.4. Under this provision, independence is compromised if 
the director was an employee of the company, had a material business relationship with the 
company, had close family ties with relevant personnel, represented a significant shareholder 
or served on the board for more than 10 years. 
371
  Ibid., Suggested Code provision A.1.4.  
372
  Austin, Ford & Ramsay, supra note 17 at 21. 
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current version of the Combined Code issued in 2008 continues this trend,373 and 
board independence has therefore become an integral part of corporate 
governance in the U.K. 
As far as U.K. is concerned, the agency problem it faces is similar to that 
in the U.S., where there is a separation of ownership and control. Shareholding is 
diffused, with institutional shareholders making up for a large portion of share 
ownership. Although the collective action problem is less severe due to 
institutional shareholding, it does not disappear, and hence there continues to be a 
need for a monitoring board of directors enhanced with the appointment of 
independent directors. The monitoring board in the U.K. serves to tackle the 
manager-shareholder agency problem, as Professor Cheffins notes: 
Since investors in a country with an ‘outsider/arms-length’ system of 
ownership and control have good reason to be fearful of ‘agency costs’ 
arising from self-serving managerial conduct, a key corporate governance 
objective should be to improve the accountability of corporate executives. 
Consistent with such reasoning, Britain’s Cadbury, Greenbury and 
Hampel Committees have, as we have seen, sought to influence 
managerial behaviour by enhancing the role of non-executive directors 
and by improving links between pay and performance.374 
                                                 
373
  Financial Reporting Council, The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (June 2008) at 
para. A.3.2, online: <http://www.frc.org.uk/CORPORATE/COMBINEDCODE.CFM> 
[Combined Code 2008]. The provision states as follows: 
Except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the chairman, should 
comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to be independent. A smaller 
company should have at least two independent non-executive directors. 
Recently, in March 2009, there has been a call for a review of the Combined Code. See 2009 
Review of the Combined Code, online: 
<http://www.frc.org.uk/corporate/reviewCombined.cfm>. 
374
  Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, supra note 63 at 11. Professor Cheffins continues to make an 
interesting contrast with the position in insider systems: 
While agency costs seem unlikely to pose a serious problem in countries with an 
insider/control-oriented system of ownership and control, a different danger exists. This 
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This trend has not only been followed by the legislature and policymakers, but by 
the judiciary as well. For instance, Langley J. held: 
It is well known that the role of the non-executive directors in corporate 
governance has been the subject of some debate in recent years. … It is 
plainly arguable, I think, that a company may reasonably at least look to 
non-executive directors for independence of judgment and supervision of 
the executive management.375 
The court’s concern, quite evidently, is to protect the interest of shareholders from 
the actions of management and that is precisely the role envisaged for non-
executive and independent directors. 
We therefore find that not only is the U.K. an outsider system with 
diffused shareholding and collective action problems, but since there are no 
controlling shareholders in most companies, the primary role foisted on non-
executive and independent directors is to tackle the manager-shareholder agency 
problem. The majority-minority agency problem does not persist in the U.K. due 
to which we see no preference from policymakers or the judiciary for using the 
                                                                                                                                     
is that core investors will collude with management to cheat others who own equity. For 
instance, a controlling shareholder might engineer ‘sweetheart’ deals with related firms in 
order to siphon off a disproportionate share of a public company’s earnings. Minority 
shareholders can also be prejudiced if a company is dominated by an entrepreneur who, 
motivated by vanity, sentiment or loyalty, continues to run the business after he is no 
longer suited to do so or transfers control to family members who are ill-suited for the 
job. It follows that in insider/control-oriented jurisdictions, providing suitable protection 
for minority shareholders should be a higher priority than reducing agency costs and 
fostering managerial accountability. Correspondingly, the corporate governance issues 
that will matter most in such countries are likely to be of a different character than they 
are in Britain. 
Ibid. at 11-12. 
375
  Equitable Life v. Bowley [2003] EWHC 2263 (Comm) at 41 cited from Nolan, supra note 256 
at 438. On the other hand, courts have not been particularly sympathetic to independent 
directors who have acted as a check on controlling shareholders. See e.g., Re Astec (BSR) plc 
[1998] 2 BCLC 556 (where the court rejected the petitioner’s challenge of the act of a 
controlling shareholder who replaced several directors with its own nominees contrary to the 
views of the independent directors). 
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independent director institution towards that issue at all. That then naturally leads 
us to the question of where the controller-stakeholder problem fares in the U.K. 
context, and whether non-executive independent directors have any role 
whatsoever to play in that regard. 
B. Non-executive Directors and the Stakeholder Theory  
Like the U.S., the shareholder value maximisation theory held sway for a very 
long time in the U.K. too.376 This theory focuses on shareholders as owners of the 
company and profit maximisation as the objective of the company.377 Consistent 
with this objective, directors primarily owed duties to the company (which is a 
separate legal entity) which ultimately meant to the shareholders (as the sole 
constituency represented by the company). It was during the dominance of this 
theory that the role of the non-executive director was envisaged under U.K. law. 
That was the time when the various committees that considered corporate 
governance norms for U.K. companies produced their reports and 
recommendations. However, by then, the stakeholder theory had begun making 
some inroads in the U.K. corporate set up, although it had failed to gain sufficient 
traction as to dilute the shareholder theory to any meaningful extent. This position 
has been captured by Professor Cheffins as follows: 
                                                 
376
  Sarah Kiarie, “At Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholder Value and Enlightened 
Shareholder Value: Which Road Should the United Kingdom Take” (2006) 17(11) I.C.C.L.R. 
329 at 329. See also Paul L. Davies, “Shareholder Value: Company and Securities Markets 
Law – A British View” (2000), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=250324> at 10. 
377
  Kiarie, ibid. at 329; Margarita Sweeney-Baird, “The Role of the Non-Executive Director in 
Modern Corporate Governance” (2006) 27(3) Comp. Law. 67 at 67. 
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The Cadbury, Greenbury and Hampel Committees generally dealt with the 
tasks assigned to them in a manner that was consistent with this narrow 
conception of corporate governance. The Hampel Committee 
acknowledged most explicitly the approach it was taking. It said that the 
single overriding objective shared by all listed companies was to preserve 
and enhance over time their shareholders’ investment. The Hampel 
Committee noted that in order to ensure success, management must 
develop relationships with other constituencies, such as employees, 
customers, credit providers and local communities. Still ultimately the 
only constituency to which directors were accountable was the 
shareholders.378 
However, in the last decade or so, the momentum for incorporating the 
stakeholder theory into U.K. corporate practice has been on the rise. In 1999, the 
Company Law Review came up with proposals to cater to stakeholder interests.379 
Essentially, two approaches that were considered: (i) the pluralist approach, which 
states that “company law should be modified to include other objectives so that a 
company is required to serve a wider range of interests, not subordinate to, or as a 
means of achieving, shareholder value …, but as valid in their own right”380, 
which represents an expansive conception of stakeholder interest; and (ii) the 
enlightened shareholder value (ESV) approach, which takes the position that the 
ultimate objective of company law to generate maximum shareholder value is also 
the best means of securing protection of all interests and thereby overall 
prosperity and welfare.381 In other words, the latter approach conceives of a 
merger of interests of stakeholders and shareholders by adopting the position that 
                                                 
378
   Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, supra note 63 at 14. 
379
  See Department for Trade and Industry, Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework (1999), online: 
<http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23279.pdf> [Company Law Review].  
380
  Company Law Review, ibid. at para. 5.1.13 (explaining that the approach is “pluralist because 
it argues that the interests of a number of groups should be advanced without the interests of a 
single group (shareholders) being overriding”). 
381
  Ibid. at para. 5.1.12. 
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if the company acts to preserve stakeholder interests, then that would necessarily 
bring about enhancement of shareholder value. In this context, a parallel 
development was the introduction of the Operating and Financial Review (OFR), 
which is a “forward-looking report that aimed at striking a balance between 
stakeholder interests by requiring large companies to describe future strategies, 
risks and uncertainties, including policies, in relation to employees and the 
environment”.382 It appeared that the U.K. regime was set to undergo a radical 
transformation towards the stakeholder approach within a very short span of time. 
However, the hastened move from a purely shareholder value 
maximisation approach towards a pluralistic stakeholder approach was halted on 
its tracks. First, the new company legislation in England (in the form of the 
Companies Act 2006) rejected the pluralistic model and displayed a preference for 
the ESV model. Hence, it is the ESV model that has received statutory 
recognition.383 This appears to be a half-way or hybrid approach that is primarily 
for the benefit of shareholders, but also obliquely takes into account the interests 
                                                 
382
  Demetra Arsalidou, “The Withdrawal of the Operation and Financial Review in the 
Companies Bill 2006: Progression or Regression” (2007) 28(5) Comp. Law. 131 at 131. 
383
  This is set out in Companies Act 2006, s. 172(1): 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to— 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers and 
others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
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of other stakeholders.384 However, in the absence of any perceptible duty owed by 
directors to stakeholders (other than shareholders) and any direct right or remedy 
that such stakeholders may have against directors, it is unlikely that the statutory 
provision will have much impact. But, at the same time, it does provide a general 
indication of the statutory departure from a pure shareholder value approach and 
dilution thereof in favour some recognition of stakeholder interests (although not 
to the extent initially desired and set out in the Company Law Review). Apart 
from the failure to attain the pluralist approach, the proponents of the stakeholder 
theory also suffered another setback, which was that the OFR requirement was 
done away with for companies, and hence it constrains free disclosure by 
companies and reduces transparency of stakeholder considerations.385 
 The U.K. regime has therefore shifted itself from a pure shareholder value 
approach to a hybrid approach that continues to consider shareholders as primary 
beneficiaries of directors’ duties, but other stakeholders possess discrete 
recognition under statutory law without legally enforceable rights. Comparing this 
with the U.S. approach, we find that while the U.S. considered stakeholder rights 
for a number of years, it has since moved to an approach that predominantly 
consists of shareholder value maximisation, while the U.K. approach has 
                                                 
384
  This approach has received criticism from the proponents of a pluralistic stakeholder theory 
on account of the fact that stakeholder interests are not adequately considered, and that this is 
just another form of shareholder value maximisation. See Deryn Fisher, “The Enlightened 
Shareholder – Leaving Stakeholders in the Dark: Will Section 172(1) of the Companies Act 
2006 Make Directors Consider the Impact of Their Decisions on Third Parties” (2009) 20(1) 
I.C.C.L.R. 10 at 10 (noting that Companies Act 2006, s. 172 has been criticised due to its 
inability to provide for a useful and practical enforcement mechanism to stakeholders, and 
that there is no likelihood that the provision would be practicable). 
385
  Arsalidou, supra note 382 at 131. 
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witnessed a reverse trend in terms of the move towards a stakeholder approach. 
To that extent, it is a matter of speculation whether the U.K. would shift back to 
pure shareholder value maximisation in the future, as the U.S. has. Despite the 
slightly different trajectories that the U.S. and the U.K have followed on the 
shareholder versus stakeholder debate, one aspect clearly emerges: shareholder 
value maximisation is still at the core of company law and consequently directors 
(including non-executive and independent) owe their duties only to shareholders 
(either directly or through the company as a separate legal entity) and not to any 
other stakeholders as a matter of corporate law. The development of the non-
executive director concept needs to be examined in this context.386 In the outsider 
systems of the U.S. and the U.K., there is therefore no evidence that emerges from 
this analysis to indicate that independent directors have been envisaged as a mode 
of resolution for the controller-stakeholder agency problem. 
3.5 Effect of Independent Directors in Outsider Systems 
As we have seen, the independent director concept has received significant thrust 
over the last few years in the outsider systems examined in this dissertation, 
namely the U.S. and the U.K. However, one question that is quite baffling 
pertains to why one would expect an independent director to act as a suitable 
                                                 
386
  As discussed earlier (supra note 335 and accompanying text), the role of the independent 
directors depends on the pre-eminence of the appropriate approach under corporate law and 
whether it provides greater emphasis to shareholders or other stakeholders. In both the U.S. 
and the U.K., shareholders continue to occupy a pre-eminent position. Just to explicate this 
point through an illustration, assume that history turned out different and the pluralist 
approach was adopted in the Companies Act 2006, then it would have been possible to state 
that the independent directors owe an implicit duty to cater to the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies as well. But, under the law as it currently stands in the U.K., it is safe to 
conclude that such is not the case. 
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monitor. What incentives does an independent director have to perform that role? 
How can law be so trusting of an individual to behave rationally and not in a self-
serving manner so as to protect other interests? Is there sufficient evidence that 
the institution is likely to be successful at all? If so, what are the parameters by 
which its success can be determined? These are several issues that continue to 
confound corporate governance academics, and despite a significant number of 
diverse studies in this area, the end appears to be nowhere in sight.387  
Despite the compelling rationales for independent directors and their 
popularity as a measure of enhancing corporate governance, there is an acute lack 
of consensus on the impact of an independent board on corporate governance and 
hence on corporate performance. My survey reveals a range of existing empirical 
literature examining the impact of an independent board, and I propose to 
categorise it into qualitative studies and quantitative studies. The purpose of this 
survey is two-fold: (i) to determine whether the independent director concept in 
the outsider system is successful or not; and (ii) to compare the performance of 
the independent directors in the outsider systems and the insider systems so as to 
properly evaluate the latter. 
A. Qualitative Studies 
Let us begin by understanding the rationale for independence on corporate boards. 
The growth of the independent director concept can partly be attributed to the 
                                                 
387
  On an optimistic note, the area at least continues to hold fort as a fertile one for academic 
research, such as the present one. 
 139
“reputation capital” theory.388 Under this theory, independent directors are 
“disciplined by the market for their services which prices them according to their 
performance as referees”.389 There is incentive for these independent directors to 
develop their reputations as they are directors, executives or key decision-makers 
in other companies.390 This in turn creates a market for independent directors that 
rewards good performance and punishes poor performance.391 
The second incentive for independent directors is equity ownership in 
companies on whose boards they serve. If such directors own shares of the 
companies, they increasingly associate themselves with the fortunes of those 
companies.392 So long as they hold a financial stake, they have an incentive to 
monitor the actions of the managers so as to protect the interests of the 
shareholder body (of which they are part). This is also referred to as the 
“convergence of interests” theory, whereby “the greater the equity holdings that 
outside directors have in the firm, the more their interests will be aligned with that 
                                                 
388
  See Fama, Agency Problems, supra note 248 at 293-94. 
389
  Ibid. at 294. 
390
  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control” (1983) 26 J.L. 
& Econ. 301 at 315. 
391
  See Lin, supra note 6 at 917. See also Lawrence Abbott, Young Park & Susan Parker, “The 
Effects of Audit Committee Activity and Independence on Corporate Fraud” (2000) 26 
Managerial Fin., Num 11 at 55, 56 (noting that “preservation of reputational capital serves as 
one motivation for higher quality monitoring on the part of outside, independent directors”); 
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, “Outside Director Liability: A Policy 
Analysis” (2006) 162 J. Institutional & Theoretical Econ. 5 at 16 [A Policy Analysis] 
(observing: “Reputation can also motivate outside directors. On the positive side, if outside 
directors respond deftly to a managerial crisis or otherwise effectively protect shareholder 
interests, the praise they receive can pay off. … Conversely, directors suffer professionally 
when boards do not perform adequately”); Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 263 at 
577. 
392
  Lorsch & MacIver, Pawns or Potentates, supra note 10 at 177-78 (stating: “Although the 
stock accumulated wouldn’t significantly add to their wealth, nor would they become major 
shareholders, it would increase their common identification with the corporation”); Monks & 
Minnow, supra note 3 at 216-17. 
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of shareholders”.393 This proposition seems to have received ample support both 
empirically and judicially. Several empirical studies demonstrate that independent 
directors tend to perform better when they hold some stock in the companies on 
whose boards they are appointed.394 The grant of stock to independent directors 
has also attained popularity as a means to compensate directors.395 Given the 
operation of these incentives, even the judiciary appears to repose confidence in 
the decisions of independent directors who hold stock in the company.396 
However, caution must be exercised to ensure that the quantum of stock (or other 
form of compensation) granted to independent directors is not so excessive as to 
distort their incentives to act in the manner they are expected to under corporate 
governance law and norms.397 
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Valuation: An Empirical Analysis” (1988) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 293 at 307). 
394
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Harper, “Trends in Director Pay” (1994) 15 Corp. Board 6; Charles M. Elson, “Director 
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board—The History of a Symptom and a 
Cure” (1996) 50 SMU L. Rev. 127; Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, “The Impact of 
Stock-Option Compensation for Outside Directors on Firm Value” (2005) 78 J. Bus. 2229. 
396
  Unitrin, supra note 313 at 1380; Travis J. Laster, “Exorcizing the Omnipresent Specter: The 
Impact of Substantial Equity Ownership by Outside Directors on Unocal Analysis” (1999) 55 
Bus. Law. 109 at 134 (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Unitrin 
establishes a lower standard for target board of directors on which a majority consists of 
outside directors who are substantial shareholders of the company, and that “directors who are 
substantial stockholders will “act in their own best economic interests” as stockholders, and 
absent proof to the contrary, will not be influenced by the prestige and perquisites of 
directorship”); Lin, supra note 6 at 918. 
397
  Carter & Lorsch, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 6 at 48 (observing in the context of 
Enron and other corporate governance disasters of 2001-2002: “Managements and boards, 
loaded up with stock and options, are subject to a potential conflict of interest. … Attempts to 
 141
The correlation between director independence and share ownership goes 
to bolster my observations throughout this Chapter that independent directors 
have been envisaged with a view only to deal with the manager-shareholder 
agency problem. Simply stated, this approach views managers on one side of the 
equation and shareholders on the other. Independent directors are expected to act 
as arbiters between these two constituencies, largely by monitoring the actions of 
managers. Independence will be a myth if the independent directors continue to 
hold their allegiance to managers. What better way to overcome this possibility 
than to make the independent directors also shareholders. Being faced with the 
same incentives as other shareholders, the independent directors will likely act to 
the benefit of the shareholder body rather than any other constituency. This 
approach reeks of a solution to the manager-shareholder agency problem rather 
than any other, and hence this approach fits well in the outsider systems where not 
only that agency problem exists, but the independent director is proffered as a 
solution to it. 
The third rationale for independent directors is in fact a deterrent: the 
threat of sanctions, which include civil and criminal liability.398 However, existing 
empirical evidence indicates that actual personal liability of outside independent 
directors is in fact rare.399 This is on account of the fact that independent directors, 
                                                                                                                                     
achieve such alignment in some companies have thus led to directors’ interests being aligned 
with management rather than with the shareholders”) (emphasis in original); Bernard S. 
Black, “The Core Fiduciary Duties of Outside Directors” Asia Business Law Review (July 
2001), online <http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=270749> at 6. 
398
  Abbott, Park & Parker, supra note 391 at 57; 
399
  This finding has been culled from an influential series of studies by academics of independent 
director liability within the U.S. and across countries: Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & 
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at least in the U.S. and particular in Delaware, are entitled to obtain the benefit of 
two protective arrangements. The first is indemnification by the company against 
any out-of-pocket liability whereby a company is entitled to indemnify 
independent directors against any “threatened, pending or completed action, suit 
or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative” by reason 
of such director’s position so long as “the person acted in good faith and in a 
manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests 
of the corporation”.400 Independent directors are also entitled to reimbursements 
for legal expenses on an ongoing basis.401 Furthermore, companies offer wide 
directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance policies in order to attract competent 
individuals to the position. Unlike indemnification provisions, there are no 
statutory restrictions on the issue of wide D&O insurance policies.402 Although 
D&O insurance policies are generally subject to several exclusions, due to market 
pressures, companies are able to obtain D&O policies that eliminate many of 
these exclusions thereby ensuring wide coverage on the policies.403 
                                                                                                                                     
Michael Klausner, “Outside Director Liability” (2006) 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055 [Outside 
Director Liability]; Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, “Liability Risk for 
Outside Directors: A Cross-Border Analysis” (2005) 11 European Fin. Mgmt. 153; Black, 
Cheffins & Klausner, A Policy Analysis, supra note 391; Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, 
Martin Gelter, Hwa-Jin Kim, Richard Nolan, Mathias Siems & Linia Prava Law Firm, “Legal 
Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 1: Substantive Grounds For Liability 
(Report to the Russian Securities Agency)” 2007 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 614; Bernard Black, 
Brian Cheffins, Martin Gelter, Hwa-Jin Kim, Richard Nolan, Mathias Siems, Linia Prava Law 
Firm, “Legal Liability of Directors and Company Officials Part 2: Court Procedures, 
Indemnification and Insurance, and Administrative and Criminal Liability (Report to the 
Russian Securities Agency)” 2008 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1. 
400
  Delaware General Corporation Law, s. 145(a). 
401
  See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, Outside Director Liability, supra note 399 at 1083. 
402
  Ibid. 
403
  Ibid. at 1087. It is further noted that “coverage risk exists, but most can be addressed by a 
state-of-the-art policy”. Ibid. at 1088. 
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Nevertheless, the mere threat of potential liability and the possibility of 
getting embroiled in cumbersome and extensive litigation could themselves acts 
as a deterrent on independent directors.404 In that sense, there could be a 
distinction between litigation risk and the risk of liability or actual pay-outs by 
directors. Higher levels of liability on independent directors may not only scare 
otherwise competent individuals from taking up independent positions on board, 
but it may also induce excessive caution in board decision-making that may not 
necessarily augur well for business in a competitive scenario. For this reason, the 
approach of foisting liability on independent directors (whether civil or criminal) 
has not been found to act as a significant rationale to boost independence.405 
Although there are several justifications for the role of independent 
directors, the concept abounds with skeptics. An influential study of corporate 
boards was conducted by Myles Mace.406 Through interviews with various 
participants in the corporate sector, he found that the role of directors was largely 
advisory and not of a decision-making nature, and that the management manages 
the company and the board merely serves as a source of advice and counsel to the 
                                                 
404
  For instance, independent directors may be concerned about damage to reputation and the 
time and effort required to engage in prolonged litigation that may bring about opportunity 
loss in the background of the routine business and other activities of such directors. Black, 
Cheffins & Klausner, Outside Director Liability, supra note 399 at 1056 (pointing to the fact 
that the “principal threats to outside directors who perform poorly are the time, aggravation, 
and potential harm to reputation that a lawsuit can entail, not direct financial loss”). 
405
  For a contrary view (which, of course, represents only a minority perspective among 
scholars), see Lisa M. Fairfax, “Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ 
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability” (2005) 42 Hous. L. Rev. 393 at 395 (disagreeing 
with the conclusion of a majority of the scholars and asserting that “legal liability represents 
an essential mechanism for ensuring directors’ fidelity to their fiduciary duties and … 
questioning reform efforts that do not include such liability”). 
406
  Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston: Harvard University, 1971). 
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management.407 This was due to the immense power wielded by the managers, 
headed by the president,408 including their de facto power to elect members of the 
board.409 The issue of dominance by the chief executive officer (CEO) can be 
partly addressed by constituting nominating committees of the board for selecting 
candidates for directorship. But, it was found that such nominating committees 
too were subject to influence by the CEO.410 Studies attribute the lack of influence 
of independent directors to various factors. These include (without being 
exhaustive): (i) informational imbalances where management has substantially 
greater information about the company than independent directors, who obtain 
only so much information as the management itself provides,411 (ii) control and 
dominance of the CEO with ability to sway the independent directors,412 (iii) the 
lack of time and expertise to digest all available information and to make a 
                                                 
407
  Mace, ibid. at 179. Although Mace’s work relates to the board as a whole, its relevance 
extends to independent directors as well, since U.S. boards did consist of independent 
directors at the time the study was conducted. 
408
  The president is more commonly referred to in the literature as chief executive officer. 
409
  Mace, supra note 406 at 182. Mace further notes: 
I have concluded that generally boards of directors do not do an effective job of 
evaluation or measuring the performance of the president. Rarely are standards or criteria 
established and agreed upon by which the president can be measured other than the usual 
general test of corporate profitability, and it is surprising how slow some directors are to 
respond to years of steadily declining profitability. Since directors are selected by the 
president, and group and individual loyalties have been developed through working 
together, directors are reluctant to measure the executive performance by the president 
carefully against specific standards. Directors base their appraisals largely on data and 
reports provided by the president himself. 
Mace, ibid. at 182. This represents the position that prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s, but a 
substantial number of issues identified in that study continue to date. See also Brudney, supra 
note 7. 
410
  Lorsch & MacIver, Pawns or Potentates, supra note 10 at 20. 
411
  Lin, supra note 6 at 914-16. See also Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation, supra note 
272 at 144. 
412
  Lin, ibid. at 913-14. 
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meaningful contribution, because independent directors are usually busy 
professionals who have their primary occupations to attend to,413 and (iv) the need 
to comply with boardroom norms that preclude open criticism of the 
management.414 This analysis is referred to as the “managerial hegemony” theory 
on account of the inability of the independent directors to check management 
excesses.415 
Skeptics also argue that the concept of independence addresses a formal 
issue, but fails to tackle the substantive problem.416 Current definitions of 
independence preclude professional, pecuniary or familial relationships between 
the director and the company or its key actors (such as the management or 
controlling shareholders). However, social ties do not disqualify a director from 
being independent.417 This allows for management to appoint persons who are 
                                                 
413
  Mace, supra note 406 at 30; Lorsch & MacIver, Pawns or Potentates, supra note 10 at 87; 
Carter & Lorsch, Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 6 at 45. 
414
  Brudney, supra note 7 at 612. 
415
  Lin, supra note 6 at 912-13. See also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, “Reinventing the 
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors” (1991) 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 at 874-
76 [Reinventing the Outside Director] (observing that no market for independent directors 
exists at all); Note, “Beyond “Independent” Directors: A Functional Approach to Board 
Independence” (2006) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1553 (arguing for functional independence of all 
directors rather than definitional independence of only some directors); Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1564 (concluding that the “apogee of a corporate 
governance paradigm resting on independent directors and the independent board may also 
mark the moment of its decline”). 
416
  Stephen M. Bainbridge, “A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standard”, 
University of California, Los Angeles School of Law Research Paper No. 02-15 (2002), 
online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=317121> (arguing that proposals of the NYSE for 
independent directors are not supported by evidence, that they adopt a “one size fits all” 
approach and that even nominally independent directors are predisposed to favour insiders on 
account of the structural bias problem). See also Donald C. Langevoort, “The Human Nature 
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and 
Accountability” (2001) 89 Geo. L. J. 797 at 799; Brudney, supra note 7 at 607. 
417
  Brudney, supra note 7 at 613. However, in re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, 824 A.2d 
917, 938-39 (Del. Ch. 2003) [Oracle], the court adopted a liberal view and applied non-
financial parameters to determine the independence of a director. It held that the 
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friends or those who belong to the same social circles as independent directors, 
which satisfies the formal requirements of independence but fails to act as a 
proper check on management abuse as such directors cannot be expected to adopt 
a strict stance towards management. In such circumstances, there is a serious risk 
that corporate governance is reduced merely to a check-the-box process rather 
than being raised to the level of corporate ethos that pervades management of a 
company in the interest of the shareholders. 
B. Quantitative Studies 
There have been several empirical studies conducted to determine the presence of 
any statistically significant relationship between board composition (primarily the 
level of independence) and shareholder value. As for measurement of shareholder 
value, several parameters have been used, including corporate performance in 
general (reflected by stock price), and the case of discrete tasks involving 
transactions where there are potential conflicts between shareholders and 
management.418 The resulting evidence can, at best, be said to be mixed. 
1. Board Composition and Corporate Performance in General 
Some studies have found a positive correlation between board independence and 
shareholder value.419 One such study found a positive reaction to stock price upon 
                                                                                                                                     
independence may be compromised if the director is beholden to an interested person, and 
that beholden in this sense does not mean just in the financial sense; it can also flow out of 
“personal or other relationships” to the interested party. 
418
  Lin, supra note 6 at 921; Bhagat & Black (1999), supra note 31 at 923. 
419
  An extensive analysis of empirical studies would be out of place in this dissertation, but a 
general understanding of the correlation between board independence and corporate 
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announcement of outside director appointment.420 This positive correlation 
indicates that market views the appointment of outside directors as enhancing 
shareholder interest.421  
 On the other hand, more recent studies cast a shadow of doubt on the 
positive correlation of board independence with corporate governance and 
company performance. In their meta-analysis conducted in 1999, Professors 
Bhagat and Black find no convincing evidence that increasing board 
independence will improve company performance.422 On the contrary, they find 
evidence that supermajority independent boards perform worse than other 
firms.423 Their findings are also buttressed by a subsequent study they performed 
in 2002.424 Other commentators too have concluded their studies with suggestions 
that firms with more independent directors may perform worse.425 
                                                                                                                                     
performance is helpful. For more exhaustive analyses of empirical studies, see, Lin, supra 
note 6; Bhagat & Black (1999), ibid.; Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, “The Non-Correlation 
Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance” (2002) 27 J. Corp. L. 231 
[Bhagat & Black (2002)]. 
420
  Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G. Wyatt, “Outside Directors, Board Independence, and 
Shareholder Wealth” (1990) 26 J. Fin. Econ. 175 at 184. 
421
  See also Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, “The Determinants of Board 
Composition” (1988) 19 Rand. J. Econ. 589; Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, 
“Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board 
Composition” (1985) 1 J.L. Econ. & Organization 101. 
422
  Bhagat & Black (1999), supra note 31 at 950. 
423
  The reason they attribute for this phenomenon is that independent directors often turn out to 
be “lapdogs” rather than “watchdogs”. Ibid. at 922. 
424
  See Bhagat & Black (2002), supra note 419 at 263 (finding a reasonably strong inverse 
correlation between firm performance in the recent past and board independence; they find no 
evidence that greater board independence improves firm performance, and if anything, there 
are hints that greater board independence may impair firm performance). 
425
  David Yermack, “Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors” 
(1996) 40 J. Fin. Econ. 185 (reporting a significant negative correlation between proportion of 
independent directors and Tobin’s q in certain circumstances); Anup Agrawal & Charles R. 
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 The empirical studies do not provide adequate clarity on the issue of 
whether or not director independence is beneficial to corporate governance.426 
Nevertheless, the more recent evidence suggests that outside directors hinder firm 
performance.427 There could be several reasons for the lack of success of 
independent directors. These include the fact that independence of directors is 
determined through formal measures (that fail to test real independence), 
independent directors lack adequate incentives to act in the interests of 
shareholders, they suffer from the “managerial hegemony” problem,428 and finally 
due to the fact that independence is not a state of fact, but rather a state of mind 
and hence actions of such directors would depend entirely on the quality of 
individuals that occupy the board seats—independence is an element that is 
inherent in the individuals and cannot be legislated for. 
2. Board Composition and Specific Tasks 
Greater correlation has been found between board composition and the role of 
independent directors with reference to discrete tasks carried out by the company. 
                                                                                                                                     
Knoeber, “Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between 
Managers and Shareholders” (1996) 31 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 377. 
426
  There are often measurement difficulties as well. Data used by empirical researchers are 
varied, and the definition of independence employed are not uniform. Professor Gordon’s 
statement elegantly captures the problem in the econometric or event study method of 
examining correlations between independent directors and corporate performance: “Teasing 
out the effects of board composition from the many other factors that affect performance is 
economically and econometrically difficult, so the lack of a strong positive connection 
between board independence and performance is perhaps unsurprising”. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1500. 
427
  See Bhagat & Black (2002), supra note 419 at 263. 
428
  See supra note 415 and accompanying text. 
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These are usually measured through event studies.429 Although event studies are 
fraught with some inherent deficiencies,430 they are nevertheless a useful method 
of empirically verifying corporate matters (such as board composition and 
independence). Some of the evidence on this count is worth discussing briefly.431 
First, as regards CEO turnover, studies show that boards with greater 
independence are likely to terminate the services of a CEO when the financial 
performance of the company is on the decline.432 On the other hand, it is also 
shown that contrary to the conventional wisdom and previous empirical studies, a 
                                                 
429
  An event study involves identifying the release of specific information about a company 
followed by an examination of the performance of the stock of the company. If the 
information is important enough, the stock price will fluctuate upwards or downwards 
depending on the acceptability of that information to investors. See Ronald J. Gilson & 
Bernard S. Black, The Law & Finance of Corporate Acquisitions (Westbury, N.Y.: 
Foundation Press, 1995) at 185 [Corporate Acquisitions]. This is a useful tool to determine 
whether the market accepts the information as positive (where the stock price can be expected 
to rise) or negative (when the stock price can be expected to drop). 
430
  For example, where there is gradual release of information, there could be some doubt as to 
when the information was in fact released to the market. There are also multiple explanations 
to events, and:  
[a]n event study can tell us that something happened but it can’t tell us why. … The event 
study technique does not eliminate the need to assess cause through deductive reasoning. 
Sometimes, there will be two or more plausible explanations for why a firm’s stock price 
changes in response to new information. 
Gilson & Black, Corporate Acquisitions, ibid. at 215. 
431
  The purpose here is not to undertake an extensive survey of the empirical literature, which is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. The objective is to expound the lack of consensus on the 
effect of independent directors at an empirical level even in the outsider systems. This also 
helps explain the lack of attention paid to this empirical evidence when the concept of 
independent directors has been transplanted into the insider systems. For detailed accounts of 
the empirical studies that have been presented by legal academics, see Lin, supra note 6 at 
921-939; Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1500-10; Bhagat & 
Black (1999), supra note 31; Bhagat & Black (2002), supra note 419. 
432
  Michael S. Weisbach, “Outside Directors and CEO Turnover” (1998) 20 J. Fin. Econ. 431 at 
431 (noting that there is a “stronger association between prior performance and the probability 
of a resignation for companies with outsider-dominated board than for companies with 
insider-dominated boards”). 
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greater proportion of outsiders has a positive effect on CEO tenure.433 There 
appears to be a lack of reconciliation of these two opposing accounts.434 
 Second, executive compensation presents a key source of conflict between 
the interests of managers and shareholders. One may therefore hypothesise that 
independent boards will loathe granting higher executive pay. Intriguingly, there 
is insufficient evidence in support of that hypothesis. In fact, several studies have 
suggested that a higher proportion of independent directors on a board results in 
higher CEO pay, which suggests that “independent directors are not doing a very 
good job of developing incentive compensation plans that will induce better 
performance”.435 Even independent directors on compensation committees do not 
correlate with lower executive pay.436 On the other hand, it was found that firms 
with higher number of inside directors are less likely to offer golden parachutes to 
                                                 
433
  R. Richard Geddes & Hrishikesh D. Vinod, “CEO Age and Outside Directors: A Hazard 
Analysis” (1997) 12 Rev. Indus. Org. 767 at 767. 
434
  In fact, in their meta analysis, Bhagat and Black state (after analysing a few other studies on 
this count): 
Taken as a whole, these studies provide some evidence that independent directors behave 
differently than inside directors when they decide whether to replace the current CEO. 
But the differences seem rather marginal, and it is not clear whether majority- or 
supermajority-independent boards make better or worse decisions than other boards, on 
average. 
Bhagat & Black (1999), supra note 31 at 926 (emphasis in original). 
435
  Ibid. at 931. 
436
  See Catherine M. Daily, Jonathan L. Johnson, Alan E. Ellstrand & Dan R. Dalton, 
“Compensation Committee Composition as a Determination of CEO Compensation” (1998) 
41 Acad. Mgmt. J. 209 at 214-16. The role of independent directors on the board as a whole 
as well as the compensation committee has been the subject-matter of the prominent litigation 
in re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1998) aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. Brehm v. Eisner 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). For an extensive discussion of this 
case in the context of the role of independent directors, see Larry Cata Backer, “Director 
Independence and the Duty of Loyalty: Race, Gender, Class and the Disney-Ovitz Litigation” 
(2005) 79 St. John’s. L. Rev. 1011. 
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management.437 Bhagat and Black sum up this issue: “Taking the evidence as a 
whole, however, there is little evidence that independent directors do a better job 
than inside directors in establishing CEO pay”.438 This statement largely holds 
true for executives other than the CEO as well. 
 Third, in the context of acquisitions and takeovers, the concept of 
independence leads us to two implicit assumptions: (i) that greater independence 
on target boards will preclude the companies from accepting value-reducing 
takeover offers, and (ii) that greater independence on acquirer boards will 
preclude them from making takeover offers that do not enhance value for their 
own shareholders. The first assumption has some support: in a well-cited study, 
researchers found that independent boards are likely to extract greater premiums 
for target shareholders.439 This holds good even in the context of management 
buyouts.440 Correspondingly, it can be expected that independent boards will act 
                                                 
437
  Philip L. Cochran, Robert A. Wood & Thomas B. Jones, “The Composition of Boards of 
Directors and Incidence of Golden Parachutes” (1985) 28 Acad. Mgmt. J. 664 at 670. 
438
  Bhagat & Black (1999), supra note 31 at 931. 
439
  James F. Cotter, Anil Shivdasani & Marc Zenner, “Do Independent Directors Enhance Target 
Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers?” (1997) 43 J. Fin. Econ. 195 (concluding that 
“independent outside directors enhance target shareholder gains from tender offers, and that 
boards with a majority of independent directors are more likely to use resistance strategies to 
enhance shareholder wealth”). 
440
  Chun I. Lee, Stuart Rosenstein, Nanda Rangan & Wallace N. Davidson III, “Board 
Composition and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Management Buyouts” (1992) 21 Fin. 
Mgmt. 58 (finding that shareholders receive better value in management buyouts when boards 
are comprised of a majority of independent directors). From a legal perspective, management 
buyouts represent the severest form of the manager-shareholder agency problem as the 
managers effecting the buyout are conflicted because they possess a personal interest in being 
able to buy the company at as low a price as possible (quite likely to the detriment of the 
shareholders). Independent directors are required to play a significantly enhanced role in such 
transactions (and almost become mediators of the interests of the shareholders and the 
managers). For an interesting discussion of the role of independent directors in management 
buyout transactions, see William T. Allen, “Independent Directors In MBO Transactions: Are 
They Fact or Fantasy?” (1990) 45 Bus. Law. 2055. 
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in the interests of shareholders when setting up takeover defences. But, there is no 
evidence to show that is the case; at best, the evidence is only inconsistent.441 In 
the case of an acquiring company, independent directors could potentially play an 
important role in preventing companies from entering into value-reducing 
transactions that are likely to be motivated by extraneous factors that favour 
management over the interests of shareholders such as “managerial empire 
building, over-optimism bias, and winner’s curse”.442 However, even here, 
consistency in the evidence is entirely elusive.443 
                                                 
441
  For a study that supports the role of independent directors in takeover defence measures, see 
James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles & Rory L. Terry, “Outside Directors and the Adoption of 
Poison Pills” (1994) 35 J. Fin. Econ. 371 at 372 (finding a “statistically significant, positive 
relation between the stock-market reaction to the adoption of poison pills and the fraction of 
outside directors on the board” and concluding that these “results are consistent with the 
hypothesis that outside directors represent shareholder interests). For studies that reveal 
contrary results, see Chamu Sundaramurthy, James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, 
“Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth” (1997) 18 Strategic 
Mgmt. J. 231 at 240 (noting that the “market reacts more negatively to antitakeover 
provisions adopted by outsider-dominated boards than to antitakeover provisions adopted by 
boards with fewer outsiders” and that this “empirical finding is contrary to agency theory 
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role of outsiders but actually discounts their presence”); Rita D. Kosnik, “Effects of Board 
Demography and Directors’ Incentives on Corporate Greenmail Decisions” (1990) 33 Acad. 
Mgmt. J. 129 (finding that companies with independent boards were more likely to pay 
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starker. For a general discussion of these studies, see Bhagat & Black (1999), supra note 31 at 
929-30; Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1503. 
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  Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1503. 
443
  A study that favours the role of independent boards is John W. Byrd, & Kent A. Hickman, 
“Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids” (1992) 32 J. 
Fin. Econ. 195 at 198-99 (finding that “the average announcement-date abnormal returns is 
significantly less negative for bidding firms on whose boards at least half the seats are held by 
independent outside directors” which is “consistent with the hypothesis that independent 
outside director monitors firm decisions on behalf of shareholders during the acquisition 
process”). For a study displaying contrary results, see Vijaya Subrahmanyam, Nanda Rangan 
& Stuart Rosenstein, “The Role of Outside Directors in Bank Acquisitions” Fin. Mgmt., 
Autumn 1997 at 23, 24 (whose “empirical results indicate that there is a negative relation 
between abnormal returns and the proportion of independent outside directors on the boards 
of directors of bidding banks”, although one must pay some attention to the fact that the 
corporate governance structure in banks is likely to be somewhat different from that in non-
financial firms, particularly because of the extensive regulation of the banking industry and 
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 Fourth, the monitoring effect of independent directors on companies 
should logically result in lesser financial frauds in those companies, and as a 
corollary, firms with greater insider directors should be susceptible to higher 
incidence of frauds. A substantial part of the financial oversight role is exercised 
by directors on the audit committee. The evidence on this count is more direct and 
optimistic,444 suggesting that independent directors may be in a position to curb 
financial frauds.445 However, the anecdotal evidence on this count is not 
promising; examples such as Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco suggest that 
independent boards have been unable to prevent financial misstatements and 
resultant stock price manipulation brought about through actions of management. 
                                                                                                                                     
the relative insignificance of a market for corporate control and takeovers in the banking 
industry). 
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  Mark S. Beasley, “An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director 
Compensation and Financial Statement Fraud” (1996) 71 Acct. Rev. 443 (finding that firms 
not facing financial frauds have a significantly higher percentage of outside directors than 
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Amy P. Sweeney, “Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of 
Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC” (1996) 13 Contemp. Acct. Res. 1 (finding 
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significantly correlated with the incidence of corporate fraud”); April Klein, “Audit 
Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management” (2002) 33 J. Acct. 
& Econ. 375 (summarising her key findings that: (i) a negative relation is found between 
board independence and abnormal accruals; (ii) a negative relation is also found between 
audit committee independence and abnormal accruals; and (iii) reductions in board or audit 
committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accruals). 
445
  Some scholars, though, are still unsure about the chain of causation. The following is a note of 
caution:  
These studies suggest that independent directors help to control financial fraud, but it is 
also possible that managers who are prone to commit fraud resist oversight by 
independent boards, so that manager fraud propensity drives both the likelihood of fraud 
and the degree of board independence. 
Bhagat & Black (1999), supra note 31 at 933. 
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 Lastly, there is an expectation that independent directors will shield the 
company from legal action, particularly from shareholders. This is consistent with 
the monitoring theory of an independent board. A study found that “boards sued 
tend to have a greater percentage of insiders than those not sued”,446 which result 
may “encourage directors to add outside members to the board”.447 However, 
other studies have not found correlation between board independence and 
shareholder suits.448 Again, there is lack of clarity on the causative factors for this 
correlation.449 
 This brings me to the questions of how to interpret the results and as to 
what implications these studies have on the continued progression of the 
independent director concept. The totality of the studies shows mixed results 
about the significance of independent directors on corporate performance as well 
as on individual discrete tasks involving companies. At the same time, there is no 
evidence against independent directors that is so overwhelming as to sound a call 
                                                 
446
  Idalene Kesner & Roy B. Johnson, “An Investigation of the Relationship Between Board 
Composition and Stockholder Suits” (1990) 11 Strategic Mgmt. J. 327 at 333. 
447
  Ibid. at 334. Furthermore, studies indicate that directors who have experience in government 
or politics (i.e., those with political backgrounds) are more likely to be appointed on boards 
where the government is an ally of the company and politics are important, while those in 
legal practice (i.e., those with legal backgrounds) are likely to be appointed where 
government is an adversary and legal knowledge is important. Anup Agrawal & Charles R. 
Knoeber, “Outside Directors, Politics, and Firm Performance” (1998), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=85310>. See also Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, “Do Some 
Outside Directors Play a Political Role?” (2001) 44 J.L. & Econ. 179. 
448
  Professor Romano finds that “sued firms did not have more outside directors than firms that 
were not sued”). Roberta R. Romano, “The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without 
Foundation?” (1991) 7 J.L. Econ. & Organization 55 at 83 cited from Lin, supra note 6 at 939 
(emphasis in original). 
449
  Roberta Romano, “Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis” (1990) 39 
Emory L.J. 1155 at 1177 (cautioning that there is an alternative explanation to this 
phenomenon, which is that the role of outside directors may be a matter of “perception rather 
than performance” because courts tend implicitly to treat actions of independent boards as 
trustworthy and those of inside-dominated boards as tainted). 
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for discarding the concept altogether. Perhaps it only signifies over-reliance by 
policymakers on the importance of independent directors as an efficacious 
monitoring mechanism with respect to companies. In that sense, independent 
directors cannot be expected to fulfill all the tasks assigned to them, and it would 
be completely impractical for policy makers to confer such a role on them. The 
persistence of the independent director concept in the U.S. despite lack of solid 
empirical evidence in its favour (and the rapid spread of the concept to other 
countries) may also be explainable by the lack of an effective alternative 
institution or mechanism that may perform the similar role. It may therefore be 
arguable that a less optimal solution to a problem (namely the agency and 
monitoring problem) may be better than no solution at all. 
 Before concluding the empirical survey, it is worth reiterating the note of 
caution. Empirical studies (particularly those that are quantitative in nature) are 
subject to inherent difficulties that may carry suitable explanations. Foremost 
among these is the sorting problem.450 Different studies use varying definitions of 
independence and the outside nature of directors. Heterogeneity in boards is a 
given and there is usually no “one-size-fits-all” approach that is tenable.451 Hence, 
while empirical studies help identify issues and trends on matters of corporate 
governance, necessary attention must be paid to factors that may cause disparity 
(or consistency for that matter) in their findings. 
                                                 
450




3.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
An analysis of the emergence of the independent director concept in the outsider 
economies of the U.S. and the U.K. enunciates the principle that the concept was 
primarily conceived as a solution to tackle the manager-shareholder agency 
problem. This was because most companies in these jurisdictions display 
characteristics of the Berle and Means corporation with diffused shareholding and 
the separation of ownership and management. It is clear from the analysis that the 
emergence of independent directors is in no way associated with the majority-
minority agency problem, because that problem was non-existent in the U.S. and 
the U.K. where the concept is said to have emerged. Furthermore, it is unclear 
whether independent directors have been found in those economies to act in the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies pursuant to the “stakeholder theory”. 
Both the U.S. as well as the U.K. continue to be primarily shareholder-centric in 
their approach to corporate governance and the role of the directors is envisaged 
as one that facilitates this process. The principal exception to this is the ESV 
approach in the U.K.,452 which too puts shareholder interests ahead of other 
stakeholders. 
 Even if the role of independent directors has been confined in the U.S. and 
the U.K. to the situation involving the manager-shareholder agency problem, have 
they been successful in tackling the problem? The empirical studies (both 
qualitative and quantitative) are inconclusive in that behalf; the results are mixed. 
                                                 
452
 See the discussion surrounding Companies Act 2006, s. 172(1), supra Section 3.4(B). 
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Hence, there is a lack of unmistakable empirical support to the institution of 
independent directors, even in the economies where it emerged. It is remarkable 
then that the concept has been so widely disseminated to other countries, 
including the emerging insider economies of China and India, without its utility 
being empirically verified. What could the rationale for this phenomenon possibly 
be? What might the thought process of policymakers in those jurisdictions be? 
Are there any other significant institutional, political, economic or social reasons 
for the ubiquity the independent director has attained around leading economies 
of the world? These are questions that bear no easy answers, although I attempt to 
analyse some of the possibilities in the Chapters to follow. 
 158
4. ADOPTION OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS BY EMERGING 
ECONOMIES: LESSONS FROM CHINA AND INDIA 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
4.2 Evolution of the Independent Director Concept in Insider Systems 
4.3 Norms Governing Independent Directors in China 
4.4 Norms Governing Independent Directors in India 
4.5 Independent Director Norms: China and India Compared 
4.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
 
4.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
Although concepts in corporate governance originated in the outsider systems of 
the U.S. and the U.K., they have been transplanted to several other countries in 
the last decade. The transplantation has occurred even in insider systems that 
possess shareholding structures and other corporate governance norms and 
practices that are entirely different from those in the outsider systems. This 
phenomenon can be ascribed to a number of reasons. First, several developments 
in the outsider systems of corporate governance have had a profound impact 
around the world. These include legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the 
U.S. and recommendations such as those of the Cadbury Committee in the U.K. 
Second, several emerging economies had opened up their markets to foreign 
investments during the last decade of the 20th century. Their requirements of 
developing their own corporate governance norms seamlessly coincided with the 
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explosion of corporate governance norms in the outsider systems at the turn of the 
century. Third, concurrent with the opening up of emerging economies to foreign 
investment, particularly from the leading investing countries of the U.S. and the 
U.K., there was a need to develop corporate governance systems that were 
familiar to investors. Transplantation was found to be a convenient response to 
this need. Among all the transplanted concepts, the independent director presents 
some of the greatest number of challenges both from a theoretical and practical 
standpoint. 
 Returning to our subject insider economies, both China and India adopted 
stringent corporate governance norms, and more specifically a mandatory 
requirement for appointment of independent directors, in the initial years of the 
21st century. In that sense, both these countries have followed a parallel 
chronological trajectory towards implementation of the independent director 
concept. Independent directors have been mandated for listed companies in both 
these countries through listing norms prescribed by the respective securities 
regulators, the China Securities Regulatory Commission [“CSRC”] in China and 
the Securities and Exchange Board of India [“SEBI”] in India. It is essential to 
understand the possible rationale adopted by these regulators in transplanting the 
concept onto their soil. 
 This Chapter sets out to undertake the tasks outlined above. I first discuss 
some possible reasons for the subject insider economies adopting Western style 
corporate governance norms (and more specifically the independent director). 
Then I outline the legal requirements that mandate board composition and 
 160
minimum number of independent directors. This exercise is carried out 
individually for China and India, with a separate discussion of some of the 
common threads as well as disparities. It is hoped that this exercise will not only 
aid in identifying any problems with transplantation of the independent director 
concept into insider economies, but also in attempting a focus on the rationale for 
the borrowing, which will enable policy makers in these countries to mould 
solutions to the problems. 
4.2 Evolution of the Independent Director Concept in the Insider Systems 
At the outset, it is necessary to note that corporate governance reforms 
(culminating with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. and the Cadbury Committee 
Report in the U.K.) have had a profound impact on corporate governance norm-
making around the world, particularly in relation to the appointment of 
independent directors as an essential matter of good governance. The Cadbury 
Committee Report has led the development of corporate governance norms in 
various countries such as Canada,453 Hong Kong,454 South Africa,455 Australia,456 
                                                 
453
  In Canada, the Day Report issued in 1994 resulted in corporate governance norms being 
established by the Toronto Stock Exchange. See Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, supra note 63 
at 6; Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, supra note 25 at 3. 
454
  The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong has adopted some principles of corporate governance 
from the Cadbury Committee Report. See Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, ibid. at 7. 
455
  In its report and a Code of Corporate Practices & Conduct, South Africa’s King Committee 
borrowed heavily from the Cadbury Committee Report. See Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, 
ibid. at 7. 
456
  In Australia, the Bosch Committee Report set out norms for corporate governance. See 
Cheffins, Britain as Exporter, ibid. at 6; Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese 
Experience, supra note 25 at 3; Austin, Ford & Ramsay, supra note 17 at 16. 
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France,457 Japan,458 Malaysia,459 and India,460 just to name a few. Similarly, the 
U.S. requirement of independent directors has also resulted in readjustment of 
corporate governance norms in various countries.461 While some of the measures 
were adopted as a reaction primarily to ensure the prevention of corporate 
governance scandals such as those involving Enron and WorldCom in their 
respective countries,462 others predate these scandals. The countries which 
adopted the norms include both other outsider systems as well as mostly insider 
systems. 
More specifically with reference to independent directors, Dahya and 
McConnell find that during the 1990s and beyond, “at least 26 countries have 
witnessed publication of guidelines that stipulate minimum levels for the 
representation of outside directors on boards of publicly traded companies”.463 
                                                 
457
  In France, the Vienot Report issued corporate governance norms. See Cheffins, Britain as 
Exporter, ibid. at 7; Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, ibid. at 3. 
458
  In Japan, the effort was led through the issue of the Corporate Governance Principles – A 
Japanese View by the Corporate Governance Forum of Japan in 1998. See Tong Lu, 
Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, ibid. at 3. 
459
  In Malaysia, the Report on Corporate Governance issued in 1999 by the High Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (Malaysia) laid down board composition requirements. 
See Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, ibid. at 4. 
460
  In India, the corporate governance wave was led by private effort through the Desirable 
Corporate Governance Code issued by the Confederation of Indian Industry, see infra note 
561. 
461
  The requirement in China of independent directors is said to be a transplant from the U.S. 
Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 129; Chong-En Bai, et al., 
“Corporate Governance and Firm Valuations in China” (2002), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=361660> at 2. 
462
  It is likely that regulators in recipient countries feared the occurrence of corporate governance 
scandals within their own jurisdictions, and hence any swift reaction would support the 
incumbent regulators in so far as they cannot be said to have failed to take appropriate action 
in response to scandals that reverberated around the world. 
463
  See Jay Dahya & John J. McConnell, “Board Composition, Corporate Performance, and the 
Cadbury Committee Recommendation” (2005), online: < http://ssrn.com/abstract=687429> at 
1. 
 162
This demonstrates the significant impact of Western-style corporate governance 
norms (particularly the independent director) on other countries within such a 
short span of time. It is not clear whether recipient countries have had the benefit 
of time to carefully scrutinise and analyse these norms before they were thrust 
upon listed companies within their jurisdictions. Such a swift method of 
implementation gives rise to considerable doubt as to whether sufficient thought 
was given prior to adoption of these norms. It is doubtful whether the social, 
political and cultural fit of these norms within each jurisdiction was specifically 
considered before adoption. As Professor Clarke aptly notes: “Very often 
[transplanted norms] are borrowed in a time of rapid social change in which the 
home culture, so to speak, is lagging behind”.464 Inherent in this rapidity of 
adoption is an element of knee-jerk reaction on the part of regulators in desiring to 
imitate developments that are occurring in other parts of the world. In the absence 
of considered adoption of norms, the process of norm-making in corporate 
governance in this manner is itself susceptible to some questioning, even without 
delving deeper into the substantive aspects of the law. 
With this brief background, I now review the transplant of corporate 
governance in general in the insider jurisdictions of China and India and the 
evolution of independent director norms in those jurisdictions. 
                                                 
464
  Clarke, Lost in Translation, supra note 28 at 2. 
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4.3 Norms Governing Independent Directors in China 
A. Evolution of Corporate Governance Norms 
There is a fair amount of history in Chinese corporate law and governance that 
dates back nearly a century.465 However, for our purpose, it would be sufficient to 
examine the evolution of corporate governance since the policy of economic 
growth and liberalisation was adopted by the Chinese leadership in the late 1970s. 
Professor Clarke refers to the emergence of the “post-traditional enterprise” which 
is “no longer bound tightly within the traditional state planning system”466 and 
one in which “voluntary, contractual relationships are important and top-down 
commands from government are less important”.467 Through the concept of 
privatisation, traditional state-owned enterprises were transformed into companies 
whose securities are listed on stock exchanges. This necessitated a streamlined set 
of laws governing such companies. 
 In modern Chinese corporate history, the first monolithic effort to codify 
company law was accomplished through the PRC Company Law 1993. 
Interestingly, that law was itself a product of legal transplantation. The Chinese 
lawmakers appear to have focused towards the German system of a two-tier 
board, which was adopted in the PRC Company Law 1993. Hence, companies 
                                                 
465
  For a brief historical overview of Chinese corporate law and governance, see Wang, Company 
Law in China, supra note 111 at 3-6. 
466
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 145. 
467
  Ibid. at 146. 
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were required to have two boards, a supervisory board and a board of directors.468 
However, the transplantation was an inchoate one at best. The Chinese 
supervisory board was not structured to be as powerful as its German 
counterpart.469 
 Shortly thereafter, there were calls to introduce the concept of the 
independent director in China. The first major initiative appeared in 1997 through 
the Guidelines for the Articles of Association of Listed Companies.470 These 1997 
Guidelines provide for an option (as opposed to a mandatory requirement) to 
companies to appoint independent directors by providing for that in their articles 
of association.471 Apart from the fact that there was no mandate to appoint 
independent directors, the 1997 Guidelines also did not provide for a detailed 
definition of independence or any clear understanding of the role that such 
directors were expected to play on listed companies.472 Hence, it has been stated 
                                                 
468
  PRC Company Law 1993, arts. 124-128. 
469
  As Chao Xi points: 
What distinguishes the Chinese board structure from the two-tier system, however, is 
both the appointment method of the members of the board of directors (directors) and the 
accountability structure. Directors are appointed by the general shareholders’ meeting, 
not by the supervisory board, and they are made accountable to the shareholders, not the 
supervisory board. 
Chao Xi, “In Search of an Effective Board Monitoring Model: Board Reforms and the 
Political Economy of Corporate Law in China” (2006) 22 Conn. J. Int’l L. 1 at 3 [Board 
Reforms]. For a further discussion of the powers and functions of the supervisory board, 
particularly in the context of overlapping roles with independent directors, see infra Chapter 
6, Section 6.3. 
470
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 183; Chao Xi, Board Reforms, 
supra note 469 at 13. 
471
  Ibid. 
472
  Ibid. 
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that the effort did not meet with much success.473 Nevertheless, although it was a 
voluntary and incomplete effort, this development represents the initiation of the 
concept of independent directors into Chinese corporate governance. 
 Subsequently, there were a series of efforts by stock exchanges, regional 
governments and Central Government ministries exhorting companies to appoint 
independent directors.474 Even the CSRC introduced a series of follow-up 
measures in the same direction.475 But, the most important step taken by the 
CSRC in this direction is the promulgation of the Notice on Release of Directive 
Opinions on the Establishment of Independent Director System in Listed 
Companies476 that was issued on August 16, 2001. The Independent Director 
Opinion mandates that all listed companies in China must have a minimum 
number of independent directors. The PRC Company Law 2005 has also 
thereafter codified the requirement of independent directors477 after much 
debate.478 However, the statute itself only indicates the broad legislative desire 
and leaves it to the State Council to formulate the detailed requirements. In that 
                                                 
473
  Ibid. 
474
  It is not necessary for the purposes of this dissertation to undertake an analysis of these 
initiatives. For a detailed listing and discussion of these initiatives, see Clarke, Independent 
Directors in China, supra note 37 at 176-83. 
475
  See ibid. at 183-90, One significant measure relates to the joint opinions of CSRC and the 
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC) mandating that “Chinese companies listed 
overseas have a board of directors with more than half of its members from outside, among 
whom at least two are independent”. Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 13. 
476
  Zhengjianfa (2001) No. 102, online: CSRC 
<http://eng.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n4001948/n4002030/4079260.html> [Independent Director 
Opinion]. 
477
  PRC Company Law 2005, art. 123. 
478
  For a brief overview of the debate and the various countervailing interests involved, see Chao 
Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 25-26. 
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sense, the PRC Company Law 2005 does not add much to the institution of 
independent directors, except perhaps recognition of the concept by a higher 
authority in the legislative hierarchy. 
 Before delving into the details of the Independent Director Opinion and 
the implications thereof, it would be appropriate to briefly consider the possible 
rationale for this and other corporate governance developments in China. 
B. Rationale for Corporate Governance Reforms 
It is necessary to explore some of the reasons that explain the introduction and 
persistence of corporate governance reforms (including the independent director 
concept) in China. From a regulatory perspective, Professor Clarke surmises that 
the independent director is a method employed by CSRC to enhance its oversight 
of listed companies.479 Businesses succumb to such mandates from regulators and 
dilute their resistance for fear of the alternative, which is greater governmental 
regulation. This theory has also been proffered as explanation for the emergence 
of stringent corporate governance norms in the developed world, with corporate 
responses to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act being the prime example.480 Professor Clarke 
adds another plausible reason, which is that the CSRC must be seen to be taking 
effective action in the wake of corporate governance scandals that were occurring 
                                                 
479
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 208. 
480
  See generally Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance” (2005) 114 Yale L.J. 1521. 
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during the period, and the requirement of independent directors was one such 
measure that would demonstrate “action” on the part of CSRC.481  
While these rationales may exist from a pure regulatory standpoint, there 
are broader and more powerful forces at play. Globalisation appears to be one of 
the major factors, due to which “there has been cross-border competition among 
securities markets for listings and trade volume”.482 Investors are wary of 
investing in markets that do not carry a minimal level of corporate governance 
norms and structures. Markets that provide the requisite framework attract greater 
investments, while others witness massive flight of capital if at all they were able 
to attract much investment in the first place.483 This is the “race to the top” 
argument and “there is evidence that competition from the international securities 
market is putting pressure on the Chinese regulatory authorities to adopt higher 
disclosure and governance standards”.484 Furthermore, where Chinese companies 
are unable to attract quality foreign investors at attractive premiums, they are 
bound to adopt the cross-listing option.485 In order to ensure that Chinese 
companies look inward to attract investors, it has been found necessary for the 
                                                 
481
  See Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 209. 
482
  Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 35. 
483
  This phenomenon is not peculiar to China, but generally applies to most emerging markets. 
Further, there also tends to be competition among emerging markets to make their regimes 
attractive to foreign investors so that foreign capital is not diverted to other countries. 
Professors Gordon and Roe note that the result of internationalisation of capital markets to 
emerging market economies is that “investment flows may move against firms perceived to 
have suboptimal governance and thus to the disadvantage of the countries in which those 
firms are based.”  Gordon & Roe, Convergence and Persistence, supra note 40 at 2. 
484
  Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 35. 
485
  Several Chinese companies are listed on the U.S., London, Hong Kong and Singapore stock 
exchanges. 
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regulator (CSRC) to ensure that the domestic corporate governance framework is 
comparable with international standards. This will enable Chinese companies to 
command appropriate premium on their securities even if they are listed 
domestically.486 
Finally, the motivation of the Chinese regulators may have been to accept 
conventional wisdom. By the late 1990s the independent director had evolved 
substantially as an institution for good governance. Whether or not there was 
sufficient evidence of its utility, the concept was becoming embedded in corporate 
systems around the world. In its race to adopt improved institutions of corporate 
governance, China may have been motivated to introduce the concept into its 
corporate governance framework.487 No matter what the real motivations may 
have been,488 it is clear that China rode the wave of corporate governance reforms 
across the world, of which the independent director was the kingpin. 
                                                 
486
  In other words, investors will then not impose any discount to the securities on account of 
perceived lack of governance standards not only within individual companies but in the 
corporate system as a whole. 
487
  See Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 36-37. 
488
  There does not appear to be any systematic study that definitively concludes on the 
motivations of the Chinese government authorities in introducing the concept of independent 
director. 
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C. The Independent Director Opinion 
The Independent Director Opinion represents the most comprehensive effort in 
Chinese corporate governance to codify the position and role of independent 
directors.489 The key features of the Independent Director Opinion are as follows: 
1. Basic Requirement  
All listed companies are required to adopt the independent director system. 
However, the concept was introduced in a phased manner into Chinese corporate 
governance. The Independent Director Opinion requires that at least 2 
independent directors be appointed on boards of listed companies before June 30, 
2002 (which is only a transitional provision) and that at least 1/3rd independent 
directors be appointed by June 30, 2003.490 There is a need for basic expertise as 
well, since at least one of the independent directors ought to be an accounting 
professional.491 
2.  Independence  
While an independent director is defined in a broad and general sense, there are 
certain circumstances that result in the presumption of a lack of independence. As 
to the broad definition, an independent director is one “who bears no duty in a 
company other than that of a director and engages in no such relation with the 
                                                 
489
  For this reason, this dissertation focuses largely on the Independent Director Opinion rather 
than previous efforts and as well as current supplemental legal provisions that either directly 
or obliquely relate to independent directors. 
490
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 1(3). 
491
  Ibid. at para. 1(3). 
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listed company and the major shareholders he/she works with as to possibly 
influence his/her objective judgment”.492 Note that independence is defined not 
only with reference to the company (that presumably includes the management) 
but also with reference to the major shareholders. Hence, there is explicit 
recognition of the majority-minority agency problem. 
 As regards specific exclusions, the following circumstances would cease 
to make directors independent: (i) those who possess employment relationships 
with the company, such as employees of listed companies or subsidiaries;493 (ii) 
those who possess familial ties with insiders, such as direct relatives and main 
social relations;494 (iii) those who possess business relationships such as 
individuals who “provide services of finance, law or consultation to the listed 
company or its subsidiaries”;495 and (iv) those who possess investing relationships 
whether direct or indirect. As to the last category, holders of 1% stock of the 
listed company or top 10 shareholders, and their relatives, are considered non-
independent because they have a direct investing relationship.496 Furthermore, 
persons working for institutional shareholders holding 5% of the stock of the 
listed company or top 5 shareholders, and their relatives are considered non-
independent because they have an indirect investing relationship.497 This presents 
                                                 
492
  Ibid. at para. 1(1). 
493
  Ibid. at para. 3(1). 
494
  While the expression “direct relatives” refers to spouse, parents and children, “main social 
relations” refers to brothers or sisters, parents-in-law, sons-in-law or daughters-in-law, 
spouses of brothers or sisters, and brothers or sisters of spouse). Ibid. at para. 3(1). 
495
  Ibid. at para. 3(5). 
496
  Ibid. at para. 3(2). 
497
  Ibid. at para. 3(3). 
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a useful contrast with the position in outsider systems. In those systems, 
ownership of stock by independent directors is considered to be a benefit as it 
aligns their interests with that of the shareholders, and hence aids in resolving the 
manager-shareholder agency problem. But, in insider systems, excessive 
shareholding by independent directors is considered to compromise 
independence, and greater stake in companies may motivate such directors to act 
in a manner that benefits them as individuals, but not the entire shareholder body 
as one constituency. Other exclusions from independence are individuals who 
have been specified in the articles of association of the company,498 and those 
specified by the CSRC.499 
 The definition of independence, however, does not capture other social 
and cultural ties between the management and controlling shareholders on the one 
hand and the directors on the other. As we shall see,500 social and cultural ties that 
extend beyond mere familial relationships are vastly prevalent in Chinese society 
and the current definition of independence does not address these ties. In other 
words, companies could appoint persons as independent directors although they 
may be good social friends of, or possess cultural ties transcending generations 
with, the insiders in the company. A formal definition that does not take into 
account these soft factors leaves significant room for abuse of the provision. 
                                                 
498
  Ibid. at para. 3(6). 
499
  Ibid. at para. 3(7). 
500
  Infra Chapter 6, Section 6.4. 
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3. Qualifications of Independent Directors  
Apart from negative factors that prohibit a director from being independent, there 
are certain positive parameters that a director must satisfy in order to be 
independent. In other words, independence does not merely relate to the lack of a 
relationship between the director and the company, its management or controlling 
shareholders, but it also requires such director to carry along some basic levels of 
competence. Independent directors shall possess the minimum qualifications that 
are required “by laws, administrative regulations or other relevant 
requirements”.501 Such director shall also possess basic knowledge and familiarity 
not only with the business and operations of the company itself but also relevant 
laws, administrative regulations, codes and rules.502 Moreover, such director must 
have work experience of at least 5 years in law, economy or other field necessary 
to properly discharge the duties as an independent director.503 Independent 
directors are also required to undergo mandatory training conducted by CSRC or 
other institutions authorised by it.504 The intention of the Independent Director 
Opinion appears to be to weed out non-serious candidates or others put up by 
company managements or controlling shareholders merely as “nodders in the 
                                                 
501
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 2(1). Further, they are required to satisfy other 
conditions as may be imposed by the articles of association of the relevant company. Ibid. at 
para. 2(5). 
502
  Ibid. at para. 2(3). 
503
  Ibid. at para. 2(4). 
504
  Ibid. at para. 1(5). 
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boardroom”.505 Only candidates with basic qualifications that are appropriate for 
the position are entertained. 
 Further, the Independent Director Opinion requires some minimum 
commitment from independent directors. Rather than positively stipulate any time 
commitment on the part of independent directors, it restricts such individuals from 
being appointed on more than 5 listed companies, thereby ensuring “sufficient 
time and energy for the effective fulfillment of the duties of an independent 
director”.506 
4.  Nomination and Appointment  
The Independent Director Opinion does carry fairly elaborate provisions on the 
nomination and appointment process. A nomination for an independent director 
can be made by the listed company’s board of directors, board of supervisors or 
shareholders individually or jointly holding 1% or more of the shares issued by 
the company.507 This provides the incumbent management (through the board) as 
well as controlling shareholders the ability to nominate independent directors. 
Interestingly, even minority shareholders can nominate independent directors so 
long as they can muster the support (even collectively) of shareholders holding 
                                                 
505
  For the usage of this expression, although not specifically in the Chinese context, see Shyamal 
Majumdar, “‘Nodders’ in the Boardroom” Business Standard (25 December 2008) [Nodders]. 
506
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 1(2). 
507
  Ibid. at para. 4(1). 
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1% shares. At first blush, this appears to be a reasonable threshold for nomination 
by minority shareholders.508 
 A peculiar requirement for nomination of independent directors relates to 
the fact that before the shareholders’ general meeting for election of independent 
directors, the listed company is required to submit details regarding the nominee 
for the independent director position to the CSRC and the relevant stock 
exchanges.509 CSRC is required to verify the credentials of the independent 
directors within 15 working days.510 Further, nominees that “have dissidence to 
the CSRC can be appointed as candidates for directors of the company but not as 
candidates [for] independent directors”.511 This requirement sends some strong 
signals in the context of the independent director requirement in China. 
Conventional wisdom indicates that independent directors are gatekeepers and 
preserve a form of self-regulation, so as to protect the interests of shareholders 
(either the entirety or the minority, as the case may be). However, this 
requirement of lack of dissidence with CSRC suggests that independent directors 
are also viewed as a substitute to governmental regulation. In other words, 
independent directors not only owe their responsibility towards shareholders, but 
possess a much larger regulatory commitment that they owe to CSRC. The idea of 
intimating CSRC and obtaining its confirmation for appointment of independent 
directors suggests something more than self-regulation and involves the 
                                                 
508
  However, as we shall see shortly, the election and appointment process (as opposed to the 
nomination process) is nevertheless dominated by the controlling shareholders. 
509
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 4(3). 
510
  Ibid. at para. 4(3). 
511
  Ibid. at para. 4(3). 
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government directly in the process. This requirement is antithetical to the concept 
of a pure monitoring board (without any governmental or regulatory overhang) 
within the background of which the concept of independent directors originated in 
the outsider systems of the U.S. and the U.K. At a practical level, it is unclear 
whether the CSRC has adequate resources to carefully review each nominee and 
exercise its judgment judiciously. Furthermore, involvement of regulatory review 
of appointment of independent directors will add another layer of complication as 
it may prevent companies from appointing otherwise competent individuals if 
their appointment is vetoed by CSRC. There is no sanguinity regarding the 
workability of such a regulatory approval process for the appointment of 
independent directors.512 
 As regards appointment, the independent directors shall be elected in the 
shareholders’ general meeting513 similar to any other director. Director elections 
are dealt with under the PRC Company Law and it would be appropriate at this 
stage to examine some of those provisions. Directors are to be appointed at a 
shareholders’ general meeting, where a shareholder shall have one vote for each 
share it holds.514 Further, resolutions are considered passed at a meeting when 
they are approved by persons present at such meeting that hold more than one-
half of the voting rights.515 In exceptional situations, specific types of resolutions 
are considered passed only if they have the support of shareholders present at 
                                                 
512
  Surprisingly, the commentary or empirical evidence regarding the working of this 
requirement is at best sparse, if not non-existent. 
513
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 4(1). 
514
  PRC Company Law 2005, art. 104. 
515
  Ibid. 
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such meeting that hold more than two-thirds of the voting rights.516 As regards 
appointment of directors, that falls under the general category requiring only an 
ordinary resolution. This takes into account the “direct” election method where 
directors are elected by a majority under a “one share one vote” rule.517 It 
effectively provides substantial powers to controlling shareholders as they are in a 
position to determine the composition of the board in general, as well as the 
appointment of independent directors in particular.518 Minority shareholders do 
not generally have the wherewithal to affect the board composition as Chinese 
companies are mostly dominated by controlling shareholders.519 
 One method of director election that provides some powers to minority 
shareholders is cumulative voting or proportionate voting rights. In such a system, 
the appointment of directors can be determined through proportional 
representation, such that minority shareholders are able to elect such number 
directors on the board correlative to the percentage of their shareholding in the 
company.520 The PRC Company Law 2005 too provides for the principle of 
cumulative voting in Article 106: 
                                                 
516
  The resolutions in this category relate to “amendments to the articles of association of the 
company, the increase or reduction of the registered capital, or the merger, split, dissolution or 
restructuring of the company”. PRC Company Law 2005, art. 104. 
517
  Gu Minkang, Understanding Chinese Company Law (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University 
Press, 2006) at 136 [Chinese Company Law]. 
518
  Gu Minkang notes that “this election method will open the door for majority shareholders to 
abuse their power such that minority shareholders may not successfully elect their 
representatives”. Ibid. 
519
  For a detailed discussion on shareholding structures of Chinese companies and dominance by 
controlling shareholders, see supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2(D)(1). 
520
  The proportional representation may be by a single transferable vote or by a system of 
cumulative voting. As Professor Gordon describes: 
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When any directors or supervisors are elected at a shareholders’ general 
meeting, an accumulative voting system may be implemented in 
accordance with the provisions of the articles of association of the 
company or a resolution passed at a shareholders’ general meeting. The 
“accumulative voting system” as referred to in this Law means that, when 
any directors or supervisors are elected at a shareholders’ general meeting, 
each share shall have the same number of votes as that of the directors or 
supervisors to be elected and the shareholders may pool their votes when 
such votes are cast.  
While this arrangement provides some consolation to minority shareholders, it is 
not a mandatory provision. Cumulative voting is provided as an option that 
companies may adopt through provisions in their articles of association. In the 
absence of such a provision, cumulative voting is not available. Since cumulative 
voting runs contrary to the interests of incumbent management and controlling 
shareholders, it is little surprise that hardly any companies have provided for 
cumulative voting in their articles of association.521 Despite the existence of an 
optional cumulative voting provision for election of directors, controlling 
                                                                                                                                     
Cumulative voting operates in two distinct settings. First, a single shareholder (or 
cohesive group) owning a significant minority block can automatically elect a director to 
the board. But second, cumulative voting lowers the cost of mobilizing diffuse 
shareholders because electoral success--in the sense of placing a nominee on the board-- 
requires much less than 50% of the votes. For example, for a ten-person board elected 
annually, a dissident needs to rally only a 10% shareholder vote to put a director on the 
board. So cumulative voting offers significant potential for shareholder selection of at 
least some directors who would be independent in this genealogical sense. 
Gordon, Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1498.  
521
  For a detailed discussion of the merits and demerits of cumulative voting, and some 
recommendations for law reform, see infra Chapters 7, Section 7.3(B)(1). It must be noted, 
however, that article 31 of the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China 
(Zhengjianfa No. 1 of 2002) [Code of Corporate Governance], which was issued by the 
CSRC on 7 January 2002 provides that for listed companies where controlling shareholders 
hold more than 30% shares the cumulative voting system is mandatory. While this is a 
promising provision, it has been found that more companies that fall within its ambit are in 
violation of this requirement than in compliance. See Gu Minkang, Chinese Company Law, 
supra note 517 at 137. It has also been noted that while more than half of the listed companies 
had inserted provisions regarding cumulative voting in their articles of association, there has 
been no reported case of cumulating voting in fact having been used to elect directors or 
supervisors. See Chao Xi, Corporate Governance and Legal Reform in China (London: 
Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing, 2009) at 145. 
 
 178
shareholders continue to wield significant powers by not opting into that scheme 
(either under law or in practice) and instead following the direct election method 
that entrenches their nominees as directors, including those that are independent. 
5.  Tenure  
Independent directors shall have a term of office that runs concurrently with other 
directors.522 In case of renewal of office, such renewals shall be limited to a 
maximum of 6 years.523 Independent directors who do not demonstrate their 
commitment to the job are liable to be removed. For instance, if an independent 
director is absent from board meetings three times continuously, the board shall 
request the shareholders’ general meeting to remove the director.524 Independent 
directors are able to resign from their position before the expiry of their term.525 
However, the resigning director is required to present a written resignation report 
to the board and clarify matters related to the resignation as necessary to draw the 
attention of shareholders and creditors.526 Further, if the ratio of independent 
directors goes below the minimum number owing to resignation, the resignation 
of the independent director shall not come into effect until the next board meeting 
where the vacancy has been filled.527 These are appropriate provisions. Often, 
independent directors resign from companies when they lose faith in the 
                                                 
522
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 4(4). 
523
  Ibid. at para. 4(4). 
524
  Ibid. at para. 4(5). 
525
  Ibid. at para. 4(6). 
526
  Ibid. at para. 4(6).  
527
  See Ibid. at para. 4(6). 
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management, find that they do not receive adequate information in order to enable 
them to take considered decisions or even when there are direct confrontations 
between independent directors on the one hand and management or controlling 
shareholders on the other. Such resignations are sometimes disguised as “owing to 
personal reasons” or “health reasons” or “other pressing commitments”.528 That 
does not provide a clear picture to the shareholders (and other stakeholders) 
regarding the true state of affairs of the company. In that sense, the Independent 
Director Opinion does well to require a transparent resignation process. An 
independent director who is forthright with the reasons for resignation could be a 
potential whistleblower regarding affairs of the company.529 
6.  Allegiance of the Independent Directors  
The question of whose interests the independent directors are required to serve is 
a crucial one.530 While the Independent Director Opinion imposes on independent 
                                                 
528
  See generally Ivan P.L. Png & Hans Tjio, “Suggestions for Sound Corp Governance” 
Business Times (Singapore) (3 September 2008) (noting also that if directors do not provide 
clear explanations for resignations at the time of announcement of financial results, that could 
lead to distortion in market prices for shares of the company). 
529
  For example, a study by the Singapore Exchange highlighted this problem, which resulted in 
the prescription of a template for resignation by independent directors: 
One of the findings of the study highlighted the importance of listed companies providing 
detailed information on the resignations of their directors and key officers to investors 
and the marketplace. The new easy-to-use announcement template will facilitate listed 
companies disclosing in detail the reasons for the resignations. The resignation of one 
director or a succession of them, particularly of independent directors, may indicate 
something untoward in terms of corporate governance or commercial developments. 
Investors should be made aware of these changes. 
Cited from “Independent Directors in the Post-Satyam Era”, Indian Corporate Law Blog (20 
April 2009), online: < http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2009/04/independent-directors-in-
post-satyam.html>. See also Michelle Quah, “Notices of Resignations to be Made More 
Prominent” Business Times (Singapore) (23 August 2007). 
530
  As we have seen earlier, in the outsider systems the independent directors are expected to 
protect the interests of the shareholder body as a whole by monitoring managers. See supra 
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directors the duties of “good faith and due diligence toward the listed company 
and all the shareholders … to protect the overall interests of the company”,531 
such directors have a special duty to “especially prevent the legal rights and 
interests of medium and minor shareholders from being violated”.532 Further, the 
“independent director shall fulfill his/her duties in an independent manner, 
without being influenced by the listed company’s major shareholders [or] 
effective controller …”.533 Specifically, independent directors are required to 
express their opinion on issues they “deem to be possibly harmful to the rights of 
medium and minor shareholders”.534 The Independent Director Opinion does well 
to recognise the majority-minority agency problem at the outset and to envisage a 
specific role for the independent director to solve that problem. However, as we 
shall see shortly, although the independent director has been introduced with 
aplomb as a guardian of minority shareholder interests, there is little in terms of 
substance that the Independent Director Opinion does to cement this idea in its 
detailed working.  
There is no role for the independent director envisaged in terms of 
protection of the non-shareholder constituencies. Although China largely adopts 
                                                                                                                                     
Chapter 3. But, as argued earlier, in insider systems such as China, it is the interests of 
minority shareholders that require protection as controlling shareholders are in a position to 
exercise monitoring activities by themselves due to the power of their shareholding in the 
company. 
531
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 1(2). 
532
  Ibid. at para. 1(2). 
533
  Ibid. 
534
  Ibid. at para. 6(1)(e). 
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the stakeholder approach to corporate law and governance,535 the independent 
directors have not been conferred any roles or responsibilities towards other 
stakeholders. On the other hand, the board of supervisors is required to be 
comprised of worker representatives at least to the extent of 1/3rd of its strength.536 
It appears that through this process of codetermination, Chinese corporate law 
foists the responsibility for worker protection on the board of supervisors rather 
than on independent directors.537 There is no specific mandate to either 
independent directors or the board of supervisors as a whole as regards other 
stakeholder interests such as creditors, consumers and the general public. 
7.  Role of Independent Directors  
One of the key imponderables for an independent director is the exact role that 
position carries. Is an independent director required to act as an advisor to 
management and controlling shareholders or as a monitor of those constituencies? 
What is the extent of involvement of an independent director in the affairs of the 
company? There is considerable divergence in existing literature on this aspect. 
Recognising the possibility of inconsistencies in approach, the Independent 
Director Opinion lays out specific roles for independent directors. They are also 
provided certain specific rights. First, independent directors have an important 
                                                 
535
  For a detailed discussion on this aspect, see supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2(D)(1). 
536
  PRC Company Law 2005, art. 118. 
537
  There is arguably a significant overlap between the roles of the independent directors and 
board of supervisors, a matter I consider in detail later. See infra Chapter 6, Section 6.3. 
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role to play in significant transactions between the company and related parties.538 
Such transactions shall be submitted for discussion on the board only after they 
have been acknowledged by the independent directors.539 This role appears 
similar to that devised by the Delaware legislature and courts while considering 
self-dealing transactions.540 Apart from this key role, there are other specific roles 
for independent directors.541 Some academics, however, have argued that these 
roles and powers are ambiguous.542 Decisions on these issues require the consent 
of more than half of all independent directors.543 Apart from decision-making, 
independent directors’ opinions shall be solicited by the company on certain 
                                                 
538
  A related transaction is one “made between the listed company and the related person 
involving a total amount of over CNY 3 million or more than 5% of the listed company’s 
latest audited net asset value”.  Independent Director Opinion, para. 5(1)(a). 
539
  Ibid. Before making judgment on related party transactions, independent directors are entitled 
to appoint an independent financial consulting firm to provide a report on which they can rely. 
540
  See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(C)(1). However, it is not entirely clear whether 
“acknowledgement” in the Chinese context bears the same meaning as “approval” as 
generally understood in the Delaware context. 
541
  These are: 
(b) Proposing to the board of directors the appointment or dismissal of an 
accountant firm. 
(c) Proposing to the board of directors an interim shareholders’  meeting. 
(d) Proposing a meeting of the board of directors. 
(e) Appointing independently an external auditing institution or consulting 
institution. 
(f) Collecting voting rights from the shareholders before the shareholder general 
meeting. 
Independent Director Opinion, para. 5(1). 
542
  Professor Clarke discusses the example of the power to call for a meeting and argues that “the 
independent directors do not have the power to actually call a meeting of shareholders or the 
board; they have only the power to recommend to the board that such a meeting be called”. 
Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 194 (emphasis in original). 
543
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 5(2). 
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matters.544 In certain cases, the opinions of independent directors have to be 
publicised too in the interests of transparency to shareholders.545 
Normally, one of the key avenues for independent directors to discharge 
their roles is through committees of directors established by the board. Principal 
among such committees are the audit committee, nomination committee and 
compensation committee. The Independent Director Opinion gives short shrift to 
the utility of committees. It provides that “[i]n case such committees as 
compensation committee, auditing committee and nomination committee are 
established under the board of directors of the listed company, the number of 
independent directors shall make [up] over half of that of the members of each 
committee”.546 Constitution of committees is, therefore, not mandatory. 
Companies may wish to constitute them at their option. This appears to be a sub-
optimal approach. Unlike the entire board, committees are smaller in size and 
focus on specialised activities forming part of the business or corporate affairs of 
                                                 
544
  These are: 
(a) Nomination, appointment and dismissal of directors. 
(b) Appointment or dismissal of senior executives. 
(c) Compensation for the company’s directors and senior executives. 
(d) The existing or newly made loan or other form of funds dealings of the listed 
company’s shareholders, effective controller or its related enterprises from the 
listed company with a total amount of over CNY 3 million or more than 5% of 
the listed company’s latest audited net asset value, and whether the company has 
taken effective measures to draw back such loans. 
(e) Issues that independent directors deem to be possibly harmful to the rights of 
medium and minor shareholders. 
(f) Other issues as stated in the company’s articles of association. 
Ibid. at para. 6(1). 
545
  Ibid. at para. 6(3). 
546
  Ibid. at para. 5(4) (emphasis supplied). 
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each company. A committee with majority of independent directors can be 
expected to act in a fair, impartial and independent manner than the entire board. 
The contribution of independent directors is likely to be greater on committees, 
and decisions of committees are normally given considerable weight by the entire 
board. Despite this, the Independent Director Opinion does not provide for 
mandatory constitution of board committees. 
This problem is exacerbated by incongruity in the minimum number of 
independent directors on the full board as compared to committees. While the full 
board itself is required to carry only a third of its strength as independent 
directors, committees (if at all constituted) are to carry a majority of independent 
directors. In the absence of mandatory requirements to constitute committees, the 
incumbent management and controlling shareholders have every incentive to 
ensure that the full board decides all matters where independent directors do not 
have a majority and hence control remains with management and controlling 
shareholders. This would benefit incumbency, rather than in a case where 
decision-making powers are handed down to committees where independent 
directors can wield significant influence. In the absence of mandatory 
requirements for committees, conventional wisdom would dictate that incumbents 
would not volunteer their constitution and cede their own influence. 
The absence of an audit committee is astonishing. Independent directors in 
other jurisdictions (particularly the accounting expert on the board) are required to 
verify the financial statements of the company and interact with the auditors to 
ensure that the financial statements are true, fair and accurate. In the absence of 
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such a stringent process in China, it is not clear how shareholders are able to rely 
on the veracity of the financial statements. Similarly, executive compensation is a 
sensitive aspect of corporate governance. This is because compensating 
management is inherently a self-dealing transaction. Most jurisdictions have 
addressed this issue by requiring an independent compensation committee to 
devise and approve executive compensation. In China, however, this is only 
optional.  
Finally, and more closely relevant to our discussion, the absence of a 
nomination committee undermines the effectiveness of independent directors. As 
discussed earlier,547 the controlling shareholders are able to determine the 
constitution of the entire board, including the independent directors. Through the 
use of their voting power, controlling shareholders may be in a position to appoint 
only such persons (as independent directors) who are able to share the same 
vision and strategy as the controlling shareholders and therefore toe their line. 
Due to this situation, independent directors, as they are appointed at the will of the 
controlling shareholders, are unlikely to be suitable monitors of their own 
appointers to whom they implicitly owe their allegiance. The clout of the 
controlling shareholders can be diluted (if not entirely eliminated) through a 
nomination process that is carried out by an independent nomination committee. 
Such a nomination process would ensure that candidates are chosen for 
independent directorship without the involvement of the controlling shareholders. 
Such an independent and impartial process would ensure that the persons 
                                                 
547
  See supra notes 513 to 519 and accompanying text. 
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appointed would become effective monitors not only of the management but also 
of the controlling shareholders. The absence of a nomination committee in 
Chinese corporate governance perpetuates the agency problem between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former are in a position 
to determine the identity of the independent directors. This is a serious 
shortcoming in the Independent Director Opinion.548 
Although independent directors have fairly immense powers, their 
effective exercise depends on various factors such as the availability of 
appropriate information, access to company officials, ability to engage a separate 
set of independent advisors and the like. The absence of these conditions would 
make the independent directors’ powers sterile. To that end, the Independent 
Director Opinion, foreseeing this issues, lays down certain basic conditions that 
companies need to provide for their independent directors. Availability of 
information is key.549 The Independent Director Opinion grants independent 
directors the same status as other directors regarding rights to information: they 
enjoy equality of informational rights along with other directors.550 Independent 
directors are required to be provided assistance of company secretaries551 as well 
                                                 
548
  For a detailed discussion relating to difficulties in the appointment of independent directors in 
the insider systems, see infra, Chapter 6, Section 6.2(A). 
549
  For a discussion on the importance of information to independent directors, see supra note 
411 and accompanying text. 
550
  Independent Director Opinion, para. 7(1). It also provides:  
If two or more independent directors deem that the materials are insufficient or evidence 
not clear, they can request jointly to the board of directors for an extension of the meeting 
of board of directors or an extension of verification on those issues, for which the board 
of directors shall acknowledge. 
551
  Ibid. at para. 7(2). 
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as access to intermediaries552 at the expense of the company. Evidently, CSRC 
has consciously attempted to legislate on these issues so that companies are 
compelled to provide a suitable working environment for their independent 
directors to act in a truly independent manner. In the absence of such efforts that 
enable proper exercise of powers by independent directors, it would not be 
appropriate to impose any high standard of care or duty on such directors.553 
8.  Effectiveness of the Independent Director Opinion  
The Independent Director Opinion represents an important milestone in the 
advancement of corporate governance measures in China. Arguably, it covers 
specific details regarding qualifications of independent directors and their roles in 
a fairly cogent manner and, to a great extent, in a manner that even corporate 
governance regulations of developed economies such as the U.S. and the U.K. fail 
to do. Prominent among these provisions include the explicit protection that 
independent directors are required to provide minority shareholders (thereby 
amply recognising the existence of the majority-minority agency problem in 
China, which is an insider system), maximum limits on number of board 
memberships for independent directors, mandatory training and specific roles and 
responsibilities that they are required to discharge on specific matters. Despite the 
robustness of those provisions, there are certain fundamental shortcomings in the 
                                                 
552
  Ibid. at para. 7(4). 
553
  In the context of Hong Kong, see Chee Keong Low, “Is the Standard of Care of Directors 
Inverted in Hong Kong?” (2008) 38 Hong Kong L.J. 31 at 47-48 (questioning “whether we 
are in danger of imposing too much responsibility, and therefore potential liability, upon the 
shoulders of independent non-executive directors who are by definition part-time members of 
the board whose access to information depends significantly on the executive management of 
the company”). 
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approach adopted by the Independent Director Opinion that causes the underlying 
edifice of the independent director concept to disintegrate at the outset. Primary 
among these are the continued dominance of controlling shareholders in 
appointing independent directors, the intervention of CSRC in the nomination 
process and the lack of a committee structure that channels independent directors’ 
contributions (advisory or monitoring) in a more meaningful manner. Unless 
these issues are addressed satisfactorily, it is not clear whether the institution of 
independent directors in China will be capable of enhancing corporate governance 
systems and measures in that country. 
Finally, there is lack of adequate clarity regarding the consequences of 
non-compliance with the Independent Director Opinion. The Opinion itself does 
not specify any sanctions that may befall a violating company, controlling 
shareholder or director. Hence, it arguably lacks sufficient teeth. Academics have 
observed that the severest form of penalty against non-compliance in China would 
be reputational sanctions.554 For instance, matters regarding the appointment of 
independent directors, their opinion on specific issues and other aspects 
surrounding their role are subject to disclosures to shareholders. In case of non-
compliance, persons who are in breach may be liable not only for negative impact 
on their reputation, but the company may suffer a loss in share value upon 
publication of such information to the extent that the stock markets are efficient. 
Furthermore, since several listed state-owned enterprises in China are managed by 
bureaucrats, any non-compliance could adversely affect their own promotions and 
                                                 
554
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 197-98. 
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governmental careers.555 Apart from such soft sanctions, there does not appear to 
be any direct penal or other consequences to non-compliance. Such ambiguity in 
enforcement of the Independent Director Opinion would result in lax compliance 
where there is no fear of sanctions. There is a need to clearly define civil or 
criminal penalties for violations, failing which there is likely to be no deterrence 
against non-compliance. This is perceived to be another serious shortcoming of 
the Independent Director Opinion. 
It would now be appropriate to review the background of the corporate 
governance movement in the other insider economy that is the subject matter of 
this dissertation, i.e., India, and to review the relevant legal regime pertaining to 
independent directors, before proceeding with an analysis of the effectiveness of 
independent directors in both China and India from a comparative, and thereafter 
empirical, perspective. 
4.4 Norms Governing Independent Directors in India 
A. Evolution of Corporate Governance Norms556 
Since its independence in 1947, India’s corporate governance regime has 
witnessed two eras. The first is the pre-1991 era, which is embodied in company 
law that was inherited from the British. The company law was substantially 
                                                 
555
  Ibid. at 198. 
556
  For a more detailed analysis on the historical developments in Indian corporate governance, 
see, Chakrabarti, Evolution and Challenges, supra note 89 at 14-20; N. Balasubramanian, 
Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets: A Case Study of India 5-6 (2008), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=992529> [Firm-
Level Corporate Governance]; Afra Afsharipour, “Corporate Governance Convergence: 
Lessons from the Indian Experience” (2009) 29 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 335. 
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overhauled about a decade after independence when it took the form of the Indian 
Companies Act in 1956. During this era, the focus was predominantly on the 
manufacturing sector. The then prevalent license-raj and industrial capacity quota 
system ensured that only a few businesses thrived.557 This led to the growth of 
certain business families and industrial groups (largely to the exclusion of others) 
that held large chunks of capital in even publicly listed companies. Finance was 
essentially available only through banking channels (as opposed to the capital 
markets). The banks and development financial institutions took up large 
shareholdings in companies and also nominated directors on boards of such 
companies. During this era, due to concentrated ownership of shares, the 
controlling shareholders, which were primarily business families or the state, 
continued to exert great influence over companies at the cost of minority 
shareholders. Governance structures were opaque as financial disclosure norms 
were poor.558  
 Signs of change, however, rapidly emerged with the 1991 reforms through 
economic liberalisation559 that led to a new era in Indian corporate governance. 
                                                 
557
  The origins of this approach can be traced to the Industries (Development and Regulation) 
Act, 1951 and the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956. See Chakrabarti, Megginson & 
Yadav, Corporate Governance in India, supra note 99 at 62. 
558
  At a broad level, there are some similarities between the growth path adopted in India on the 
one hand and Germany and Japan on the other, due to which all of these countries have 
witnessed concentrated shareholdings in their companies to varying degrees. These are also 
due to the interplay of economic, political and cultural factors. For a discussion of Germany 
and Japan, see Roe, Some Differences, supra note 92. 
559
  Radical reforms were occasioned in 1991 due to the exceptionally severe balance of payments 
crisis and dismal growth. See Montek S. Ahluwalia, “Economic Reforms in India Since 1991: 
Has Gradualism Worked?” in Rahul Mukherji, ed., India’s Economic Transition: The Politics 
of Reforms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 87; Anne O. Krueger & Sajjid Chinoy, 
“The Indian Economy in Global Context” in Anne O. Krueger, ed., Economic Policy Reforms 
and the Indian Economy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003) at 21. 
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The year 1992 witnessed the establishment of SEBI as the Indian securities 
markets regulator.560 SEBI rapidly began ushering in securities market reforms 
that gradually led to corporate governance reforms as well. Curiously, the first 
corporate governance initiative was sponsored by industry. In 1998, a National 
Task force constituted by the Confederation of Indian Industry [hereinafter “CII”] 
recommended a code for “Desirable Corporate Governance,” which was 
voluntarily adopted by a few companies.561 Thereafter, a committee chaired by 
Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla submitted a report to SEBI “to promote and raise the 
standard of Corporate Governance in respect of listed companies.”562 Based on 
the recommendations of the Kumar Mangalam Birla committee, the new Clause 
49 containing norms for corporate governance was inserted in 2000 into the 
Equity Listing Agreement that was applicable to all listed companies of a certain 
size.563 India’s corporate governance norms therefore came to be governed 
                                                 
560
  SEBI was established under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992. 
561
  Confederation of Indian Industry, Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code (Apr. 1998), 
online: <http://www.acga-asia.org/public/files/CII_Code_1998.pdf> [CII Code]. The CII 
Code, which was directed at large companies, contained some of the measures that continue 
to date, such as the appointment of a minimum number of non-executive independent 
directors, an independent audit committee, the unimpeded flow of key information to the 
board of directors and norms for corporate disclosures to shareholders. 
562
  See Securities and Exchange Board of India, Report of the Kumar Mangalam Birla 
Committee on Corporate Governance (Feb. 2000), online: 
<http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.html> [Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee 
Report]. This report built upon the pattern established by the CII Code and recommended that 
“under Indian conditions a statutory rather than voluntary code would be far more purposive 
and meaningful, at least in respect of essential features of corporate governance.” Ibid. at 
para. 1.7. For a detailed discussion regarding the transition from the CII Code to the Kumar 
Mangalam Birla Committee Report, see, Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can 
Corporate Governance Reforms Increase Firms’ Market Values? Evidence from India, 
Journal of Empirical Studies, Vol. 4 (2007), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=914440> 
[Corporate Governance Reforms: Evidence from India]. 
563
  Securities and Exchange Board of India, SMDRP/POLICY/CIR-10/2000 (21 February 2000), 
online: <http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2000/CIR102000.html>. Clause 49 contained a 
schedule of implementation whereby it was applicable at the outset to large companies and 
newly listed companies, and thereafter to smaller companies over a defined timeframe. 
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through a clause in the listing agreement popularly referred to as “Clause 49”.564 
Although both the CII Code as well as the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee 
Report expressly cautioned against mechanically importing forms of corporate 
governance from the developed world,565 several concepts introduced by them 
were indeed those that emerged in countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. These 
include the concepts such as an independent board and audit committee. 
 Thereafter, following Enron, WorldCom and other global scandals, SEBI 
decided to strengthen Indian corporate governance norms. In the wake of the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S., SEBI appointed the Narayana 
Murthy Committee to examine Clause 49 and recommend changes to the existing 
regime.566 Following the recommendations of the Narayana Murthy Committee, 
SEBI, on 29 October 2004, issued a revised version of Clause 49 that was to come 
                                                 
564
  Some discussion about the Equity Listing Agreement [hereinafter the “Listing Agreement”] is 
in order. It is a contractual document that is executed between a company desirous of listing 
its securities and the stock exchanges where the securities are to be listed. The execution of 
the Listing Agreement is a pre-condition of listing securities on a stock exchange. Since the 
format of the Listing Agreement is prescribed by India’s securities regulator, the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India, all stock exchanges are required to follow the standard Listing 
Agreement, and hence its terms do not vary from one stock exchange to another. The standard 
form of the Listing Agreement is available online: 
<http://www.nseindia.com/content/equities/eq_listagree.zip>. See also Securities (Contracts) 
Regulation Act, 1956, s. 21, which provides that a company that applies for listing of 
securities on a stock exchange shall comply with the provisions of the Listing Agreement. 
565
  CII Code, supra note 561 at 1; Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report, supra note 562 at 
para. 2.6 and endnote. 
566
  Securities and Exchange Board of India, Report of the SEBI Committee on Corporate 
Governance (Feb. 2003), online: <http://www.sebi.gov.in/commreport/corpgov.pdf> 
[hereinafter the “Narayana Murthy Committee Report”]. The need for a review of Clause 49 
was in part triggered by events that occurred in the U.S. at the turn of the century, such as the 
collapse of Enron and WorldCom. See Narayana Murthy Committee Report, ibid. at para. 
1.6.1. Considerable emphasis was placed in this report on financial disclosures, financial 
literacy of audit committee members as well as on chief executive officer (CEO) and chief 
financial officer (CFO) certification, all of which are matters similar to those dealt with by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
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into effect on 1 April 2005.567 However, since a large number of companies were 
not yet in a state of preparedness to be fully compliant with such stringent 
requirements, SEBI extended the date compliance to 31 December 2005.568 
Hence, detailed corporate governance norms were introduced into Indian 
corporate regulations only from 1 January 2006.569 Clause 49 in its present form 
provides for the following key features of corporate governance:570 
(i) boards of directors of listed companies must have a minimum 
number of independent directors, with independence being defined in a 
detailed manner;571 
(ii) listed companies must have audit committees of the board with a 
minimum of three directors, two-thirds of whom must be independent;572 
                                                 
567
  Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2004/12/10 (29 October 
2004), online: <http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2004/cfdcir0104.pdf>.  
568
  Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2005/29/3 (29 March 2005), 
online: <http://www.sebi.gov.in/circulars/2005/dil0105.html>.   
569
  These norms have been subjected to some periodic amendments and clarifications thereafter. 
See Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2008/08/04 (8 April 
2008);  Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/2/2008/23/10 (23 
October 2008); Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/LA/2009/3/2 (3 
February 2009).  
570
  Clause 49 applies to all listed companies (or those that are seeking listing), except for very 
small companies (being those that have a paid-up capital of less than Rs. 30 million and net 
worth of less than Rs. 250 million throughout their history). While several requirements of 
Clause 49 are mandatory in nature, there are certain requirements (such as remuneration 
committee, training of board members and whistle blower policy) that are merely 
recommendatory in nature. See SEBI Circular (29 October 2004), supra note 567. 
571
  Where the Chairman is an executive or a promoter or related to a promoter or a senior official, 
then at least one-half the board should comprise independent directors; in other cases, 
independent directors should constitute at least one-third of the board size. Listing 
Agreement, clause 49(I)(A).  
572
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(A). 
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the roles and responsibilities of the audit committee are specified in 
detail;573 
(iii) listed companies must periodically make various disclosures 
regarding financial and other matters to ensure transparency;574 
(iv) the CEO and CFO of listed companies must (a) certify that the 
financial statements are fair and (b) accept responsibility for internal 
controls;575 and 
(v) annual reports of listed companies must carry status reports about 
compliance with corporate governance norms.576 
However, there are some existing proposals to reform some of these 
corporate governance provisions, specifically those relating to independent 
directors, under the Companies Bill, 2008, which is pending in Parliament.577  
B. Rationale for Corporate Governance Reforms 
The drive towards a more stringent corporate governance regime over the last 
decade can be attributed to two factors, viz., (i) the internationalisation of Indian 
                                                 
573
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(D). 
574
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(IV). 
575
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(V). 
576
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(VI). 
577
  The concept of “independent director” is proposed under the Bill to be introduced in the 
Indian Companies Act for the first time. Companies that have a prescribed minimum share 
capital are required to have at least one-third of their board consist of independent directors. 
This will be a uniform requirement and the distinction between companies with executive 
chairman and non-executive chairman will be removed. See Companies Bill, 2008, clause 
132(3). 
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capital markets, and (ii) cross-listings by Indian companies. Beginning with the 
phenomenon of internationalisation, a review of the pre-1991 era indicates that 
the capital markets were heavily regulated,578 thereby impeding foreign investors 
from investing in the Indian markets. However, with the liberalisation of the 
Indian economy in 1991 and the consequent promotion of capital market activity 
by SEBI, a simplified process became available to Indian companies to access 
capital from the public.579 Simultaneously, the foreign investment regime was 
relaxed thereby increasing the avenues available to foreign investors to participate 
in the Indian capital markets.580 These measures signify the objective of the 
Indian Government during the turn of the century to attract foreign capital so as to 
make its securities markets more competitive among emerging markets.581  
In addition, Indian companies themselves found it essential to issue 
securities to investors in other countries to meet their capital needs. When Indian 
companies undertook public offerings of securities in India with listings on Indian 
                                                 
578
  All securities offerings to the public required the approval of the Controller of Capital Issues 
[hereinafter “CCI”], which effectively micro-managed offerings including by reviewing the 
details such as price at which securities were to be offered rather than leaving those to the 
market forces to determine. 
579
  The office of the CCI was abolished in 1992 by the Capital Issues (Control) Repeal Act, 1992. 
Furthermore, SEBI effected a series of capital market reforms in the late 1990s streamlining 
the public offering process. Significant measures include the introduction of the bookbuilding 
process for price discovery, dematerialisation of securities (and the consequent availability of 
scripless trading) and the use of “shelf prospectus.” All of these helped stimulate greater 
capital market activity in India. See Armour & Lele, supra note 161. 
580
  Significant changes in the foreign investment regime include the enactment of the Foreign 
Exchange Management Act, 1999 and the availability of the automatic route for foreign 
investment in most sectors up to specified shareholding percentages. Government of India, 
Ministry of Industry, Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Press Note No. 2 (2000 
Series). See also, Rohit Sachdev, “Comparing the Legal Foundations of Foreign Direct 
Investment in India and China: Law and the Rule of Law in the Indian Foreign Direct 
Investment Context” 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 167 at 200-04.  
581
  See Tania Mazumdar, “Where the Traditional and Modern Collide: Indian Corporate 
Governance Law” (2007) 16 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 243 at 253. 
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stock exchanges, a significant portion of the investments came from offshore 
investors. Due to this phenomenon, Indian companies (at least those raising 
capital market finance) were persuaded to comply with corporate governance 
norms that most investors around the world understood in order for the securities 
offerings to be successfully marketed overseas.582 Companies therefore had to 
depart from their own norms and meet standards in other countries from where 
they received investments. Since a large portion of such foreign investment came 
from the developed world (primarily the U.S. and the U.K.), it became convenient 
for companies to adopt standards with which investors from those countries were 
familiar.583 Such a move was aided by the Government through imposition of 
corporate governance norms (in the form of Clause 49) that met with industry 
demands. 
Moving on to the cross-listing factor, while the Indian capital markets 
were becoming international, Indian companies began listing overseas in order to 
raise capital. By the late 1990s, it was common for Indian companies to issue their 
securities through global depository receipts (GDRs) that were listed on the 
London or Luxembourg stock exchange. The event that marks a watershed in 
                                                 
582
  See Rajiv Gupta, “Reforms Made and Reforms Needed in India’s Capital Markets: Issues 
Facing U.S. Investors” (2008) 1650 PLI/Corp 85. 
583
  Several U.S. pension funds, who are activist investors, began investing significant sums of 
money in the Indian stock markets. Vikas Dhoot, “Pension Funds from Across the World 
Flock to Dalal Street While India Still Waits” Indian Express (13 January 2008) (noting that 
“as many as 152 global pension funds from 18 countries are here and the number is growing 
fast”). Even the California state employees’ pension fund (referred to as CalPERS), renowned 
for its activism in instilling corporate governance standards in its portfolio companies, 
commenced investment in the Indian stock markets in 2004. Dhammika Dharmapala & 
Vikramaditya Khanna, “Corporate Governance, Enforcement, and Firm Value: Evidence from 
India” (2008), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105732> at 18-19 [Corporate Governance, 
Enforcement and Firm Value]. This phenomenon is not peculiar to India, but generally applies 
to most emerging markets.  
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cross-listings by Indian companies is the listing of American depository receipts 
(ADRs) by Infosys, the Indian information technology bellwether, on the 
NASDAQ Stock Market in 1999.584 As a result of its NASDAQ listing, Infosys 
submitted itself to the full-blown corporate governance requirements applicable to 
foreign listings on NASDAQ.585 Apart from seeking capital at better valuations, 
overseas listings were also driven by the desire of companies to build credibility 
and reputation in the international markets.586 Greater numbers of offshore listings 
by Indian companies compelled such companies to adhere to norms and practices 
of corporate governance applicable to markets where they listed their securities. 
Consequently, those norms and practices permeated into the general Indian 
corporate scenario, at least among the leading and more reputable companies. 
These motivating factors reveal that apart from the general desire to 
enhance governance and transparency among Indian companies, the 
developments in Indian corporate governance since 1991 were also largely driven 
by the need to attract foreign capital into the Indian markets which indicates the 
trend to borrow, willy-nilly, well-understood concepts of corporate governance 
                                                 
584
  Khanna & Palepu, Evidence from Infosys, supra note 162 at 489. 
585
  This sparked off somewhat of a trend, and as of December 2008, there are 16 Indian 
companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges (3 on NASDAQ and 13 on NYSE) and hence 
subject to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and other U.S. corporate governance requirements. See 
NASDAQ International Listing, online: 
<http://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp?page=I&region=asia>; NYSE Euronext, 
online: <http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/lc_all_region_7.html?country=3>.  
586
  Khanna & Palepu, Evidence from Infosys, supra note 162 at 484 (commenting that “[t]he 
success and generally positive reputation of India’s software firms … provides at least surface 
credence to the idea that the global markets to which these firms are exposed has affected 
their governance systems”). See also Amir N. Licht, “Cross-Listing and Corporate 
Governance: Bonding or Avoiding?” (2003) 4 Chi. J. Int’l L. 141 at 142 [Cross-Listing and 
Corporate Governance] (referring to this concept as the “bonding thesis” and noting that 
“cross-listing on a foreign stock market can serve as a bonding mechanism for corporate 
insiders to commit credibly to a better governance regime”). 
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from the developed economies such as the U.S. and U.K. Admittedly, the direct 
evidence of borrowing by the Indian regulators from the U.S. or the U.K. 
corporate governance regimes is scanty. In fact, both the CII Code as well as the 
Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee Report expressly cautioned against borrowing 
from other regimes keeping in view the special circumstances that are applicable 
to the Indian corporate sector.587 However, that is not to say that connections do 
not exist. Due regard must be had to the fact that the recommendations of the 
committees that advised SEBI on this issue were likely influenced by 
developments that occurred throughout the world (but primarily in the U.S. and 
the U.K.) during the period between 1998 and 2004 when the initial round of 
corporate governance reforms in India were underway. These include the 
sustained discussion surrounding the Cadbury Committee Report in the U.K. and 
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the U.S. As one commentator 
observes, the “similarities [of Indian corporate governance norms] with Sarbanes 
Oxley and other governance reforms around the globe should be obvious.”588 
Furthermore, available evidence indicates that the review of corporate governance 
norms by the Narayana Murthy Committee was occasioned by the developments 
in the U.S. following Enron.589 Given these circumstances, the fact that the 
committees recommended (and SEBI adopted) measures such as independent 
directors, audit committees and CEO/CFO certification, all of which constitute the 
                                                 
587
  See supra note 565 and accompanying text.   
588
  Geis, supra note 151 at 284. 
589
  See supra note 566 and accompanying text. 
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fulcrum of corporate governance norms in the U.S. and the U.K., provides ample 
support to the borrowing or transplant argument.590 
C. Clause 49 and Independent Directors 
It is necessary at this stage to examine the specific provisions in Clause 49 
relating to independent directors. 
1. Basic Requirement  
Boards of listed companies are required to have an optimum combination of 
executive and non-executive directors, with at least half of the board comprising 
non-executive directors.591 As regards the minimum number of independent 
directors, that varies depending on the identity of the chairman of the board. 
Where the chairman holds an executive position in the company, at least one half 
of the board should consist of independent directors, and where the chairman is in 
a non-executive capacity, at least one third of the board should consist of 
independent directors.592 Recently, another condition was imposed to determine 
                                                 
590
  In a recent interview, Mr. Narayana Murthy stated:  
My committee on corporate governance came out with a set of recommendations based 
on the best practices in many parts of the world and India. We talked about the whistle-
blower policy, related-party transactions, need for independent directors to be truly 
independent, tenure of non-executive directors, CEO-and CFO-certification on the lines 
of Sarbanes-Oxley, oversight of subsidiaries. 
Subir Roy, “‘We Have to Make Respect Respectable’ – Q&A: N R Narayana Murthy, 
Chairman and Chief Mentor of Infosys Technologies” Business Standard (27 February 2009). 
591
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(A)(i). 
592
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(A)(ii). 
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the number of independent directors.593 Where the non-executive chairman is a 
promoter or a person “related to any promoter” of the company, at least one half 
of the board should consist of independent directors.594 The insertion of this 
condition was necessitated due to the then prevailing practice. Chairmen of 
companies retained themselves in a non-executive capacity, but were often 
relatives of the promoters (in case of individuals) or controllers of parent/holding 
companies (where promoters were other companies). For example, in family-
owned companies, the patriarch or matriarch of the family would be the non-
executive chairman, while the day-to-day management (in executive capacity) 
would be carried out by persons from the subsequent generations such as children 
and grand-children. Promoter-related chairmen were thus able to exert significant 
influence. With the recent amendment to Clause 49,595 chairmen are required to 
be truly independent to justify the composition of the board with one-third 
independent rather than one half. 
2. Independence  
An independent director is defined as a non-executive director who: 
                                                 
593
  See Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/1/2008/08/04 (8 April 
2008). This was subject to a further clarification in Securities and Exchange Board of India, 
SEBI/CFD/DIL/CG/2/2008/23/10 (23 October 2008). 
594
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(A)(ii) proviso, which also explains the expression “related to 
any promoter” as follows: 
a. If the promoter is a listed entity, its directors other than the independent directors, its 
employees or its nominees shall be deemed to be related to it; 
b. If the promoter is an unlisted entity, its directors, its employees or its nominees shall 
be deemed to be related to it”. 
595
  Ibid. 
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apart from receiving director’s remuneration, does not have any material 
pecuniary relationships or transactions with the company, its promoters, 
its directors, its senior management or its holding company, its 
subsidiaries and associates which may affect independence of the 
director.596 
Apart from the general statement above, there are certain specific factors that help 
determine whether or not a director is independent.597 Note that all these factors 
dictate as to who cannot become independent directors. There is a complete 
absence of positive factors that would qualify a person for being an independent 
director (except perhaps for the age of the person). For example, there is no 
mention of the types of qualification or experience the person should possess prior 
to appointment to the position so as to be able to discharge board responsibilities 
effectively. This is a serious deficiency in the definition of independence. It 
                                                 
596
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(A)(iii)(a). 
597
  These are that the director: 
b. is not related to promoters or persons occupying management positions at the board 
level or at one level below the board; 
c. has not been an executive of the company in the immediately preceding three financial 
years; 
d. is not a partner or an executive or was not a partner or an executive during the 
preceding three years, of any of the following: 
i. the statutory audit firm or the internal audit firm that is associated with the 
company, and 
ii. the legal firm(s) and consulting firm(s) that have a material association with 
the company. 
e. is not a material supplier, service provider or customer or a lessor or lessee of the 
company, which may affect independence of the director; 
f. is not a substantial shareholder of the company, i.e. owning two percent or more of the 
block of voting shares; 
g. is not less than 21 years of age. 
Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(A)(iii). 
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encourages companies to appoint persons who satisfy the formal requirements of 
independence, but who may otherwise not be suited for the job.598 
Directors are, however, required to ensure some minimum commitment 
towards boards on which they sit. Companies are required to have at least four 
board meetings a year.599 Apart from that, there may be meetings of various 
committees of the board that directors are required to attend if they are members 
of such committees. Towards that end, there are maximum limits as to the number 
of boards and committees on which independent directors can sit. An independent 
director cannot be a member of more than 10 committees or act as chairman of 
more than 5 committees across all companies.600 This is to ensure that the director 
is not so busy as to be unable to devote sufficient time and attention towards 
responsibilities in each company. The Listing Agreement, does not, however 
specify any positive commitment that each director has to make towards a 
company, for instance in terms of the minimum number hours or days to be spent 
each year on a company. 
                                                 
598
  It is not the case that all companies in India adopt that path. Of course, there are reputable 
companies that appoint eminently suited individuals to be position despite the absence of any 
positive qualifications. But, one cannot rule out the possibility of mid-cap and small-cap 
companies (who usually stay below the radar screen of public scrutiny) that may adopt the 
undemanding approach of appointing persons that are independent, but without the requisite 
competence to effectively undertake the task of board membership and monitoring 
management. 
599
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(C)(i). 
600
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(I)(C)(ii). 
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3. Nomination and Appointment  
Clause 49 does not contain any specific procedure for nomination and 
appointment of independent directors. That process occurs in the same manner as 
it does for any other director. It therefore requires us to explore the provisions of 
the Indian Companies Act to examine how directors are appointed and the various 
factors that play out in that regard. 
In India, the appointment of each director is to be voted on individually at 
a shareholders’ meeting by way of a separate resolution. Each director’s 
appointment is to be approved by a majority of shareholders present and voting on 
such resolution.601 Hence, controlling shareholders, by virtue of being able to 
muster a majority of shareholders present and voting on such resolution can 
control the appointment of every single director and thereby determine the 
constitution of the entire board. Similarly, controlling shareholders can influence 
the renewal (or otherwise) of the term of directorship.602 More importantly, 
shareholders possess significant powers to effect the removal of a director: all that 
is required is a simple majority of shareholders present and voting at a 
shareholders’ meeting.603 The only protection available to directors subject to 
                                                 
601
  Indian Companies Act, s. 263 provides as follows: 
(1) At a general meeting of a public company or of a private company which is a 
subsidiary of a public company, a motion shall not be made for the appointment of two or 
more persons as directors of the company by a single resolution, unless a resolution that it 
shall be so made has first been agreed to by the meeting without any vote being given 
against it. 
602
  The mechanism that applies for appointment of directors applies equally to renewal of the 
term once the director’s office comes up for retirement. 
603
  Indian Companies Act, s. 284 provides as follows: 
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removal is that they are entitled to the benefit of the principles of natural justice, 
with the ability to make a representation and explain their own case to the 
shareholders before the meeting decides the fate of such directors. The removal 
can be for any reason, and there is no need whatsoever to establish “cause”, 
thereby making it a potential weapon in the hands of controlling shareholders to 
wield against directors (particularly those the controlling shareholders see as 
errant to their own perceptions regarding the business and management of the 
company). 
The absence of a specific procedure for nomination and appointment of 
independent directors makes it vulnerable to capture by the controlling 
shareholders.604 Assuming that one of the purposes of the independent directors is 
to protect the interest of the minority shareholders from the actions of the 
controlling shareholders, such a purpose can hardly be achieved given the current 
matrix of director appointment, renewal and removal. The absolute dominance of 
controlling shareholders in this process creates a level of allegiance that 
independent directors owe towards controlling shareholders. If controlling 
shareholders cease to be pleased with the efforts of an independent director, such 
a director can be certain that his or her term will not be renewed, even if such 
director is spared the more disastrous consequence of being removed from the 
board. 
                                                                                                                                     
(1) A company may, by ordinary resolution, remove a director … before the expiry of his 
period of office … 
604
  One observer notes: “one of the major weaknesses in Indian corporate governance has been 
provisions allowing the appointment of purportedly independent directors who are old friends 
or associates of management or of controlling shareholders”. Majumdar, Nodders, supra note 
505. 
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The position of the controlling shareholders further gets reinforced due to 
the dispersed nature of the remaining shareholding in the company.605 In most 
Indian companies, institutional shareholders do not individually hold a significant 
percentage shareholding, even though the aggregate shareholding of all 
institutional shareholders may be fairly substantial.606 Further, although 
establishment of coalitions of institutional shareholders is generally not subject to 
restrictions under law (unlike in the U.S.), institutional shareholders in practice 
rarely form coalitions except in dire circumstances, such as where the company is 
on the verge of bankruptcy or the promoters or managers of the company have 
been involved in egregious conduct. This factor adds to the vast powers already 
available to controlling shareholders in determining the board composition of an 
Indian company. 
There are possible alternative approaches that can considerably dilute the 
influence of the controlling shareholders in the appointment of independent 
directors. The first approach is to have an independent nomination committee of 
directors that will determine the persons who will be placed on the board as 
independent directors.607 As we shall see shortly, this is not a mandatory 
requirement under Clause 49. 
The other alternative is the method of cumulative voting or proportional 
representation that will provide minority shareholders the ability to appoint at 
                                                 
605
  For a discussion of the shareholding pattern generally in Indian companies, see supra Chapter 
2, Section 2.2(D)(2). 
606
  See infra note 805 and accompanying text. 
607
  See infra Chapter 7, Section 7.3(A). 
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least some independent directors.608 The Indian Companies Act does provide for 
cumulative voting in Section 265, which reads: 
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the articles of a company 
may provide for the appointment of not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of the directors of a public company or of a private company 
which is a subsidiary of a public company, according to the principle of 
proportional representation, whether by the single transferable vote or by a 
system of cumulative voting or otherwise, the appointments being made 
once in every three years and interim casual vacancies being filled in 
accordance with the provisions, mutatis mutandis, of section 262. 
The key factor is that this provision is not mandatory and is only optional 
permitting companies to incorporate the system of proportional representation in 
their articles of association. It is hardly surprising then that very few companies, if 
any at all, have adopted the system of proportional representation to elect their 
directors because controlling shareholders do not have any incentive to 
incorporate these provisions by amending the articles association as their own 
influence in the voting process will be diluted. 
 It is therefore amply clear that the determination of who is appointed as 
independent directors, who stays on the board and who should be removed are all 
within the overall influence of the controlling shareholders who possess extensive 
powers in this behalf. 
4. Allegiance of the Independent Directors  
Under Clause 49, there is no indication at all as to the constituencies that 
independent directors are to serve. It is not clear whether independent directors 
                                                 
608
  For a discussion of cumulative voting, see supra note 520. 
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are to serve the interests of the shareholder body as a whole or whether they are 
required to pay greater attention to the interests of the minority shareholders. 
Considering that India is an insider economy, it seems logical that independent 
directors should bear the interests of minority shareholders in mind, but there is 
no direct evidence of that intention in the express wording of Clause 49.609 In the 
absence of any express signals, this leaves Indian independent directors in the 
unenviable position of having to determine for themselves the constituency they 
are to serve. Similarly, there is no indication as to whether independent directors 
are to bear in mind the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, and if so, in 
what situation. The inability of Clause 49 to pinpoint the interests independent 
directors are to serve arguably renders their position futile and this makes the 
institution somewhat ambiguous. In outsider economies, the absence of such 
clarity causes less ambiguity as board members generally, and independent 
directors more specifically, serve to preserve shareholder value,610 but in insider 
economies where divergent interests are involved, the lack of clarity in the role is 
inexplicable. 
5. Role of Independent Directors  
Much as Clause 49 does not specify to whom the independent directors owe their 
allegiance, it also does not contemplate any specific role for them. There is no 
separate task or function assigned to independent directors. The most prominent 
                                                 
609
  This is in stark contrast to the position in China where the Independent Director Opinion 
expressly requires independent directors to protect the interests of minority shareholders. See 
supra note 532. 
610
  Although the U.K. follows the ESV model, the priority of competing interests has been fairly 
satisfactorily addressed in Companies Act 2006, s. 172(1). 
 208
among such functions could have been for independent directors to consider and 
approve related party transactions that involve self-dealing. But, there is nothing 
of the kind envisaged. Independent directors are treated like any other director for 
purposes of role and decision making and there is neither a specific privilege 
conferred nor a specific duty or function imposed on independent directors, in 
either case specifically by law, on the board. 
 However, as regards board committees, there are some specific 
requirements pertaining to independent directors. All companies that satisfy a 
minimum size are mandated by the Indian Companies Act to constitute an audit 
committee.611 The audit committee must be comprised of at least two thirds non-
executive directors; no reference is made to independence. However, in case of 
listed companies, Clause 49 provides that an audit committee shall be constituted 
consisting of three directors, with at least two-third of them (including the 
chairman) being independent directors.612 In case of audit committee members 
(unlike for independent directors on the board), there is a need for positive 
qualifications regarding competence:613 all members shall be “financially 
                                                 
611
  Indian Companies Act, s. 292A provides: 
(1) Every public company having paid-up capital of not less than [fifty million] rupees 
shall constitute a committee of the Board knows as "Audit Committee" which shall 
consist of not less than three directors and such number of other directors as the Board 
may determine of which two thirds of the total number of members shall be directors, 
other than managing or whole-time directors. 
612
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(A)(i). 
613
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(A)(ii). 
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literate”614 and at least one of them must have “accounting or related financial 
management expertise”.615 
 Unlike the case of independent directors on the entire board, the audit 
committee’s mandate is fairly clear and elaborate.616 These include oversight of 
the company’s financial reporting process, recommendations regarding 
appointment of auditors and review of their performance, review of financial 
statements before submission to management and the like.617  As far as related 
party transactions are concerned, the audit committee is required to verify the 
disclosures made in that behalf in the financial statements. Curiously enough, the 
audit committee only has a disclosure obligation regarding related party 
transactions. It has no approval rights.618 Hence, independent directors have not 
been conferred any roles or responsibilities to monitor transactions that may cause 
erosion of value to the company and its shareholders while enriching one or more 
groups of insiders such as managers or controlling shareholders. 
                                                 
614
  The term “financially literate” is defined to mean “the ability to read and understand basic 
financial statements, i.e. balance sheet, profit and loss account, and statement of cash flows”. 
Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(A)(ii), Explanation I. 
615
  This requirement is defined as follows: 
A member will be considered to have accounting or related financial management 
expertise if he or she possesses experience in finance or accounting, or requisite 
professional certification in accounting, or any other comparable experience or 
background which results in the individual’s financial sophistication, including being or 
having been a chief executive officer, chief financial officer or other senior office with 
financial oversight responsibilities. 
Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(A)(ii), Explanation II. 
616
  Clause 49 prescribes a list of 13 functions that the audit committee is required to discharge in 
addition to reviewing various types of information. Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(D)-(E). 
617
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(II)(D). 
618
  This is in contrast with the position in the U.S. where the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
s. 144 expressly provides powers to an independent committee to approve self-dealing 
transactions or in China with the Independent Director Opinion conferring a specific role on 
independent directors to acknowledge and express their opinion on related party transactions. 
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 Apart from the audit committee, there is only one other board committee, 
i.e., the “Shareholders/Investors Grievances Committee” that is required to be 
constituted mandatorily.619 This committee is not required to comprise any 
independent directors, although in practice they do carry a fair amount of 
independents on them. The role of this committee is insubstantial in the overall 
scheme of things as it is required to “look into the redressal of shareholder and 
other investor complaints like transfer of shares, non-receipt of balance sheet, 
non-receipt of declared dividends, etc.”.620 Many of these matters have now 
become insignificant with the advent of dematerialised trading in shares and the 
use of modern technology to track investor communication. 
 As far as the remuneration committee is concerned, that is only a non-
mandatory requirement.621 It is for the companies themselves to decide whether to 
include such committees or not, although in the case of large listed companies, it 
is almost always the case that such companies have a remuneration committee 
where independent directors play a significant role. 
 Finally, as we have seen earlier, the nomination committee generally plays 
an important role in corporate governance. As in the case of China, India too does 
not have a mandatory requirement to constitute nomination committees to 
nominate independent directors. For this reason, the controlling shareholders are 
able to significantly influence the process of nomination and appointment of 
                                                 
619
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(IV)(G)(iii). 
620
  Listing Agreement, clause 49(IV)(G)(iii). 
621
  Listing Agreement, clause 49, Annexure ID, para. 2. 
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independent directors. The absence of a nomination committee presents a 
significant obstacle to the protection of minority shareholder interest as 
controlling shareholders are able to determine the identity of individuals who 
occupy the position of independent directors and they are likely to ensure the 
appointment of such individuals who will be sympathetic to the perspectives of 
the controlling shareholders with complete allegiance in fact towards them. 
Moreover, at a broad level, the absence of any specific role for directors 
creates difficulties at a practical level. Neither independent directors themselves 
nor the corporate community in general are able to comprehend what is expected 
of independent directors. For instance, nearly all of the independent directors in 
India that I interviewed for the purposes of the current research believed their role 
to be one of advising management from a business or strategic standpoint rather 
than to act as monitors of management or the controlling shareholders.622 While 
the evolution of the monitoring board in the outsider economies of the U.S. and 
the U.K. is quite clear as we have seen earlier, even in the insider economy of 
China, there is a specific monitoring role for independent directors to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. In the absence of any such clarity in regulatory 
intentions in the Indian context, one cannot expect any meaningful level of 
monitoring from independent directors.  
                                                 
622
  At least a majority of the independent directors I interviewed were of this view. 
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6. Effectiveness of Clause 49  
In an overall sense, Clause 49 makes a considerable effort to codify the 
independent director concept in India. It has taken giant strides to carefully define 
who an independent director is.623 It has also made efforts to develop a certain 
role for independent directors on audit committees. But, apart from these efforts, 
there are severe shortcomings in Clause 49. The entire nomination and 
appointment is liable to capture by the controlling shareholders who the 
independent directors are generally expected to monitor in the first place in any 
insider system as argued in this dissertation. This is because independent directors 
are treated in a like manner as other directors for purposes of appointment, 
renewal of term as well as removal, without the special circumstances of their 
position being given any importance at all. There is no clear role that independent 
directors are required to play on companies, nor is there any understanding as to 
the exact interests or constituencies that the independent directors are expected to 
protect. The dichotomy as to whether an independent director is to strategically 
advise management (and controlling shareholders) or to monitor their activities 
continues unabated, although these two objectives work at cross-purposes and an 
incorrect understanding among independent directors and the corporate 
community can result in unintended consequences. 
                                                 
623
  Following the recommendations of the Narayana Murthy Committee Report, SEBI introduced 
a stringent definition of “independent director”, see SEBI Circular (29 October 2004), supra 
note 567, which finally came into effect on 1 January 2006, see SEBI Circular (29 March 
2005), supra note 568. 
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When it comes to enforcement of the independent director requirement 
under Clause 49, India fares well in terms of the law on the statute books. 
Previously, there were no specific sanctions for violation of the Listing 
Agreement, which contains the corporate governance norms.624 At most, stock 
exchanges could threaten to delist companies from the stock exchanges. That 
would not be a viable solution because it would be the shareholders that suffer 
from the consequences of delisting as it would deprive them of liquidity in the 
markets and even a resultant fall in the value of their shareholding. Conscious of 
this shortcoming, certain statutory amendments were introduced in 2004. Section 
23E was inserted into the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 (SCRA) that 
provided a penalty of up to Rs. 250 million for violation of the listing 
conditions.625 This imposes significant deterrence against non-compliance of the 
Listing Agreement (including the corporate governance norms embodied in 
Clause 49). However, as we shall see later, there could still be drawbacks in the 
implementation of these enforcement provisions in the Indian context.626 
                                                 
624
  The difficulties that emanate from such an inchoate position regarding enforcement are 
evident from the parallel situation in Hong Kong. See Chee Keong Low, “Silence is Golden: 
The Case of CITIC Pacific in Hong Kong” (2009), online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1381990> (highlighting “a lacuna in the regulatory framework in 
Hong Kong with some anomalous outcomes likely”; more specifically that “while the 
company and its directors will be censured for their breach of the Listing Rules they are 
unlikely to be correspondingly sanctioned under the Securities and Futures Ordinance” and 
that “the rectification of such anomalies requires the introduction of statutory backing to the 
Listing Rules which was first discussed by the government in 2003”). 
625
  SCRA, s. 23E reads: 
If a company … fails to comply with the listing conditions or delisting conditions or 
grounds or commits a breach thereof, it or he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 
twenty-five crore rupees. 
626
  See infra Chapter 5, Section 5.5. 
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4.5 Independent Director Norms: China and India Compared 
A. Chronological Survey 
This review of the origin and nature of corporate governance norms in China and 
India with respect to independent directors provides some broad understanding of 
how the concept has evolved in emerging economies through transplantation from 
the developed economies. The earlier discussion in this Chapter points towards 
factors that may have led to transplantation of concepts from outsider economies 
such as the U.S. and the U.K. To a large extent, there is a body of robust evidence 
that signifies such transplantation. However, it is not always possible to conduct 
any psychoanalysis to gauge the minds of the regulators to determine their 
intention for such legal transplantation. But, it is possible to look at the 
circumstances in which countries adopted the institution of independent directors. 
A chronological survey of developments would help shed some light regarding 
the nexus between developments in the outsider economies on the one hand and 
how they have been closely developed in the insider economies of China and 
India. 
As we have seen in the previous Chapter, the concept of independent 
directors, although existent in the U.S. for about half a century now, gained 
traction only since the 1990s, first with the advent of the Cadbury Committee 
Report and thereafter in the aftermath of the Enron and cohort of scandals that 
triggered the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Interestingly, the 
transplantation of the concept of independent directors to the insider economies of 
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China and India closely follow the developments in the leading outsider 
economies of the U.S. and the U.K. While it may be argued that some of these 
norms in the insider economies cannot be directly attributed to developments in 
the outsider economies,627 some general trends do reveal a close connection. 
Table 3 presents some key recent developments so as to obtain some 
chronological understanding of the nexus: 
Table 3 
Comparative Regulatory Timeline 









 1950s   
Emergence of a 
monitoring 
board 













1992   
 Greenbury 
Report 
1995   
  1997 Guidelines for 
article of assoc. 
 
                                                 
627
  For example, it can be argued that the mandatory requirement of independent directors was 
imposed both in China (2001) and India (2000) even before it became mandatory in the U.S. 
(in the wake of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). That is only one aspect of the matter. The mandatory 
requirement was heavily debated in the U.S. even before that through the ALI Principles of 
Corporate Governance, see supra note 280. Further, the Cadbury Committee which also 
recommended a minimum level of board independence was already in place by that time.  
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1999   

















 2002   




2003  Clause 49 
amended 






2008   
 
These developments can broadly be categorised into three phases. Phase I relates 
to the evolution of the concept in the U.S. for nearly four decades since the 1950s. 
That phase seems to suggest that the U.S. was a loner of sorts. No serious 
developments regarding independent directors can be ascertained from a study of 
the other three economies that are the subject matter of this dissertation, i.e., the 
U.K., China and India.  
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The wider popularity of the concept is manifested only in Phase II with 
developments in the U.K. beginning with the Cadbury Committee Report in 1992. 
As far as China and India are concerned, the rudiments of the independent 
director concept, more as exhortations for voluntary compliance from regulators 
as well as business associations, can be seen in the years 1997 (China) and 1998 
(India). The concept was then elevated to mandatory status through regulatory 
pronouncements in 2000 (India) and 2001 (China). So far, both China and India 
appear to be following the stream of intense activity that occurred primarily in the 
U.K. in the 1990s.628 Phase II represents the period when the regulators of both 
China and India committed themselves to introduce the concept of independent 
directors into their corporate governance systems. 
Phase III, which followed immediately after Phase II, represents the flurry 
of regulatory activity that was witnessed in the wake of Enron, WorldCom and 
other scandals, primarily in the U.S. The regulatory changes on this occasion were 
triggered in the U.S. through the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Following 
this, the principal stock exchanges in the U.S. made it mandatory for listed 
companies to have a majority of their board populated by independent directors. 
The impact of this regulatory change in the U.S. was so enormous that it resulted 
in a review of corporate governance norms in the other subject countries as well. 
For example, the U.K. amended the Combined Code in 2003 following the Higgs 
                                                 
628
  It is evident from Table 3 that the U.S. is an outlier in Phase II as well, as it witnessed a lull 
during the 1990s as far as regulatory developments relating to independent directors are 
concerned. That can perhaps be attributed to the fact that the concept had already evolved 
fairly substantially during the preceding decades, while the other subject countries were still 
catching up. However, even during this phase, there was no mandatory requirement to carry 
independent directors on U.S. corporate boards. 
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Report to enhance the position of independent directors, the Indian securities 
regulator SEBI introduced changes to Clause 49 following the Narayana Murthy 
Committee Report and China provided statutory affirmation to independent 
directors in the PRC Company Law 2005.  
This brief chronological survey indicates that both China and India largely 
followed developments in the U.S. and the U.K. while legislating on the 
institution of independent directors.629 It is also interesting to note that the 
transplantation of the concept to China and India occurred soon after it became a 
popular measure in the U.S. and the U.K. For example, within a decade of it being 
popularised by the Cadbury Report,630 the concept found its way into Chinese and 
Indian corporate governance. It was not as if the concept was embedded in some 
systems for a considerable time and well-tested before they were transplanted to 
the other systems.631 
The key question that emerges from this survey is whether the regulators 
both in China and India consciously adopted these changes keeping in mind the 
differences in the outsider systems and insider systems of corporate governance or 
                                                 
629
  The only exception to this general trend is that China did not enact any significant changes to 
the institution of independent directors following the developments in the U.S. in 2002. This 
is perhaps explicable because the Independent Director Opinion that preceded the Sarbanes-
Oxley set of reforms in the U.S. in 2002 was fairly detailed and comprehensive any way as we 
have already seen, and hence did not require any reactionary changes thereafter. 
630
  Although independent directors existed within the U.S. prior to the 1990s, they had not 
received any popular international appeal until they was recognised in the Cadbury 
Committee Report. 
631
  Usually, legal transplants pertain to rules that have been established in a system for a 
considerable period of time before they are imported by other systems. This is evident from 
the other legal transplant examples, such as trusts and directors’ fiduciary duties, studied in 
academic research. For these and other instances, see Clarke, Lost in Translation, supra note 
28; Kanda & Milhaupt, supra note 28. 
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whether they were compelled to adopt the independent director institution to 
attune their own systems with the prevalent position owing to increasing demands 
of globalisation. The close chronological nexus discussed here coupled with the 
difficulties in implementation of the concept of independent directors in the 
insider economies of China and India owing to the different sets of problems that 
operate there seem to indicate that the transplant of independent directors to those 
jurisdictions was not at all a conscious and considered effort. 
B. Comparison of Key Features 
As between China and India, while there are several similarities in the approach 
towards the institution of independent directors, there are significant differences 
as well. Appendix 3 sets out a comparison of the key provisions of the 
Independent Director Opinion in China with that of Clause 49 in India. 
 At a broad level, the Independent Director Opinion in China provides 
greater details regarding the role of independent directors, including the need to 
protect the interests of minority shareholders, while Clause 49 does not specify 
anything at all about the role of independent directors. While the Independent 
Director Opinion creates a fairly adequate environment in terms of functioning of 
independent directors, such as mandating the availability of adequate information, 
access to company officials and external advisors, Clause 49 does not provide any 
such support. On the other hand, while the Independent Director Opinion pays lip 
services to board committees, Clause 49 mandates the establishment of an audit 
committee with a minimum level of independence to ensure that the financial 
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statements of the company are true, fair and accurate. This is an important 
monitoring role for independent directors as stakeholders tend to make their 
decisions regarding the company based on such financial statements. 
 Both the Chinese and Indian regulations do share several shortcomings as 
well. Principal among them is the continuing influence of the controlling 
shareholders in the nomination and appointments process. Both jurisdictions treat 
the appointment of independent directors in the same manner as the appointment 
of other directors. Neither provides for mechanisms such as the nomination 
committee or mandatory cumulative voting or proportional representation that 
would dilute the influence of the controlling shareholders. While cumulative 
voting and proportional representation are provided for in the regulations in both 
countries, they remain optional only.632 Further, the definition of independence is 
narrow in both countries and does not take into account the social and cultural 
factors that play a significant role in these jurisdictions. All these shortcomings 
are arguably related to the inappropriate transplantation of the concept from the 
outsider jurisdictions without proper consideration of its utility in the insider 
jurisdictions in the same manner. To that extent, these shortcomings in regulation 
may operate as impediments to the proper implementation of the independent 
director institution as a measure of enhanced corporate governance. 
                                                 
632
 Even when it is mandatory in certain circumstances in China, the implementation of this 
requirement has not been satisfactory. See supra note 521. 
 221
4.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
The discussion in this Chapter reveals the nexus between developments pertaining 
to the independent director concept in the developed outsider economies of the 
U.S. and the U.K. on the one hand and the emerging insider economies of China 
and India. Since the late 1990s, the emerging economies have been close on the 
heels of the outsider economies. This is a result of the possible convergence of 
corporate governance norms towards the U.S. and the U.K. models. 
 However, a closer examination of the specific norms pertaining to 
independent directors in China and India indicate their adoption in these countries 
without suitable changes to reflect the agency problems that are prevalent there. 
Although the independent director concept was evolved as a solution to the 
manager-shareholder agency problem in the U.S. and the U.K., they have been 
incorporated in China and India without substantial modifications. For instance, 
the independent director concept does very little to address the majority-minority 
agency problem which is prevalent in these countries. Neither has there been any 
deliberation on whether the concept deals with the majority-minority agency 
problem at all, nor have there been any suitable adjustments in its applicability to 
deal with that agency problem. This results in a mismatch in the application of the 
independent director concept that is clear from a close scrutiny of the Independent 
Director Opinion in China and Clause 49 in India. The survey of the development 
of corporate governance norms in these countries coupled with an analysis of the 
legal provisions indicate a failed transplant. This is even without any empirical 
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analysis of how the concept has in fact worked in practice, a matter I shall now 
turn to in the next chapter. 
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5. EFFECTIVENESS OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN CHINA 
AND INDIA 
5.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
5.2 Independent Directors in China: Empirical Survey 
5.3 Independent Directors in China: Case Studies 
5.4 Independent Directors in India: Empirical Survey 
5.5 Independent Directors in India: Case Studies 
5.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
 
5.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
After having analysed the evolution (i.e., through transplantation) of the 
independent director concept in China and India, it is necessary to determine the 
success of independent directors in both these countries. This is sought to be 
achieved through an analysis of empirical studies as well as anecdotal evidence by 
means of case studies. There is a significant correlation between the analysis of 
the corporate governance provisions in Chapter 4 and the results of the empirical 
and anecdotal analysis in this Chapter. In Chapter 4, I identified several reasons 
why the independent director concept may not be effective in the insider 
economies of China and India. In this Chapter, it is evident from the empirical and 
anecdotal analysis that the concept has not been effective in practice, at least not 
to the extent anticipated by regulators at the time of its inception. 
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 Here, I survey existing empirical literature and case studies relating to the 
effectiveness of independent directors in China and India, and also conduct one 
case study involving a recent corporate failure in India (pertaining to Satyam 
Computer Services Limited). Through this survey, I find that the independent 
director concept has not been successful in these economies, following which I 
also identify reasons for the lack of desired success. 
 In the case of China, there exists a fair amount of empirical literature in 
academic circles that evaluates the effectiveness of independent directors over 
less than a decade during which the concept has been embedded in Chinese 
corporate governance norms. To that extent, in my analysis, I rely on this 
literature to glean conclusions. Similarly, at an anecdotal level too, there have 
been case studies conducted by legal academics, at least in respect of four 
companies, which have also been referred to extensively in academic literature. 
Here again, I rely upon these existing case studies to draw conclusions. 
 In the case of India, however, the availability of studies (empirical or 
anecdotal) on independent directors is far more limited. At an empirical level, 
there are some recent studies that examine the role of corporate governance in 
general and its impact on corporate performance. This literature employs the 
event study method. These studies are relevant to the extent that independent 
directors form one of the instruments or institutions used to enhance corporate 
governance in India. Moving more specifically to independent directors, there are 
some recent empirical surveys that have been conducted by professional bodies 
and consultants. This has not yet been surveyed from a legal academic standpoint, 
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and it is hoped that the survey in this Chapter will contribute to a more concerted 
move in that direction. Similarly, there has been an absence of case studies 
regarding independent directors in Indian academic literature. Owing to the 
inadequacy of anecdotal support, I propose to conduct in this Chapter an 
extensive case study of Satyam corporate governance failure and the role of the 
independent directors on the board of that company. The inability of Satyam’s 
independent directors (who were prominent individuals in their own right) to 
detect a corporate governance scam involving over $1 billion raises questions 
about the effectiveness of independent directors as currently envisaged. Due to the 
disparity in empirical evidence on independent directors’ performance between 
China (where some academic studies do exist) and India (where none exists), the 
contents of this Chapter weigh more heavily on the Indian side rather than on the 
Chinese side, which is more by way of design rather than by default. 
 As for empirical studies, it is important to exercise some caution in 
making a direct comparison of empirical studies in China and India on the one 
hand and the outsider economies of the U.S. and the U.K. on the other hand.633 
That is because the nature of empirical studies available in both these sets of 
jurisdictions varies quite substantially from each other. While the empirical 
studies in the U.S. and the U.K. are largely based on event studies involving 
independent directors and board composition, such event studies are few and far 
between in China and India. In China and India, the empirical studies report board 
                                                 
633
  For an analysis of the empirical studies in the U.S. and the U.K. regarding the effectiveness of 
independent directors, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 
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practices rather than determine their effect on corporate performance. Hence, it is 
not possible to undertake an apples-to-apples comparison of the two sets of 
empirical studies. If that were possible, it could have made this task a matter of 
mathematical or econometric analysis rather than a more subjective analysis 
which would be necessitated by this comparative survey. Nevertheless, 
conclusions can be drawn from different sets of studies, whether an event study or 
an empirical survey of corporate practices, and it is these conclusions that this 
dissertation seeks to compare between the outsider economies and insider 
economies. This comparison and the conclusions drawn provide sufficient data to 
evaluate the success of independent director norms in the emerging insider 
economies of China and India. 
5.2 Independent Directors in China: Empirical Survey 
In the previous Chapter, I analysed several reasons why independent directors 
may not be effective in China. Here, I discuss some reasons for this based on 
empirical studies. 
A. Effect on Corporate Performance 
To begin with, there are a few studies in China that examine the effect of board 
independence on corporate performance. In an early study that examined 207 
companies that were listed in the year 1996, Tian and Lau found no correlation 
between the presence of independent directors on corporate boards and 
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performance of the companies.634 This study, which was conducted even before 
independent directors were made mandatory in China in 2001, shows that the 
stock market perceived no utility in inducting independent directors on Chinese 
corporate boards.635 Subsequent studies too show no positive correlation between 
the number of independent directors on companies’ boards and corporate 
performance, as identified by Professor Clarke636 and Jie Yuan.637 A couple of 
studies are somewhat equivocal, although they seem to suggest indifference 
towards independent directors. One, by Xiao, finds that “while the degree of 
independence of independent directors (measured by whether or not they were 
nominated by the controlling shareholder) was significantly (although very 
modestly) related to corporate performance, the proportion of independent 
directors on the board was not”.638 It is pertinent to note that even the modest 
                                                 
634
  Jenny J. Tian & Chung-Ming Lau, “Board Composition, Leadership Structure and 
Performance in Chinese Shareholding in Companies” (2001) 18 Asia Pacific J. of Mgmt. 245. 
635
  Tian and Lau also assert that the agency theory that applies in western models may not apply 
in the Chinese context. Tian & Lau, ibid. at 245. 
636
  Professor Clarke cites two such studies. Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 
37 at 204-05 (citing Gao Minghua & Ma Shouli, “Duli Dongshi Zhidu yu Gongsi Jixiao 
Guanxi de Shizheng Fenxi [An Empirical Analysis of the Relationship Between the 
Independent Director System and Corporate Results]”, Nankai Jingji Yanjiu [Nankai 
University Economic Studies], No. 2, 2002 at 64-68 (examining 1151 companies reporting on 
the two Chinese exchanges, 83 of which had appointed independent directors in the previous 
three years); Luo Pinliang, et. al., “Duli Dongshi Zhidu yu Gongsi Yehi de Xiangguanxing 
Fenxi: Laizi Hushi A-Gu De Sinzheng Yanjiu [An Analysis of the Relationship Between 
Independent Directors and Corporate Performance: An Empirical Study of A-share 
Performance in the Shanghai Stock Market]”, Shanghai Guanli Kexue [Shanghai Mgmt. Sci.], 
No. 2, 2004 at 20-23 (examining 81 listed companies that had independent directors since 
2000 or before)). 
637
  In addition to the studies cited by Professor Clarke, Jie Yuan notes a study by Wu Yan which 
“states that the performance of Chinese listed companies does not have a direct relation to 
independent directors”. Jie Yuan, “Formal Convergence or Substantial Divergence? Evidence 
from Adoption of the Independent Director System in China” (2007) 9 Asian-Pac. L. & Pol’y 
J. 71 at 91. 
638
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 205 (citing Xiao Li, “Duli Dongshi 
Zhidu yu Shangshi Gongsi Yeji: Laizi Zhongguo Shangshi Gongsi de Zhengju [Independent 
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statistical significance of the correlation seems to arise only when independent 
directors are not nominated by the controlling shareholder. Hence, it establishes 
the need for complete separation of the nomination and appointment process of 
the independent director from the controlling shareholder, which is currently 
absent in Chinese corporate governance. The other, a very recent study by Jing, 
Young and Qian finds that “although there is a negative relationship between 
board size, board independence and firm performance, Tobin’s Q increases in 
relation to board size and board independence for large and diversified firms 
…”.
639
 Interestingly, the authors find that even in the case of large and diversified 
firms, the benefit of independent directors arises from their advisory role to such 
firms than any form of monitoring role they may play.640 
 In essence, if we found that in the case of outsider economies such as the 
U.S. and the U.K., there are mixed results in relation to the positive effect of 
independent directors on corporate performance, the few studies in the Chinese 
context in fact go to show no positive effect at all. To that extent, the results in 
China are even more pessimistic than they are in the outsider economies. This 
leads us to the conclusion that from the standpoint of correlation with corporate 
performance, independent directors have not played a significant role in Chinese 
corporate governance, even to the extent that they have in the outsider economies. 
                                                                                                                                     
Directors and Listed Company Performance: Evidence from Listed Companies in China]”, 
Nanjing Shenji Xueyuan Xuebao [J. Nanjing Audit Inst.], No. 2, 2004 at 21-23). 
639
  Jing Liao, Martin R. Young & Qian Sun, “The Advisory Role of the Board: Evidence from 
the Implementation of Independent Director System in China”, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361202> at 4. For this study, the authors estimate Tobin’s Q as 
“book assets minus book equity plus market value of equity all divided by book assets”. Ibid. 
at 20. 
640
  See ibid. at 4. 
 229
The ancillary conclusion is that even if independent directors could have played 
an effective role, the current system of norms in China does not enable them to 
play that role. For instance, independent directors continue to be nominated by 
controlling shareholders and their role is primarily viewed to be advisory rather 
than mandatory (matters that have been confirmed by these empirical studies). 
B. Number of Independent Directors 
Following the issuance of the Independent Director Opinion in 2001, Chinese 
listed companies wasted little time in appointing the required number of 
independent directors on their boards. The CSRC data issued in June 2003 
suggest that “1,244 of China’s 1,250 listed companies had hired independent 
directors, and the total number of independent directors was 3,839 (an average of 
three independent directors in each company)”.641 By the end of 2005, this 
number had increased to 4,640 independent directors on the boards of 1,377 listed 
companies;642 further, independent directors constituted more than one-third in 
93.3 percent of listed companies.643 However, only 0.66 percent of listed 
companies had majority independent boards.644 
                                                 
641
  Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 87 (citing “Jixu Tuidong Wanshan Duli Dongshi Zhidu—
Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Youguan Bumen Fuzeren Da Jizhe Wen [Continue to perfect the 
independent director system in China—China Securities Regulatory Commission officials’ 
Response to the questions raised by reporters]”, Zhongguo Zhengquanbao [China Securities 
Journal] (6 February 2004) at 1). 
642
  Jie Yuan, ibid. at 86 (citing Pan Qing, “Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Buzai “Chenmo” 
[Independent Directors of Listed Companies Will Be No Longer “Silent”]”, Guoji Jinrong 
Bao [International Financial News] (13 December 2006) at 3). 
643
  Jie Yuan, ibid. at 86-87 (citing Pan Qing, ibid.). 
644
  Jie Yuan, ibid. at 87 (citing Chen Huifa, “Woguo Shangshigongsi Dulidongshi Zhidu Yu 
Gongsi Yeji De Shizhen Yanjiu [Empirical Research on Independent Director System and 
Corporate Performance in the Listed Company]” at 1 (8 October 2005)). 
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 While this reveals the urgency on the part of Chinese listed companies to 
comply with the Independent Director Opinion,645 such compliance appears to be 
only formal in nature. For example, the compliance is limited only to the minimal 
required number of independent directors, while voluntary over-compliance such 
as the institution of a majority independent board is virtually non-existent. 
C. Nomination and Appointment 
Severe criticism was levelled in the previous Chapter regarding the nomination 
and appointment provisions of the Independent Director Opinion.646 However, 
veracity of that criticism needs to be tested empirically. Surveys in Chinese 
corporate governance are unanimous about the unstinted influence of the 
controlling shareholders in the nomination and appointments process.647 One 
study shows that 40% of the independent directors are nominated by high-echelon 
managers, 40% by controlling shareholders and the remaining 20% by others.648 
This study also reports that hardly any influence is exercised by small and 
medium sized shareholders in the nomination and appointment process.649 
Another study shows that “[b]oards nominate approximately 63 percent of 
independent director candidates, including 36 percent who are directly nominated 
                                                 
645
  Contrast this with the lax compliance by Indian companies even with the formal requirement 
of appointing a minimum number of independent directors. See infra notes 705 and 706 and 
accompanying text. 
646
  See supra Chapter 4, Section 4.3(C). 
647
  Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 17. 
648
  Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, supra note 25 at 9. 
649
  Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, ibid. at 9. 
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by major shareholders”.650 All this confirms the significant influence of 
controlling shareholders in nominating individuals who are entrusted with the task 
of monitoring their own nominators. Even if nomination itself is carried out by 
others (who might be independent), the residual power of appointment still 
remains with the controlling shareholders. Hence, even if a candidate is 
nominated through an independent nomination process, unless there is some 
obligation on the controlling shareholders to ensure the election or appointment of 
such candidate, the independent nomination process leads to no avail. 
D. Competence 
In developed economies such as the U.S. and the U.K., independent directors 
generally tend to be senior executives in other companies or professionals such as 
accountants, lawyers or bankers. Such individuals do possess the requisite 
qualifications and experience to perform their role as independent directors on 
corporate boards. Apart from that, they share commonalities with inside directors 
in the sense that they are familiar with the way they run their own companies and 
can not only bring to bear their experience in advising the companies on which 
they are independent directors, but also utilise their skills and experience in 
effectively monitoring management. 
However, the position in China is vastly different. Academics display an 
overwhelming presence on corporate boards as independent directors. Most 
empirical surveys put the number of academics at between 40 and 50 percent of 
                                                 
650
  Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 87-88. 
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the total number of independent directors on Chinese corporate boards. For ease 
of reference, Table 4 summarises some key studies and the broad distribution of 
professionals as independent directors:651 
Table 4 
Characteristics of Independent Directors in China 









48% 15% 15% 22% 
CSRC - I653 39% - 30% 10% 
Yue 
Qingtang654 
45% - 14% 28% 
CSRC - II655 44% - - 14% 
Tong Lu656 47.6% 15.5% - 22.3% 
                                                 
651
  Note that some of the data have been extrapolated from graphs and tables, and hence 
represent approximate numbers and may not be entirely accurate. But, these estimates would 
nevertheless assist in enabling a conceptual discussion. 
652
  Shi Xinghui, “104 Wei Duli Dongshi Diaocha Fenxi—Tamen Shi Shei? [An Investigation and 
Analysis of 104 Independent Directors: Who Are They?]”, Zhongguo Qiye Jia [The Chinese 
Entrepreneur], No. 7, 2001 at 17 cited from Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra 
note 37 at 207. 
653
  Quanjing Wangluo [Panorama Net], “Du Dong Duiwu Jiso Kuorong [Ranks of Independent 
Directors Quickly Enlarged]” (22 March 2003) cited from Clarke, Independent Directors in 
China, ibid. at 193, 207. 
654
  Yue Qingtang, “Dui 500 Jia Shangshi Gongsi Duli Dongshi Nianling Zhuanye Deng 
Goucheng de Sinzheng Yanjiu [An Empirical Study of the Age and Occupational 
Composition of the Independent Directors in 500 Listed Companies]”, Jingjijie [Econ. 
World], No. 2, 2004 at 86-88 cited from Clarke, Independent Directors in China, ibid. at 207. 
655
  Ding Tao, “Jixu Tuidong Wanshan Duli Dongshi Zhidu – Zhongguo Zhengjianhui Youguan 
Bumen Fuzeren Da Jizhe Wen [Continue to Advance and Improve the System of Independent 
Directors – the Responsible Officer of the CSRC’s Relevant Department Answered Questions 
of Correspondents]”, Zhongguo Zhengquan Bao [China Sec. News] (6 February 2004) cited 
from Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 19. For a discussion of this CSRC data, see 
also Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 88. 
656
  Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, supra note 25 at 8. 
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Crowding academics on corporate boards as independent directors supports the 
argument that listed companies seek to only comply with the formal requirements 
of the Independent Director Opinion. Not only are academics less familiar with 
the day-to-day aspects of the business world, but they are also less likely to 
question the management and controlling shareholders as their position on the 
board is predominantly due to their allegiance to these interests. Government 
officials and other professionals (such as lawyers and accountants) too share the 
same predicament. However, the constituency consisting of other business 
executives that may be in the most optimal position to carry out a monitoring role 
on corporate boards finds the least space in China. Such business executives are 
usually familiar with key aspects of managing businesses and are more likely to 
raise questions that they themselves face in their own companies. The broad 
profile distribution of independent directors in Chinese companies does not 
indicate that the institution will likely be effective for the reasons discussed 
above. 
E. Incentives and Disincentives 
Independent directors need to be adequately incentivised so that they are able to 
carry out their functions effectively on corporate boards. As far as remuneration 
of independent directors is concerned, it is important to correctly assess not only 
the appropriate amount of remuneration, but also the appropriate form. 
Remuneration which is too low may not prove to be much of an incentive, while 
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excessive remuneration may impinge upon the independence of the director. 
However, the Independent Director Opinion does not attempt to regulate the 
remuneration of independent directors. 
 As for the practice in Chinese boardrooms, Professor Clarke lists a range 
of amounts that independent directors are paid by listed companies.657 Several 
independent directors willingly participate on corporate boards without receiving 
any payment whatsoever.658 Many of them are only reimbursed their expenses.659 
This is because such directors find it a matter of prestige and reputation for them 
to be on corporate boards, particularly on the leading ones. The current system of 
remunerating independent directors does not offer suitable incentives for them to 
carry out their monitoring functions in a manner that is preferred. Existing 
surveys also do not indicate any desire to remunerate independent directors 
through stock options or by issue of shares. In the outsider economies, it is quite 
common to incentivise outside directors (especially in the U.S.) by enabling them 
to hold stock so that their interests are aligned with that of shareholders (as 
opposed to managers), which is the constituency they are required to protect.660 
This rationale may not entirely hold well in insider economies, although it is 
arguable that enabling an independent director to be a minority shareholder on a 
                                                 
657
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 206-07. 
658
  Ibid. at 206. 
659
  Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, supra note 25 at 9. 
660
  It is necessary to note, however, that in the U.K., the grant of stock options to directors by 
companies tends to militate against their independence on those companies. See Combined 
Code 2008, supra note 373, para. A.3.1. This is also the case in Australia where non-
executive directors are not permitted to receive stock options in the company. See ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice 
Recommendations (March 2003) available online: 
<http://www.hawkamah.org/publications/principles/files/Australia.pdf>. 
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company will align the interests of such director with that of the minority 
shareholders.  
 On the other hand, there are also significant disincentives that operate 
against independent directors. The first relates to liability and the threat of legal 
action for matters involving the company. Since independent directors are not 
involved in the day-to-day management of the company, they have inadequate 
information regarding potential liabilities and hence may open themselves to 
unlimited exposure. Although the risk of personal liability of independent 
directors tends to be overstated, as we have seen in the case of outsider 
economies, this threat could be real in the Chinese context. First, the PRC 
Company Law 2005 does not contain a direct provision that offers 
indemnification to independent directors, similar to Section 145(a) of the 
Delaware General Corporations Law.661 Second, as far D&O insurance is 
concerned, the markets for the same are not as developed as they are in the 
outsider systems. Hence, insurance polices, even where they are in fact taken, are 
accompanied by significant exclusions whereby even any act that results in a 
breach of law is excluded from the purview of insurance even if the directors act 
in good faith.662 This is on account of paragraph 39 of the Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies in China663 which provides that “insurance 
                                                 
661
  See supra note 400 and accompanying text. 
662
  See Pan Yujia & Liao Chunlan, “Directors and Officers Liability Insurance in China” 
available online: <http://www.kingandwood.com/Bulletin/Bulletin%20PDF/en_2006-05-
China-panyujia.pdf> at 2. 
663
  Supra note 521. 
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shall not cover the liabilities arising in connection with directors’ violation of 
laws, regulations or the company’s articles of association”. 
Although there appear to be no empirical studies that survey the liability, 
indemnification and D&O insurance aspects, the case studies to be discussed 
shortly support the assertion regarding the greater exposure of independent 
directors in China compared to the outsider systems.  
F. Role of Independent Directors 
Apart from the lack of appropriate competence and incentives, there are several 
other factors that temper the effectiveness of independent directors. There is the 
lack of adequate information available to independent directors, shortage of time 
devoted to affairs of each company and consequently the inability to discharge 
their monitoring roles. These deficiencies in independent director roles are not 
unique to China and do exist even in the outsider economies.664 The additional 
difficulty in the Chinese context relates to the vagueness regarding the role of 
independent directors. This is despite a significant amount of detail the 
Independent Director Opinion carries regarding their role.665 While independent 
directors are explicitly required to protect the interests of small and medium (i.e., 
minority) shareholders, the manner in which the independent director mechanism 
is set up in China drives it towards achieving the opposite result. Professor 
                                                 
664
  For a previous discussion in the context of outsider economies, see supra Chapter 3, Section 
3.5. 
665
  See supra Chapter 4, Section 4.3(C). 
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Clarke’s illustration of the absence of understanding of independent director roles 
is paradigmatic of this deficiency: 
The Dean of the Changjiang School of Business, who serves as an 
independent director, was quoted as saying, “I have never thought that the 
independent director is the protector of medium and small shareholders; 
never think of that. My job is first and foremost to protect the interests of 
the large shareholder, because the large shareholder is the state”.666 
In addition, there is some tendency for independent directors to consider 
themselves to be the guardian of ‘public interest’.667 However, this view does not 
seem unequivocal, particularly because the Independent Director Opinion does 
not expressly require them to take into account the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies.  
To conclude, the empirical studies do not instill any optimism regarding 
the role and effectiveness of independent directors in China. They are not 
expected in practice to play any significant role in monitoring management or 
even in addressing the majority-minority agency problem that is prevalent in 
China. Not only is there a failure in the Independent Director Opinion and its 
provisions to address the prevalent agency problem in China, but there has been 
no movement towards addressing that problem in practice either, as the empirical 
studies have revealed. It is not at all surprising therefore to find that Chinese 
                                                 
666
  Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 172 (citing Xiang Bing, quoted in 
“Duli Dongshi Xiang Huaping? [Are Independent Directors Just Decorative?]”, Gang-Ao 
Xinxi Ribao [Hong Kong-Macao News Daily] (1 January 2003)). It is astonishing that the 
ambiguity in understanding among independent directors continued even after the express 
statement in the Independent Director Opinion (which preceded the aforesaid quote) 
regarding protection of small and medium shareholders. 
667
  See Clarke, Independent Directors in China, ibid. at 173. 
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academic literature is replete with references to independent directors as “vase 
directors”.668 
 
5.3 Independent Directors in China: Case Studies 
In addition to empirical studies, there are also some existing case studies that 
anecdotally examine the effect of independent directors on Chinese corporate 
governance. It would be useful to briefly discuss those studies and the findings 
that emanate from them. 
A. Effectiveness 
The case of Leshan Electric Power Co. Ltd. represents an instance where the role 
of the independent director came to the forefront in China.669 Leshan was the local 
power company of Sichuan province and was listed on the Shanghai stock 
exchange.670 As the company’s financial performance was witnessing a decline, 
the three independent directors of Leshan were invited to express their opinions 
on the financial statements of the company. While the request was made on 12 
February 2004, the independent directors’ opinion was solicited by 20 February 
                                                 
668
  Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 89-90, Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, 
supra note 25 at 11, Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 18. 
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  Facts regarding the Leshan case have been extracted from Tong Lu, “Defects in China’s 
Independent Director System: A Case Study of Leshan Power Company”, online: 
<http://old.iwep.org.cn/pdf/2005/Defects_in_China's_Independent_Director_System_TongLu
.pdf> at 3-6 [Case Study of Leshan]; See also Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 94-95; Chao Xi, 
Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 18. 
670
  Tong Lu, Case Study of Leshan, ibid. 
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2004, giving them only 6 days to study the financials.671 Moreover, no additional 
audit materials were available to the independent directors.672 Quite naturally, two 
of the three independent directors requisitioned the services of another accounting 
firm Shenzhen Pengcheng to independently verify the financials. However, the 
audit firm was not granted access to financial materials of the company on various 
pretexts, including the unreasonableness of the requests, the lack of adequate time 
and also the absence of any precedent for conduct of such audit by an independent 
accounting firm.673 The matter reached a stalemate. Although it appears that some 
compromise was arrived at between the parties through the intervention of the 
Chengdu Securities Regulatory Bureau,674 not only was there a continued delay in 
the publication of Leshan’s financial statements,675 but the independent directors 
were asked to resign from the company.676 An interesting fact which came to light 
in this episode was that the independent directors were not acting on their own 
accord out of any salutary concern to protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders. They are stated to have been taking up the cause of the second 
largest shareholder of the company in a contest for control.677 That perhaps 
explains the rare circumstances in which independent directors on Chinese 
companies have challenged the actions of the controlling shareholders and the 
management. 
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  Ibid. at 4. 
672
  Ibid. 
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  Ibid. 
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  Ibid. at 6. 
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  Ibid. See also Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 95. 
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  Jie Yuan, ibid. at 95. 
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  Jie Yuan, ibid.; Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 18. 
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 The Leshan episode offers significant lessons regarding inadequacies in 
the effectiveness of independent directors in Chinese corporate governance. First, 
the abundance of legal powers provided to independent directors is not adequate if 
the corporate structure and regulatory system in China are not suitably adapted to 
receive the institution. For example, the Independent Director Opinion not only 
obligates independent directors to provide their views on sensitive matters,678 but 
also permits them to engage independent professionals and intermediaries to 
advise them.679 But, the independent directors of Leshan were unable to exercise 
these powers in practice. Second, the power of the controlling shareholders and 
management continues to reign supreme. This is the reason for the inability of 
independent directors to exercise their available powers. For example, in the 
Leshan case, not only did the management and controlling shareholders influence 
the flow (or lack thereof) of information to independent directors and the 
accounting firm, but they even succeeded in forcing the independent directors out 
of the company. Third, despite earnest exhortations in the Independent Director 
Opinion for protection of minority shareholder interest, that rarely occurs in 
practice, as independent directors began taking sides in a battle for control rather 
than to take an independent and impartial stand. All these seem to indicate that 
even with detailed powers provided to independent directors in the Independent 
Director Opinion, their ability to exercise them meaningfully fails as that depends 
on several other institutional, social and cultural factors. 
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  Independent Director Opinion, para. 6. See also supra note 544 and accompanying text. 
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  Independent Director Opinion, para. 7(4). See also supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
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 Similar instances have been occasioned in other companies as well. The 
Inner Mongolia Yili Group case bears parallels to the Leshan Power case. Three 
independent directors of Inner Mongolia Yili Industrial Co. Ltd. raised alarm bells 
about the company’s trading in treasury bonds, and sought the appointment of an 
independent auditor to look into the financial implications.680 The management 
and controlling shareholders retaliated by triggering a removal of one of the 
independent directors, while the other two resigned of their own volition. 
Surprisingly, it was the supervisory board that triggered the move to remove the 
independent directors. In this case, the supervisory board ended up as a pawn in 
the hands of the management and controlling shareholders. As in the Leshan case, 
the independent directors were unable to take the monitoring of the company’s 
activities to its logical end as they fell before their task was complete. This case 
also exposes the complicated and arguably incongruous combination between the 
independent directors and the supervisory board, a matter I deal with in detail 
subsequently.681 
 In the Xinjiang Tunhe case,682 the company steamrolled decisions through 
the board without meaningfully consulting the independent directors and 
obtaining their views. This was due to the fact that inside directors were in the 
majority. Often, board meetings were held without the independent directors, as 
inadequate notice was given. Independent directors’ requests for further 
information were not honoured. An independent director, who was an academic, 
                                                 
680
  See Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 18; Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 97. 
681
  See infra Chapter 6, Section 6.3. 
682
  This case has been discussed in some detail in Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 95-97. 
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was reprimanded by the CSRC for the company’s failure to make proper 
disclosures. Matters were made more difficult for that independent director as he 
was unable to resign and had to continue on the board.683 
 There have also been instances where the independent directors have been 
oblivious of related party transactions and other self-dealing activities through 
which monies have been siphoned off from companies. But, as in the Kelon 
Electronic Holding Co. case, all the independent directors did was to resign from 
the company.684 
 These cases clearly exhibit significant shortcomings in the functioning of 
independent directors and in the practical implementation of the Independent 
Director Opinion. This supports the argument made earlier that the transplant of 
the concept from outsider economies where the manager-shareholder agency 
problem exists will not be effective in insider economies where the majority-
minority agency problem exists. 
B. Legal Liability 
One of the key disincentives for competent people to offer themselves for 
independent directorship is the existence of unacceptable exposure to legal risks 
and liabilities. In the U.S. and several other countries, studies have revealed that 
the exposure is not as wide as it is generally considered to be, because the threat 
                                                 
683
  This is due to the fact that where the number of independent directors falls below the 
minimum required due to resignation of an independent director, such resignation shall not 
come into effect until the vacancy is filled at a following board meeting. Independent Director 
Opinion, para. 4(6). 
684
  See Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 19. 
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of losing a lawsuit is greater than the actual loss or financial outflow owing to 
such lawsuit.685 However, in the Chinese context, the liability of independent 
directors is largely untested. Even with the single prominent instance where 
liability has been imposed, that seems to work against independent directors. In 
that case, Lu Jiahao, a retired language professor served on the board of 
Zhengzhou Baiwen Corporation without any compensation.686 It was discovered 
that the company had made false disclosures, for which the CSRC imposed a fine 
of RMB 100,000 on Lu. He adopted the defence that his directorship was purely 
honorary and that he was not involved in management. His appeal to the No. 1 
Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing was rejected, although on procedural 
grounds without going into merits.687 This decision indicates that CSRC would 
treat independent directors on the same footing as other directors when it comes 
to legal liability. The fact that they are not involved in management makes no 
difference. As Professor Clarke notes,688 CSRC’s position tracks that of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court: 
Because directors are bound to exercise ordinary care, they cannot set up 
as a defense lack of the knowledge needed to exercise the requisite degree 
of care. If one “feels that he has not had the sufficient business experience 
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  See supra note 399 and accompanying text. 
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  See Clarke, Independent Directors in China, supra note 37 at 224; Minkang Gu, “Will an 
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to qualify him to perform the duties of a director, he should either acquire 
the knowledge by inquiry, or refuse to act”.689 
Following the decision against Lu, there was a scramble by independent directors 
to resign from their boards fearing greater liability.690 Such wide exposure to 
liability will prevent otherwise competent individuals from taking up independent 
directorships and will compromise the quality of independent directors who 
continue on Chinese corporate boards. 
5.4 Independent Directors in India: Empirical Survey 
In India too, there are some recent empirical studies that examine the 
effectiveness of independent directors. Unlike in the case of China, there are no 
academic studies that specifically analyse the role of independent directors from 
an empirical standpoint. These studies pertain to corporate governance in general, 
of which independent directors are only one component. For instance, the event 
studies in the Indian context deal with the impact of Clause 49 reforms as a whole 
without specifically focusing on independent directors. On the other hand, there 
are other empirical studies primarily carried out by professional bodies that 
examine board practices that focus more specifically on the institution of 
independent directors. It is proposed in this Section to analyse the findings of 
these studies and to draw conclusions regarding the role of independent directors 
in India. 
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Anderson (1995) 16 ACSR 607. 
690
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A. Effect on Corporate Performance 
There is an emerging body of empirical literature on Indian corporate 
governance,691 but for the present purposes it would suffice to review two recent 
empirical studies. In the first, 692 an event study, Professors Black and Khanna 
study the impact of corporate governance reforms reflected by the formation of 
the Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee693 and find that over a 2-day event 
window around 7 May 1999,694 the share prices of large firms, to which the 
corporate governance reforms were then intended to apply, rose by roughly 4% 
relative to other small firms, thereby signalling the investors’ expectations that 
corporate governance reforms will increase market value of firms.695 The second 
study by Dharmapala and Khanna acknowledges the importance of enforcement 
in corporate governance reform.696 The authors study the impact of the 
introduction of Section 23E to the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 in 
2004 that imposed large penalties of Rs. 25 crores (Rs. 250 million) for non-
compliance with the Listing Agreement (that also includes Clause 49 containing 
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  For a review of this empirical literature, see, Chakrabarti, Megginson & Yadav, Corporate 
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the corporate governance norms).697  Using a sample of over 4000 firms during 
the 1998-2006 period, the study reveals a “large and statistically significant 
positive effect (amounting to over 10% of firm value) of the Clause 49 reforms in 
combination with the 2004 sanctions.”698 
 While these studies indicate a positive impact of corporate governance 
reforms in the market place, and are extremely useful in setting the agenda for 
further empirical debate in the Indian context, they are to be treated with some 
caution.699 As for the first study by Black and Khanna, it is arguable that the date 
chosen for the event study, i.e., 7 May 1999, is premature, and that the 
information about the details of the corporate governance reforms cannot be said 
to have filtered through the corporate system so as to affect the stock price. All 
that was known to the market on that date is the formation of a committee under 
the chairmanship of Mr. Kumar Mangalam Birla to enhance corporate 
governance. There was no indication as to the possible outcome of the 
committee’s deliberations, except perhaps some general expectation that it would 
further the reforms that began voluntarily by the CII Code. No details with any 
amount of adequacy was available at that stage, thereby questioning whether the 
stock price movement at such an early stage is any indication at all about the 
acceptability of the reform measures in corporate governance. While the study can 
be said to confirm the desire and expectation of Indian firms to submit themselves 
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to greater measures of corporate governance, the difficulty arises on account of 
the fact that the precise details of the reforms (including whether the measures 
will be imported to some extent from other jurisdictions) cannot have been 
factored in at such an early stage and hence this study does not affirm 
acceptability (or otherwise) of the specific concepts of corporate governance that 
were to be incorporated (which were subsequently introduced only after the 
Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee issued its recommendations). Acceptability of 
enhanced corporate governance measures is one thing; assimilation of the detailed 
norms is yet another. The event study by Black and Khanna answers the former, 
but does not entirely address the latter. 
 The second study by Dharmapala and Khanna also poses some challenges. 
It shows a positive correlation between the introduction of stringent enforcement 
norms and companies’ market value. But, in the Indian context, law (or even 
strong penalties) on the statute books does not result in effective enforcement. 
Regard is also to be had to the inadequate enforcement machinery and the 
overburdened court system that make enforcement cumbersome in practice. There 
is ample discussion in existing literature about these problems that plague law 
enforcement in India.700 Hence, the evidence pertaining to the success in 
implementation of corporate governance reforms lies in whether violations have 
been successfully prosecuted in fact, and not whether there are stringent penal 
                                                 
700
  As some academics note that “when it comes to enforcement … the de facto protection of 
investor’s rights in India lags significantly behind the de jure protection.” Chakrabarti, 
Megginson & Yadav, Corporate Governance in India, supra note 99 at 67. This is essentially 
on account of an overburdened Indian judicial system and difficulties in enforcement of 
contracts. For details, see supra note 176 and accompanying text. 
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provisions in the law. An assessment based on the enforcement provisions on the 
statute books would be inadequate.701 
 While these event studies are optimistic about the impact of recent 
corporate governance measures in India, it would imprudent to conclude that 
independent directors have been effective in India. These studies examine the 
impact of Clause 49 in its entirety, of which the independent director is only one 
part. There are other measures such as the audit committee, financial disclosures, 
CEO/CFO certification, whistle blower policy, a corporate governance code and 
the like that are part of the package. 
 Since event studies do not provide much evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of independent directors, it is necessary to examine studies on 
corporate governance practices, particularly those relating to board practice. 
Recent events in India such as the Satyam corporate governance scandal have 
spurred a number of surveys. While there is one academic survey702 that explores 
corporate governance practices in Indian companies, there are three recent 
surveys by professional bodies that cover similar ground.703 The remainder of this 
                                                 
701
  In a broad sense, the threat of enforcement may itself act as a deterrent against non-
compliance. But, that may be the case in jurisdictions where the enforcement can be 
successfully taken to its logical end, and not in jurisdictions such as India where the success 
of enforcement actions is ridden with uncertainty due to the inadequacy of the enforcement 
machinery. See also La Porta, et al., What Works in Securities Laws?, supra note 175 at 27-
28. 
702
  Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556. This 
study is based on responses to a 2006 survey of 370 Indian public listed companies. 
703
  First, AT Kearney, AZB & Partners and Hunt Partners, “India Board Report – 2007: 
Findings, Action Plans and Innovative Strategies” (2007) (copy on file with the author) [AAH 
Report] studies board composition through a survey across various public companies that are 
listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange. 
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Section discusses the relevance of these surveys and the conclusions that emanate 
from them on the subject matter of this dissertation with specific reference to 
India. 
B. Number of Independent Directors 
As we have seen earlier,704 boards are required to have at least one third of their 
size comprised of independent directors, and if the chairman is an executive 
director or related to the promoters, then at least one half. This requirement has 
been mandatory for all large companies since 1 January 2006. However, 
Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna find that 7% of the firms surveyed do not 
have the minimum one-third independent directors and further a number of other 
companies that have a common chairman and CEO do not have the minimum 
one-half independent directors.705 They find that only 87% comply with board 
independence rules.706 The fact that 13% companies are yet to even comply with 
the minimum formal requirement of independent directors is startling. First, the 
definition of independence does not require any positive factors but only the 
                                                                                                                                     
 Second, and quite recently, FICCI & Grant Thornton, “CG Review 2009: India 101-500” 
(March 2009), online: <http://www.wcgt.in/assets/FICCI-GT_CGR-2009.pdf> [FICCI GT 
Report] analyses corporate governance at ‘mid-market’ listed companies in India by 
reviewing the nature and extent of corporate governance practices in approximately 500 
companies across various sectors that were targeted to participate in the survey. 
 Third, and more recently, KPMG Audit Committee Institute, “The State of Corporate 
Governance in India: A Poll” (2009), online: 
<http://www.in.kpmg.com/TL_Files/Pictures/CG%20Survey%20Report.pdf> [KPMG 
Report] presents findings on a poll conducted between November 2008 and January 2009, 
involving over “90 respondents comprising CEOs, CFOs, independent directors and similar 
leaders, who were asked about the journey, experience and the outlook for corporate 
governance in India”.  
704
  Supra notes 592 to 594. 
705
  Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556 at 14. 
706
  Ibid. 
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absence of relationships with the company or its controlling shareholders. Hence, 
the pool of candidates for companies to choose from is fairly large, especially in a 
country whose total population exceeds one billion. Further, it has generally not 
been difficult for companies to find independent directors.707 In this background, 
non-compliance of even the formal requirements by a large number of companies 
indicates the lack of all-round corporate will to follow more stringent governance 
norms in India. Even where companies do meet the minimum number of 
independent directors, a large number of them are appointed principally to satisfy 
compliance requirements.708 
 Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna also find that in 59% of the surveyed 
companies, there was a separate CEO and chairman.709 At first blush, these 
statistics appear to be impressive. However, a Practitioner Interview revealed that 
several companies maintained separate CEO and chair positions so as to be able 
to comply with Clause 49 by appointing one-third of their board as independent 
directors rather than one-half, because if the positions of CEO and chairman were 
held by the same person the more onerous requirement of appointing one half of 
the board as independent directors would apply instead of the one-third 
                                                 
707
  This finding is supported by Bala, Black & Khanna, ibid. at 14 and also in the Practitioner 
Interviews that I conducted for the present research. 
708
  One survey shows that 64% of its respondents believe independent directors merely 
contribute towards satisfying a regulatory requirement, although empowering them would 
enhance their performance significantly. KPMG Report, supra note 703 at 6. 
709
  Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556 at 14. 
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requirement. This way, management and controlling shareholders can keep the 
influence of independent directors on boards at a minimum.710 
C. Nomination and Appointment 
While the analysis of Clause 49 in the previous Chapter identifies controlling 
shareholder influence as a key shortcoming, the empirical survey of board 
practices reflects the perpetuation of the problem in practice. Controlling 
shareholders in fact do exercise control over appointment of independent directors 
as they have in the case of other directors too.711 The FICCI GT Report observes 
as follows: 
The survey shows that majority of the respondents (56%) do not have a 
nomination committee to lead the process of identifying and appointing 
directors. Possibly, the general practice has been for the promoters to 
identify people known to them or with whom they have comfort levels or 
otherwise people who are known personalities and can thus enhance the 
visible creditability of the board. This naturally restricts the choice to a 
relatively small segment and explains why the second most populated 
                                                 
710
  It must be noted, however, that when Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna conducted their 
survey in 2006, the one-third requirement could be satisfied by merely separating the 
positions of the CEO and chairman. At that stage, it was quite common for companies to 
appoint promoters (who were not in any executive capacity) as the chairman of the company. 
For example, the patriarch of the family controlling a company would be the chairman, while 
a representative from the next generation would be the CEO or executive director handling 
day-to-day affairs of the company. This effectively ensured that the chairmanship as well as 
the key managerial responsibilities remained with the family. It is for this reason that an 
additional requirement was introduced in April 2008 requiring companies to avail of the one-
third independent director requirement, i.e. that the chairman should also not be related to the 
promoter. See also supra notes 594 and 595 and accompanying text. This will ensure that 
boards are structured such that either the chairman is truly independent or that at least one half 
of the board consists of independent directors. It is possible that any survey over a period 
following April 2008 may yield different results. 
711
  Furthermore, it is not mandatory under Clause 49 to have independent nomination committees 
that would handle the process of selection, nomination and appointment of independent 
directors. 
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country in the world has been voicing a problem with numbers when it 
comes to finding independent directors.712 
The AAH Report finds that a “good 90% of the non-executive independent 
directors were appointed using CEO/chairperson’s personal network/referrals, and 
the remaining 10% through executive search firms”.713 These findings are also 
overwhelmingly supported by Practitioner Interviews. Most practitioners were of 
the view that the involvement of promoters in director nomination and 
appointment is “huge”. Interestingly, some practitioners opined that such 
involvement is not necessarily objectionable, primarily because promoters 
themselves gain when high quality individuals are enlisted onto corporate boards 
as independent directors as their contribution would be immensely useful to the 
companies. Apart from that, bringing in independent directors who can work with 
promoters and the management will enable collegiality on the board.714 While the 
practitioner view will enable seamless board activity, it is not clear if that would 
result in proper monitoring so as to ensure that the interests of all constituencies 
involved are appropriately protected. However, most practitioners were of the 
view that nomination committees ought to be made mandatory as that will 
introduce objectivity in the independent director selection process.715 
                                                 
712
  FICCI GT Report, supra note 703 at 11. 
713
  AAH Report, supra note 703 at 33. This study also finds that only “39.1% followed a formal 
process for the selection of board of directors in 2005-2006”. 
714
  One practitioner even observed that boards should not become “debating societies” and that 
constructive decision-making is essential.  
715
  Some of the surveys too call for reform by way of mandating a nomination committee. See 
FICCI GT Report, supra note 703 at 11; KPMG Report, supra note 703 at 6. 
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D. Competence 
 Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna report their findings on backgrounds 
of independent directors. They find that 39% of the firms surveyed had a scholar 
on their board.716 This compares well with the position in China, where the 
involvement of academics is almost similar, though marginally higher.717 The 
other prominent categories of individuals for independent directorship are lawyers 
(in 38% of companies) and former governmental officials or politicians (30%).718 
The study by Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna does not track executives from 
other companies as independent directors. However, it appears from a sample 
survey of large reputed Indian companies and also Practitioner Interviews that the 
category of business executives is becoming increasingly prominent. Practitioner 
Interviews also suggests the emergence of a cadre of professional directors, 
although they are few and far between compared to the other categories.719 
 As regards the dominant categories of academics, professionals (such as 
lawyers), retired governmental officials and politicians, it is not clear if they do 
possess requisite qualities to perform monitoring activities in the required manner.  
                                                 
716
  Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556 at 
16. They find that scholars are an attractive choice for companies as they are formally 
independent. 
717
  See supra note 651 and accompanying text. 
718
  Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556 at 
16. 
719
  This is similar to the category recommended by Professors Gilson and Kraakman whereby the 
primary occupation of such individuals is independent directorships on the boards of a few 
companies.  See Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director, supra note 415. 
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E. Incentives and Disincentives 
Remuneration of independent directors in India is fairly low compared to 
international standards. Independent directors are paid a sitting fee or a 
commission (as a share of profits)720 or are awarded stock options in the 
company.721 Further, committee members are paid additional compensation for 
their enhanced efforts in performing specific functions. The quantum of 
remuneration has been on the upswing in recent years. The AAH Report found 
that the “average annual compensation increased from [Rs. 397,000] in 2004-05 
to [Rs. 606,000] in 2005-06, an increase of 52.5%”722 and the “average annual 
sitting fee increased by 39%, from [Rs. 112,000] in 2004-05 to [Rs. 155,000] in 
2005-06”.723 Although the numbers are increasing, they may not be sufficient to 
attract high quality talent. One recent trend is that the emerging band of 
professional independent directors commands a high premium due to the amount 
of time and attention they are willing to devote to companies.724 Such directors 
are paid significantly higher than other non-executive directors. 
From an empirical standpoint, the key question relates to whether increase 
in compensation would compromise independence, especially if the independent 
director’s principal source of income were to come from such directorship. 
                                                 
720
  As regards sitting fees and commissions, there are limits on the amounts payable. While the 
sitting fee is a small amount, the commission is determined on the basis of profitability of the 
company. 
721
  The trend of awarding stock options to independent directors is of recent vintage and is yet 
not entirely common. AAH Report, supra note 703 at 50. 
722
  Ibid. at 49. 
723
  Ibid. at 49. 
724
  Practitioner Interviews. 
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During the Practitioner Interviews, most respondents seem to believe that 
increased compensation by itself will not impinge upon independence, 
particularly if individuals are independent directors on multiple boards. 
There are several disincentives to individuals for acting as independent 
directors. The principal among them relates to potential liability and loss of 
reputation, primarily in case of breach of law by the company or any other types 
of malfeasance. Furthermore, companies are not in a position to indemnify 
independent directors except in certain circumstances.725 As regards D&O 
insurance policies in favour of independent directors, they are not as popular as 
they are in the outsider economies, although the Indian market for such policies is 
on the rise.726 Following the corporate governance scandal at Satyam, SEBI is 
even seriously considering imposing a mandatory requirement that all public 
listed companies obtain D&O insurance policies for their directors.727 However, 
there are certain practical difficulties in the wide acceptance of D&O insurance 
policies. While the large and more reputed companies, particularly those that are 
cross-listed on international stock exchanges, do obtain large amounts of D&O 
insurance policies, most of the other companies find it prohibitively expensive to 
                                                 
725
  Indian Companies Act, s. 201 provides that any such indemnification provision in favour of a 
director (including an independent director) that holds such person harmless “against any 
negligence, default, misfeasance, breach of duty or breach of trust of which he may be guilty 
in relation to the company, shall be void”. Moreover, any expenses incurred in defending 
proceedings can be reimbursed by the company only when the independent directors have 
been acquitted or discharged or when relief is granted to them. 
726
  “D&O insurance policies market picking up” The Hindu Business Line (10 November 2005). 
727
  Aman Dhall, “SEBI may make D&O liability insurance must for listed cos” Economic Times 
(19 April 2009). 
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obtain meaningful policies.728 Indian insurance companies have only recently 
begun offering this type of insurance policies and there are bound to be 
difficulties in successfully invoking such policies. 
There appears to be no empirical survey that tracks the manner in which 
such disincentives operate in the minds of independent directors in India. 
However, there are some cases which provide an indication in this regard, which 
will be examined in the next section. 
F. Role of Independent Directors 
As we have seen in the previous Chapter, Clause 49 is altogether silent when it 
comes to the roles and responsibilities of independent directors. It is not clear if 
they are to be involved in strategic advisory functions or monitoring functions. It 
is also not clear if they are to owe their allegiance to the shareholder body as a 
whole, to the minority shareholders specifically, or to other stakeholders. It is 
somewhat surprising, therefore, to find that survey results report a great level of 
confidence among independent directors about knowledge of their own roles. The 
AAH Report states that 62.5% of the respondents “believe that the roles and 
responsibilities of the non-executive directors are clearly defined and 
documented”.729 In the FICCI GT Report, a slightly larger proportion of 69% 
respondents expressed satisfaction with the outline of the current role and 
                                                 
728
  Practitioner Interviews. 
729
  AAH Report, supra note 703 at 25. 
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responsibility of the board members in general.730 If participants in the corporate 
sector seem quite conscious of their own role, what exactly is that role – strategic 
advisory or monitoring? This is an important question which the surveys do not 
readily answer. The only guidance available is that 59% respondents to one 
survey believe that independent director involvement in annual planning and 
strategy development of the company of the company is moderate, while 22% 
believe it to be substantial and 13% minimal.731 But, the monitoring function, 
which has been the mainstay of the evolution of the independent director in the 
U.S. and the U.K., appears not yet to be a key part of an independent director’s 
role in India. While the surveys themselves do not track the monitoring function, 
the Practitioner Interviews suggest a greater involvement of independent directors 
in business strategy formulation than on monitoring.732  
 In the context of persistence of the majority-minority agency problem, 
there is no general tendency on the part of independent directors to bear in mind 
the interests of minority shareholders. One survey finds that “[o]ver 20% of firms 
have a director who explicitly represents minority shareholders or institutional 
investors”.733 However, the survey does not identify the types of minority 
investors. Based on Practitioner Interviews and a broad overview of minority 
investors in Indian companies, it appears that these independent directors are 
                                                 
730
  FICCI GT Report, supra note 703 at 15. Note that this report, unlike the AAH Report, surveys 
the role of the board as a whole as opposed to the specific roles of independent directors. 
731
  FICCI GT Report, ibid. at 17. 
732
  Many practitioners believed that their role is not meant to be one of a “policeman”, and that 
with their minimal involvement in the company’s affairs it was impossible for them unearth 
all goings-on in the company. 
733
  Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556 at 16. 
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usually appointed by institutional investors who take significant shareholdings in 
public listed companies.734 The investors enter into contractual arrangements 
(though subscription and shareholders’ agreements) with the company and the 
controlling shareholders to identify the inter se rights among the parties. The so-
called independent directors, who are otherwise nominees of the investors, are 
appointed to oversee the interests of the investors appointing them and do not 
have any explicit mandate to cater to the interests of minority shareholders as a 
whole. Such an independent director selectively takes into account the interests of 
one minority shareholder, and cannot be said to aid in the resolution of the 
majority-minority shareholder problem in general.735 
 Similarly, there is no indication whether independent directors pay any 
attention to stakeholders such as creditors, employees, consumers and the general 
public. Even more, there is in fact no unanimity as to whether the concept of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) is even entrenched in Indian corporate 
                                                 
734
  These institutional investors are private equity funds, venture capital funds and similar 
institutional investors who take up a stake in public listed companies through what are known 
as PIPE (private investment in public equity) transactions or are investors who came into the 
company prior to its listing, but have remained even thereafter. These types of investors rely 
extensively on additional rights provided under contractual documentation, including the right 
to nominate directors on the boards of the companies. Practice reveals that several companies 
treat such nominees as independent directors. This is because such directors tend to satisfy the 
formal definition of independence in Clause 49 and there is no further clarity regarding the 
status of such nominee directors. Other companies, however, adopt a more conservative 
approach and refuse to treat such nominees as independent directors. The practice is 
dichotomous. 
735
  The KPMG Report generally notes that “75 percent of the respondents believe that significant 
efforts need to be made to address the concerns of minority shareholders” and that “12 percent 
of the respondents say that minority shareholders’ concerns are sometimes addressed but not 
in the best interests of the company”. KPMG Report, supra note 703 at 7. 
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boards generally, let alone in the minds of independent directors. While one 
survey is quite optimistic, the other indicates the opposite result.736 
 This discussion points us towards a remarkable outcome indeed: while 
Clause 49 is silent as to the interests the independent directors are to protect, there 
is no clarity regarding that in practice either, although independent directors and 
other corporate players appear confident about what they believe is the role of 
independent directors! 
 Finally, independent directors can play an impactful role only when board 
systems and practices enable such role. One of the key obstacles to the proper 
functioning of independent directors relates to availability of information. 
Although the amount of information being shared with independent directors has 
been increasing over the years, surveys find that there is a need for drastic 
improvement both in terms of the timeliness and quality of information 
provided.737 Furthermore, independent directors can be effective only if they are 
provided adequate training and their performance is properly evaluated. As far as 
training is concerned, although there is no mandatory training requirement in 
Clause 49,738 one survey suggests that 57% of the respondents are taking steps to 
                                                 
736
  The AAH Report, supra note 703 at 47, finds that “the number of companies having a CSR 
agenda increased to 77.8% in 2005-06 as compared to 75% in 2004-05”. Contrast this with 
the KPMG Report, supra note 703 at 11, finding that CSR is “not yet top of mind for Indian 
corporates” because “47 percent of the respondents believe that CSR is not high on the agenda 
of Indian companies” and that “thirty percent of the respondents were undecided on this 
aspect”. 
737
  AAH Report, supra note 703 at 30-31; FICCI GT Report, supra note 703 at 13; KPMG 
Report, supra note 703 at 10. 
738
  This is unlike the Independent Director Opinion in China where independent director training 
is mandatory. See supra note 504. 
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provide training to their directors.739 Independent directors will have an incentive 
to carry out their roles diligently if their performance is periodically evaluated.740 
However, performance evaluation of independent directors has not evolved 
sufficiently in India as a common practice. One survey indicates that only a 
quarter of responding firms have an evaluation system for non-executive 
directors,741 while another survey indicates that about 39% companies surveyed 
had a formal board evaluation process742 (which perhaps covers the entire board 
rather than just the independent non-executive directors). This suggests that 
independent directors are often brought on boards merely to comply with the legal 
requirement rather than with a view of obtaining any significant contribution 
(either in terms of strategic value-add or monitoring).743 
 In conclusion, the empirical surveys reemphasise the shortcomings not 
only of the concept of the independent director itself but its current form as 
contained in Clause 49. Although respondents are generally optimistic about 
greater effectiveness of the independent directors once appropriate conditions are 
                                                 
739
  FICCI GT Report, supra note 703 at 24. This is also consistent with Practitioner Interviews 
indicating that companies do provide opportunities to directors for training programmes. 
However, these are provided only on a voluntary basis and directors do avail of them 
depending on their need for the training and the availability of time. 
740
  Under Clause 49, evaluation of the performance of non-executive directors is only a non-
mandatory requirement. Listing Agreement, clause 49, Annexure ID, paragraph 6. 
741
  Balasubramanian, Black & Khanna, Firm-Level Corporate Governance, supra note 556 at 18. 
742
  AAH Report, supra note 703 at 33. 
743
  In a Practitioner Interview, one respondent remarked that often individuals are brought in as 
independent directors just to “keep the seat warm”. This is also consistent with the 
inadequacies pointed out in the nomination and appointments process. If there is a serious 
evaluation process, controlling shareholders and managers would be compelled to nominate 
competent and strong-willed individuals as independent directors with the ability to sustain 
serious scrutiny, and who may not necessarily adhere to the policies and aspirations of their 
nominators. 
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created, the current situation is far from the desired.744 To a large extent, the 
claims made in this dissertation about the inadequacies of the independent 
director regime in India745 stand supported by empirical evidence. 
 Before concluding on the empirical front, it is necessary to highlight one 
heartening trend. During Practitioner Interviews, the research revealed that in a 
handful of leading Indian companies (the so called ‘blue-chip’ companies), the 
corporate governance norms and practices identified were far superior to what is 
prescribed by Clause 49 and were also comparable to, and perhaps more 
stringently followed than, practices around the world, particularly in developing 
countries. In these companies, only competent individuals who are truly 
independent are appointed following a rigorous appointment process. Further, the 
companies (management and controlling shareholders) themselves are highly 
demanding of the time and attention of the independent directors. They seek 
independent advice of such directors (on strategy, compliance, monitoring and 
other issues), rely substantially on their inputs and even impose an onerous 
evaluation system. However, these are only honourable exceptions that seem to 
flow against the tide. 
                                                 
744
  One survey summarises the deficiencies in the current position: 
According to directors, the greatest impediments in changing board structure include 
limited pool of independent directors, and lack of willingness on part of existing board 
members to change. Absence of a structured process to select capable independent 
directors was also perceived to be an impediment to a certain extent. 
AAH Report, supra note 703 at 23. The survey also noted that “[r]elatively few directors 
believe that adding more independent directors could add further value to the board”. AAH 
Report, ibid. at 23. 
745
  See supra Chapter 4, Section 4.4(C). 
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5.5 Independent Directors in India: Case Studies 
In addition to empirical evidence, there is also a fair amount of anecdotal 
evidence represented by case studies (with the prominent ones being most recent) 
that help analyse the effectiveness of independent directors in Indian corporate 
governance. The case studies are divided into three categories and discussed 
below. 
A. Compliance with Clause 49 
Even assuming that independent directors are not believed to be effective, it 
would be right to presume that companies would nevertheless appoint 
independent directors in order to comply with the minimum requirements of 
Clause 49, at least as a means of “checking the box”. However, as we have 
seen,746 nearly 13% companies were yet to appoint the minimum number of 
independent directors as of 2006. Surprisingly, the principal offenders are not the 
medium-and-small scale companies or other fly-by-night operators, but the 
Government itself in the case of public sector undertakings. 
In a string of cases, SEBI initiated action in 2007747 against several 
government companies for non-compliance of Clause 49.748 These actions were 
initiated on the specific count that these government companies had failed to 
                                                 
746
  Supra note 706 and accompanying text. 
747
  “SEBI Cracks the Whip—Violation of Corporate Code Under Lens” The Telegraph (12 
September 2007); “SEBI Proceeds Against 20 Cos For Not Complying With Clause 49 Norms” 
The Hindu Business Line (12 September 2007). 
748
  SEBI repeatedly made public statements through its Chairman indicating its intention to ensure 
that government companies too strictly comply with Clause 49. See “PSUs Must Meet Clause 49 
Norms” Rediff Money (3 January 2008).  
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appoint the requisite number of independent directors as required by Clause 49. 
However, these actions were subsequently dropped by SEBI.749 The principal 
ground for dropping the action is that, in the case of the government companies 
involved, the articles of association provide for the appointment of directors by 
the President of India (as the controlling shareholder), acting through the relevant 
administrative Ministry. SEBI found that despite continuous follow up by the 
government companies, the appointments did not take effect due to the need to 
follow the requisite process and hence the failure by those companies to comply 
with Clause 49 was not deliberate or intentional.  
This episode may likely have deleterious consequences on corporate 
governance reforms in India. Compliance or otherwise of corporate governance 
norms by government companies has an important signalling effect. Strict 
adherence to these norms by government companies may persuade others to 
follow as well. But, when government companies violate the norms with 
impunity, it is bound to trigger negative consequences in the market-place thereby 
making implementation of corporate governance norms a more arduous task. 
Furthermore, such implementation failures raise important questions as to the 
acceptability of transplanted concepts of corporate governance in the Indian 
context. 
                                                 
749
  During October and November 2008, SEBI passed a series of orders involving several government 
companies, viz. NTPC Limited (8 October), GAIL (India) Limited (27 October), Indian Oil 
Corporation Limited (31 October) and Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (3 November), all 
available online: <http://www.sebi.gov.in>.  
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B. Effectiveness of Independent Directors: The Satyam Episode 
Even where there is a stellar independent board of directors, it may not be 
possible for them to perform their role effectively if the conditions for proper 
performance do not exist. The Satyam episode demonstrates some of the reasons 
why independent directors may not be effective, particularly in India and more 
generally in emerging economies. 
1. Satyam: The Company and its Board 
Satyam Computer Services Limited (recently renamed as Mahindra Satyam) is a 
leading information technology services company incorporated in India.750 
Satyam’s promoters, represented by Mr. Ramalinga Raju and his family, held 
about 8% shares in the company at the end of 2008,751 while the remaining 
shareholding in the company was diffused.752 Its securities are listed on the 
                                                 
750
  It is paradoxical that the expression “Satyam” stands for “truth” in Sanskrit. 
751
  It has been reported that the promoters’ percentage shareholding in Satyam declined over a 
period of time: 
Though the precise numbers quoted vary, according to observers the stake of the 
promoters fell sharply after 2001 when they held 25.60 per cent of equity in the company. 
This fell to 22.26 per cent by the end of March, 2002, 20.74 per cent in 2003, 17.35 per 
cent in 2004, 15.67 per cent in 2005, 14.02 per cent in 2006, 8.79 in 2007, 8.65 at the end 
of September 2008, and 5.13 per cent in January 2009 (Business Line, January 3, 2009). 
The most recent decline is attributed to the decision of lenders from whom the family had 
borrowed to sell the shares that were pledged with them. But the earlier declines must 
have been the result either of sale of shares by promoters or of sale of new shares to 
investors. 
C.P. Chandrasekhar, “The Satyam Scam: Separating Truth from Lies” The Hindu (14 January 
2009). It would be cumbersome to obtain the exact amount of voting shares held by the 
promoters as large parts of those shares were pledged to lenders and those pledges were 
enforced by the lenders, thereby bringing the promoter holdings down to negligible levels. 
752
  In Satyam’s case, institutional shareholders held a total of 60% shares as of 31 December 
2008; the highest individual shareholding of an institutional shareholder, however, was only 
3.76%. This information has been extracted from Satyam’s filing of shareholding pattern with 
the BSE for the quarter ended 31 December 2008, online: 
<http://www.bseindia.com/shareholding/shareholdingPattern.asp?scripcd=500376&qtrid=60> 
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Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock Exchange.753 Furthermore, the 
company’s securities are cross-listed on the NYSE.754 This required Satyam to 
comply not only with Clause 49 but also the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act as well as NYSE Listed Company Manual. Satyam took immense pride in its 
corporate governance practices.755  
 Satyam had a majority independent board, thus over-complying with the 
requirements of Clause 49. Its board consisted of the following:756 
Executive Directors 
(a) B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman; 
(b) B. Rama Raju, Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer; 
(c) Ram Mynampati, Whole Time Director; 
Non-Executive, Non-Independent Directors 
(d) Prof. Krishna G. Palepu, Ross Graham Walker Professor of Business 
Administration at the Harvard Business School;757 
                                                 
753
  Satyam Computer Services Limited, 21st Annual Report 2007-2008 (21 April 2008) at 43 
[Satyam Annual Report]. 
754
  Satyam Annual Report, ibid. at 43. The securities listed on the NYSE are known as American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) that are derivative securities issued to holders by a global 
depository that holds underlying equity shares of Satyam. 
755 
 It is also ironical that the company was awarded the Golden Peacock Award for Corporate 
Governance by the World Council for Corporate Governance as late as September 2008. 
“Satyam receives Golden Peacock Global Award for Excellence in Corporate Governance” 
Financial Express (23 September 2008). 
756
  The list of directors and their background information have been obtained from the Satyam 
Annual Report and Satyam Computer Services Limited, Form 20-F filed with the United 
States Securities and Exchange Commission (8 August 2008) [Satyam Form 20-F]. 
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Independent 
(e) Dr. Mangalam Srinivasan, management consultant and a visiting 
professor at several U.S. universities; 
(f) Vinod K. Dham, Vice President and General Manager, Carrier Access 
Business Unit, of Broadcom Corporation;758 
(g) Prof. M. Rammohan Rao, Dean, Indian School of Business; 
(h) T. R. Prasad, former Cabinet Secretary, Government of India; and 
(i) V. S. Raju, Chairman, Naval Research Board and former Director, 
Indian Institute of Technology, Madras. 
The board consisted of 3 executive directors, 5 independent directors and 1 grey 
(or affiliated) director. Amongst the non-executives, 4 were academics, 1 was 
from government service and the last was a business executive. At a broad level, 
it can be said that very few Indian boards can lay claim to such an impressive 
array of independent directors. 
                                                                                                                                     
757
  Although Prof. Palepu was initially appointed as an independent director, he ceased to be so 
in view of the special remuneration of $0.2 million that he received from the company 
towards professional consulting services rendered. Satyam Form 20-F, ibid. at 64. 
758
  Vinod Dham is a seasoned technocrat who is also referred to as the “father of the Pentium 
chip”. “Scandal at Satyam: Truth, Lies and Corporate Governance” India 
Knowledge@Wharton (9 January 2009), online: 
<http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/india/article.cfm?articleid=4344>.  
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2. The Maytas Transaction 
On 16 December 2008, a meeting of Satyam’s board was convened to consider a 
proposal for acquisition of two companies, Maytas Infra Limited and Maytas 
Properties Limited.759 Two sets of facts gain immense relevance to the 
transaction. One is that the Maytas pair of companies760 was predominantly 
owned in excess of 30% each by the Raju family,761 thereby making the proposed 
acquisition deal a related party transaction. The other is that the Maytas 
companies were in the businesses of real estate and infrastructure development, 
both unrelated to the core business of Satyam. The transactions were also 
significant as the total purchase consideration for the acquisition was Rs. 7,914.10 
crores (US$ 1,615.11 million).762 It is important to note that, if effected, the 
transaction would result in a significant amount of cash flowing from Satyam, a 
publicly listed company, to its individual promoters, the Raju family. 
 The board meeting on 16 December 2008 was attended by all directors, 
except for Palepu and Dham who participated by audio conference.763 On account 
of the related party situation and unrelated business diversification, it is natural to 
expect a significant amount of resistance from the independent directors to the 
                                                 
759
  See Satyam Computer Services Limited, Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of 
the Company Held on Tuesday, 16 December 2008 at 4.00 P.M. at Satyam Infocity, Hitech 
City, Madhapur, Hyderabad – 500 081 (copy on file with the author) [Satyam Board Minutes]. 
760
  Maytas is a palindrome for Satyam. See R. Narayanaswamy, “L’affaire Satyam” The Hindu 
Business Line (28 December 2008). 
761
  K.V. Ramana, “Satyam Buys Maytas Cos for $ 1.6b” DNA: Money (16 December 2008). 
762
  Satyam Board Minutes, supra note 759 at 2.  
763
  Under the Indian Companies Act, participation by audio conference is not recognised and 
hence is not considered for the purpose of quorum or voting. 
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Maytas transactions.764 After the company’s officers made a presentation to the 
board regarding the transactions, the independent directors did raise some 
concerns. For example, “Dr. Mangalam Srinivasan, Director enquired if there are 
any particular reasons either external or internal for this initiative and timing of 
the proposal” and “suggested to involve the Board members right from the 
beginning of the process to avoid the impression that the Board is used as a rubber 
stamp to affirm the consequent or decisions already reached”.765 Other 
independent directors such as a Rao and Dham were concerned about the risks in 
a diversifying strategy as the company was venturing into a completely unrelated 
business.766 Yet others opined that “since the transactions are among related 
parties, it is important to demonstrate as to how the acquisition would benefit the 
shareholders of the company and enhance their value”767 and that there should be 
“complete and justification” regarding the valuation methodology adopted, which 
“should be communicated to all the concerned stakeholders”.768 
 The independent directors cannot be criticised for failing to identify the 
issues or to raising their concerns at the board meeting, for that is precisely what 
they did. Surprisingly, however, the final outcome of the meeting was a 
“unanimous” resolution of the board to proceed with the Maytas transaction, 
                                                 
764
  As a technical matter, however, this board meeting was chaired by Rao (an independent 
director) rather than the Chairman, Raju, as the latter was interested in the Maytas 
transactions. See Satyam Board Minutes, supra note 759 at 1. 
765
  Satyam Board Minutes, ibid. at 2. Her suggestions were for “the management to take Board’s 
guidance at appropriate stages for all acquisitions”. 
766
  Satyam Board Minutes, ibid. at 2. 
767
  Dham, Satyam Board Minutes, ibid. at 5. 
768
  Rao, Satyam Board Minutes, ibid. at 7. 
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without any dissent whatsoever.769 As required by the listing agreement, Satyam 
notified the stock exchanges about the board approval immediately following the 
board meeting.770 This information was not at all accepted kindly by the investors. 
The stock price of Satyam’s American Depository Receipts fell during a single 
trading session by over 50% due to massive selling and the company was 
compelled to withdraw the Maytas proposal within eight hours of its 
announcement.771 
 This episode gives rise to a number of questions regarding the role of the 
independent directors. If the transactions were ridden with issues, why were they 
approved “unanimously” by the independent directors even though they voiced 
their concerns quite forcefully? Why were the interests of the minority public 
(institutional and individual) shareholders not borne in mind by the independent 
directors when the transaction involved a blatant transfer of funds from the 
company (which was owned more than 90% by public shareholders) to the 
individual promoters that is tantamount to siphoning of funds of a company by its 
controlling shareholders to the detriment of all other stakeholders? Why were the 
independent directors unable to judge the drastic loss in value to the shareholders 
by virtue of the transactions and stop them or even defer the decision to a further 
                                                 
769
  Satyam Board Minutes, ibid. at 8-10. 
770
  Satyam Board Minutes, ibid. at 8. The announcements to the stock markets were made after 
the close of trading hours in India, but before the commencement of trading on the NYSE 
(resulting in some disparity in information between the markets due to the time difference 
between India and the U.S.). 
771
  Somasekhar Sundaresan, “Year of All-Pervasive Poor Governance” Business Standard (29 
December 2008) [Year of All-Pervasive Poor Governance]; S. Nagesh Kumar, “Independent 
Directors Put Tough Questions, But Gave Blank Cheque” The Hindu (14 January 2009) 
(noting that the drastic collapse of Satyam’s stock price following the board meeting signalled 
“the start of Satyam’s downhill journey”). 
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date by seeking more information on the transactions? How was it the case that 
the investors directly blocked the transaction when the independent directors were 
themselves unable to do so? These questions do not bear easy answers, but it is 
clear from this episode that shareholder activism (exhibited through the “Wall 
Street walk”) performed a more significant role in questioning a poor corporate 
governance practice than independent directors. If independent directors are to be 
the guardians of minority shareholders’ interests, as they are expected to be in the 
case of insider systems such as India, Satyam’s directors arguably failed in their 
endeavours. 
 In the ensuing furore that this episode generated, four of the non-executive 
directors resigned from Satyam’s board.772 However, most independent directors 
defended themselves stating that they had raised their objections to the Maytas 
transactions as independent directors should.773 While the markets were still 
recovering from the purported corporate governance failures at Satyam, evidence 
of a bigger scandal emerged during the first week of 2009 raising further 
questions about the role of independent directors. 
                                                 
772
  The directors who resigned are Dr. Mangalam Srinivasan, Prof. Krishna Palepu, Mr. Vinod 
Dham and Prof. Rammohan Rao. “Corporate Lawyers, CAs Hit Out at Satyam’s Independent 
Directors for Quitting” The Mint (30 December 2008). While Dr. Srinivasan “had the humility 
to admit in writing that regardless of the concerns expressed, she did not positively vote 
against the deal” and that she “resigned owning moral responsibility”, it is not clear if the 
others specified any reasons. Sundaresan, Year of All-Pervasive Poor Governance, supra note 
771. 
773
  “Satyam’s Independent Directors Had Raised Concerns Over the Deal” Business Line (19 
December 2008).  
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3. Fraud in Financial Statements 
On 7 January 2009, the Chairman of the company, Mr. Ramalinga Raju, 
confessed to having falsified the financial statements of the company, including 
by showing fictitious cash assets of over US$ 1 billion on its books.774 The 
confession also revealed that the proposed Maytas buy-outs were just illusory 
transactions intended to manipulate the balance sheet of Satyam and to wipe out 
inconsistencies therein.775 The stock price of the company reacted adversely to 
                                                 
774
  In his confession addressed to Satyam’s board, Raju wrote: 
It is with deep regret, and tremendous burden that I am carrying on my conscience, that I 
would like to bring the following factors to your notice:: 
1. The Balance Sheet carries as of September 30, 2008 
a. Inflated (non-existent) cash and bank balances of Rs. [50.40 billion] (as 
against [Rs. 53.61 billion] reflected in the books) 
b. An accrued interest of [Rs. 3.76 billion] which is non-existent 
c. An understated liability of [Rs. 12.30 billion] on account of funds arranged 
by me 
d. An over stated debtors position of [Rs. 4.90 billion] (as against [Rs. 26.51 
billion] reflected in the books 
2. For the September quarter (Q2) we reported a revenue of [Rs. 27 billion] and an 
operating margin of [Rs. 6.49 billion] (24% of revenues) as against the actual 
revenues of [Rs. 21.12 billion] and an actual operating margin of [Rs. 610 
million] (3% of revenues). This has resulted in artificial cash and bank balances 
going up by [Rs. 5.88 billion] in Q2 alone. 
The gap in the Balance Sheet has arisen purely on account of inflated profits over a 
period of last several years … What started as a marginal gap between actual operating 
profit and the one reflected in the books of accounts continued to grow over the years. It 
has attained unmanageable proportions as the size of the company operations grew 
significantly …  
Letter dated 7 January 2009 from B. Ramalinga Raju, Chairman, Satyam Computer Services 




  Raju’s letter further goes on to state:  
The aborted Maytas acquisition deal was the last attempt to fill the fictitious assets with 
real ones. Maytas’ investors were convinced that this is a good investment opportunity 
and a strategic fit. Once Satyam’s problem was solved, it was hoped that Maytas’ 
payments can be delayed. But that was not to be. What followed in the last several days is 
common knowledge” 
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this information and fell more than 70%,776 thereby wiping out the wealth of its 
shareholders, some of whom are employees with stock options.777 Minority 
shareholders were significantly affected as they were unaware of the veracity (or 
otherwise) of the financial statements of Satyam, and hence this exacerbated the 
majority-minority agency problem.778  
This episode invoked fervent reaction from the Indian government. 
Several regulatory authorities such as the Ministry of Company Affairs, 
Government of India779 and SEBI780 initiated investigations into the matter. While 
several independent directors of the company resigned,781 the remaining directors 
were substituted with persons nominated by the Government.782 Certain key 
officers of Satyam, being the chairman, the managing director and the chief 
financial officer were arrested by the police within a few days following the 
                                                                                                                                     
Chairman’s Confession, ibid. 
776
  “Satyam Chief Admits Huge Fraud” The New York Times (8 January 2009). 
777
  Santanu Mishra & Ranjit Shinde, “Satyam Esop-Holders in Deep Sea as Valuation Takes a 
Hit” The Economic Times (8 January 2009). 
778
  The magnitude of the financial loss caused to unwitting minority shareholders is 
unimaginable. As one column notes:  
Shareholders have lost [Rs. 136 billion] in Satyam shares in less than a month.  The 
market capitalisation fell to [Rs. 16.07 billion] on January 9, 2008, from [Rs. 152.62 
billion] at the end of trade on December 16, 2008, the day when Satyam had announced 
the [Rs. 80 billion] acquisition deal of two firms promoted by the kin of the IT firm’s 
former chairman Ramalinga Raju. 
Ashish K. Bhattacharyya, “Satyam: How Guilty are the Independent Directors?” Business 
Standard (12 January 2009). 
779
  Souvik Sanyal, “Government Refers Satyam Case to Serious Frauds Investigation Office” The 
Economic Times (13 January 2009). 
780
  Oomen A. Ninan, “Satyam Episode: SEBI Enquiries Will Focus on Three Areas” The Hindu 
Business Line (16 January 2009). 
781
  See supra note 772 and accompanying text. 
782
  Mukesh Jagota & Romit Guha, “India Names New Satyam Board” The Wall Street Journal 
Asia (12 January 2009). 
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confession,783 while two partners of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Satyam’s auditor, 
were arrested thereafter.784 The investigations by the various authorities, which 
are likely to be time-consuming, are ongoing and it is expected that their outcome 
will be available only in due course. The only significant investigation that has 
been completed is that of the Ministry of Company Affairs conducted through the 
Serious Frauds (Investigation) Office.785 At a broader level, the Satyam episode 
has triggered renewed calls for corporate governance reforms in India, and it is 
likely that changes may be proposed to corporate governance norms in the light of 
lessons learnt from the Satyam episode.786 
 As for the company itself, it witnessed a remarkable turnaround of 
fortunes under the leadership of its new government-nominated board of 
directors.787 The new board and their advisors took charge of the affairs of the 
                                                 
783
  “Satyam’s Raju Brothers Arrested by AP Police” The Economic Times (9 January 2009); 
“Satyam Fraud: Raju Sent to Central Prison; CFO Vadlamani Arrested” The Economic Times 
(10 January 2009). 
784
  Jackie Range, “Pricewaterhouse Partners Arrested in Satyam Probe” The Wall Street Journal 
Asia (25 January 2009). 
785
  “Satyam: SFIO Report Being Examined” The Hindu Business Line (26 April 2009). 
786
  Some of the immediate developments towards change can be summarised as follows: (i) 
within days of the Satyam episode coming to light, the CII set up a special task force on 
corporate governance to examine issues arising out of the Satyam episode and to make 
suitable recommendations. “CII Sets Up Task Force on Corporate Governance” Business 
Standard (12 January 2009); (ii) the National Association of Software and Services 
Companies [hereinafter “NASSCOM”], the premier trade body representing Indian IT – BPO 
industry announced that it will be forming a Corporate Governance and Ethics Committee to 
be chaired by Mr. N. R. Narayana Murthy, Chairman and Chief Mentor, Infosys Technologies 
Ltd. This signifies NASSCOM’s efforts to strengthen corporate governance practices in the 
Indian IT-BPO industry. “NASSCOM Announces Formation of Corporate Governance and 
Ethics Committee” Business Standard (11 February 2009); and (iii) the Minister for 
Corporate Affairs, Government of India announced that the Ministry will consider changes to 
the Companies Bill, 2008 (that is pending in Parliament) in the light of events surrounding 
Satyam. “Satyam Scam: Provisions of New Companies Bill to be Reviewed” The Hindu 
Business Line (8 January 2009). 
787
  A six-member board was appointed pursuant to orders passed by the Company Law Board. 
The board (as of 18 May 2009) consisted of industrialists, representative of business 
 274
company, appointed a new chief executive, and undertook tireless efforts to retain 
clients and employees. Finally, the company itself was sold through a global 
bidding process to Tech Mahindra, another Indian IT player in a transaction that 
received uniform adulation for the alacrity with which the various players 
(particularly the new board of Satyam) acted to resuscitate the company and 
protect the interests of its stakeholders.788 
4. Lessons from Satyam 
In the meanwhile, it is necessary to examine to how misstatements in Satyam’s 
financials were made possible in the first place despite the applicability not only 
of Clause 49 (as Satyam was listed on Indian stock exchanges), but also of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (as the company was also listed on the NYSE). Satyam had 
seemingly complied with all the onerous requirements imposed by Clause 49 and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, such as the appointment of an impressive array of 
independent directors, an audit committee, and the audit of its financial statements 
by a “Big Four” audit firm, but these corporate governance failures nevertheless 
occurred.789 This episode raises serious questions about implementation of 
                                                                                                                                     
associations, professional bodies and a former government officer. They were: Deepak 
Parekh, Kiran Karnik, C. Achutan, Tarun Das, T.N. Manoharan and S.B. Mainak, online: 
Satyam Computers <http://www.satyam.com/about/board_members.asp>. 
788
  See “Reactions to the Satyam Sale”, Indian Corporate Law Blog (15 April 2009), online: 
<http://indiacorplaw.blogspot.com/2009/04/reactions-to-satyam-sale.html>. 
789
  See Pratip Kar, “Enron? Parmalat? Lehman? No, no, it’s Satyam” Business Standard (9 
January 2009); Salil Tripathi, “India Faces an ‘Enron Moment’” The Wall Street Journal (9 
January 2009). An additional question that has baffled observers pertains to how Satyam was 
able to circumvent the onerous provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that were applicable to it 
by virtue of its cross-listing on NYSE, and the consequent operation of the bonding thesis. 
For an introduction to the bonding thesis that arises out of cross-listings, see, Licht, Cross-
Listing and Corporate Governance, supra note 586 at 142. However, at an academic level, 
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corporate governance norms in India, and points towards a failure of 
transplantation.  
More specifically, several key questions arise with reference to the role of 
independent directors in such situations. Satyam’s independent directors were 
unable to prevent the falsification of financial statements. Various reasons can be 
attributed to this failure. No doubt, the Satyam board was largely independent and 
also comprised distinguished and reputable individuals. But, independent 
directors cannot generally be expected to uncover frauds in companies as the 
decisions they make are generally based on information provided to them by 
management.790 Even in Satyam’s own case, the Chairman’s Confession itself 
concedes that “[n]one of the board members, past or present, had any knowledge 
of the situation in which the company is placed”.791 Since independent directors 
                                                                                                                                     
there are some challenges to the bonding thesis. Licht argues that the role of the bonding 
thesis has been greatly overstated. He adds: 
 A large body of evidence, using various research methodologies, indicates that the 
bonding theory is unfounded. Indeed, the evidence supports an alternative theory, which 
may be called “the avoiding hypothesis.” To the extent that corporate governance issues 
play a role in the cross-listing decision, it is a negative role. The dominant factors in the 
choice of cross-listing destination markets are access to cheaper finance and enhancing 
issuer visibility. Corporate governance is a second-order consideration whose effect is 
either to deter issuers from accessing better-regulated markets or to induce securities 
regulators to allow foreign issuers to avoid some of the more exacting domestic 
regulations. Overall, the global picture of cross-listing patterns is best described as a 
model of informational distance, which comprises elements of geographical and cultural 
distance.” 
Licht, Cross-Listing and Corporate Governance, ibid. 
790
  The management or controlling shareholders control the “amount, quality and structure” of 
information that is provided to the board, and this “kind of power over information flow is 
virtually equivalent to power over decision.” Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation, 
supra note 272 at 144, 172. Added to that is the complexity of the information based on which 
directors are required to decide. Often, directors’ roles are “predicated on a detailed 
knowledge of a company and its business.” Lorsch & MacIver, Pawns or Potentates, supra 
note 10 at 57. 
791
  Chairman’s Confession, supra note 774. 
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do not get involved in the day-to-day management of the company, it is virtually 
impossible for them to unearth such frauds.792 Hence, even when monitoring 
functions are imposed on independent boards, it is impractical to expect watchdog 
functions being exercised effectively by independent directors as their role is 
necessarily limited. In addition, independent directors are busy individuals who 
spend little time each year tending to matters pertaining to each company on 
whose boards they serve. This also limits their ability to delve deeper into 
financial, business and other matters involving the companies. It is therefore not 
surprising that the SFIO investigation largely exonerated the independent 
directors in the Satyam fraud.793  
At a structural level, as discussed earlier, independent directors are subject 
to nomination, appointment and removal, all at the hands of the controlling 
shareholders,794 and hence may be subject to influence by the controlling 
shareholders.795 Although Satyam was subject to the listing requirements of 
NYSE,796 it did not have an independent nomination committee797 that could have 
                                                 
792
  It has been noted that “by their nature, the directors on the board largely rely on information 
from the management and auditors, with their capacity to independently verify financial 
information being quite limited …”. D. Murali, “Truly Independent Director, A Rarity” The 
Hindu Business Line (22 January 2009). 
793
  “Independent Directors Clean: SFIO” Business Standard (18 April 2009). 
794
  See supra Chapter 4, Section 4.4(C)(4) and this Chapter 5, Section 5.4(C). 
795
  To be sure, this is not to suggest any malfeasance on the part of Satyam’s independent 
directors. The independent director may act well-intentioned and bona fide, but due to the 
operation of several constraints on time, information, as well as on business, financial and 
legal expertise, they may not be in a position to challenge management or controlling 
shareholders when required. An observation made several years ago by a leading 
commentator on board behavior continues to be apt even today: ““Professional courtesy” and 
“corporate manners” were phrases used to explain the lack of challenging questions.” Mace, 
supra note 406 at 54. 
796
  Satyam’s ADRs are listed on the NYSE. Symbol: SAY. For further details, see online: 
<http://www.nyse.com/about/listed/say.html>. 
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potentially brought the appointment of directors outside the purview of the 
controlling shareholders. In the present case, it is evident that the independent 
directors were not willing to completely oppose the proposals of the management 
and promoters, as they may have implicitly owed allegiance to the promoters of 
the company who were in a position to influence their appointment and 
continuance on the board.798  
Independent directors are said to be in a position to exchange their views 
more frankly if they meet separately from the management (or the controlling 
shareholders). This would ensure that they are not inhibited by the presence of the 
management or their possible reaction to the views of the independent directors. 
This would help independent directors take a more unbiased position. However, 
Indian corporate governance norms do not require such executive sessions 
without the presence of management, and hence independent directors’ views 
tend to be equivocal even when they are not convinced of the merits of any 
proposals that are before them for consideration. The Satyam episode presents 
evidence of this difficulty. 
                                                                                                                                     
797
  Satyam did not constitute a nomination committee even though that is mandated by the 
corporate governance requirements of the NYSE. NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 
14, § 303A.04 (2003). See Form 20-F filed by Satyam with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission on 8 August 2008 at 70. 
798
  As one observer quite directly notes:  
If the board is in awe of the family executive, it makes it difficult for the board 
sometimes to ask tough questions or at other times the right questions at the right time in 
order to serve the interests of the shareholders better. As a result truly independent 
directors are rarely found in Indian companies. 
D. Murali, supra note 792. In the Satyam case, although the independent directors did ask 
pointed questions, they seemed will to accept answers which may not have been altogether 
convincing (because the investors voted thumbs down as they did not seem convinced with 
the proposals). 
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Furthermore, the Indian corporate governance norms do not specify the 
roles of independent directors. It is not entirely clear whether independent 
directors ought to act as advisors to management from a business strategy 
perspective or whether they ought to act as a guardian of shareholder interest.799 
The Indian corporate governance norms such as Clause 49 only provide a 
negative definition of independence,800 but do not specify any positive qualities, a 
specific role or other attributes for independent directors. Such lack of clarity in 
their roles could result in less desirable outcomes from independent director 
action as we have witnessed in Satyam’s case. More importantly, there is no 
special role for independent directors in related party transactions with the 
controlling shareholders. For instance, if there is a requirement that all such 
related party transactions are to be approved by a vote of independent directors 
only, then such office bearers are likely to take on greater onus and responsibility 
for their decisions.801 Again, there is no such specific role envisaged for 
independent directors in the Indian corporate governance norms. 
Lastly, the Satyam episode is also symptomatic of a signalling problem 
with the role of independent directors. That is, the corporate governance norms 
bestow too much (and somewhat misplaced) importance on the role of 
independent directors than is justified. In epitomising independent directors as a 
                                                 
799
  Several independent directors I spoke to in the course of Practitioner Interviews believe that 
their primary role on corporate boards is to provide strategic inputs to management and do not 
believe they have any significant role to play in acting as a constant check on management or 
controlling shareholders or in preventing frauds or similar corporate governance failures. 
800
  Clause 49(I)(A)(iii) of the Listing Agreement lists out persons who do not qualify to become 
an independent director of a listed company.  
801
  For such provisions in the laws of Delaware, see supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
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guardian of various corporate interests, including possibly minority shareholders, 
the corporate governance norms create a false sense of security among corporate 
stakeholders.802 However, as the Satyam episode has demonstrated, the 
independent directors are constrained in the extent to which they can be effective 
in unearthing frauds, even when they exercise a fair amount of diligence in their 
action. 
There also exists the larger issue of promoter control in Indian companies 
that affects the functioning of independent directors. Promoters (who are 
controlling shareholders) exercise significant influence on matters involving their 
companies, even though such companies are listed on stock exchanges and hence 
have public shareholders. Indian law confers some distinct roles for promoters.803 
This largely holds good even for companies that have controlling shareholders 
with small percentage holdings in companies. For instance, the Raju family who 
are the promoters of Satyam held only about 5% shares around the time when the 
Chairman’s confession was made on 7 January 2009.804 A company with a 5% 
                                                 
802
  It has been observed that an “independent director is a myth in India”. Virendra Varma & 
Rachna Monga, “Cry Freedom!; Investor Activism More Than Independent Directors Can 
Keep Managements in Check” Business Today (25 January 2009). 
803
  The importance of the position emanates in the context of public offerings of securities, where 
the role of key persons involved in control of the company is material information that is to be 
disclosed to investors to enable them to take an informed investment decision. Apart from 
that, promoters are required to hold minimum number of shares in the company at the time of 
listing (also known as minimum promoter contribution) and they are subject to lock-in on 
their shares. It has been argued that “[a]ny requirement that statutorily forces a promoter to 
bring in specific investment amounts or maintain specific shareholding would necessarily 
perpetrate the unfortunate reality of keeping our listed companies in the hands of the 
promoters.” Somasekhar Sundaresan, “SEBI Should Phase Out ‘Promoter’ Concept” Business 
Standard (8 October 2007) [Promoter Concept]. This would arguably inhibit any transition 
from controlling shareholding in companies (i.e., the insider system) to diffused shareholding 
(i.e., the outsider system) so as to engender board-driven-professionally-managed companies. 
Ibid. 
804
  See supra note 751. 
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promoter shareholding will usually be considered as belonging to the outsider 
model in terms of diffused shareholding, and hence requiring the correction of 
agency problems between shareholders and managers. However, the gradual 
decrease in controlling shareholders’ percentage holdings coupled with the 
concept of “promoter” under Indian regulations makes the distinction between an 
insider-type company and outsider-type company somewhat hazy in the Indian 
context. The Raju family, as promoters, continued to wield significant powers in 
the management of the company despite a drastic drop in their shareholdings over 
the last few years. This was aided by the diffused nature of the remaining 
shareholding within the company.805 The Satyam episode illustrates that a 
company with minimal promoter shareholding could still be subject to 
considerable influence by the promoters, thereby requiring a resolution of the 
agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
                                                 
805
  Although institutional shareholders (particularly foreign institutional investors) are beginning 
to hold significant number of shares in Indian listed companies, they have refrained from 
exercising significant influence over corporate decision-making. Collective action problems 
continue to operate and, over a period of time,  “the culture of institutional shareholders 
always blindly voting with the promoter was established.” Ajay Shah, “Getting the Right 
Architecture for Corporate Governance” Financial Express (13 January 2009). In Satyam’s 
case, institutional shareholders held a total of 60% shares as of 31 December 2008; the 
highest individual shareholding of an institutional shareholders, however, was only 3.76%. 
This information has been extracted from Satyam’s filing of shareholding pattern with the 
BSE for the quarter ended Dec. 31, 2008, available online: 
<http://www.bseindia.com/shareholding/shareholdingPattern.asp?scripcd=500376&qtrid=60> 
In the U.S., hedge funds and other institutional shareholders effectively monitor and 
sometimes agitate against inefficient boards and managements and also help shape general 
corporate governance norms. They are ably aided by proxy consultants such as RiskMetrics 
(previously known as ISS) to build coalitions of institutional investors to adopt an “activist” 
role in companies. The absence of these checks and balances in the Indian context confers 
unhindered powers to controlling shareholders or promoters (including those with limited 
shareholding percentages) to wield significant influence over corporate decision-making. The 
“transplantation” of investor activism from developed markets such as the U.S. and yet to find 
an entrenched position in the Indian corporate milieu, although signs of activist investors in 
India are slowing beginning to emerge. This tepid involvement of investors in corporate 
governance of Indian companies has also been a subject matter of empirical studies. See Geis, 
supra note 151. 
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even at those shareholding levels.806 The transition of companies from the insider 
model to the outsider model through constant dilution of shareholding by 
controlling shareholders can be difficult, as Satyam demonstrates. Corporate 
governance regimes in emerging markets such as India which are likely to witness 
such transition from insider to outsider regimes through dilution of controlling 
shareholding need to provide mechanisms to tackle undue control by promoters 
with limited shareholding.807 
The Satyam case clearly demonstrates the inability of the existing 
corporate governance norms in India to deal with corporate governance failures in 
family-controlled companies, even where the level of promoter shareholding is 
relatively low. Any reforms to the independent director regime that spring from 
this case ought to take into account the vulnerability of minority shareholders in 
such companies that lie at the cusp of insider and outsider systems. 
                                                 
806
  Observers believe that companies with controlling shareholders holding limited stakes can be 
particularly vulnerable to corporate governance failures. As Ajay Shah, a noted Indian 
economist states: “The incentive for theft [in such cases] is the greatest: there is a great 
temptation for a CEO who owns 8% of a company to make a grab for 100% of the cashflow.” 
Shah, ibid. Further, promoters who are in the twilight zone of control, i.e., where they hold 
shares less than that required to comfortably exercise control over the company, have perverse 
incentives to keep the corporate performance and stock price of the company at high levels so 
as to thwart any attempted takeover of the company. The following statement by Ramalinga 
Raju is emblematic of how this incentive operates: “As the promoters held a small percentage 
of equity, the concern was that poor performance would result in a take-over, thereby 
exposing the gap. It was like riding a tiger, not knowing how to get off without being eaten.” 
Chairman’s Confession, supra note 774. 
807
  There is an argument that if there is to be a smooth transition towards an outsider regime and 
“[i]f SEBI truly desires the Indian market to have board-driven-professionally-managed 
companies, it should begin by considering a roadmap to do away with the “promoter” concept 
over time.” Sundaresan, Promoter Concept, supra note 803. See also Cheffins, London to 
Milan to Toronto, supra note 73. 
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C. Legal Liability 
If the Satyam episode exhibits the lack of appropriate institutions and incentives 
that enable independent directors to act effectively, certain other recent cases 
demonstrate the operation of several disincentives that impede otherwise 
competent individuals from taking up independent director position. The case of 
Nagarjuna Finance is symptomatic of potential criminal liability that could be 
foisted upon independent directors. 
 Nagarjuna Finance, located in Hyderabad, State of Andhra Pradesh, is a 
non-banking financial company that had raised deposits worth Rs. 938 million 
from the public (about 85,000 depositors) during the years 1997 and 1998.808 
During the period when the deposits were raised, the company’s board included 
prominent individuals such as Nimesh Kampani, one of India’s leading 
investment bankers, Minoo Shroff, a former industrialist, A.P. Kurien, a 
prominent finance professional and L.V.V. Iyer, a corporate lawyer. As they were 
independent directors, they were not involved in the day-to-day management of 
the company. Reports indicate that at the time the deposits were obtained, the 
company had an unblemished track record of repaying its deposits.809 This 
continued until 2000.810 In the meanwhile, the independent directors ceased to 
hold office in the company.811 Subsequently, from the year 2000, the company 
                                                 
808
  “The Common-Sense View; The Supreme Court’s Decision Not to Grant Anticipatory Bail” 
Business Standard (11 May 2009). 
809
  Shyamal Majumdar, “Gunning for Kampani” Business Standard (22 January 2009). 
810
  Ibid. 
811
  Ibid. 
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began defaulting on its deposits, and a large number of depositors suffered severe 
financial loss on that count. 
 In terms of Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of 
Financial Establishments Act, 1999, which is a state legislation and not a central 
or federal legislation, it is a criminal offence if the company is unable to repay its 
depositors, due to which “every person responsible for the management of the 
affairs of the financial establishment including the promoter, manager or member 
of the financial establishment shall be punished with up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and with up to Rs. [100,000] fine”.812 Based on this provision, the 
Andhra Pradesh state police issued arrest warrants against a number of persons 
involved with Nagarjuna Finance, including those who were independent 
directors of the company when it raised deposits.813 It did not matter that these 
persons ceased to be independent directors by the time the deposits became 
matured for repayment, i.e., when the default in fact occurred. Fearing persecution 
by the police, at least two independent directors, Kampani and Shroff, have 
remained in Dubai and London, respectively for almost 6 months now.814 
 This has also instilled fear in the minds of independent directors. Indian 
law does not make any distinction between executive directors and independent 
directors when it comes to liability.815 Furthermore, criminal liability resulting in 
                                                 
812
  Ibid. 
813
  “Professionals Turn Fall Guys of Boards” Financial Express (5 January 2009). 
814
  Sucheta Dalal, “Scared Speechless” Money Life (9 April 2009). 
815
  This is somewhat similar to the position in China, discussed supra notes 688 and 689 and 
accompanying text. 
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imprisonment tends to be a greater disincentive than civil liability towards fine or 
compensation. 
 The recent events involving Satyam and Nagarjuna have resulted in a 
mass exodus of independent directors from Indian corporate boards. In Satyam’s 
case, there has been no liability (either civil or criminal) yet imposed on the 
independent directors. However, Satyam’s directors suffered a grave loss of 
reputation as all of them were individuals of great standing. In Nagarjuna’s case, 
it is more than just reputation, i.e., the actual fear of arrest. Due to the alarming 
effect of these instances, more than 500 independent directors have resigned from 
companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchanges during the first three months of 
2009 itself.816 This adds to the issues pertaining to the availability of competent 
individuals to act as independent directors on Indian companies. 
 Finally, even where indemnification provisions and D&O insurance 
policies are available to directors to protect themselves against liability, there is 
no past track-record in India as to how such claims have been handled. In the 
recent instance involving Satyam, although the company is said to have taken a 
D&O policy cover in the range of US$ 75 million to US$ 100 million,817 the 
insurance company has disputed the claims of the independent directors in 
                                                 
816
  Abha Bakaya, “Independent Directors on Quitting Spree” Economic Times (20 April 2009); 
Ranju Sarkar, “Why Independent Directors are Quitting in Droves” Business Standard (14 
May 2009); Candice Mak, “Corporate Structures are Frightening Independent Directors” Asia 
Law (9 April 2009). 
817
  Mayur Shetty, “Satyam Scam Triggers Biggest D&O Claim” Economic Times (8 January 
2009); Kevin LaCroix, “What About Satyam’s D&O Insurance?” D&O Diary (9 January 
2009) available online: <http://www.dandodiary.com/2009/01/articles/d-o-insurance/what-
about-satyams-do-insurance/>. 
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connection with expenses incurred by them in defending various actions, 
including class actions filed in the U.S. courts.818 Although it is somewhat 
premature to conclude on the outcome of the claim, existing evidence does not 
point to the effectiveness of protective provisions such as indemnity and D&O 
policies in favour of independent directors in India yet. 
5.6 Conclusion to the Chapter 
Previous Chapters laid down the hypothesis that the functioning of independent 
directors in the insider economies of China and India would be different from that 
in the outsider economies of the U.S. and the U.K. from where they were 
transplanted. Further, the preceding chapter identified shortcomings in the legal 
provisions that dictate the roles and other aspects pertaining to independent 
directors. In this Chapter, these shortcomings were verified empirically, in terms 
of quantitative measures (to a limited extent), but more by way of qualitative 
assessments of board practices as well as through case studies. This exercise 
establishes through available evidence that the institution of independent directors 
that was devised in the outsider economies to resolve the manager-shareholder 
agency problem may not be effective in that very form in the insider economies 
(to which it was transplanted) in order to resolve the majority-minority agency 
problem that is predominant in these economies. The forthcoming chapters will 
analyse the findings determined so far from a theoretical and normative 
                                                 
818
  “Tata AIG Disputes Satyam’s D&O Claim” Economic Times (10 June 2009). 
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perspective, with specific reference to the applicability of the independent director 
concept to the insider economies of China and India. 
 287
6. CONSTRAINTS FACING INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN THE 
INSIDER ECONOMIES 
 
6.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
6.2 Structural Constraints 
6.3 Legal Constraints 
6.4 Cultural Constraints 
6.5 Political Constraints 
6.6 Perceptional Constraints 
6.7 Conclusion to the Chapter 
 
6.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
After analysing the origin of independent directors, their transplantation to the 
insider systems of China and India as well as their effectiveness in these two 
jurisdictions, I now return to the theoretical realm to proffer reasons as to why the 
independent director institution may not have achieved its objective in these two 
jurisdictions. This analysis is intended to explore the reasons for the lack of full 
effectiveness of the independent director concept in emerging economies and to 
determine the extent to which they can be effective, if at all measures were to be 
taken to strengthen that institution. The goal of this Chapter is to identify and 
analyse these various constraints, which may serve as the basis on which 
regulators in such systems may recast their regulatory policies and determine the 
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necessary modifications and adaptations that need to be made to the prevailing 
regimes in order to improve their efficacy. 
 To clarify the scope of this Chapter, the analysis is not intended to 
exhaustively cover all issues pertaining to independent directors in the insider 
systems. Its objective is largely focused on issues pertaining to independent 
directors that highlight disparity between the outsider systems and the insider 
systems. These include the nomination and appointment of independent directors, 
their role and allegiance, several cultural factors that affect their efficient 
functioning (such as social ties and anthropological considerations) and the like. 
Several other practical considerations such as remuneration of directors, training, 
requirement of minimum time commitment on boards, number of other 
directorships, extent of personal liability and insurance coverage and the like are 
equally important issues that determine the effectiveness of independent directors. 
However, those issues are present in same measure in insider systems as they are 
in the outsider systems, and consequently they do not require any detailed 
comparative legal analysis that distinguishes their operation in the outsider 
systems and insider systems separately. 
6.2 Structural Constraints 
The first, and perhaps the most significant, constraint is the different corporate 
structures that prevail in the insider systems as compared to the outsider systems. 
The genesis of the independent director concept is directly relatable to the 
outsider systems. That is because the concept emerged in those systems. The 
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corporate structure in outsider systems is one of diffused shareholding thereby 
resulting in significant powers in the hands of the managers, who may be 
susceptible to shirking and to appropriating corporate assets for their own 
benefits. It is not surprising therefore that the independent director evolved as a 
monitor of managers in order to protect the interests of the shareholder body as a 
whole. There is some element of unassailable logic in this approach. 
 Turn to insider systems, and the results vary significantly. This is due to 
the existence of very different corporate structures in the insider systems, as I 
have elaborated in Chapter 3. The presence of dominant shareholders in most 
companies causes the manager-shareholder agency problem to pale in 
significance. Controlling shareholders are able to exercise their voting power and 
overall dominance to hire and fire managers. In that sense, there is a merger of 
interests between the controlling shareholders and the managers; from an agency 
problem account, controlling shareholders and managers are one and the same. 
The constituency that is omitted from this matrix is the minority shareholders. 
That is the interest group that requires the protection of corporate governance 
norms. In insider systems, it is the majority-minority agency problem that is 
rampant. What have convergence of legal rules and the transplant effect achieved? 
Through the dissemination of the independent director concept from the outsider 
systems to the insider systems, these movements have attempted to resolve one 
type of agency problem (majority-minority) using the tool and concept that was 
evolved, and indeed intended, to resolve another type of agency problem 
(manager-shareholder). It is this mismatch of objectives that has resulted in sub-
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optimal implementation of the independent director concept in the insider 
systems. 
 The incongruity of the independent director concept in the insider system 
is amplified by the fact that the origin of the concept (in the outsider systems) was 
never intended to resolve the majority-minority agency problem in the first place. 
We have already seen that the stock exchange requirements in the U.S.819 exempt 
controlled companies from mandatorily carrying independent directors on their 
boards.820 This stance of the U.S. regulators clarifies two important issues: (i) it 
drives home the point that the independent director has been conceived of as a 
monitor of managers in order to protect the interests of the shareholders as a 
whole (i.e., in situations where the shareholding is diffused); and (ii) in case of 
controlled companies, the shareholders (albeit dominated by the controlling 
shareholders) and the managers form one and the same constituency and the 
shareholders therefore do not require any protection from the actions of managers, 
which they are able to secure anyway by virtue of their shareholding. If the 
independent director has not been conceived to deal with the majority-minority 
agency problem, then what is the rationale for its transplantation to the insider 
systems that face that problem? Is it really the case that the concept would act to 
resolve (or at least attempt to resolve) the majority-minority agency problem in 
the insider systems? Were the regulators in the insider systems conscious of the 
effects of this disparity in corporate structures while importing the independent 
                                                 
819
  See NYSE Listed Company Manual, supra note 14, § 303A.00; NASDAQ Rules, supra 14, R. 
5615(c). 
820
  See Chapter 3, Section 3.3(D). 
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director from the outsider systems? Was the concept imported nevertheless due to 
any other unknown qualities that may help resolve the majority-minority agency 
problem? The existing discourse in comparative corporate governance does not 
attempt any answers to these important questions, and the academic literature on 
this aspect is surprisingly dismal.821 
 Examining the details, the structural constraints operate with reference to 
two specific instances. One relates to the process of appointment of independent 
directors. The other relates to the role which the independent directors are 
expected to play and the constituency to whom they are to owe their allegiance. 
These aspects deserve elaboration. 
A. Appointment of Independent Directors 
If independent directors are to function in a manner that helps resolve the 
majority-minority agency problem (which is prevalent in the insider systems), 
then their appointment process should take that into account. In other words, if the 
minority shareholders are to be the real beneficiaries of monitoring (by 
independent directors) over the actions of the controlling shareholders (and 
thereby the managers), then the appointment process of independent directors 
should be removed (at least substantially, if not entirely) from the purview of the 
controlling shareholders and placed in the hands of the minority shareholders. 
                                                 
821
  For example, neither the Independent Director Opinion in China or Clause 49 in India nor any 
of the other numerous prior efforts through rule-making or through committee reports has 
expressly identified this incongruity operating with respect to controlled companies, which 
appears to be a serious shortcoming in the transplantation process. As a noted Indian 
industrialist bemoans: “I find the lack of mention of this fact in the outpouring of verbiage on 
this issue in our country quite amazing.” Rahul Bajaj, “How Independent Can a Director Be?” 
Rediff (30 July 2005). 
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But, that has not occurred at all in the insider systems, where independent director 
appointment continues to be within the sole domain of controlling shareholders. 
Independent directors continue to be appointed in the same manner as other 
(executive or non-independent) directors.822  
The de jure and de facto powers of the controlling shareholders enable 
them to appoint independent directors who are likely to share the visions and 
perceptions of the controlling shareholders with reference to the business, strategy 
and the future of the company. It is highly unlikely (and virtually a rarity in 
practice) that controlling shareholders will consent to the appointment of any 
person who will be inimical to the controlling shareholders’ own interests in the 
company, when those interests are enjoyed at the cost of the minority 
shareholders. It does not matter even if the controlling shareholders’ interests are 
different from (or contrary to) the interests of the company as a whole, including 
that of the minority shareholders.  
Furthermore, independent directors are capable of being elected to 
multiple terms. Hence, even when they are on boards of companies, their actions 
                                                 
822
  Although in the insider systems of both China and India, the independent director is required 
to be formally independent of both the management as well as controlling shareholders, their 
appointment is still subject to the voting influence of controlling shareholders. At the formal 
level though, both China and India can be contrasted with a developed economy, viz., 
Singapore, where the formal definition of independent directors takes into account the 
absence of any relationship with the company, related companies or managers, but does not 
pay any attention to relationship with the controlling shareholders. See Code of Corporate 
Governance 2005 (Singapore) available online: 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/singapore_ccg_2005.pdf> at para. 2.1 (defining an 
independent director as “one who has no relationship with the company, its related companies 
or its officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to interfere, with the exercise of 
the director’s independent business judgement with a view to the best interests of the 
company”). 
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are likely to be guided by the question of whether the consequences of their 
actions will result in their reappointment (or otherwise) when their current term 
comes to an end. In that situation too, it is the controlling shareholders who are in 
a position to influence the outcome as to whether independent directors’ terms are 
to be renewed or not. It is hard to assume anything other than that the independent 
directors will act in a manner that will satisfy the objectives of the controlling 
shareholders if they are to guarantee themselves a position on the board when 
their term comes up for renewal. Such a grasp over independent directors by the 
controlling shareholders can be held in a seemingly innocuous way. Whenever an 
independent director’s term comes to an end, there is normally no justification 
that is required to be provided to shareholders as to why the director’s term is not 
being extended.823 This would ensure a lack of adverse publicity to the company 
and any consequent embarrassment. For this reason, the power of the controlling 
shareholders in retention of the independent directors’ position acts as a strong 
disincentive to directors’ actions that may otherwise constitute monitoring of the 
activities of the controlling shareholders so as to protect the interests of the 
minority shareholders. 
 Another power that controlling shareholders can exercise, at least in 
extreme cases, is to remove independent directors from the board of the company. 
This power is exercisable in the insider systems of China and India by a simple 
majority of shareholders present and voting at a shareholders’ meeting. If 
independent directors are liable to be removed at the will of the controlling 
                                                 
823
  Contrast this with the power of removal of directors discussed shortly. 
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shareholders, it is not realistic to expect such directors to act in any manner that 
may displease the controlling shareholders. In that sense, independent directors 
will be forced to act in the shadow of a possible removal by controlling 
shareholders. However, when it comes to actual practice, the weapon of removal 
may in fact be exercised by controlling shareholders to a lesser extent. This is 
because removal (unlike failure to renew the term of a retiring director) could 
result in adverse publicity to the company itself. For instance, stakeholders and 
the stock markets may seek further information on the background of removal, 
and if it is related to disagreements on the business, strategy or even any 
compliance-related matter, that could not only affect the reputation of the 
company in the market, but could even invite regulatory probes. Hence, it is likely 
that the weapon of removal may be exercised sparingly by the controlling 
shareholders. However, the very existence of that right in the hands of the 
controlling shareholders could impinge upon the true independence and 
impartiality of the independent directors. 
This discussion seeks to demonstrate that the transplantation of the 
independent director concept from the outsider systems to the insider systems 
fails to take into account the differences in corporate structures in the two types of 
systems. While it is generally acceptable for independent directors to be appointed 
by the shareholder body as a whole in the outsider systems, the adoption of the 
rule in toto in the insider systems is inappropriate because the shareholder body in 
these systems is divided into two distinct groups, namely the controlling 
shareholders and the minority shareholders. The independent director 
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appointment process in the insider systems pays lip service to this distinction in 
the shareholder body by allowing all shareholders to participate in the 
appointment of the independent directors, although that process will always be 
usurped by the controlling shareholders. This process is replicated even in the 
reappointment (upon expiry of term) and removal of independent directors, as we 
have seen above.  
This incongruity in the appointments, renewal and removal process 
significantly hampers the functioning of the independent directors towards 
protecting the interests of the constituency that requires the greatest protection in 
the insider systems, viz., the minority shareholders. For this reason, the 
independent directors cannot be expected to bring about any noteworthy impact in 
corporate governance in the insider systems, unless there is a fundamental change 
in the appointments, renewal and removal processes, which is a matter I deal with 
in detail in Chapter 7 below. 
B. Role and Allegiance of Independent Directors 
In Chapter 3, I find that there is an overwhelming body of guidance available to 
independent directors in the outsider systems as to their role on corporate boards 
and the constituency whose interests they are to protect. The concept of 
independent directors evolved along with the monitoring board.824 In that sense, 
independent directors were viewed as monitors of management. Furthermore, the 
evolution of the independent directors can be traced to the shareholder value 
                                                 
824
  See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(B). 
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model in the U.S.825 and the ESV model in the U.K.826 In the U.S., independent 
directors are the guardians of shareholder interests (with shareholders being 
considered as one homogenous group) whose interests are to be protected against 
self-serving actions of management. In the U.K., however, independent directors 
are in addition required to consider (albeit secondarily) the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies. Hence, the evolution of independent directors is 
associated with a fairly clear demarcation of their roles and allegiance. 
 When it comes to the transplantation of the concept into insider systems, 
the role of independent directors and the constituencies that deserve their 
protection becomes somewhat murky. Either there is no clarity in the law on this 
aspect or, even where there is some semblance of guidance, it is appallingly 
inadequate (with countervailing factors diminishing the effect of such clarity in 
practice). This calls for a brief discussion, which is divided into two parts: (i) the 
advisory and monitoring aspects of independent director functioning; and (ii) 
constituencies which deserve the protection of independent directors. 
1. Role of Independent Directors: Strategic and Monitoring 
First, as regards the functions of independent directors, the strategic or business 
advisory function usually plays an important part. This is because companies rely 
on the benefits that the expertise of the independent directors brings to the boards 
on which they sit. Hence, a minimal level of expertise either in the specific 
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  See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(E). 
826
  See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.4(B).  
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business of the company, business strategy in general or even in other areas such 
as accounting, finance, law and compliance is always a given for independent 
directors, at least in theory.827 It is the monitoring aspect of the independent 
director’s role that creates an element of uncertainty in the insider systems. Here, 
there is a wide chasm between the legal provisions in China and India.  
As discussed in Chapter 4,828 the Independent Director Opinion in China 
lays down specific roles for independent directors regarding monitoring of the 
affairs of the company. This includes the acknowledgment of related party 
transactions829 and expressing of views on several other matters of board 
decision-making,830 many of which are required to be publicised. Such 
requirements compel independent directors to apply their mind to monitoring 
aspects of corporate behaviour. As to the detailed modalities, monitoring is 
usually best carried out through committees of directors rather than through the 
entire board.831 This is because committees carry out specific tasks rather than 
matters at a general level; members of committees are individuals who are experts 
in the relevant field rather than generalists.832 However, the corporate governance 
norms in China do not mandate the requirement for committees of directors. This 
                                                 
827
  It is a different matter that often companies appoint “celebrity” independent directors who do 
not have the requisite qualifications. Alternatively, they appoint friends, schoolmates, persons 
from the same social or business circles or other acquaintances who do not possess any of the 
above types of expertise. 
828
  See supra Chapter 4, Section 4.3(C)(7). 
829
  Supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
830
  Supra note 544 and accompanying text. 
831
  See generally April Klein, “Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure” (1998) 41 
J.L. & Econ. 275. 
832
  Ibid. at 278. 
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significantly dilutes the monitoring role of directors as there are inherent 
limitations regarding the depth of discussion on monitoring issues on the whole 
board. On the other hand, discussions on monitoring aspects can be intensive in 
committees as they not only consist of a small number of individuals, but they 
also possess the requisite expertise to deal with matters efficiently and in a time-
bound manner. 
The position in India is different. There is no guidance in Clause 49 
regarding the role of independent directors at the board level. Practice also 
indicates that independent directors contribute on business strategy, advisory and 
compliance issues rather than on monitoring of the activities of the management 
and controlling shareholders. They perform an advisory role instead of a 
monitoring role. This is evident from the empirical studies explored in Chapter 5 
and the case studies (specifically the Satyam case). The only monitoring role 
performed is on the audit committee where specific functions have been 
delineated. But, even there, limitations are inherent as we have seen in the Satyam 
case as audit committee members are likely to be unable to unearth frauds or 
wrongdoings in financial statements as their role even on audit committees is only 
perfunctory and cannot be expected to take on forensic proportions. 
Neither the corporate governance norms nor the practice takes into 
account the complex position of the independent director in insider systems which 
involve multiple sets of shareholders.833 This is again because of the 
                                                 
833
  If at all there is any recognition of this complexity, that is in the Independent Director 
Opinion, in China, which provides some specific role for independent directors such as that 
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transplantation of the concept from outsider systems where there is no complexity 
in shareholding. The problem gets magnified even further in the context of 
family-owned companies, which constitute a significant proportion of companies 
both in China and in India. As Professor DeMott observes: 
My thesis is that directors who are independent of both management and 
the founding family serve distinct functions within the complex 
environment of a family-influenced public company. Independent 
directors are the sole actors at the highest level of firm governance who 
have the capacity to bring appropriate detachment to bear in resolving 
difficult questions that implicate family ties as well as business necessity, 
including management succession and external threats to the firm’s 
position and separate existence. Independent directors may help assure the 
board’s appropriate focus on the corporation’s business despite the 
distracting influence or overhang of frictions internal to the founding 
family. Additionally, independent directors, by acting vigilantly, may 
guard the corporation’s assets against legally problematic extractions by a 
controlling shareholder, whether or not that shareholder acts in cahoots 
with senior management.834 
Similar complexities arise in the case of government companies as well where the 
state is the dominant shareholder. Independent directors are required to act 
carefully to separate the interests of the controlling shareholder from that of the 
company (which would subsume in itself the interests of the minority 
shareholders). Due to the problems of legal transplantation, the roles of 
independent directors in the insider systems do not take into account these 
complexities. Hence, there are bound to be doubts regarding the effectiveness of 
independent directors in countries that follow the insider model of corporate 
governance. 
                                                                                                                                     
for related party transactions involving controlling shareholders. But, even that has not been 
effective in practice. 
834
  Deborah A. DeMott, “Guests at the Table? Independent Directors in Family-Influenced Public 
Companies” (2007) 33 J. Corp. L. 819 at 824. 
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In essence, the law and practice in the insider systems point largely 
towards the existence of a strategic and advisory role to independent directors 
than a monitoring one. Independent directors are more akin to advisors to the 
companies on boards they occupy a position. Sometimes, they may even act as 
advisors to the controlling shareholders (or managers) who arranged for their 
appointment in their first place. All this indicates the lack of an appropriate level 
of concern or regard for the interests of the minority shareholders. Hence, the role 
of the independent directors in the insider systems (both in law and in practice) 
does not directly help resolve the majority-minority agency problem that is 
prevalent in those systems. 
2. Independent Directors and Their Constituencies 
In the outsider systems, independent directors are to protect the interests of 
shareholders as group. The focus is on shareholder value and the group itself 
consists of homogenous members. Hence, there is a fair amount of clarity on the 
constituencies that the independent directors are required to represent in the 
outsider systems. 
 In the insider systems, it is the minority shareholders who require the 
protection of independent director monitoring as the shareholder body is divided 
into two groups, consisting of the controlling shareholders and the minority 
shareholders. However, except in the Independent Director Opinion in China, 
which has not been entirely successful in practice, there is no other indication in 
the corporate governance norms or practices in the insider systems of China and 
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India that require independent directors to act in the interests of minority 
shareholders. For this reason, independent directors often tend to blend the 
interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, which is not 
possible in many circumstances, especially where there are related party 
transactions involving the controlling shareholders. In the case of related party 
transactions, the interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
are at variance, and unless the independent directors are required specifically to 
consider the interests of minority shareholders, there could be a decline in the 
value of the minority shareholder interests in the company owing to transactions 
between the company and controlling shareholders that are value-reducing 
propositions for the minority shareholders, as we have seen in the Satyam-Maytas 
example. The improper transplantation of the concept of independent directors 
from the outsider systems to the insider systems has resulted in insufficient 
protection to the interests of minority shareholders, and hence this may not 
meaningfully resolve the majority-minority agency problem. 
 Apart from minority shareholders, insider systems also focus on protection 
of non-shareholder constituencies (i.e., stakeholders) through corporate law.835 
The question here is whether the role of independent directors can be extended to 
that of an instrument which resolves the controller-stakeholder agency problem in 
these jurisdictions. A brief discussion of some theoretical aspects on this issue 
would be in order here. Despite a fairly expansive literature on independent 
directors in the outsider systems, there is very little on offer with respect to the 
                                                 
835
  For a detailed discussion on this aspect, see supra Chapter 2, Section 2.2(C). 
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role of independent directors towards stakeholders. Professor Brudney is one of 
the few academics who confront this issue directly. He notes that the “role 
envisioned for outside directors varies as the balance the proponents seek shifts 
from a concern primarily with shareholder wealth maximization toward a concern 
principally with the welfare of other constituencies”.836 However, Professor 
Brudney identifies several problems with the role of independent directors 
towards stakeholders. These are essentially measurement problems. He notes that 
“efforts to find and apply acceptable standards implicate more variables and 
require wider-ranging judgments than efforts to measure integrity or 
efficiency”.837 Therefore, the optimism with respect to the independent directors’ 
role in resolving the controller-stakeholder agency problem is much more 
tempered in comparison with their ability to resolve the manager-shareholder 
agency problem or the majority-minority agency problem. 
Applying this paradigm to the present discussion, and beginning with the 
outsider systems (particularly the U.S.), the corporate governance movement that 
has strengthened the role of independent directors is inextricably linked to the 
movement away from the stakeholder theory and in favour of true shareholder 
value enhancement.838 Therefore, the role of the independent director has been 
perceived to be one of monitoring managers so as to enhance the long-term 
                                                 
836
  Brudney, supra note 7 at 605. 
837
  Ibid. at 639. Professor Brudney also goes on to note: “Evidence on independent directors’ 
behavior on their effect on corporate social responsibility does not lend itself to systematic 
collection or description”, and that “independent directors offer small promise of any great 
leap forward in corporate social responsibility”. Ibid. at 647, 652. 
838
  See Gordon, Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 11 at 1510-41. For a greater 
discussion of this aspect, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(E). 
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wealth of shareholders. Scant regard has been paid to the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies while defining the role of the independent directors in 
the outsider systems.839 
 Moving on to the insider systems of China and India, although corporate 
law in these countries expressly recognises the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies, there is no guidance whatsoever to independent directors on how 
they are to discharge any duties or obligations towards these stakeholders.840 
Independent directors in the insider systems are appointed solely by the 
shareholders, and other constituencies do not play any role in director elections. 
Furthermore, the independent director norms in these countries do not specify any 
legal duty (whether primary or secondary) or even a persuasive recognition of 
their interests (through voluntarism) when it comes to the interests of 
stakeholders. Hence, it is not appropriate for non-shareholder constituencies in the 
insider systems to expect any cognisance of their interests by independent 
directors.  
This is another example of a half-hearted transplantation of the 
independent director system from the outsider systems to the insider systems. 
Silence about allegiance of independent directors to non-shareholder 
constituencies in outsider systems is acceptable as those systems provide minimal 
                                                 
839
  The only exception is the ESV in the U.K. where non-shareholder constituencies deserve 
some secondary recognition of their interests as part of directors’ duties generally. See supra 
note 383 and accompanying text. 
840
  Although independent directors cannot be expected to perform any significant role with 
respect to stakeholders, some recognition of their allegiance towards stakeholder interests 
would be appropriate considering that insider systems pay greater attention towards 
stakeholder interests. 
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protection to those constituencies under corporate law anyway. However, 
adoption of that same position in the insider systems results in incongruities in the 
role of independent directors as these systems tend to continue to follow the 
stakeholder approach rather than a pure shareholder value enhancement approach, 
as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. This can be a key shortcoming in the role of 
independent directors in the insider systems. 
6.3 Legal Constraints 
The “law matters” thesis developed by LLSV and discussed earlier, in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4(A), propounds that corporate ownership and governance in various 
jurisdictions depend upon the level of legal protection available to investors. 
Countries are divided into categories depending on the legal families to which 
they belong. Legal protection is determined in terms of both laws on the statute or 
rule books as well as the enforcement of those laws. LLSV state that common law 
systems fare better than civil law systems when it comes to corporate governance 
and investor protection. Although the LLSV thesis has been subjected to some 
criticism,841 it nevertheless offers an elegant theoretical platform to test my 
hypothesis in this dissertation regarding the efficacy of the transplantation of the 
independent director concept from the outsider systems to the insider systems. 
 In this Section, I rely upon three broad propositions that emanate from the 
“law matters” thesis. First, different characteristics of corporate structure and 
                                                 
841
  The purpose of this discussion is not to support or critique the LLSV thesis in any general 
manner or to examine its intricacies. That is not necessary as it is extraneous to the scope of 
this dissertation. 
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governance operate in the common law and civil law systems. Second, the 
enforcement of legal rules is as important as legislating the rules in the first place. 
Following from the above two propositions is the third that an advanced legal 
regime (inclusive of both law-making as well as enforcement) engenders market 
regulation or self-regulation models that involve gatekeepers such as independent 
directors, while legal regimes that are less advanced will continue to rely on 
strong state involvement through regulation of business (or corporate) activity. I 
now discuss each of these propositions in some detail. 
A. Legal Characteristics of Corporate Structures 
When it comes to board structures, two models are prevalent in corporate systems 
around the world. The first is a unitary board, which exists in nearly all of the 
common law countries.842 The other is a two-tier board, which exists in a number 
of the civil law countries, especially within the European Union.843 Within this 
matrix, it is interesting to note that the origins of the independent director can be 
traced to the unitary board structure that was prevalent in the common law 
countries of the U.S. and the U.K., which are also part of the outsider model of 
corporate governance. Hence, the independent director concept was evolved as a 
means of strengthening the unitary board so as to introduce or enhance its 
monitoring functions. However, the concept has then been transplanted to other 
countries, which not only form part of the common law world, but also those that 
follow civil law. From this specific point of view, the transplantation of the 
                                                 
842
  See Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 24 at 34. 
843
  See Clarke, Lost in Translation, supra note 28 at 5. 
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independent director concept from the U.S. and the U.K. to India is 
understandable as all three countries follow a unitary board structure for their 
companies. It is somewhat surprising, though, that the concept has also been 
transplanted to civil law countries such as China that follow a two-tier board 
structure. Again, it is unclear whether sufficient regard was had to the fact China 
is a civil law country and follows a two-tier board structure and hence the 
independent director may not function in the same manner as envisaged in a 
unitary board structure. There are evidently a number of issues that arise from this 
mismatch of board structures and the use of the independent director concept 
across both structures.844 
 Chinese corporate law and governance norms have witnessed a transplant 
effect even prior to the introduction of independent directors. The two-tier board 
system introduced for the first time in China’s PRC Company Law 1993 was the 
result of a transplant, this time from the German system.845 In that system, there 
are two boards in a company, a board of directors (which is otherwise known as a 
management board) and a board of supervisors (otherwise known as a supervisory 
board).846 Under the PRC Company Law 1993, the primary functions of the 
supervisory board were: first “to supervise the management of the company, and 
second, to examine the financial affairs of the company”.847 In other words, the 
                                                 
844
  Since this mismatch in board structures primarily relates to China (among the countries 
focused on in this dissertation), the discussion herein is confined to that country. This issue is 
not relevant to the case of India. 
845
  Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 3. 
846
  Ibid. 
847
  Ibid. 
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supervisory board was effectively carrying out monitoring functions. Despite a 
greater number of powers being conferred by amendments to the Company Law in 
2005,848 the performance of the supervisory boards has been found to be 
unsatisfactory. This is largely on account of improper transplantation of that 
concept from Germany. As commentators have observed, the powers of the 
supervisory board in China are insignificant compared to those of the German 
supervisory board. The powers of the German supervisory board are vast, as noted 
below:  
In essence, the [board of directors] in a German stock corporation is 
responsible to the [supervisory board] to a very large extent as the 
members of the [board of directors] have to be appointed and removed by 
the latter, and seek consent from the [supervisory board] regarding 
important business decisions.849 
However, the comparable position under Chinese corporate law is far weaker, as 
noted below: 
What distinguishes the Chinese board structure from the two-tier system 
[in Germany], however, is both the appointment method of members of 
the board of directors (directors) and the accountability structure. 
Directors are appointed by the general shareholders’ meeting, not by the 
supervisory board, and they are made accountable to the shareholders, not 
to the supervisory board.850 
Supervisory boards are therefore subject to capture by the controlling 
shareholders as they are appointed by the latter. Hence, it cannot be reasonably 
                                                 
848
  The additional powers include proposing to the shareholders’ meeting the removal of 
directors or senior managers who have failed in compliance, to convene shareholders’ 
meetings in certain cases and to bring lawsuits against directors. The amendments also 
provided that the supervisory board must have at least one-third of its members are 
representatives of employees. See Wang, Two-Tier Board Structure, supra note 690 at 48-49. 
849
  Ibid. at 49. 
850
  Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 3. 
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expected that the supervisory board will appropriately monitor the actions of the 
controlling shareholders. The legal provisions for the appointment of supervisors 
as well as the role of the supervisors and their authority require considerable 
strengthening. Curiously enough, but understandable given the preceding points, 
the Chinese authorities appeared to have a preference for enhancing monitoring 
activity through the introduction of independent directors rather than by 
strengthening the supervisory board.851 To that extent, the Independent Director 
Opinion does not seem to have paid much regard to the existence of the 
supervisory board, and it prompts the independent directors to operate as stand-
alone institutions.  
This gives rise to a peculiar situation. Both supervisors and independent 
directors possess monitoring responsibilities. However, there is no clear 
demarcation of the roles of the two institutions, and there is bound to be overlap 
in their functioning.852 Moreover, both the institutions suffer from the same 
defects, i.e., that they are subject to the influence of the controlling shareholders 
as they are both elected through the voting power of such shareholders. The 
existence of two different institutions for monitoring controlling shareholders 
(and the managers) when they are both subject to capture by the constituency they 
are required to monitor only goes to complicate the situation further. In practice, 
the overlap between the role of the supervisory board and independent directors 
                                                 
851
  Ibid. at 13 (noting that “China’s regulatory authorities seemed to have favored a more 
independent board of directors over a stronger supervisory board”). 
852
  See Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 102 (observing that the “coexistence of two monitors can lead 
to free-rider problems where each institution relies on the other to fulfill the responsibility of 
oversight”). 
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has resulted in ineffectiveness of the role of the latter. For instance, in the Inner 
Mongolia Yili case, the supervisory board initiated the removal of an independent 
director who was only demonstrating the required zealousness in performing his 
role.853 This is symptomatic of the problem when two institutions with similar 
roles operate at cross-purposes. 
Why then do both the supervisors and independent directors coexist? It 
has been thought that independent directors were introduced in China due to the 
failure of the supervisory board.854 If that were to be the case, one would have 
expected the supervisory board to be phased out once independent directors 
entered the corporate arena. But, what occurred was entirely to the contrary. The 
2005 amendments to the PRC Company Law instead strengthened the supervisory 
board’s powers.855 Therefore, it appears that the supervisory board is here to stay 
despite its failings. As one commentator notes: 
[I]t seems unlikely even after adopting the independent director system, 
that China will also adopt a one-tier board system. As a practical matter, it 
would be difficult for China to abandon the supervisory board because of 
its long statutory history as a monitor.856 
Others believe that “the independent director system cannot replace the role of the 
supervisory board system, and due to its nature of supervision, the independent 
director system can only be regarded as the supplementary system to the 
                                                 
853
  See supra notes 680 and 681 and accompanying text. 
854
  See Wang, Two-Tier Board Structure, supra note 690 at 54. 
855
  See supra note 848. See also, Jie Yuan, supra note 637 at 103. 
856
  Jie Yuan, ibid. 
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supervisory board system”.857 There are no reforms in sight that can be expected 
to streamline the role of the dual monitors in Chinese companies. The only 
convincing explanation of this phenomenon appears to be the worker participation 
function that the supervisory board performs, which is consistent with the 
ideological influences that beset Chinese business laws and practices.858  
In substance, this discussion seeks to explain the difficulties in 
transplanting a concept that has originated in common law countries with a 
unitary board structure into a civil law country with a two-tier board structure, and 
that too without paying adequate attention to these important differences. 
B. Robustness of the Legal System for Enforcement of Independent Director 
Norms 
Academics have raised some concerns about the current disposition of director 
independence, whereby independence is conferred as a status upon persons who 
qualify as such under certain criteria.859 They call for a more contextual approach 
whereby status cannot be determined ex ante, but based on the actual behaviour of 
the directors.860 Attention in this debate often throws the spotlight on Delaware 
courts. As Professor Rodrigues observes: 
                                                 
857
  Minkang Gu, Independent Director Institution, supra note 686 at 59. 
858
  Chao Xi, Board Reforms, supra note 469 at 43. 
859
  The criteria are usually negative in nature, i.e., the absence of any material relationship with 
the company, its managers or controlling shareholders. This is gauged by the “lack of ties 
through the use of two metrics: (1) lack of financial ties to the corporation, and (2) lack of 
familial ties to the managers of the corporation”. Rodrigues, supra note 288 at 450. With 
some exceptions, there are no positive parameters attached to independence.  
860
  See Scott J. Gorsline, Statutory ““Independent” Directors: A Solution to the Interested 
Director Problem?” (1989) 66 U. Det. L. Rev. 655 at 690, stating as follows: 
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In contrast to the standard corporate governance definition of 
independence, which equates independence with outsider status, Delaware 
courts conduct a more nuanced inquiry into independence in two ways. 
First, Delaware courts examine a director’s behavior as an indicator of 
independence, creating a contextual approach—rather than looking only to 
rigid proxies like the lack of familial or financial relationship—in gauging 
the lack of improper influence or conflicts of interest. Second, Delaware 
examines each conflict specifically, looking at a mix of factors rather than 
a preprogrammed set.861 
The Delaware approach ensures that the independence enquiry is substantive 
rather than merely a formal or status-based one.862 
 This requires that the judiciary in countries where independent directors 
are appointed is in a position to determine whether each such individual was in 
fact independent from the company, its management and controlling shareholders, 
and whether the specific actions of the independent directors display fairness and 
impartiality. It is not sufficient for the legislature to lay down black-letter law, but 
that law must be effectively implemented in relation to the facts of each case. In 
the absence of such a system, parties would structure their transactions in such a 
                                                                                                                                     
The present system, whereby conflict transactions are scrutinized as to their fairness, is a 
better system for all parties involved--shareholders, directors, and management. 
Therefore, state legislatures should not attempt to strictly define what types of 
relationships would statutorily deem a director as lacking independence. Conflict 
transactions should continue to be analyzed under the fairness test, whereby state courts 
analyze the conflict or potential conflict on the facts of specific cases. 
861
  Rodrigues, supra note 288 at 465. 
862
  See ibid. at 475-76 (noting that “Delaware courts delve far deeper into what one might call 
“true” independence than the rules of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the exchanges require” and 
that “[t]he very ability of Delaware to reserve the power to examine these other facets of 
human relationships give its bite”). Professors Kahan and Rock go on to observe: 
Delaware in contrast to other jurisdictions, employs both formal and substantive scrutiny 
before it gives weight to actions by outside directors. For an outside director to be 
deemed “independent,” the absence of an executive position or of a financial interest in 
the transaction is not sufficient. Rather, to be regarded as an independent director, an 
outside director must act independently and take her role as such seriously. 
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: 
Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law” (2002) 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871 at 904. 
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manner as to stay outside the proscription of the law although such transactions 
may violate the spirit or essence of the law. For instance, it is possible for 
companies to appoint persons who have no financial or pecuniary relationship 
with the company as independent directors, but such persons may have social or 
other relationships that may impinge on the independent decision-making of such 
persons. In the case of bright-line rules, such directors may still be considered 
independent, whereas if a court of law were to examine the transaction based on 
its essence, the outcome could be different.863 
 In common law countries such as the U.S. (particularly in the state of 
Delaware) and the U.K., apart from the legislature and the executive that 
prescribe statutes and rules, the courts have an important role to play in 
interpreting the rules, in determining the actions of independent directors (and 
other corporate actors) on the facts of each individual case, and in ascertaining 
whether there has been a breach of such duties by the independent directors. 
Courts do have the power, which is quite often exercised, to recharacterise 
transactions if they have been structured with a view only to stay outside the 
purview of legal proscriptions.864 Moreover, a robust body of case law laid down 
by the judiciary also provides certainty to corporate actors such as independent 
directors who are presented with a principles-based regime that would determine 
                                                 
863
  An oft-used example in this regard is the case of Oracle where Chancellor Strine held that 
social ties between the outside directors and the managers may have a role to play in 
analysing the independence of such directors. See Oracle, supra note 417. 
864
  An example of transactions where courts, particularly in the developed world, quite often 
exercise their powers to recharacterise legal structures and documents pertains to structured 
finance and securitisation. See Steven L. Schwarcz, “Securitization Post-Enron” (2004) 25 
Cardozo L. Rev. 1539. 
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the validity of their actions. To that extent, the independent director concept 
receives ample support from the court system in common law jurisdictions such 
as the U.S. and the U.K. 
 However, these factors are absent (nearly) in most insider systems, 
including China and India. Being part of the civil law system, Chinese laws are 
mostly codified in statutes and regulations.865 Although courts do interpret these 
laws, their role is far more minimal compared to the common law systems.866 The 
principle of stare decisis is slowly creeping into the Chinese legal system, at least 
at the upper echelons,867 perhaps due to the influences of globalisation, but it is 
still far from the type that is practised in the common law systems. It is not 
possible to expect the kind of dynamism and activism demonstrated by common 
                                                 
865
  See Nicholas C. Howson, “Regulation of Companies with Publicly Listed Share Capital in the 
People’s Republic of China” (2005) 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 237 at 242-43. See also Wang, 
Company Law in China, supra note 111 at 9. 
866
  Wang outlines the role of Chinese courts as follows: 
China’s legal system is officially a civil law system, which essentially means that courts 
are supposed to play a passive role. As Peerenboom (2006) observes, unlike their 
counterpart in common jurisdictions, Chinese courts theoretically do not possess the 
power to “make law”. “Their role is to apply law to the facts. If the laws or regulations 
are unclear, the courts are supposed to seek guidance and clarification from the entities 
that promulgated the laws or regulations.” Given that written laws could not possibly be 
applied without proper interpretation, especially in courts’ adjudication process, a legal 
system should provide either rules of statutory interpretation or case law, or both, to serve 
as interpretation devices. 
Wang, Company Law in China, ibid. at 14. 
867
  Wang further observes: 
There is however no doubt that judicial cases do not constitute a formal source of law in 
China. Nevertheless, it is correctly observed that some court decisions “do generate legal 
norms and have persuasive or even binding force in practice”. The most noticed cases are 
those judgments or summary of judgments selected and published by the SPC in the 
Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court, which are considered “authoritative and an 
important means through which the Supreme People’s Court provides guidance to lower 
courts with regard to their adjudicative work.” 
Ibid. at 15. 
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law courts (e.g., Delaware in the case of corporate law) so as to provide 
principles-based guidance to various aspects relating to independent directors 
such as their appointment, role and validity of their actions. 
 As far as India is concerned, the position is different. It follows the 
common law system and, to that extent, courts can be expected to interpret the 
law and provide principles-based guidance for independent director action. 
However, the difficulty arises, not with the substantive law itself, but with the 
judicial administration. The Indian judiciary is overburdened with over 28 million 
cases pending at various levels in the judicial hierarchy.868 There is no certainty of 
being able to obtain a ruling from an Indian court in a timely manner, or at all. 
Even if an Indian court were to rule on the validity of independent director action, 
that ruling may be delivered after a prolonged wait, by which time the issue at 
hand may no longer even be relevant. The delays in the Indian judicial system 
foreclose the availability of certainty to corporate actors such as independent 
directors. Although India follows the common law system and is no stranger to 
judicial activism and dynamism, there is doubt as to whether the courts would be 
in a position to determine issues on corporate matters effectively so as to provide 
adequate principles-based support to independent directors, being the kind that is 
available in the outsider systems of the U.S. and the U.K. 
                                                 
868
  See Jayanth K. Krishnan, “Globetrotting Law Firms” (2009) 23 Geo. J.L. Ethics 
(forthcoming) available online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1371098> at 14-15 setting out the 
statistics:  
… the Indian judiciary has been in crisis for year; currently there are roughly 40,000 
cases pending before the Supreme Court, a total of about 3 million cases languishing in 
all of the state High Courts, and 25 million cases lying dormant in the district courts. 
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 It must be noted that the independent director concept emanated in 
common law systems where courts are responsive to the needs of guiding the role 
of independent directors through a principles-based approach.869 However, in 
countries such as China and India to which the concept has been transplanted, 
courts are unable to play such a dynamic role, and hence independent directors 
would be necessary limited in their effectiveness.870 
C. Market Regulation Versus State Regulation 
In Chapter 2,871 I discussed that the outsider systems follow a market-based model 
for regulation of corporate actors. This is due to their focus on efficient stock 
markets and the existence of a robust legal system and a sophisticated group of 
reputation intermediaries (otherwise known as gatekeepers) such as accountants, 
investment bankers, lawyers and even independent directors.872 In these outsider 
systems, there is a market-oriented approach towards regulation where the state 
only lays down default rules (as opposed to mandatory rules), which the various 
actors themselves largely implement. The rules relating to self-dealing in 
                                                 
869
  The significant role played by the Delaware courts in promoting the role of board 
independence bears testimony to this fact. For a greater discussion of Delaware courts and 
independent directors, see supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(C). 
870
  It is a different matter that courts have sometimes played a role in the insider systems that has 
turned out to be counterproductive when it comes to independent directors. See discussion 
relating to the Lu Jiahao case in China, supra notes 686 to 690 and accompanying text, and 
the Nagarjuna case in India, supra notes 808 to 814 and accompanying text. 
871
  See supra Section 2.2(A). 
872
  See Black, Legal and Institutional Preconditions, supra note 70. The effect of reputational 
intermediaries and gatekeepers such as auditors can be seen in re WorldCom, Inc. Securities 
Litigation 346 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.N.Y., 2004) [WorldCom Litigation (although the court 
held that the board of a company cannot blindly rely on audited financial statements). But see 
Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC. v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. 552 U.S. 148 (Sup. Ct., 2004) 
(holding that secondary actors cannot be liable as primary violators in securities fraud actions 
under the concept of scheme liability). 
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Delaware873 and the Combined Code for Corporate Governance in the U.K.874 are 
emblematic of this approach. 
 In this background, in the outsider systems, independent directors are 
considered to be an effective alternative to state regulation. Professor Brudney 
addresses this question directly,875 and points to the fact that the “theoretical 
justification for the independent director’s role as monitor of integrity is that he 
functions as a market substitute that is less costly than regulation”.876 It is stated 
that “the independent director is less costly than governmental regulation by an 
amount that outweighs its shortcomings”.877 The outsider systems therefore 
consider independent directors as an integral part of market regulation that leads 
to minimal intervention by the state in corporate affairs. 
 In insider systems, the state plays a significant role in the regulation of 
corporate activity through imposition of mandatory rules. There is a perceived 
unwillingness on the part of the state to confer self-regulatory powers on market 
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  See supra Chapter 3, Section 3.3(C)(1). These rules provide substantial deference to the 
decisions of independent directors while approving self-dealing transactions. 
874
  Supra note 367 and accompanying text (following the “comply or explain” approach). 
875
  See Brudney, supra note 7 at 622. He cites the example of how self-dealing transactions were 
earlier prohibited altogether in Delaware, but have since been permitted through the 
justification of approval by independent directors. However, apart from this, the issue of 
independent directors as alternative to state regulation has received scant attention in 
academic literature, although this is a fairly critical issue. 
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  Ibid. at 653. 
877
  Ibid. at 655. Professor Brudney, however, cautions by saying that the independent director 
concept should not be supported by a mere hostility towards state regulation, and that greater 
evaluation of the costs and benefits (of independent directors as an alternative to state 
regulation) needs to be conducted. Ibid. at 659. 
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players.878 This is also on account of the fact that reputational intermediaries such 
as investment banks, accountants and lawyers are only beginning to play an 
important role in the insider systems. Independent directors too form part of the 
same cohort. To that extent, it cannot be said that independent directors are a 
substitute to state regulation in the insider systems. That is clear from the limited 
powers conferred upon independent directors in those systems.879 The reluctance 
of the state to cede its regulatory domain is also evident from the peculiar 
provision in the Independent Director Opinion that requires all independent 
director nominees to be approved by the CSRC before they are in fact 
appointed.880 This, in an elementary sense, is tantamount to independent directors 
being treated as agents of the state. This discussion leads to the conclusion that 
independent directors are not substitutes to state regulation in the insider systems 
as they had perceived to be when the concept originated in the outsider systems. 
That creates some ambiguities in their role as compared to outsider systems where 
they are to perform the role of reputational intermediaries in the context of 
market-regulation. 
 In addition to the discussion above, it is necessary to note that independent 
directors cannot function in isolation. They can only form part of a system of 
                                                 
878
  However, in more recent times, self-regulatory mechanisms have been introduced even in 
insider systems. For instance, in India, companies are required to establish a self-enforcing 
code of conduct on insider trading. See Securities and Exchange Board of India (Prohibition 
of Insider Trading) Regulations, 1992. 
879
  For example, independent directors are not specifically conferred the powers to approve self-
dealing transactions. While they can acknowledge and express their views on such 
transactions under the Independent Director Opinion in China, no such provisions are 
contained in Clause 49 in India. 
880
  See supra notes 509 to 511 and accompanying text. 
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norms and institutions that enhance corporate governance. Those institutions 
include gatekeepers such as accountants, lawyers, investment bankers and even 
the regulator and courts.881 Other factors include the existence of a market for 
control, and the possibility of takeovers as a threat to incumbent management’s 
laxities. As far as outsider systems are concerned, the legal structures ensure the 
presence (at least to a large extent, if not entirely) of these systems and 
institutions that support the independent director. However, such systems and 
institutions either do not exist in several insider systems, or do not perform their 
roles effectively. In such a scenario, it is not possible to expect the independent 
directors to make any difference without effective support from these 
complementary institutions. To take one illustration, the Satyam independent 
directors were unable to unearth frauds on their own in the absence of effective 
financial reporting and auditing mechanisms within the company. Furthermore, 
the availability of advanced accounting standards would certainly equip the 
functioning of independent directors as they would be in a position to rely on the 
accuracy of financial information pertaining to the company and thereby 
determine the performance of management and, if required, challenge the 
management in case of poor performance.882 
 To conclude this Section, we find that there are differences in the legal 
structures, enforcement of law and in the model of regulation that distinguish the 
                                                 
881
  See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
882
  Professor Gordon details the correlation between the role of independent directors and 
transparency in financial information. See Gordon, Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 
11 at Part III. 
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outsider systems from the insider systems. In this setting, the independent director 
concept operates in varying ways in either set of systems. It appears that the 
transplantation of the concept from the outsider systems to the insider systems has 
failed to take into account these differences that will continue to operate as legal 
constraints to effective implementation of the independent director concept in the 
insider systems, particularly in China and India. 
6.4 Cultural Constraints 
A discourse in comparative governance that is important, but one which is yet to 
obtain considerable traction, relates to the role of cultural and anthropological 
factors in the success (or otherwise) in the transplantation of corporate 
governance norms.883 Professor Licht has propounded that cultural differences are 
one of the reasons for disparity in corporate governance regimes among 
countries.884 He finds that the inability of countries to change their cultures results 
in path dependence, which comes in the way of radically transforming the 
corporate governance regimes in countries.885 Whenever the law reform process 
(including that which is by way of transplantation of norms) omits cognisance of 
cultural differences between systems, this can result in failure of reforms.886 He 
elaborates on the role of cultural factors: 
                                                 
883
  One commentator bemoans the paucity of discussions on this issue. See Branson, The Very 
Uncertain Prospect, supra note 42 at 347 (observing that “[w]ith the nearly complete absence 
of any discussion of varying cultures, or of the role of culture, the U.S. global convergence 
advocates seem never to have learned those basic truths about comparative study”). 
884
  Licht, Mother of All Path Dependencies, supra note 214. 
885
  Ibid. at 149. 
886
  Ibid. at 150. 
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Note that according to current analyses, culture is considered to be a very 
powerful impediment to change. Under a weak version of the story, 
culture is just another factor guiding the system along the beaten path. 
Developments are spontaneous. … Under a strong version, culture could 
actually stand as a roadblock on the way to reform, even when such 
reform is intentional and backed by considerable political power. 
However, as the system evolves, “it would be remarkable if a key 
economic institution were antithetical to a country’s culture; either the 
institution would change or the culture would change.887 
… 
 
… from a forward-looking viewpoint, cultural values are deeply 
embedded in people’s minds and in social institutions. As a result, a 
corporate governance system that is compatible with social preferences in 
other areas (most importantly, legal areas) is more likely to work smoothly 
in a particular society. Additionally, such compatibility may increase the 
persistence of certain features and impede reforms.888 
I now apply this theory to the subject matter of this dissertation. The concept of 
independent directors evolved in the U.S. and the U.K., which can be commonly 
said to follow the Anglo-American culture (also known generally as the Western 
culture and attitudes).889 Interestingly, the cultural factors in those systems make 
the role of the independent director more adaptable and relevant to them. First, in 
that culture the individual is the basic unit in society, and hence all matters yield 
                                                 
887
  Ibid. at 150. Since culture is entrenched in society, it is often inherently resistant to change. 
See Erica Schoenberger, The Cultural Crisis of the Firm (Cambridge MA, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1997) at 118. 
888
  Licht, Mother of All Path Dependencies, supra note 214 at 187. See also, Monks & Minnow, 
supra note 3 at 298 (arguing that players in the corporate sector will always be bound by local 
cultures and practices, and that it would not be possible to transplant concepts of corporate 
governance which the recipient cultures cannot suitably accept); Paredes, supra note 20 at 
1058 (noting that if U.S. corporate law is transplanted into another system in a manner that 
does not fit with the recipient’s cultural values, then there will be a misfit); Black, Core 
Institutions, supra note 81 at 1597 (pointing to the fact that local culture may turn out to be an 
obstacle in a country’s effort to piggyback on a foreign country’s rules on corporate and 
securities laws). 
889
  See Cheffins, London to Milan to Toronto, supra note 73 at 11 (noting that “corporate 
governance arrangements in any one country are, to a significant extent, a product of the local 
economic and social environment” and that a “distinctive feature of the British corporate 
governance system is that the environment in which its public companies operate strongly 
resembles that which exists in the United States”). 
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to individual liberty.890 This requires individuals to think independently and take 
decisions on the basis of optimal outcomes rather than on the basis of any other 
extraneous factors. Second, human relationships are transient in the Anglo-
American culture.891 Individuals do not have any compulsions to be recognised as 
part of a collective. Third, decisions by individuals are made on the basis of 
rationality and are devoid of emotional attachments.892 
 Since the evolution of independent directors is connected with the 
emergence of a monitoring board, the concept fits well with Anglo-American 
liberal attitudes in the corporate sector. The monitoring role of an independent 
director requires that individual to constantly challenge members of the 
management such as the CEO. Such challenges are not necessarily seen as 
questioning the authority of the CEO or other managers. The focus is usually on 
the issue at hand rather than the individuals involved.  In crisis situations, the non-
performing CEO may have to be confronted or even shown the door out of the 
company. Independent directors have in fact carried out that role even in recent 
times.893 Culturally, there is nothing heretical about such conduct. Therefore, at a 
                                                 
890
  Charles Lee, Cowboys and Dragons: Shattering the Cultural Myths to Advance Chinese-
American Business (U.S.A.: Dearborn Trade Publishing, 2003) at 59. 
891
  Ibid. at 59. 
892
  Ibid. at 59 (referring to individuals in the Anglo-American cultures as “cowboys”). Lee 
further notes: “Cowboys reach decisions with the head. Everything is rational: “I think it is a 
good decision””. Ibid. at 189. However, it is necessary to note that even in the developed 
markets, the forces of behavioural finance and social science perspectives such as sociology 
and psychology cannot be forsaken. For the strand of literature advocating that position, see 
Robert J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); 
Robert J. Shiller, “From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance” (2003) 17 J. Econ. 
Persp. 83. 
893
  See e.g., Greg Farrell, “Under Fire, Merrill Lynch CEO O’Neal Retires” USA Today (30 
October 2007); Ben Livesey, “RBS Cedes to U.K., Seeks $34 Billion as CEO Quits” 
Bloomberg (13 October 2008). 
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broad level, it appears that the Anglo-American cultures are more conducive to 
independent monitoring by directors over managers, and that perhaps explains 
why the concept of independent directors originated in those jurisdictions in the 
first place. It is a different matter, though, that even in Anglo-American 
boardrooms, it is felt that management has not been challenged enough in practice 
by independent directors.894 
 Moving to the insider systems at hand, they demonstrate very different 
cultural values (often alluded to as the Asian values representing the region that 
China and India belong to). Some of the cultural characteristics in the insider 
systems are diametrically opposite to those of the outsider systems.895 More 
specifically, these are as follows: (i) society confers greater importance to the 
                                                 
894
  Myles Mace, supra note 406 at 52; Lorsch & MacIver, Pawns or Potentates, supra note 10 at 
96. Such situations also occur in highly collegial boards. Such collegiality creates what is 
known as “groupthink”. As one author notes: 
Groupthink, a term coined by Irving Janis, signifies that defective judgment arises in 
unified groups because the unification fosters overoptimism and confidence in the 
ingroup's viewpoints and suppresses inconsistent information. Although increased 
cohesion results from groupthink, often the group remains blind to the disadvantages of 
its decisions. 
Rachel A. Fink, “Social Ties in the Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director 
Independence to Eliminate “Rubber-Stamping” Board” (2006) 79 S. Cal. L. Rev. 455 at 468. 
See also Irving L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink (Boston: Houghton, 1972). The theory of 
groupthink has tremendous relevance to board behaviour and the role of independent 
directors. However, it is not necessary to deal with it in detail in this dissertation as the 
problems are groupthink are largely behavioural as opposed to cultural, and hence apply 
uniformly across both the outsider systems as well as insider systems. 
Despite this situation, reform efforts like the Higgs Committee recognise the “collegiate 
environment” in which the boards (and the independent directors) should operate. See Higgs 
Report, supra note 368 at para. 6.15. 
895
  See Richard Nisbett, The Geography of Thought: How Asians and Westerners Think 
Different—and Why (London: Nicholas Brealey, 2003) (citing experimental, historical and 
social evidence to find that East Asian thought tends to be more holistic attending to the entire 
field in question, while Westerners are more analytic and pay closer attention to the primary 
issue at hand and use formal logic to explain and predict behaviour). In that sense, while 
Asian thought is more relational, the Western thought is transactional. 
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collective than the individual; (ii) interpersonal relationships matter more than 
substantive issues; and (iii) decision-making often gets mired among extraneous 
issues without a unified focus on the optimal outcome. These issues are discussed 
below to the extent that they are relevant to the question of board independence in 
these insider systems.896 
 To begin with China, the cultural traditions in that country have been 
influenced to a great extent by Confucianism.897 To simplify matters, 
Confucianism propounds conventions that can be categorised into hierarchy, 
collectivism, ‘face’ protection, respect for tradition or age and egalitarianism.898 
China follows the collectivist model,899 which is built on the concept of “‘family 
state’, a form of social organisation that is autocratic and hierarchical and not at 
all democratic”.900 Such a societal structure defies individual beliefs and 
convictions and requires individuals to follow the person in authority in 
accordance with applicable customs and traditions. Harmony is an essential 
                                                 
896
  While some level of generalisation is possible with reference to the features of all 
jurisdictions that form part of the insider system, that ought not to be assumed in the case of 
cultural factors as they can vary significant from country to country. This is because cultural 
factors take shape on the basis of historical and anthropological factors that are specific to 
each system. Hence, while there are some common traits among cultural values in the 
different Asian countries, they are subject to equally diverse factors among these countries. 
This discussion is therefore subject to more detailed application within specific societies. 
897
  See Tan & Wang, Modelling for China, supra note 106 at 167-68; Yuan Wang, Xin Sheng 
Zhang & Rob Goodfellow, Business Culture in China (Singapore: Butterworth Heinemann 
Asia, 1998) at 19-20. 
898
  Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, ibid. at 20. 
899
  See Heidi Dahles & Harry Wels, eds., Culture, Organization and Management in East Asia: 
Doing Business in China (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002) at 44. 
900
  Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, supra note 897 at 20. 
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element of interpersonal relationships, and breaking the mould is not at all 
considered acceptable.901 
 Human relationships are built very carefully and are long-lasting. Two 
facets of interpersonal behaviour are peculiar to China and require further 
exploration. They are guanxi and mianzi. The simple meaning of guanxi is 
relationships,902 although it is understood to involve personal relationships created 
through reciprocal favours or creation (and repayment) of personal debts from 
time to time among individuals.903 Such mutual trust continues to operate between 
individual relationships in a manner that it is considered unacceptable to offend 
the other person through actions or conduct. An extension of guanxi  is the 
concept of mianzi, which literally means ‘face’.904 As Dahles and Wels note: 
‘Face’, or rather ‘loss of face’ comes to play in the guanxi context when a 
person cannot fulfil the duties or obligations based on his or her social 
position or the requirements of his or her network ties. This is the debtor’s 
perspective. Vice versa, people can create debt for other people by ‘giving 
face’, such as bestowing honor upon others or doing unasked favors, 
which other have to return in due course.905 
                                                 
901
  See also Tan & Wang, Modelling for China, supra note 106 at 169 (noting that “it would thus 
be imprudent and even dangerous to openly express differences with someone, for these 
differences may offend not only that person but his entire network of friends”); Wang, Xin & 
Goodfellow, ibid. at 22 (finding that this requires individuals to act in accordance with 
expectations of other human beings rather than on the basis of their own beliefs or wishes). 
902
  Lee, supra note 890 at 150. It is sometimes also interpreted to mean “connections”. See 
Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, ibid. at 75. 
903
  See Tan & Wang, Modelling for China, supra note 106 at 169; Lee, ibid. at 150. 
904
  Such interpretation is perhaps inaccurate in the present context, where it ought to be referred 
either to “loss of face” or, to the contrary, “face saving”. See Dahles & Wels, supra note 899 
at 5; Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, supra note 897 at 23. 
905
  Dahles & Wels, ibid. at 5. Another explanation of mianzi goes: “All relationships, especially 
between friends, relatives or colleagues, are reciprocal. One must do one’s best to reciprocate 
a ‘favour’. The untoward consequence of social carelessness in not repaying a favour may be 
the ‘loss of face’”. Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, ibid. at 23. 
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Mianzi tends to avoid embarrassment, particularly to persons higher up in the 
hierarchy. In return, it also requires the recipient of the favour to have to return it 
at a later point in time creating obligations between parties. Both guanxi and 
mianzi play an important cultural role in the way Chinese business organisations 
are managed.906  
These concepts are important not only in family-owned businesses but 
also in the state owned enterprises (SOEs). The dominance of SOEs in the 
Chinese business sphere signifies the acceptance of the relationship between the 
bureaucracy and other corporate actors.907 Although the influence of the 
bureaucracy in business enterprise was initiated with a view to prevent the 
“socially destabilising influence” of businesses, 908 “government officials involved 
in commerce used their privileged positions to guarantee business success”.909 
This naturally meant the commingling of businesses and the political process. The 
concepts of guanxi and mianzi tend to operate even more forcefully in the case of 
SOEs, as any other conduct would be seen as subversive to the political system as 
                                                 
906
  Literature on business culture and anthropology in China also refers to concepts such as 
xinyong, or personal trust, and jen-ching, or human obligations. Dahles & Wels, ibid. at 5. 
Referring to individuals in the Chinese culture as “dragons”, Lee notes: “Dragons reach 
decisions with the heart. Everything is intuitive: “I feel good about the decision””. Lee, supra 
note 890 at 189. 
907
  See Chenxia Shi, “What Matters in the Governance of the Board? – A Comparative 
Perspective” (2004) 17 A.J.C.L. 144 at 151, finding: 
As the state or state-owned entities are controlling shareholders in the listed companies 
that were restructured from the SOEs, these companies inherited traditional operating and 
management culture and systems of the former SOEs. The role and functions of the board 
are, as a matter of fact, in form rather than in substance. 
908
  Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, supra note 897 at 29. 
909
  Ibid. 
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a whole.910 These features look down upon individual opinions and look to the 
overall benefit of the collectivity and with a view to maintaining harmony. 
Finally, Chinese culture does not permit individuals to directly reject or 
say ‘no’ to any idea, suggestion or proposal.911 This is due to the operation of 
mianzi, as “Chinese people believe that directly saying ‘no’ to a partner or 
associate may engender hurt and therefore damage a valued friendship or network 
relationship”.912 
Moving further to India, it is interesting to note that there are several 
commonalities with Chinese culture. For example, the prominence of collectivity, 
the importance of personal or familial relationships and the inability to directly 
say ‘no’ are all entrenched in the Indian culture as well. However, compared to 
China, there is greater recognition of individual freedoms, particularly of speech 
and expression, thereby making the Indian society somewhat more liberal 
compared to the Chinese society.913 However, the difference between Chinese and 
Indian cultures tends to matter more in terms of the degree than in substance if 
                                                 
910
  See Tan & Wang, Modelling for China, supra note 106 at 169 (observing that “people have 
been taught that it is improper and dangerous to assert self-interest in making any claims upon 
the political system. Subjects are supposed to be dependent on, not demanding of, the political 
system”). 
911
  See Margaret Wang, supra note 34 at 247 (finding that “these difficulties seem to be cultural 
– reflecting a transformation from a country which was traditionally ruled by man to a country 
which has begun to adopt the western ideology of the rule of law”). 
912
  Wang, Xin & Goodfellow, supra note 897 at 38. 
913
  For a broad understanding of the comparison between the two politico-cultural systems in the 
context of business and economics, see Randall Peerenboom, “Law and Development in 
China and India: The Advantage and Disadvantages of Front-Loading the Costs of Political 
Reform” La Trobe University School of Law Legal Studies Working Paper Number 2008/15, 
available online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1283209>. 
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one were to compare both these systems together with the Anglo-American 
cultural set up. 
To be more specific about India, most family businesses are run on the 
basis of collectivity and personal relationships. Family is the basic social unit, and 
in the case of Hindu undivided family or joint family the eldest male in the family 
(also known as the karta) possesses principal authority.914 The family unit 
traverses the business arena as well. In family owned businesses, which form a 
significant portion of Indian businesses (including publicly listed companies), the 
head of the family maintains strict control of the business and exercises 
significant powers.915 Authority is normally vested in such person, and it is rare to 
question the mode of functioning of such patriarch. 
As in China, relationships matter much in India as well. Business is 
carried on through personal relationships, which are often bonded on the basis of 
factors such as heredity, family, religion and even caste.916 These relationships 
last several generations, and are mutually beneficial, owing to which it is difficult 
for any party to question the actions of the others due to the fear of upsetting the 
harmony. Moreover, as one study notes: 
There is in India an age old distrust of purely formal, abstract reasoning. A 
typical Indian “tender” and “soft” way of solving organizational problems 
(both in family and in a company) is linked to the emotional and personal 
                                                 
914
  See SVIIB and Rotterdam School of Management, India, Culture and Management: The Art 
of Doing Business (Rotterdam: Eburon, 1989) at 188. 
915
  Ibid. 
916
  S. Balasubramanian, The Art of Business Leadership: Indian Experiences (New Delhi: 
Response Books, 2007) at 97. 
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relations which are being perceived as more vital than purely functional 
and structural ones.917 
As in the case of China, decisions are made through the ‘heart’ rather than 
through the ‘head’. Furthermore, it has been found that the Indian management 
style is not direct and goes “round and round in circles, and [takes] forever to 
formulate policy”.918 Indians also find it difficult to directly say ‘no’ to reject any 
offer or proposal.919 
 Applying these cultural factors to the present discussion, it is not 
surprising that independent directors have not been very effective in the insider 
systems of China and India. Apart from the general dissonance between the 
concept of the independent director (performing a monitoring mechanism) and the 
way in which businesses are managed in these countries, there are two specific 
implications. First, the definitions of independence in both these countries fail to 
take into account the cultural factors.920 They define independence with reference 
to familial and pecuniary ties, and do not extend the definitions to social ties and 
other loose forms of bonding through the collectivity theory practised in China 
and India, such as through guanxi in China and ties such as the extended family in 
                                                 
917
  SVIIB and Rotterdam School of Management, supra note 914 at 39. 
918
  William Nobrega & Ashish Sinha, Riding the Indian Tiger: Understanding India—The 
World’s Fastest Growing Market (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008) at 203. 
919
  Ibid. 
920
  Sibao Shen, “China’s New Corporate Governance Measures After Its Accessions into the 
WTO” (2004) 17 A.J.C.L. 6 at 8 (noting that “there is a clash between the original 
international definition of corporate governance and traditional Chinese values. This is one of 
the root causes of the many imperfections that can be found in relation to corporate 
governance in China.” 
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India.921 It is possible for companies to pack their boards with directors who 
satisfy the formal definition of independence, but are otherwise obligated through 
social ties to the controlling shareholders or management or both. 
 Second, both China and, to a lesser extent, India find dissent objectionable 
owing to the cultural factors that are in play in these countries as discussed earlier. 
Therefore, independent directors, even when they are truly independent of 
management and controlling shareholders, are unlikely to demonstrate their 
objection to any matter on corporate boards even if that is part of their monitoring 
role. At most, they are only likely to raise questions, but may not take matters to 
their logical conclusion for fear of creating disharmony on boards.922 Deference to 
the company patriarch often inhibits independent directors from voicing their 
concerns in the open board. They may raise issues with the controlling 
shareholders or management outside board meetings, but they quite often tend to 
be convinced by the insider on the issue and do not press further. These cultural 
barriers obstruct independent directors from performing their roles satisfactorily 
towards resolution of the agency problems between majority and minority 
                                                 
921
  It is a different matter that social relationships are unrecognised by rules even in the outsider 
systems. For example, Professor Brudney critiques the definitions in the U.S. by stating: “No 
definition of independence yet offered precludes an independent director from being a social 
friend of, or a member of the same clubs, associations, or charitable efforts as, the persons 
whose compensation or self-dealing transaction he is asked to assess”. Brudney, supra note 7 
at 613. This issue is less thorny in the U.S. than it is in China or India for two reasons. First, 
social ties do not bind individuals as strongly (comparatively) in the U.S. Second, the courts 
in the U.S. are capable of extending principles of independence to social factors based on 
individualised facts of each case. The Oracle ruling is a pertinent illustration on point. See 
Oracle, supra note 417. 
922
  The example of Satyam directors raising concerns relating to the Maytas transactions, but 
then finally assenting unanimously, is one piece of evidence of this phenomenon. See supra 
note 769 and accompanying text. 
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shareholders.923 Western-style independence cannot seem to coexist with the 
Asian search for harmony, even on corporate boards. While independent directors 
are implicitly beholden to the management and controlling shareholders due to the 
cultural bonds, they share no such relationship with minority shareholders (whose 
interests they are required to protect). In that sense, the intended beneficiaries of 
the independent directors’ allegiance are a faceless class of persons in this cultural 
setting.  
 The transplantation of the independent director concept from the outsider 
systems that share the Anglo-American liberal culture, which recognise the 
importance of individuals and even constructive dissent, into societies such as 
China and India, which pride on the supremacy of collective harmony, is bound to 
be fatal in its effective implementation. Surely, there is no inkling of the fact that 
these cultural factors having been taken into account or provided for in the 
process of transplantation, which explains the lack of its intended effectiveness. 
6.5 Political Constraints 
In Chapter 4, we saw that it was the forces of globalisation that caused insider 
systems to embrace norms of corporate governance that emanated in the West.924 
In this context, proponents of convergence argue that corporate governance laws 
and practices will converge into one single model, that of the Anglo-American 
                                                 
923
  See Tong Lu, Independent Directors and Chinese Experience, supra note 25.  
924
  For this phenomenon in China, see supra Section 4.3(B) and for India, see supra Section 
4.4(B). 
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model, which, according to them, is the only successful model.925 As far as board 
structures are concerned, they profess that the converged model will involve the 
unitary board with a substantial role to independent directors.926 Perhaps there is 
some truth to the fact that the emerging economies of China and India have joined 
the bandwagon too as they have embraced corporate governance norms that have 
been transplanted from the West. However, it is found that these norms have been 
adopted by these economies to open up their markets for investments from 
countries that are familiar with the Anglo-American model of corporate 
governance rather than with any particular concern for benefiting their own 
constituencies such as minority shareholders. The changes adopted so far have 
been largely with a view to provide signalling and comfort to international 
investors about enhanced corporate governance norms. This has given rise to the 
situation where concepts such as independent directors have been introduced into 
these economies on paper, but there still continues to be a lingering uncertainty 
and confusion regarding proper implementation of the concept. 
 This situation can be explained using the theories of path dependence, 
interest group politics and rent-seeking, which seem to have played a major role 
in bringing about inadequacies in the independent director concept in the insider 
systems of China and India. Professors Bebchuk and Roe elaborate on the theory 
of path dependence in corporate governance. They argue that two sources of path 
dependence, namely structure-driven path dependence and rule-driven path 
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  See Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History, supra note 66. 
926
  Ibid. at 456. 
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dependence cause countries’ corporate governance norms and structures to 
display persistence.927 
 As regards structure-driven path dependence, Professors Bebchuk and Roe 
argue that “existing corporate structures might well have persistence power due to 
internal rent-seeking, even if they cease to be efficient”.928 Parties who are 
beneficiaries of corporate control under existing structures have every incentive to 
maintain status quo so that they continue to enjoy the benefits of control. Parties 
with control will impede even efficient changes if that reduces their level of 
control.929 This explains the continued existence of concentrated ownership of 
companies in the insider systems, particularly in China and India. Although the 
forces of globalisation and convergence have commenced the process of diffusion 
of shareholdings in these countries, the rate of progression on that count is far 
from any concerted move towards convergence.930 The stickiness of concentrated 
ownership and the persevered dominance of controlling shareholders are not 
likely to bring about significant change in the role of independent directors in the 
insider systems of China and India. The effect of structure-driven path 
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  Bebchuk & Roe, Path Dependence, supra note 20 at 129. 
928
  Ibid. at 130. 
929
  Ibid., noting further: 
As long as those who can block structural transformation do not bear the full costs of 
persistence, or do not capture the full benefits of an efficient move, inefficient structures 
that are already in place might persist. To be sure, all potentially efficient changes would 
take place in a purely Coasian world. However, as we show, the transactions feasible in 
our imperfectly Coasian world often would not prevent the persistence of some 
inefficient structures that are already in place. 
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  As discussed in Chapter 2, it is only a few companies in these jurisdictions that have moved 
towards a diffused shareholding structure. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. Most 
of the companies continue to operate under a concentrated ownership structure, which is still 
the norm. 
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dependence will only help maintain the current position rather than accommodate 
change. 
 The phenomenon of rule-driven path dependence has a greater play in this 
arena. This theory argues that the existing corporate structures will determine the 
relative efficiency of alternative corporate rules.931 Further, it finds that interest 
group politics play an important role in rule-driven path dependence. Bebchuk 
and Roe have pinpointed the effect of interest group politics: 
A country's initial pattern of corporate structures influences the power that 
various interest groups have in the process of producing corporate rules. If 
the initial pattern provides one group of players with relatively more 
wealth and power, this group would have a better chance to have corporate 
rules that it favors down the road. Positional advantages inside firms will 
be translated into positional advantages in a country's politics. And this 
effect on corporate rules will reinforce the initial patterns of ownership 
structure.932 
For example, it has been noted that managers continue to play a dominant role in 
interest group politics in the outsider systems.933 Similarly, controlling 
shareholders are bound to play such a key role in the insider systems.934 
Controlling shareholders in these systems will have a significant influence in rule-
making in the insider systems. Given this scenario, it is unlikely that they would 
                                                 
931
  Bebchuk & Roe, Path Dependence, supra note 20 at 131. For instance, the existing 
concentrated shareholding in the insider systems would determine the efficiency of the 
independent director rule in those systems, while diffused shareholding would do so in the 
outsider systems. 
932
  Ibid. at 131. 
933
  Roe, Strong Managers Weak Owners, supra note 206. This is not surprising because the 
collective action problems of shareholders in the outsider systems discussed in Chapter 2 (see 
supra Section 2.2(A)) confer significant powers to managers, and they are bound to play their 
interest group politics in favour of retaining their dominant positions in companies. 
934
  Since the ownership structures of companies in the insider systems provide significant powers 
to controlling shareholders, they will likely play interest group politics to retain their 
dominant influence in companies. 
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permit any rule changes that would significantly erode their dominance in the 
corporate governance sphere, even if those changes are in fact efficient.935 This is 
particularly so in the case of China, and to a lesser extent India, where the state 
itself is a controlling shareholder of a number of publicly listed companies, and 
hence can directly influence policy-making. 
 Finally, Professors Bebchuk and Roe find that the effective 
implementation of rules is as important as promulgating the rules. They state: 
What counts are all elements of a corporate legal system that bear on 
corporate decisions and the distribution of value: not just general 
principles, but also all the particular rules implementing them; not just 
substantive rules, but also procedural rules, judicial practices, institutional 
and procedural infrastructure, and enforcement capabilities. Because our 
concern is with the corporate rules system "in action" rather than "on the 
books," all these elements are quite important.936 
The application of the convergence and path dependence theories to the 
transplantation of independent directors from the outsider systems to the insider 
systems yields incredible results. The proponents of the convergence theory 
would suggest that the embracing of the independent director concept by the 
insider systems is itself a move towards convergence. On the other hand, path 
dependence theorists would suggest that there are significant hurdles to the 
                                                 
935
  Bebchuk and Roe find: 
Legal rules are often the product of political processes, which combine public-regarding 
features with interest group politics. To the extent that interest groups play a role, each 
interest group will seek to push for rules that favor it. Thus, the corporate rules that 
actually will be chosen and maintained might depend on the relative strength of the 
relevant interest groups. Interest groups differ in their ability to mobilize and then exert 
pressure in favor of legal rules that favor them or against rules that disfavor them. The 
more resources and power a group has, the more influence the group will tend to have in 
the political process. 
Bebchuk & Roe, Path Dependence, supra note 20 at 157. 
936
  Ibid. at 154. 
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implementation of the concept even if it is indeed present on the rule books. It 
seems difficult to argue against the influence of the path dependence theory to this 
problem. 
 No doubt, the insider systems have moved towards the Anglo-American 
model by embracing the independent director concept. However, as I have 
demonstrated earlier, that movement has been primarily with a view to providing 
cosmetic comfort to investors from those systems. The substantive rules and the 
other constraints discussed in this Chapter impede the efficient functioning of the 
independent directors. I argue here that interest group politics have been played in 
a manner that benefits controlling shareholders. The introduction of the 
independent director in the insider systems in form helps controlling shareholders 
raise equity financing for their companies thereby enhancing their own wealth in 
their companies. On the other hand, by ensuring a largely docile position for 
independent directors in the insider systems, controlling shareholders have 
ensured that there is no reduction in their overall private benefits of control. As I 
have emphasised, the continued dominance of controlling shareholders in 
appointing, renewing and removing independent directors and the lack of any 
specific mandate to independent directors to protect other interests in any 
meaningful way are just some illustrations of how interest group politics have 
devised a more ornamental role for independent directors.  
Due to the path dependence driven corporate governance reforms in the 
insider systems, it appears that there will not be any meaningful changes to the 
position of the independent directors in a manner that would threaten the 
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dominance of controlling shareholders. Under this theory, it would be akin to 
“asking for the moon” if one were to expect controlling shareholders to empower 
independent directors in a manner that would erode their own influence, or even 
to “tilting at windmills” if independent directors are expected to fight unwinnable 
battles. The interest group politics in this situation gives rise to an interesting 
contradiction, whereby controlling shareholders themselves are influencing the 
process of how their actions should be monitored by independent directors. It 
cannot have been starker. However, as we have seen, the operation of the path 
dependence theory is not absolute and change can occur, albeit gradually; the 
introduction of the independent directors in the insider systems at least at a formal 
level is indication of the fact that any resistance to change can be weakened over a 
period of time. 
6.6 Perceptional Constraints 
Apart from the actual role of independent directors, the perception of their utility 
among corporate players as well as the general public is bound to play an 
important role in how well they are received and regarded, and hence relates to 
the extent of their effectiveness. Two questions come to mind from a perceptional 
viewpoint:  
(i)  Does the institution of independent directors in the insider systems 
suffer from an over-optimism bias whereby the expectation of 
results far outweigh their ability to deliver the expected results?  
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(ii)  As far as the transplantation is concerned, how is the institution 
expected to be successful in the insider systems when its success is 
in doubt even in the outsider system where it originated? 
Dealing with the first issue, the independent director has become recognised as 
the harbinger of corporate governance reforms in the insider systems. A great deal 
of faith has been reposed in the independent director to bring about enhancement 
in corporate governance standards in the insider systems. Independent directors 
have been a part of the reforms from the outset thereby being an integral part of 
the corporate governance framework.937 For this reason, the corporate 
stakeholders have reposed tremendous trust and faith in the independent directors 
to raise governance standards. Independent directors have been viewed as the 
panacea for all ills plaguing the corporate sector. I argue that the corporate 
governance norms in the insider systems bestow too much (and somewhat 
misplaced) importance on the role of independent directors than is justified. In 
epitomising independent directors as a guardian of the interests of shareholders or 
other stakeholders, the corporate governance norms create a false sense of 
security. However, as discussed at length, there are significant difficulties in the 
implementation of the concept in the insider systems that belie popular 
expectation.  
                                                 
937
  This is unlike in the case of outsider systems where board independence was only a part of 
corporate governance reforms. The reforms there contained other aspects such as the 
existence of sophisticated third party intermediaries (gatekeepers), well-developed securities 
regulator and a dynamic judiciary. 
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Such an over-optimism bias has resulted in greater negative reaction to 
failures. As one commentator in India has observed: “[i]f almost the entire 
foundation of corporate governance rests on the shoulders of the independent 
directors (IDs), it is not beyond debate that the foundation indeed is extremely 
fragile”.938 This has brought about calls for sacrificing independent directors and 
doing away with the concept altogether.939 For example, in India the Satyam fraud 
caused a significant backlash against independent directors, although they were 
incapable of detecting any such fraud that the accountants themselves did not 
have any wind of.940 This has created a pessimistic outlook not only with respect 
to independent directors, but to corporate governance reforms in general. 
Regulators in the insider systems of China and India have not adequately 
addressed the expectations of corporate actors by tempering the perceptions of 
corporate actors, the investor community and the general public, which has only 
created greater confusion about the likelihood of success. 
 The second question posed earlier raises a tricky issue. If the success of 
the independent director concept has not been validated empirically in the 
outsider systems,941 then it is difficult to see what the rationale of transplanting it 
to other systems is. Its lack of success in the outsider system causes some level of 
                                                 
938
  Prithvi Haldea, “The Naked Truth About Independent Directors” available online: 
<http://www.directorsdatabase.com/IDs_Myth_PH.pdf> (emphasis in original).  
939
  Ibid. 
940
  See Beverly Behan, “Governance Lessons from India’s Satyam” Business Week (16 January 
2009); “Ban Satyam Directors from Other Boards” Business Standard (19 January 2009); 
Sanjiv Shankaran, “Independent Directors Can’t Solve Governance Problems” The Mint (8 
April 2009). 
941
  This aspect has been discussed in a fair amount of detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 
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pessimism in its implementation in the insider systems. It is a different matter that 
this kind of pessimism is borne mainly in persons who are directly involved in 
corporate governance in the insider systems, being policymakers, regulators or 
even researchers (such as one writing a dissertation on the subject-matter!) whose 
job it is to undertake in-depth analysis of the empirical results. But, such 
pessimism also percolates to a wider audience because failures have also arisen 
more recently in the outsider systems that provide anecdotal evidence of 
weaknesses in corporate governance norms, including the role of independent 
directors. This creates a serious perceptional constraint in the minds of corporate 
actors.  
 Recent events provide evidence, at least anecdotal in nature, that the 
corporate governance norms followed in the U.S. and the U.K. have not been 
effective in preventing large-scale corporate governance failures,942 thereby 
raising questions about that model itself. They have questioned the effectiveness 
of boards of directors in curbing excessive risk-taking by managers, especially in 
the case of complex financial transactions that led to the current financial crisis.943 
The boards seemingly failed to oversee the actions of the company executives. 
That also leads to the issue of the types of individuals who served on the boards of 
                                                 
942
  During the year 2008 alone, several U.S. corporations such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, 
Freddie Mac, Fannie May, Merrill Lynch and AIG saw a massive fall in their stock prices 
thereby severely hurting the interest of their investors. Similarly, the U.K. witnessed the 
collapse of the Northern Trust Bank. Allegations are rife that the boards of directors and the 
corporate governance mechanisms established within these companies did not foresee the 
oncoming financial crisis and take measures to ameliorate its impact. See e.g., Julie 
MacIntosh, “Lehman Insiders Question Clout of Board” Financial Times (16 September 
2008); John Schnatter, “Where Were the Boards?” The Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition) 
(25 October 2008) at A. 11. 
943
  See Carl Icahn, “We Pay So Much For So Little” The Icahn Report (17 September 2008) 
available online: <http://www.icahnreport.com/report/2008/09/we-pay-so-much.html>. 
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these companies. Obviously, many of them were independent directors, but not 
perhaps eminently suited for the position and for the roles they were expected to 
discharge.944 Surely, these were highly accomplished individuals, but whether 
they were suited for the job is a different question altogether. Board independence 
does not seem to have instilled a strong level of monitoring on such boards. In 
sum, this points to the fact that the independent directors in the U.S. and the U.K. 
have not been successful in preventing corporate governance failures, and further 
goes to show that it may not be entirely efficacious for other countries such as 
China and India to adopt concepts from the U.S. and U.K. 
6.7 Conclusion to the Chapter 
This Chapter finds that there are several constraints that operate in the insider 
systems of China and India that obstruct the effective implementation of the 
independent director concept that has been transplanted from the outsider 
systems. These constraints, which are embedded in the insider systems, help 
explain the underlying reasons for the lack of desired success of the independent 
                                                 
944
  A news-report discusses the composition of the Lehman board: 
Lehman’s five-member finance and risk committee, which reviewed the bank’s financial 
policies and practices, is chaired by Henry Kaufman, the respected former Salomon 
Brothers economist. But Roger Berlind, a board member for 23 years, left the brokerage 
business decades ago to produce Broadway plays. 
Another director, Marsha Johnson Evans, is a former chief of the American Red Cross 
and the Girl Scouts. Jerry Grundhofer, the former US Bancorp chief executive, is the only 
Lehman external director who has recently run a bank. But he did not sit on any board 
committees. 
“This was not the strongest board for a company this size – in terms of age and in terms 
of people who have a toe in the water,” said one senior Lehman employee.” 
MacIntosh, supra note 942. 
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director concept in those systems. Utilising the effect of constraints analysed in 
this Chapter, the next delves into some possible options looking into the future. 
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7. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
7.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
7.2 Revisiting the Concept 
7.3 Alternate Structures for Appointment of Independent Directors 
7.4 Crystallising the Role of Independent Directors 
7.5 Providing Support Systems 
7.6 Role of the Law and Other Factors 
 
7.1 Introduction to the Chapter 
In the previous Chapters, I discussed the performance of independent directors in 
the emerging economies of China and India that follow the insider model of 
corporate governance: that (i) the norms regarding independent directors in these 
countries contain several shortcomings that question their effectiveness; (ii) the 
empirical evidence of independent directors’ performance in those countries does 
not call for optimism; and (iii) the reason for the present disposition in those 
countries is the persistence of several constraints that operate to minimise the 
effect of independent directors. 
 In this Chapter, I approach the question from a normative standpoint. 
What does the future hold for independent directors in emerging economies? Is it 
time to consider jettisoning the concept altogether in these economies? 
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Alternatively, is there merit in retaining the concept and, if so, what are the 
changes required to be introduced to embolden independent directors in emerging 
economies such that they are able to perform the monitoring role and protect the 
interests of minority shareholders, the basic constituency that requires the 
independent directors’ allegiance? This Chapter seeks to address these questions. 
 Here, I confine myself to a discussion of reforms required to some of the 
key legal considerations that emerge from the analysis in the previous Chapters. 
For example, it has been found that issues relating to the nomination and 
appointment of independent directors and their exact role and constituencies they 
are required to protect are matters of grave doubt in the insider systems. Hence, 
this Chapter seeks to provide some options for future reforms on these fronts. On 
the other hand, there are also several practical issues relating to independent 
directors: their competence levels, availability of adequate information, ability to 
commit adequate time for the job and other matters pertaining to their 
performance of the role in practice. Many of these issues are common both in the 
outsider systems as well as insider systems. Hence, I do not propose to delve into 
details regarding some of these practical issues from a normative standpoint, but 
only to list them with some basic discussion so as to constitute an exhaustive 
guidance of factors to be taken into account by emerging economies while 
reforming their independent director norms. 
 344
7.2 Revisiting the Concept 
If the independent director concept in insider systems is mired in conceptual and 
practical problems, the obvious question that arises is whether the concept adds 
any value at all and hence whether it should be done away with altogether. Of 
course, independent directors may add value to companies from an advisory 
standpoint, but that can be a matter left to determination by parties voluntarily. 
For instance, if companies wish to bring experts on to their boards, they could do 
so nevertheless without the existence of any law that mandates the same. It is only 
the monitoring aspect that requires regulatory oversight or mandate by law, and if 
that aspect is not being fulfilled by independent directors, it may be argued that 
there is no merit in retaining independent directors as a mandatory requirement by 
law. At one level, it may seem outrageous to approach the issue from such an 
angle, but it might be worthwhile to ask that question anyway, considering that 
the present research seeks to strike at fundamental issues pertaining to the role of 
independent directors in the insider systems (particularly of China and India). 
 Having said that, the analysis in the previous Chapter does not support a 
radical proposal such as eliminating independent directors altogether in the insider 
systems. These questions have arisen previously in the outsider systems as well, 
where also there has been no empirical evidence of success of the concept, but 
scholars have repeatedly avoided the path of calling for extinction of independent 
directors. For example, it has been observed that “it is hard to oppose more 
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independent directors”945; even more, “[t]o oppose the institution of the 
independent director almost amounts to heresy”;946 and “[a]ny jurisdiction that 
does not stipulate the need for independent directors may find itself unable to 
attract capital to its securities markets”.947 The outcome of the present research is 
to advocate a similar position. 
 Merely because the concept has not been fully effective, it is not prudent 
to follow the radical (and perhaps less disquieting) approach of doing away with 
independent directors.948 Metaphorically speaking, that would tantamount to 
“throwing the baby out with the bathwater”. Independent directors do bring 
significant value to corporate governance not only in their advisory role, but also 
in their monitoring role. If the requirement of mandating independent directors is 
done away with, that would mean a loss of even the currently available (albeit 
minimal) monitoring efforts on corporate boards in insider systems. Hence, what 
is required is a revamping of the structure of the institution and the support 
systems available to independent directors to carry on their role more effectively. 
 However, it is equally important not to be over-optimistic about 
independent directors even within a reinforced set up. For reasons that have 
perhaps been belaboured at length earlier in this dissertation, it is not possible for 
                                                 
945
  Kahan & Rock, supra note 862 at 892. 
946
  Rodrigues, supra note 288 at 457. 
947
  Tan Cheng Han, “Corporate Governance and Independent Directors” (2003) 15 S.Ac.L.J. 355 
at 390-91. 
948
  Commentators in insider systems have noted that since it is a “universally acclaimed 
regulation” [sic], it ought to be retained, and that any other approach would question its 
introduction in the first place as a misjudged policy choice in these countries. Haldea, supra 
note 938. 
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independent directors to perform any magical role that ensures complete 
protection to minority shareholders, for example by preventing frauds in 
companies on whose boards they sit. That simply cannot be expected. Hence, it is 
incumbent upon the governments and regulatory authorities in insider systems, 
and particularly emerging economies such as China and India, to first comprehend 
the extent of utility of independent directors and to devise a corporate governance 
regime with that in mind, so that the current over-optimism bias is eliminated. 
Similarly, the regulatory authorities must moderate the expectation of the 
corporate players in order to ensure that there is no over-reliance on independent 
directors and that they are not seen as a solution to all corporate governance ills 
that plague those economies. In other words, it is important that the perceptional 
constraints that currently operate in the insider systems of China and India are 
carefully addressed so that corporate actors obtain clarity on the role of the 
independent directors and the extent to which they can make a difference to 
corporate governance in those countries. 
7.3 Alternate Structures for Appointment of Independent Directors 
One of the significant weaknesses of the current structure for independent 
directors in insider systems relates to their nomination and appointment. Since 
controlling shareholders (who are to be monitored) have a strong influence on the 
nomination and election process, the independent director institution fails to have 
any bite to begin with. As we have seen, independent directors tend to toe the line 
of the controlling shareholders as the latter category of persons nominates, 
appoints, remunerations, renews the term and even removes the independent 
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directors. This process obstructs the efficacy of independent directors in 
protecting the interests of minority shareholders. In terms of the way forward, one 
of the key areas for reforms relates to the process of nomination and appointment 
of independent directors. In this section, I propose to explore several alternate 
structures for the appointment of directors (other than straightforward election by 
shareholders) that may diminish the influence of controlling shareholders and 
thereby instill greater independent in fact in such directors. The details of each 
structure and a discussion of their advantages and disadvantages precede the 
recommendations for an optimal structure. 
A. Nomination Committee 
Nomination committees consisting of independent directors are mandatory in the 
U.S., as required by the leading stock exchanges,949 and they have also been 
called for in the U.K.950 The role of the nomination committee is to consider 
various candidates for appointment as independent directors and to make 
recommendations to the full board.951 There are various methods that nomination 
committees utilise before they make their choice. These include consideration of 
candidates identified by external consultants (e.g., recruitment firms), through 
                                                 
949
  See supra note 323 and accompanying text. Both the NYSE and the NASDAQ require the 
nomination committee to be comprised entirely of independent directors. 
950
  The strands of this approach can be seen in the Cadbury Committee Report. See supra note 
362 and accompanying text. The key recommendations of the Cadbury Committee Report 
have been adopted in the Combined Code for Corporate Governance in the U.K., which 
requires the majority of nomination committees to consist of independent directors. See 
Combined Code 2008, supra note 373, para. A.4.1. There is a similar requirement in other 
Commonwealth countries. See e.g., in Australia, as recommended by the Bosch Committee. 
Ford, Austin & Ramsay, supra note 17 at 16. 
951
  See Charles A. Anderson & Robert N. Anthony, The New Corporate Directors (John Wiley 
& Sons, 1986) at 94. 
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recommendations from other industry players, and quite often through names put 
forth by the management itself.952 In many cases, nomination committees are 
required to follow strict procedures and maintain utmost transparency in their 
functioning.953 It has become almost customary for independent directors to be 
nominated by nomination committees in outsider systems. However, there is no 
requirement of nomination committees in the insider systems of China954 and 
India.955 It is therefore necessary to consider whether such nomination committees 
in these insider systems will adequately deal with the problem of controlling 
shareholder influence in the appointment of independent directors. 
 As far as outsider systems are concerned, nomination committees do serve 
a purpose. Since it is the manager-shareholder agency problem that dominates the 
                                                 
952
  See Helen Bird, “The Rise and Fall of the Independent Director” (1995) 5 A.J.C.L. 235 at 
251. Some of the practitioners interviewed for this research shared their experience on the 
nomination process followed by companies (including some listed in outsider systems) on 
whose boards they occupy seats and generally concurred with this perspective. 
953
  For example, one observer notes elaborate mechanisms to be followed by a nomination 
committee: 
The [nomination committee requirement] significantly expands the disclosures relating to 
the director nomination process. A company is … also required to: make the nominating 
committee's charter publicly available, disclose whether the nominating committee 
members meet … independence requirements, disclose whether the committee has a 
policy regarding considering nominees recommended by shareholders, describe the 
minimum qualifications for nominees recommended by the committee, describe the 
qualities and skills that the nominating committee believes are necessary or desirable for 
board members, describe the nominating committee's process for identifying and 
evaluating candidates and whether fees are paid in connection therewith, disclose who 
recommended the nominee, and disclose the identity of any candidate nominated by a 
holder of more than five percent of the voting common stock, regardless of whether the 
nominating committee chose to nominate that candidate. 
Patty M. DeGaetano, “The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased 
Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?” (2005) 41 Cal. 
W.L. Rev. 361 at 382. 
954
  As we have seen earlier, supra Chapter 4, Section 4.3(C)(7), there is no mandatory 
requirement to constitute committees of directors, let alone a nomination committee, in China. 
955
  The establishment of a nomination committee is not mandated in India either. See supra 
Chapter 4, Section 4.4(C)(5). 
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corporate governance arena, the nomination committee removes the independent 
director nomination process outside the purview of the management. When an 
independent nomination committee picks candidates for independent directorship, 
they present the candidate to the shareholders for their vote. Since the 
shareholders are dispersed in the outsider system, they are likely to vote for the 
candidate presented by the independent nomination committee, and they are 
unlikely to come together to vote against a candidate (unless, of course, there are 
some extreme circumstances). This process effectively keeps the management 
outside the nomination and election process.956 
 However, if this system is replicated in the insider system, the outcome is 
likely to be different by quite a wide margin. Even if an independent nomination 
committee were to nominate candidates without the influence of the controlling 
shareholders or management, those candidates would ultimately have to be voted 
at a shareholders’ meeting, where the controlling shareholders will wield a 
significant influence. While the nomination and election are virtually seamless in 
the outsider systems (due to lack of significant shareholder input), they are two 
different processes in the insider systems. The nomination committee tackles the 
first process, but it does not touch upon the second. Controlling shareholders will 
continue to have the ability to sway the shareholder decision on whether the 
candidate nominated by the nomination committee should be appointed on not. 
                                                 
956
  It is a different matter that criticisms have been levelled that management continues to play an 
important role in the manner in which nomination committees select their candidates. For 
example, quite often, nomination committees tend to rely extensively on candidates that have 
been identified by management. See Monks & Minnow, supra note 3 at 202; Anderson & 
Anthony, supra note 951 at 94. 
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Hence, nomination committees are compelled to function in the shadow of an 
ultimate shareholder decision (with controlling shareholder influence). For this 
reason, nomination committees are unlikely to pick a candidate who does not 
have the tacit acceptance of a controlling shareholder. It would be an 
embarrassment after all if the person nominated by the nomination committee 
fails to muster enough votes at a shareholders’ meeting due to opposition from the 
controlling shareholders. Implicitly, therefore, independent nomination 
committees are likely to consult controlling shareholders before putting up names 
for election.  
Such a process is unlikely to effectively deal with the majority-minority 
agency problem in the insider systems as independent director appointments 
continue to be within the de facto control of the controlling shareholders. 
However, a nomination committee process is nevertheless superior to the current 
system of direct elections (without an independent nomination process). A 
rigorous and transparent nomination process957 could minimise the influence of 
controlling shareholders.958 
The next few options involve a change in the voting process for election of 
independent directors and also in the constituencies that elect them. 
                                                 
957
  For a brief description of such a process, see supra note 953. 
958
  When independent nomination committees select candidates in a manner that is transparent to 
all shareholders (and other stakeholders), controlling shareholders may find it difficult to veto 
the appointment of such nominee as that would send negative signals about the company and 
its corporate governance principles to the market, which could also impact the company’s 
stock performance. 
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B. Minority Shareholder Participation in Independent Director Elections 
Currently, independent directors in the insider systems are elected by shareholders 
through the “straight voting” system, whereby a majority of the shareholders 
present and voting for a resolution can determine whether or not a candidate for 
independent directorship is appointed.959 It is the straight voting system that 
provides complete dominance to controlling shareholders in the appointment of 
independent directors, as minority shareholders do not have any say at all. My 
proposal in this Section deals with the enhancement of minority shareholder 
involvement in independent director elections. This would make independent 
directors accountable to the shareholder body as a whole (including the minority 
shareholders) as opposed to the sole allegiance to controlling shareholders as 
currently practised in the insider systems. 
Minority shareholder participation can be introduced through two 
principal methods: (i) cumulative voting by shareholders;960 and (ii) election of 
independent directors by a “majority of the minority”.961 At this stage, it is 
                                                 
959
  See Sanjai Bhagat & James A. Brickley, “Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority 
Shareholder Voting Rights” (1984) 27 J.L. & Econ. 339 at 339 [Minority Shareholder Voting 
Rights], providing a simple description: 
In most corporation board members are elected through “straight voting.” In straight 
voting each shareholder is entitled to cast votes equal to the number of shares held for 
each director position. If a group controls 51 percent of the vote, it can elect the entire 
board of directors by casting all of its votes for the candidate that it favors for each 
position. 
Note, however, that in straight voting any shareholding above 50%, i.e. one vote more than 
50%, is sufficient to guarantee appointment of all directors. It is not necessary to have “51 
percent” as the authors suggest above. 
960
  For an introduction to the concept of cumulative voting, see supra note 520. 
961
  In this method, controlling shareholders will not be permitted to vote for the election of 
independent directors. The independent directors will be elected by a majority of votes that 
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imperative to discuss the rationale for minority involvement in independent 
director elections before dealing with the details of each of the two options.962 
 Minority shareholder involvement in director elections as a mandatory 
matter is almost a rarity. Currently, only the company law that was adopted in 
Russia over a decade ago contains a mandatory provision for cumulative voting 
for director elections.963 However, historical accounts of cumulative voting 
(including one by Professor Gordon)964 indicate that it was a prevalent practice in 
the early part of the 20th century, and was even a mandatory provision for director 
elections in some states in the U.S. This practice witnessed its demise first in the 
1950s and thereafter in the 1980s due to pressure from the managerialist forces.965 
Managers sought to ensure complete influence in director elections without 
shareholder influence, thereby perpetuating the manager-shareholder agency 
problem. The nearly-eliminated concept of cumulative voting (as a measure of 
                                                                                                                                     
are cast by all the non-controlling shareholders. Hence the expression “majority of the 
minority”. 
962
  Note, however, that the literature concerning the role of minority shareholders in director 
elections is largely embedded in the context of cumulative voting rather than “majority of the 
minority”, and hence any reference to cumulative voting in this rationale discussion will apply 
equally to the “majority of the minority” even though no explicit reference is made to the 
latter. 
963
  See Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 24 at 55. 
964
  See Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative 
Voting” (1994) 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124 [Cumulative Voting].  
965
  Ibid. at 144. Professor Gordon further notes: 
I have looked at salient historical factors operating during the two periods of rapid 
movement away from mandatory cumulative voting, the 1950s and the 1980s. The 
evidence suggests that at both times managerialist motives activated the process of 
legislative change: in the 1950s, managers wanted to reduce the threat of proxy contests 
which, among other characteristics, seemed to jeopardize senior management tenure; in 
the 1980s, they wanted to reduce the threat of hostile takeovers by eliminating a 
particular route to board representation. 
Ibid. at 148. 
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minority shareholder involvement in director elections) has found its resurrection 
recently, but only in the form of the mandate in Russia.966 
 Minority shareholder participation in elections of directors in general and 
independent directors in particular carries with it significant advantages. First, 
minority shareholders obtain representation on the board of directors,967 as they 
are unable to do so in the straight voting process. Second, independent directors 
elected by minority shareholders will obtain knowledge about various policy 
decisions that are being discussed on the board. Knowledge itself is a significant 
advantage, and it is of special significance where public disclosure of company 
information is not advanced in the relevant jurisdiction.968 This bears significance 
to jurisdictions like China and India where the availability of company 
information is not as wide as it is in the outsider economies.969 Third, independent 
directors will be truly independent (of management and controlling shareholders) 
and hence accountable to the minority shareholders as such directors have been 
elected by that constituency.970 Fourth, the minority shareholders’ voice will be 
heard on the board through independent directors elected by them.971 Fifth, 
                                                 
966
  See supra note 963. See also, Black & Kraakman, Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 52. 
967
  Whitney Campbell, “The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors” (1955) 10 
Bus. Law. 3 at 13. 
968
  Black & Kraakman, Self-Enforcing Model, supra note 52 at 1947. 
969
  As between China and India, it must be noted that SEBI in India has taken significant steps in 
recent times to improve disclosure of financial and other information by companies by 
prescribing detailed disclosure norms, both in the primary markets as well as secondary 
markets. 
970
  Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 964 at 133. 
971
  Campbell, supra note 967 at 13. Another commentator observes: 
… while criticism [of management and controlling shareholders] may be painful, it often 
acts as an oven to refine out impurities or expose weaknesses. A board of directors' 
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independent directors elected by minority shareholders will have incentives to 
monitor the activities of management and controlling shareholders against 
transactions that create conflicts of interest.972 Finally, there is fairly unequivocal 
empirical evidence that supports minority shareholder participation in director 
elections through cumulative voting.973 
 On the other hand, minority shareholder representation on corporate 
boards brings with it certain disadvantages. First, minority shareholder 
representation could impede constructive decision making on corporate boards as 
it is likely to create frictions causing disruption in boardroom activity. Second, 
due to the diversity of interests represented on the board, it is argued that 
“minority representation schemes expose the firm to an uncompensated risk of 
making inconsistent or illogical decisions”.974 Third, it may be a device for certain 
minority shareholders to extract rents out of management or controlling 
shareholders – a kind of blackmail, by which the process can be subjected to 
                                                                                                                                     
meeting should be a place for hard work and clear thinking. It should not be run like a 
social club where a person with unpopular ideas can be "blackballed" by those who don't 
like him. A famous statesman is reported to have said: "If you can't stand the heat, get out 
of the kitchen." 
John G. Sobieski, “In Support of Cumulative Voting” (1960) 15 Bus. Law. 316 at 321-22. 
972
  Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 964 at 170. 
973
  Bhagat & Brickley, Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 959 at 364 (finding that 
the inclusion of a provision for cumulative voting rights in charters of companies enhanced 
share values of such companies); Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, “On Corporate 
Governance: The Impact of Proxy Contests” (1983) 11 J. Fin. Econ. 401 (concluding that 
cumulative voting tends to benefit shareholders). The empirical studies in this area may be 
limited, but they are at least consistent. 
974
  Frank. H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, (1983) “Voting in Corporate Law 26 J. Law & 
Econ. 395 at 410. 
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abuse.975 Fourth, it could provide avenues for competitors to put forth candidates 
as independent directors so as to obtain information about the company and derive 
undue competitive advantage.976 
 Having considered the advantages and disadvantages of minority 
shareholder representation on corporate boards, I argue that the benefits of this 
method of director election far outweigh its costs. Of course, minority shareholder 
representation is likely to denude the collegiality on corporate boards, but that is a 
small price to pay for the lack of effective monitoring that exists on corporate 
boards currently in the insider systems where independent directors are effectively 
the nominees of the controlling shareholders. There may be complexities in the 
decision-making process, but the benefit is effective monitoring that protects all 
shareholders (including the minority). Objections such as rent-seeking behaviour 
and exposure to competition can also be carefully addressed. Rent-seeking by 
minority shareholders can be avoided through a careful nomination process of 
independent directors by an independent nomination committee.977 Furthermore, 
as a matter of law, allegiance of independent directors to competition could result 
in breach of duties by independent directors that could expose them to potential 
liability. In essence, the perceived disadvantages of minority shareholder 
representation cannot preclude the introduction of an otherwise beneficial method 
of independent director election. 
                                                 
975
  See Ralph E. Axley, “The Case Against Cumulative Voting” 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 278 at 283. 
See also Campbell, supra note 967 at 13; Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 964 at 169. 
976
  See Axley, ibid. at 283. 
977
  This is a matter I discuss later. See infra note 996 and accompanying text. 
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 On a more theoretical plane, it is interesting to note that the arguments 
against minority shareholder representation carry greater acceptability in the 
context of outsider systems and that the concept is more attuned towards the 
insider systems. For instance, Professor Gordon notes that the decline of 
cumulative voting is associated with the movement among U.S. companies from 
concentrated ownership to diffused ownership.978 Such a view finds 
overwhelming support.979 In the context of the theoretical analysis adopted in this 
dissertation, this only boils down to one conclusion. Minority shareholder 
representation may not be necessary (and may even be undesirable) where there is 
diffused shareholding, and hence it is not seen as a mechanism for addressing the 
                                                 
978
  Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 964 at 169, stating: 
In the large public corporation there was no face-off between majority and minority 
interests; rather, management was the party on the other side. Thus the potential role of 
cumulative voting changed, from giving a minority a voice in a majority-dominated firm 
to giving a minority a voice in a management-dominated firm. This led to a significant 
problem. Management's control, because it rested only on the proxy machinery and on 
the majority's apathy, seemed at risk in such a confrontation. Because a tenacious 
minority could do real damage to management's position, management would face the 
temptation to accede to various rentextraction proposals that a minority might present. In 
short, in the absence of a majority check on minority power and without adequate 
monitoring of management by the majority, the minority's power under a cumulative 
voting regime made the firm vulnerable to hold-up. 
979
  See Herbert F. Sturdy, “Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism” (1961) 16 Bus. 
Law. 550 at 563, noting: 
The preceding case histories and comments deal principally with close corporations 
which usually have an unchanging majority. About the only escape for the minority 
whose interests are being abused is to be bought out in one way or another. Publicly held 
corporations are, on the other hand, quite different in many respects. In the first place 
there is probably a market in which the shares of a minority may be sold. Furthermore 
there is no fixed majority so that one who is in the majority today may be in the minority 
tomorrow and vice versa. Because shares are available to anyone on the market, and 
because of the fluidity of the majority position, and because of the necessity of dealing 
with many proxies, it is in the publicly held corporation that the results of mandatory 
cumulative voting can be seen at their worst. 
In this context, it is necessary to note that the liquidity in stock markets and the availability of 
free-float stock (i.e., that which is not held by the controlling shareholders) in insider systems 
is considerably low making them similar to the kind of close corporation referred to by 
Sturdy. 
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manager-shareholder agency problem.980 However, where there is concentrated 
shareholding, with a long-term controlling shareholder in control, minority 
shareholder participation can make all the difference in being able to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders. Contextually, therefore, minority shareholder 
participation in director elections (especially of independent directors) is an 
important tool in the hands of minority shareholders in insider systems, and its 
benefits significantly exceed its costs in these systems, thereby providing the 
requisite justification for introduction of such a voting method in these 
jurisdictions. 
 In the backdrop of this discussion, it is now necessary to consider some 
proposals for the specific application of minority shareholder participation in 
independent director elections in the insider systems such as China and India. 
1. Cumulative Voting 
This proposal relates to the use of cumulative voting for the election of 
independent directors. Cumulative voting will ensure that minority shareholders 
will have the ability to elect such number of independent directors as is 
proportionate to their shareholding in the company, thereby reducing the 
dominance of controlling shareholders in the process. In this structure, each 
shareholder gets to exercise such number of votes determined as the product of 
the number of shares held by the shareholder and the number of independent 
directors to be elected. The shareholder can exercise all votes in favour of a single 
                                                 
980
  This perhaps explains why cumulative voting was eliminated as a mandatory requirement in 
the U.S., in addition to manager influence in the policy-making process. 
 358
candidate or can split the votes among different candidates. In case all votes are 
cast in favour of a single candidate, then that candidate may have a chance of 
being elected depending on the total number of candidates that are in the fray.  
 The formula that is used for this purpose is:981 
     (X - 1) (D + 1) 
N = ---------------------- 
V 
where: 
X = number of votes exercised by a shareholder 
D = number of independent directors to be elected 
V = total number of votes exercised in the independent director election 
 
The important variables here are the number of votes available to a shareholder 
(relative to the total shareholding of the company) as well as the number of 
directors to be elected.982 Any change in either variable can alter the possibility of 
minority shareholders effectively being able to influence the overall outcome of 
the election.983 Therefore, the higher the number of independent directors, the 
greater the chance that shareholders with smaller stakes will be able to elect 
independent directors through cumulative voting. The reverse holds good equally. 
Hence, the concept of cumulative voting works only if the board of the company 
                                                 
981
  Bhagat & Brickley, Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, supra note 959 at 343. 
982
  Ibid. at 343 (explaining through an illustration that “if a corporation is to elect seven directors 
and it is estimated that one thousand shares will be voted, a group controlling 126 shares can 
expect to elect one director (if it cumulates its votes and votes for only one director)”. 
983
  Ibid. (making a small variation to their illustration to indicate that “in the example, if only five 
directors are to be elected, it requires 168 shares (rather than 126) to elect one director.” 
 359
is large, which therefore needs a larger body of independent directors that is 
mandatorily stipulated. 
 The advantage of cumulative voting is that it allows both controlling 
shareholders as well as minority shareholders to elect independent directors 
depending on the proportion of their respective shareholding. This creates a 
suitable mix of persons who are acceptable to controlling shareholders (and 
management) as well as truly independent directors. In that sense, the interests of 
all parties (including minority shareholders) are likely to be well-protected.984 
Furthermore, the management and controlling shareholders may also benefit from 
the guidance and counsel of independent directors that each of them may 
nominate. Such an election process may create three distinct classes of directors: 
(i) executive or promoter (non-independent directors), (ii) independent directors 
elected through votes of controlling shareholders, and (iii) independent directors 
elected by minority shareholders. This process will create a diverse board 
                                                 
984
  Apart from cumulative voting, the result of proportional representation of minority 
shareholders can be achieved through the system of single transferable vote. This is provided, 
for example, as an option for director elections in India. See Indian Companies Act, s. 265. A 
scheme involving a single transferable vote is explained below: 
 Single transferable [(“STV”)]vote is a preference voting system for a multi-seat election. 
… With STV, however, the voters are allowed to indicate more than simply their first 
choice among the candidates. Voters may also, if they wish, rank order candidates to 
reflect their relative preferences among them. … Ranking candidates in order of 
preference in an STV election enables votes that would be “wasted” on one candidate to 
be transferred to another candidate. A vote is wasted in either of two ways. It could be 
cast in support of a losing candidate, or it could be a “surplus” vote cast in support of a 
candidate who would win without it. Rather than waste a vote in such situations, STV 
allows a vote to be transferred to another candidate, provided the voter has specified a 
subsequent preference. STV is a voting system designed to increase the proportion of 
voters in an election whose vote will ultimately contribute to the election of a candidate. 
Richard L. Engstrom, “The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority 
Vote Dilution” (1993) 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 779 at 788. While STV helps achieve the same result 
for minority shareholders as cumulative voting, it is somewhat more complex as it requires 
voters to make multiple choices in order of preference. 
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representing varying interests, and hence it cannot be said that there is any 
shareholder interest that is unprotected.985 
The interests of minority shareholders will be truly protected in this 
scheme only if the total number of independent directors is significant, but not 
otherwise.986 In this context, there may be a question as to what is the minimum 
number of independent directors for whose election the cumulative voting method 
can be employed. Here, the present research does not propose to identify any 
magical figure and to impose the same as a criterion for the applicability of the 
rule. That would depend on a number of factors such as broad shareholding 
patterns in companies in a particular insider system, usual board size, the 
                                                 
985
  The second category of persons, i.e., those independent directors elected by controlling 
shareholders may have an important role to perform as well, in terms of mediating the various 
interests on the board. On the one hand they are elected by controlling shareholders, but on 
the other hand they are independent (at least in form) as they will still be required to satisfy 
the definition of “independence” under the relevant corporate governance norms applicable in 
the insider jurisdiction. Their role will be akin to the ‘mediating director’ described by 
Professor Langevoort: 
Such persons may not, for reasons often emphasized in the literature, be the best external 
monitors. But they may well make up for this shortcoming as advisers to the management 
and as emissaries to the true outsiders on the board. The same may be true of the so-
called “gray” directors. … But again, whatever their limits as monitors, their knowledge 
of, and ties to, the senior managers put them in a good position to earn trust inside. They 
can then build on this trust to work with the outsiders to reduce the level of cognitive 
diversity and allow the board to function more efficiently. 
… 
We have put forward two sets of less conventional reasons why firms with “mixed” 
boards may be more productive than super-independent ones. The first is that giving 
insiders a significant political presence on the board may help both de-bias the outsiders 
and bolster the perceived quality and stability … The second reason is that overloading 
the board with true monitors may create too stark a dilemma for the senior managers, 
forcing them to engage in impression management tactics at the expenses of seeking 
needed advice and assistance in strategy formulation and resource gathering. 
Langevoort, supra note 416 at 815-16. This discussion in the context of the manager-
shareholder agency problem has its parallel in the majority-minority agency problem as well. 
986
  Whenever there is a small number of independent directors, it is recommended that they be 
appointed by the “majority of the minority” voting method discussed below, see infra Section 
7.3(B)(2). 
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minimum number of independent directors to be appointed and the like. It would 
be best left to the discretion of regulatory authorities within the relevant insider 
system to crystallise that minimum number of independent directors. Similarly, 
cumulative voting is effective only when the minority shareholders (at least as a 
collective) hold a meaningful number of shares, but even the determination of that 
number is best left for determination on a case-by-case basis, without hazarding 
any guess as to a magic number.987 Lastly, it is also necessary to provide that all 
independent directors will have a concurrent term that runs for a period to be 
determined by the relevant insider system.988 In that case, all independent 
directors will be elected at the same time989 thereby providing a robust number for 
an election that makes cumulative voting more meaningful. This is to guard 
against a situation where minority shareholders do not have much power in 
cumulative voting. For example, in a staggered board, only a small number of 
independent directors will come up for elections each year, in which case 
cumulative voting will not provide any meaningful role to minority shareholders 
for reasons discussed earlier. If minority shareholders do not have a meaningful 
role at repeated elections due to the thin number of independent directors being 
elected, then the controlling shareholders enjoy similar powers as they have in the 
                                                 
987
  Even here, where shareholding of the minority shareholders is minimal, then the appointment 
of some, if not all, independent directors can be determined by a “majority of the minority”. 
See infra Section 7.3(B)(2). This can be illustrated by certain companies in India, e.g. Wipro, 
which are listed on stock exchange both in India and the U.S., but where the controlling 
shareholder holds in excess of 80% with very little possibility of any minority representation 
on the board through the election of even a single independent director. 
988
  For example, a 3-year term would be customary and desirable, although there is no hard and 
fast rule in that behalf. 
989
  In case any independent director’s term comes to an end in the interim for any reason (such as 
resignation, death, removal or the like), then it can be provided that the term of all 
independent directors will come to an end at the ensuing annual general meeting where fresh 
elections are to be held. 
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case of straight voting. Hence, it is important that all independent directors are 
elected together at the same time, and not on a staggered basis. 
2. Voting by “Majority of the Minority” 
In this schema, only the minority shareholders are entitled to vote for the election 
of independent directors. Each independent director will be elected so long as the 
candidate enjoys majority support within the constituency comprising of the 
minority shareholders. In this approach, neither the controlling shareholder nor 
the management can influence the appointment as they have no role at all. The 
controlling shareholders will not be permitted to vote in independent director 
elections under this proposal. Furthermore, this is useful where the number of 
independent directors to be appointed is small whereby the system of cumulative 
voting would render itself ineffective.990 This will result in true representation of 
minority shareholders on corporate boards and instill accountability in the minds 
of the independent directors towards minority shareholders. 
 The principal drawback of this proposal is that it could become subject to 
“capture” by the minority shareholders. For example, minority shareholders who 
may have an axe to grind with management or controlling shareholders could put 
up candidates who may denude constructive decision-making on the board. 
Moreover, it could also provide avenues to competitors to gain entry into 
corporate boards. The disadvantages of minority shareholder participation on 
corporate boards will be greatly accentuated in the “majority of the minority” 
                                                 
990
  For reasons, see supra note 986 and accompanying text. 
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scheme than in the cumulative voting scheme. Despite these drawbacks, this 
proposal gives significant rights to minority shareholders so as to ameliorate the 
majority-minority agency problem. 
3. Evaluation of Options for Minority Shareholder Representation 
Having considered the two types of minority shareholder participation in 
independent director elections,991 it would be necessary to evaluate some concrete 
proposals in the context of the issues identified in this dissertation. 
(a) Is there an optimal option?: For the reasons discussed in this Section, 
minority shareholder participation is the recommended option for election of 
independent directors. However, as between the two options of cumulative voting 
and “majority of the minority” as methods of such participation, this dissertation 
would stop short of recommending one option over the other. That is because the 
optimality of the option would depend on a number of circumstances, such as the 
normal board size (including any minimum number of directors required) in a 
corporate governance system, the number of independent directors to be elected, 
                                                 
991
  In addition to these two methods, there is another method sometimes employed to provide 
succour to minority shareholders. This method imposes caps on shareholders’ voting rights. 
See Kraakman, et. al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra note 24 at 55-56. For example, 
it can be stated that regardless of the number of shares held by a shareholder, such shareholder 
can exercise voting rights in respect of only a defined maximum number of shares (10%, just 
to illustrate). This would mean that a controlling shareholder can exercise voting rights for 
10% shares no matter what percentage of shares that shareholder holds, while a coalition of 
minority shareholders holding more than 10% shares in the aggregate could command a 
majority (so long as each of those minority shareholders hold less than 10% shares 
individually). This would effectively provide controlling powers to the minority shareholders. 
This scheme is neither being discussed nor recommended in this dissertation as it could result 
in abuse of powers by the minority of the controlling shareholders, an instance of reverse 
discrimination and abuse. Even as a general matter, caps on voting rights are not widely 
utilised in corporate law systems, except in certain specific countries or in respect of 
industries that are subject to heavy regulation (such as banking and certain types of financial 
services). 
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the broad shareholding pattern of companies in that system, and the like. It 
should, therefore, be open to the regulators in each relevant insider system to 
determine which of the options suits the system in the best possible way, given 
the operability of these factors. To recommend one single option as cast in stone 
may result in lack of effectiveness if other factors are not commensurate with 
such option. 
(b) How to deal with the collective action problem?: At this stage, an 
important question may arise in the reader’s mind. If powers of selection of 
independent directors are to be conferred on minority shareholders, can there be 
an assurance that those powers will be exercised in fact? Will the minority 
shareholders not suffer from the collective action problem, thereby resulting in 
sub-optimal choices for independent directors? These are valid questions indeed 
and need to be addressed. At the outset, it is to be noted that the collective action 
problem is more severe in the straight voting process than voting with minority 
shareholder participation. In straight voting, it is almost guaranteed that the 
controlling shareholder will be able to influence the outcome of the election, and 
hence minority shareholders rarely take part in the elections as their votes do not 
affect the final outcome. The collective action problem among minority 
shareholders is at its highest intensity because there is no benefit in forming any 
coalitions due to their inability to affect the result. However, where the election 
process guarantees some level of influence to minority shareholders (either 
through cumulative voting or “majority of the minority”), they are likely to be 
incentivised to exercise their ballot. Each vote could make a difference to the 
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outcome. Hence, the collective action problem among minority shareholders is far 
lesser in voting with minority shareholder participation than in straight voting. 
 But, this may not be adequate on its own. It is also necessary to inculcate a 
culture of investor activism in the insider systems. The process of activism, which 
has generated great interest even in the developed nations only about a decade 
ago,992 has found its way into the insider systems as well.993 The concepts of 
relational investing994 by institutional investors such as private equity funds and 
venture capital funds as well as the increase of participation by investors such as 
CalPERS and activist hedge funds into emerging markets will raise levels of 
investor activism. Regulatory authorities too can encourage investor activism 
through establishment of investor associations that can take up causes on behalf of 
minority shareholders, including by encouraging them to exercise their rights in 
the corporate democracy.995 Such measures would ensure that shareholder 
participation is achieved not just as a legal matter, but in practice as well. 
(c) How to prevent rent-seeking by minority shareholders?: In order to ensure 
that the disadvantages of minority shareholder representation are neutralised, it is 
necessary to adopt a stringent nomination process that results in the selection of 
                                                 
992
 See e.g., Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director, supra note 415. 
993
  For example, in the Satyam case, it was activism in the form of excessive sale of stocks that 
raised crucial questions regarding related party transactions with the Maytas companies. See 
supra note 771 and accompanying text. 
994
  In this arrangement, “institutions see themselves as long term investors in the firm-owners-
rather than as short term traders or arbitrageurs”. Gordon, Cumulative Voting, supra note 964 
at 127. 
995
  For example, in India, SEBI already encourages and regulates the operation of investors’ 
associations. See online: <http://investor.sebi.gov.in/InvAssOperations.html>.  
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competent, committed and impartial candidates who are put up for election by 
minority shareholders. Such a nomination process can be accomplished by the 
mandatory requirement of a nomination committee that carries on its process with 
regard for due transparency.996 This would ensure that minority shareholders (and 
other stakeholders) have adequate information about candidates that stand for the 
post of independent directors as also their competence levels and an 
understanding about the broad constituencies they are likely to represent. This 
would act as an effective deterrence against rent-seeking (including by 
competitors and alleged blackmailers). Therefore, it is clear that minority 
shareholder participation would act as an effective method of independent director 
election only if it is accompanied by an unimpeachable nomination process that is 
truly independent. 
(d) Renewal and removal of independent directors: The procedure for renewal 
of the term of independent directors ought to be the same as that for a fresh 
appointment, i.e., through a selection by an independent nomination committee 
and election through minority shareholder participation. As far as removal is 
concerned, there are some key issues to be borne in mind. There is no benefit in 
having a carefully considered election process for independent director if that can 
be undone in one stroke by a straight forward removal process. For example, if 
independent directors can be removed by a simple majority of shareholders, then 
the controlling shareholders can reverse the effect of appointing independent 
                                                 
996
  Such a detailed and transparent nomination process has been discussed earlier. See supra note 
953. 
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directors by removing them through exercise of their influence.997 In order to 
obviate such a reversal, along with minority shareholder participation in 
independent director elections, it is necessary to impose stringent removal 
requirements. Either independent directors can be removed by shareholders only 
for “cause” or they can be removed with a supermajority that requires a higher 
threshold (of say 3/4th or 2/3rd majority of shareholders voting for the resolution). 
This would ensure that independent directors are capable of being removed only 
in extreme circumstances, and not simply because such directors no longer enjoy 
the trust of the controlling shareholders. Such a requirement is essential to ensure 
that independent directors remain outside the influence of controlling 
shareholders. 
 Before concluding the discussion on nomination and appointment of 
independent directors, it is necessary to discuss two other possibilities that pertain 
to appointments by persons other than shareholders (i.e., by stakeholders and by 
the government). 
C. “Public Interest” Directors 
One possible option may be for independent directors to be either elected or 
selected by non-shareholder constituencies such as employees, creditors, 
consumers or other stakeholders so as to preserve the “public interest” element in 
                                                 
997
  This could result in disastrous consequences that exacerbate the majority-minority agency 
problem. For instance, one of the shortcomings of the revised company law in Russia is that 
although it provided for director elections through mandatory cumulative voting, it continued 
to retain a straight forward removal process (albeit with some differences) whereby 
controlling shareholders can wipe out the effect of the cumulative voting process. See 
Nikulin, supra note 52 at 371. 
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companies. Such directors will represent the non-shareholder constituencies,998 
and their position is consistent with the stakeholder approach followed in the 
insider systems. However, there could be certain difficulties in the 
implementation of such a proposal. First, public interest directors may dilute the 
focus of the company and its board, thereby resulting in neither enhancement of 
shareholder value nor protection of public interest.999 Second, the interests of the 
various stakeholders are likely to be heterogeneous and hence an independent 
director elected to cater to the interests of one constituency may not be in a 
position to protect the other diverse interests. The diversity in the interests makes 
it difficult to find independent directors who are accountable to all 
constituencies.1000 Furthermore, the interests of non-shareholder constituencies 
may be protected through other means, both under corporate law (e.g., 
                                                 
998
  See Douglas M. Branson, “Corporate Governance “Reform” and the New Corporate Social 
Responsibility” (2001) 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 605 at 612. 
999
  For instance, it has been noted: 
Although directors selected from such groups may legitimately claim that they are urging 
the board to look at the company's operations with a wider perspective than the 
immediate or short run profitability of the company, there is the risk that their presence 
on the board (particularly if they have been consciously selected to promote a special 
point of view) will tilt board decisions in special directions that comport neither with 
company profitability nor with the more widely dispersed interests of the community as a 
whole. 
Noyes E. Leech & Robert H. Mundheim, “The Outside Director of the Publicly held 
Corporation” (1976) 31 Bus. Law. 1799 at 1828. 
1000
  Christopher J. Smart, Note, “Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our 
Brothers’ Keeper?” 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 301 at 315, finding:  
One profound obstacle lies in the selection of the non-shareholder constituencies entitled 
to representation. As a practical matter, one could not provide individual board 
representation for all constituencies affected by corporate decision-making—the board 
would be too large to function effectively. However, the criteria with which to narrow the 
potential applicant pool are difficult to establish. 
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supervisory board in a two-tier system)1001 and under other laws (such as labour 
laws, creditor-protection laws, consumer protection laws and the like). For these 
reasons, it is found that there is no merit in requiring non-shareholder 
constituencies to appoint independent directors. 
D. Government Director 
Another variant of the public interest director is an independent director who is 
appointed on corporate boards by the government so as to protect general interest 
(which may include the interests of minority shareholders as well as other non-
shareholder constituencies). This is an alternative to election of independent 
directors by stakeholder constituencies directly.1002 Usually, the appointment of 
directors by the government is resorted to only in extreme cases where the 
company cannot stay afloat on its own and the stakeholders’ interests are 
adversely affected. The Satyam case involves an instance where the appointment 
of government directors was met with huge success. After the fraud was 
discovered, the government appointed six directors who acted responsibly and in 
a timely manner, even managing to find a new buyer for the company thereby 
protecting the interests of the employees, creditors and customers.1003  
However, apart from this, it has been found that such directors have not 
been successful in the past and have been subject to serious conflicts of 
                                                 
1001
  A classic example of this is the codetermination requirement on supervisory boards in China. 
See PRC Company Law, art. 118. 
1002
  Smart, supra note 1000 at 316. 
1003
  For a discussion on this issue, see supra note 788 and accompanying text. 
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interest.1004 More importantly, the decisions of the government officials in 
effecting the appointment of independent directors may be influenced by 
extraneous considerations. Controlling shareholders and management too may 
play a rent-seeking role in influencing the government’s identification of 
independent directors for a company. Owing to these reasons, while the position 
of government directors may be useful in rare cases, it is not necessary to consider 
that as a general principle for selection of independent directors on corporate 
boards of listed companies in the insider systems. 
To conclude the discussion on selection of independent directors, the 
recommended course of action is the nomination of such directors by an 
independent nomination committee through a transparent process and the election 
of such directors by way of minority shareholder participation (either through 
cumulative voting or “majority of the minority”). 
7.4 Crystallising the Role of Independent Directors 
Following the appointment process, this dissertation identifies the lack of a clear 
role for independent directors as a key shortcoming of the corporate governance 
norms in the insider systems. That leads to the question as to what the role of the 
independent director ought to be. 
 It is recommended that the role consist of two parts: (i) advisory; and (ii) 
monitoring. Independent directors need to bring value to the company in terms of 
their ability to provide inputs on strategy, business, marketing, legal, compliance 
                                                 
1004
  See Smart, supra note 1000 at 316. 
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or other relevant aspects and also carry out monitoring functions (by acting as 
watchdogs) in order to protect the interests of shareholders in general and 
minority shareholders in particular. The corporate governance norms in the 
insider systems ought to clearly outline these rules so that independent directors 
are not subject to any uncertainty on this front. It must also be admitted that it 
may be too much to require every independent director to perform both advisory 
and monitoring functions, and that may not be practicable to begin with.1005 
However, the board could be comprised of independent directors with different 
capabilities so that the board as a whole may be in a position to performance both 
these functions effectively. 
 More specifically, the monitoring aspects can be carried out by 
independent directors only if they are conferred specific powers. It is not 
sufficient if independent directors merely record any transaction or express their 
opinion on the suitability thereof whenever that comes up for consideration before 
the board, particularly where such transaction involves self-dealing or other 
related party transaction between the company on the one hand and the 
management or controlling shareholders on the other. Currently, the powers 
conferred on independent directors are insufficient. For example, in China, 
independent directors are only required to acknowledge and state their opinions 
on key transactions involving related party affairs,1006 and in India the audit 
committee is required only to verify disclosures pertaining to related party 
                                                 
1005
  This aspect has been emphasised by Nolan, supra note 256 at 438. 
1006
  For a discussion of this aspect, see supra note 539 and accompanying text. 
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transactions.1007 They have no approval rights whatsoever even though related 
party transactions may significantly enrich the controlling shareholders and erode 
the value of the minority shareholders.1008 Such a situation can be corrected if 
independent directors are provided the exclusive right to approve certain types of 
transactions involving related parties that reduce the value of the minority 
shareholders. In such transactions, it is the minority shareholders who are entirely 
under-protected under the current dispensation. It is not proposed in this 
dissertation to list out the items that require the approval of the independent 
directors. That would be a matter of detail to be suitably tailored by the regulators 
to each insider system, but the guiding principle to defining a related party 
transaction is that it should include any transaction that involves self-dealing with 
management or controlling shareholders, being any transaction that benefits 
management or controlling shareholders to the detriment of the other (minority) 
shareholders. 
 As a matter of procedure, it is necessary to ensure that such matters for 
approval of independent directors are taken up at a separate meeting of 
independent directors without the presence of management or controlling 
shareholder representatives (i.e., in executive sessions). This is essential to ensure 
that independent directors are able to freely exchange views among themselves, 
adopt a proper position and make an impartial judgment. The presence of 
                                                 
1007
  See supra note 618 and accompanying text. 
1008
  Even in the Satyam case, we find that in the discussions pertaining to a significant related 
party transaction, independent directors only raised questions, but in the end unanimously 
approved the transactions as they were voting along with the non-independent directors, 
although the directors representing the related parties themselves abstained. See supra note 
769. 
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management or controlling shareholder will negatively influence the decision-
making by the independent directors. Such an approach may seem largely 
procedural, but it has enormous implications. This procedure will help 
independent directors overcome the cultural constraints in the insider system that 
I have discussed in detail earlier.1009 
 Identification of clear roles and functions by regulatory authorities will not 
only introduce certainty in the minds of the independent directors as to their tasks 
on corporate boards, but it will also manage the expectations of shareholders and 
other stakeholders as to the level of monitoring they can expect from independent 
directors. Regulators too will be in a position to structure other corporate 
governance protections around the clearly defined role of independent directors. 
 The next key issue pertains to the constituencies that deserve the attention 
of independent directors. At the outset, it must be clarified that independent 
directors are required to owe their duties to the company as the separate legal 
entity. In that sense, all shareholders (whether controlling or minority) will be the 
beneficiaries of directors’ duties. Any breach of such duties would be met with 
consequences that are normally provided under law.  
 In addition to duties of directors generally, independent directors must 
have a special duty to protect the interests of minority shareholders where those 
rights are expected to come in conflict with those of the controlling 
                                                 
1009
  See supra Chapter 6, Section 6.4. 
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shareholder.1010 In such circumstances, controlling shareholders do not require 
any protection as they virtually dominate the affairs of the company through their 
voting power. It is the minority shareholders who deserve protection through 
monitoring by independent directors. In case of a breach of these duties, 
appropriate remedies need to be devised depending on the types of shareholder 
actions available under each insider jurisdiction. In that sense, minority 
shareholders are a key constituency whose interests are to be protected by 
independent directors. 
 By way of analogy, even where directors owe duties to the company as a 
legal entity, the shield of separate legal personality breaks down in certain 
circumstances such as where the company falls into insolvency.1011 Similarly, it 
should be made possible to break down the legal personality when directors 
decide on specific transactions such as related-party transactions involving the 
controlling shareholders, where the specific consideration by independent 
directors of minority shareholder interests ought to educate or inform their 
decision-making and discharge of their duties owed to the company. 
 Moving to non-shareholder constituencies, the position becomes 
somewhat murky. As discussed earlier,1012 stakeholders are diverse in nature with 
heterogeneous interests and it will be difficult to impose any duties on the part of 
                                                 
1010
  It must be noted that the Independent Director Opinion in China does contemplate this 
situation and provide for such a special duty. See supra note 532 and accompanying text. 
However, that appears to be on the rule-book, but without any implementation whatsoever in 
practice. In India, on the other hand, no such duty exists at all under current law. 
1011
  Larry E. Ribstein & Kelli A. Alces, “Directors’ Duties in Failing Firms” (2007) 1 J. Bus. & 
Tech. L. 529. 
1012
  See supra note 1000 and accompanying text. 
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independent directors to act in the interests of any of the non-shareholder 
constituencies. Further, unlike the case of minority shareholders, it is difficult, if 
not impossible, to measure the interests of the stakeholders. Hence, it will be 
counterproductive to impose any duty on independent directors to act in the 
interests of stakeholders. Although stakeholder interests generally receive better 
protection under company law in the insider systems as opposed to the outsider 
systems, the institution of independent directors may not be the appropriate one to 
deal with those interests. For instance, institutions such as the supervisory board 
in a two-tier system, e.g., in China, may serve that purpose. In that sense, this 
dissertation does not seek to argue against the concept of supervisory board in 
China, but calls for a clear demarcation of the roles and responsibilities of 
independent directors and the supervisory board. To that extent, the supervisory 
board’s responsibilities can be delineated to include the protection of stakeholder 
interests (that it carries on in any case through codetermination), while the 
independent directors’ role can be to cater to shareholder interests, with particular 
reference to minority shareholders. Such a clear delineation would ensure that the 
two institutions do not work at cross-purposes. 
 Although this dissertation does not call for any special duty owed by 
independent directors towards the interests of stakeholders, it does not 
automatically imply the lack of any regard towards such interests. To that extent, 
a position similar to the ESV would be appropriate: while the shareholders’ 
interest (including minority shareholder interest) is paramount, necessary regard 
can be had to stakeholder interests. This only provides some general guidance to 
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independent directors regarding their role. It, however, does not provide any 
justiciable right on its own to the stakeholders if independent directors were to 
breach that requirement. 
7.5 Other Relevant Considerations 
In order to engender a workable institution of independent directors in insider 
systems, it is necessary to create an appropriate environment, both in terms of 
legal requirements as well as other practical considerations. In this Section, it is 
proposed to highlight some of these key considerations. The intention here is only 
to set out the broad principles in terms of recommendations without insisting on 
specific changes or formulations. It is for policy-makers in each insider system to 
consider these principles and devise specific policies as may be appropriate. 
A. Defining Independence 
In insider systems, independence is currently defined with respect to the existence 
of pecuniary or business relationships and family relationships. These are quite 
narrow, and in insider systems such as China and India where the cultural 
backgrounds create other forms of social relationships between individuals (such 
as extended familial relationships and friendships and bonds between business 
families that transcend generations), it is necessary for definitions of 
independence to capture such relationships as well. The importance of social 
institutions cannot be undermined.1013 Admittedly, it is an onerous task for legal 
                                                 
1013
  This issue has not been entirely resolved even in the outsider systems, although it has received 
attention in rare cases. See Oracle, supra note 417. 
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definitions to capture such fluid relationships, but guiding principles can 
nevertheless be set out without attempting very specific definitions. On this count, 
I advocate a principles-based approach rather than a rule-based approach. The 
latter is fraught with difficulties because bright lines always lead to non-
compliance in spirit as parties would tend to arrange their affairs in such a manner 
as to stay out of the bite of the regulation with impunity. Any such principles-
based definition ought to capture the objective of independence and the problems 
that are sought to be addressed through the system of independent directors. 
 On a related note, it is recommended that the roles of the chairman and 
chief executive officer be separated, such that the latter role is always played by 
an independent director. 
B. Competence and Qualifications 
Current definitions of independence largely rely on the lack of relationships 
between the director and the company, management or controlling shareholder. It 
does not matter if the person is otherwise ill-suited for the job. That leads to the 
appointments of persons who do not possess any business acumen or other skills 
that are required of a director on corporate boards. The appointment of celebrity 
directors on boards is one such example.1014 As this results almost in a mockery of 
the independent director institution, it is necessary to introduce positive qualities 
that individuals are required to display before they can occupy an independent 
                                                 
1014
  For instance, film stars, lyricists, sports persons, fiction writers and the like have been 
appointed on corporate boards, often to enhance the branding of the company and sometimes 
also as a marketing tool to sell shares in an IPO. See Haldea, supra note 938. 
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director’s board seat.1015 This can be knowledge or experience in the particularly 
industry in which the company operates, or even general business and managerial 
skills, or other allied skills in areas such as accounting, marketing, strategy, law 
and the like that the individual can bring to bear on corporate boards. Any such 
skills would also enhance monitoring on corporate boards. More importantly, at 
least one director should have significant expertise in accounting and financial 
matters because accounting fraud, manipulation and non-transparent disclosures 
has been found to be a key corporate governance failure in insider systems. 
 Other “soft” factors ought to be kept in mind while appointing 
independent directors. For example, there are often complaints that the average 
age of independent directors is very high and that it is usually male-dominated. 
These issues are to be addressed so that the element of board diversity is 
maintained. This would bring persons with varied skills, experience and 
backgrounds on to boards as independent directors. 
C. Commitment 
One universal concern in the insider systems is the lack of availability of 
competent individuals suitable to don the mantle of independent directors. The 
ones who have the necessary qualification and competence are required to serve 
various boards, and hence find it difficult to commit ample time to each board. 
One solution would be to specify that an independent director shall spend a 
certain number of hours or days each year for every company on whose board he 
                                                 
1015
  Some of these positive qualification requirements do exist in China, at least on paper. 
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or she serves. However, that would be difficult to enforce or even effectively 
monitor. The other would be to specify the maximum number of companies on 
which independent directors may serve and to keep that at a low number so that 
they can justify their role on each board.1016 While that would be a necessary 
requirement, it may not command a “one size fits all solution”. It would depend 
on the competence levels of the directors, time available on their hands (which 
would vary on the basis of whether they are gainfully employed elsewhere) and 
the amount of work required on each board. Hence, it is not appropriate to 
mandate the maximum number of boards on which independent directors would 
serve, but to leave it to the independent directors and the companies themselves to 
determine the specifics. However, there ought to be a clear understanding under 
law that some level of minimum commitment is essential.  
 One idea that is extremely attractive in the context of several of the 
practical issues discussed in this dissertation (but one that is yet to find its way 
into practice in a common way) relates to the appointment of professional 
directors.1017 Such directors’ principal vocation is to serve on a handful of 
corporate boards, from which they earn their living. The ability of such directors 
to commit their time and attention as independent directors would be tremendous, 
as they are not distracted by any other principal vocation or profession. In 
practice, it is found that the concept of professional directors is gradually finding 
                                                 
1016
  While there are caps on the number of boards that directors can serve, both in China and in 
India, they are arguably too high to be meaningful. 
1017
  The concept of professional directors has been advocated notably by Professors Gilson and 
Kraakman. See Gilson & Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director, supra note 415. 
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its way into the corporate governance sphere in the insider systems.1018 However, 
this system needs to take on a more sustainable form, and the results of the current 
research sense an enormous opportunity for such a system of professional 
directors to enhance the role of independence on corporate boards. 
D. Cadre of Independent Directors 
Professionalisation can be taken to the next level through additional steps. The 
first is training for independent directors. Introducing mandatory training at the 
time of induction as well as continual training on a periodic basis would ensure 
that independent directors are aware of their roles and responsibilities. Apart from 
formal training, informal briefings and caucuses would work as well. For 
example, forums where independent directors get together and share their 
experiences would help in improving best practices in the field.1019 The learning 
from these trainings and forums can be put to use by independent directors across 
all boards that they serve. 
 In addition, it is necessary for policy-makers to explore the possibility of 
creating a cadre for independent directors through a certification process. In this 
proposal, a regulatory authority or peer body would register individuals as 
independent directors upon satisfaction of certain conditions, including 
qualifications, experience, competence levels, training, and so on. Such a 
certification would not only ensure uniform standards in independent directors, 
                                                 
1018
  Practitioner Interviews affirm the gradual emergence of this type of directorship, particularly 
in India. 
1019
  Practitioner Interviews indicate the existence of at least one such forum in India. 
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but would also make such directors accountable to their peers. This is similar to 
certification of lawyers, chartered accountants, architects and other professionals. 
It may be premature at this stage in the evolution of corporate governance of 
emerging economies to insist on certification as a mandatory requirement, but it is 
an aspect which should be attained eventually and policy-making efforts ought to 
clearly bear that in mind. 
E. Incentives 
Independent directors need to be provided sufficient incentives to carry out their 
functions effectively. Of course, compensation of independent directors in 
monetary terms is the most measurable of the incentives. Currently, monetary 
compensation of independent directors in insider systems is far from satisfactory, 
as we have seen in Chapter 5. Therefore, it is necessary to appropriately 
remunerate the independent directors so that they take their job seriously, in a 
responsive and accountable manner, and not as a charitable matter. At the same 
time, there is a risk of over-compensating directors that may cause them to lose 
their independence. The monetary compensation should not be so high that the 
independent director begins to rely heavily on the board position, which will 
impinge on the impartial decision making faculties of such directors. It is critical 
that the line is drawn very carefully. It would not be appropriate to fix specific 
limits and caps on independent director remuneration, as that would be 
counterproductive. However, it is possible to lay down some rules of thumb. The 
guiding factor should not be the relevance of the remuneration with reference to 
the financial size of the company itself. Rather, it should bear relevance to the 
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overall earnings of the independent director. In other words, any limit should be 
placed as a percentage of the director’s overall earnings, as that would determine 
whether the director will place greater reliance on the board position that is a 
necessary means of earning and hence not act entirely dependent. Even here, a 
principles-based approach would augur well. 
 One of the significant forms of independent director compensation is 
through stock options.1020 The advantage of stock options is that it provides the 
independent directors with a stake in the fortune of the company and its business. 
In that sense, it motivates independent directors to act in a manner that preserves 
shareholder value. However, adequate care is to be taken to ensure that some of 
the perverse incentives that operate in stock options do not flow over to 
independent directors as well. First, holders of stock options are motivated to 
increase the short-term earnings of companies so that they are able to encash on 
their options.1021 This is often at the cost of long-term performance of the 
company. Second, any stake in a company obtained by independent directors 
ought not to exceed predetermined maximum limits. For example, in case 
independent directors obtain a controlling position (more likely de facto in nature) 
in a company, such director is perhaps likely to act as any controlling shareholder 
would do rather than in the interests of the minority shareholders. That would 
defeat the very purpose of appointment of independent directors in insider 
                                                 
1020
  Stock options for independent directors is beginning to take on an important form of 
compensation in insider systems, more so in India than in China. 
1021
  See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer G. Hill, “Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize 
Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned Incentives?” (2000) 35 Wake 
Forest L. Rev. 83. 
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systems. These perverse incentives of stock options must always be guarded 
against. 
 Finally, there are certain non-monetary incentives that would propel 
independent directors to perform well. Reputation of independent directors is 
primary among them. A reputable independent director can be assured of 
directorships in a greater number of companies. This reputation effect in turn 
creates a market for independent directors, thereby enhancing the importance of 
that institution. However, it is important to ensure that such a reputation market 
for independent director is correlated only to his or her performance (in the 
interests of the shareholders, particularly the minority) and not with reference to 
allegiance shown towards management or controlling shareholders. Performance 
in such a market is to be determined with reference to identified criteria that is 
justified in the context of such a role.1022 
F. Disincentives 
One of the significant disincentives that drives competent individuals away from 
independent directors is personal liability for non-compliance of law by the 
company. This, as we have seen, is a crucial issue in the insider systems, both in 
China1023 as well as in India,1024 due to which individuals are not only reluctant to 
take up independent director positions, but even existing independent directors 
                                                 
1022
  For details of such performance evaluation criteria, see infra Section 7.4(H). 
1023
  The case involving Lu explains this issue with reference to China. See supra Chapter 5, 
Section 5.3(B). 
1024
  The case involving the directors of Nagarjuna Finance highlights this issue in the Indian 
context. See supra Chapter 5, Section 5.5(C). 
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have been resigning in droves. This issue needs to be addressed in the insider 
systems. 
First, the liability regime ought to take into account the fact that 
independent directors are not involved in the day-to-day management of the 
company. Hence, they cannot be held liable for matters that are not within their 
knowledge, or those that they were not capable of identifying on their own.1025 In 
that sense, all directors (whether independent or otherwise) will be subject to a 
basic minimum duty of care. However, executive directors may be subjected to a 
higher standard as they not only possess business expertise but also greater 
knowledge regarding the affairs of the company. Independent directors cannot 
bear such higher burden. Such a regime must be made clear. 
Further, independent directors need to be provided the benefit of 
indemnities by the company and also D&O insurance policies. In case 
independent directors take actions genuinely that result in potential liabilities, 
such as for simple negligence, these protective provisions are to be attracted. 
Companies should be required mandatorily to provide such indemnities and D&O 
insurance policies. These requirements must be applied as a matter of practice 
each time an independent director is appointed to a company’s board. 
Legislatures and courts must be educated about the precarious position 
with reference to independent directors and their liability. For example, criminal 
                                                 
1025
  This refers to the concept of “red flags” whereby directors are expected to identify and raise 
questions regarding issues that are quite obvious on their face without having to make any in-
depth enquiries. For a more detailed discussion on “red flags”, see WorldCom Litigation, 
supra note 872. 
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legislation should not be utilised by the state or the courts to harass independent 
directors in a manner that extracts benefits from the companies.1026 Even if such 
criminal actions may not ultimately succeed, it causes significant hardships to the 
independent directors as they are required to devote time and attention to defend 
themselves, leading them to forego their primary professional commitments 
thereby raising the opportunity costs. More importantly, it causes severe 
reputational hardships to such independent directors. All these problems tend to 
be compounded in insider systems such as China and India where courts are prone 
to delays in resolution of disputes. The pendency of such disputes for a prolonged 
period of time enhances direct costs and reputational losses significantly. 
G. Other Supporting Factors 
Independent directors cannot function effectively without a conducive 
environment. At the outset, it is necessary to ensure that independent directors 
obtain all relevant information that enables them to make considered decisions on 
matters. There needs to be a regular flow of information from management (and 
controlling shareholders) to independent directors. Furthermore, independent 
directors should have direct access to key company officials without going 
through management (or controlling shareholders), as it is important to make sure 
they receive information that is not filtered at any level.  
 If independent directors are to decide impartially, they should be allowed 
to meet without management in executive sessions. This should be a requirement 
                                                 
1026
  The Nagarjuna Finance case is a classic example of what appears to be the victimisation of 
the independent directors. 
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of the corporate governance norms. If this is not made mandatory, independent 
directors may not convene such separate meetings for fear of showing mistrust of 
the controllers. However, when it is made mandatory, they can do so without any 
such fears. This is an important step as boards in insider systems tend to be more 
collegial showing reverence (sometimes misguidedly) to the person in control, all 
of which act as an obstacle to the impartial thought-process of independent 
directors. Executive sessions will permit issues to come to the fore and for issues 
to be dealt with threadbare. 
 Independent directors must also be provided the option to engage experts 
and consultants on specific matter. These include forensic auditors (in case of 
suspected fraud), chartered valuers (in case of sale or purchase of business), 
lawyers (in case of a serious litigation or compliance issue) and the like, all at the 
cost of the company. This is so that independent directors obtain the benefit of 
expert advice on specific or complex matters. This is even more important in light 
of the proposal that independent directors should separately approve related party 
transactions. 
H. Performance Evaluation 
Independent directors will be made more accountable if their performance is 
evaluated periodically – at least once a year. Currently, only very few companies 
in the insider systems follow such performance evaluation of independent 
directors. It is important to determine the factors and metrics on the basis of 
which the independent directors are evaluated. Those should be consistent with 
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the roles and responsibilities of the independent directors and also to the extent to 
which the interests of the relevant constituencies (such as minority shareholders) 
have been protected. Of course, this cannot be a purely quantitative exercise, as it 
involves subjective factors. However, it is possible for companies to appoint 
external consultants (such as human resources management firms) to carry out 
such performance evaluation. Ultimately, it is for the chairman of the company as 
well as the nomination committee to determine the performance of independent 
directors (based on relevant reports) and decide whether the term of such director 
should be renewed or not. Such a process of constant evaluation of independent 
directors would motivate them to perform effectively in a manner that fulfills their 
roles and functions. 
7.6 Role of the Law and Other Factors 
While a number of recommendations have been made in this Chapter, not all of 
them require legislation to implement. Certain aspects require a legislative 
framework before they can be effective. These include the definition of 
independence, voting systems for election of independent directors, clarity 
regarding the duties, role and allegiance of independent, mechanisms for 
compensating directors and fixation of liability. However, various other aspects 
such as commitment in terms of time, procedures for receipt of information and 
conduct of board and independent director meetings are matters for which the 
legal regime needs to provide for some basic principles, but the detailed working 
are to be left to the various corporate players to devise. These matters will vary 
among companies and hence some level of flexibility is called for. Moreover, 
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these matters will need to be developed in the form of standard practices, and in 
that behalf, various business associations and director forums could play a more 
significant role than legislation. Regulators in the insider systems therefore need 
to determine items of regulation that require the mandate of the law and other 
matters that need to be developed as good practices. Both are essential to 
engender a workable institution of independent directors in the insider systems. 
 Finally, it is necessary to reiterate that the independent director institution 
is only one of the mechanisms that would enhance corporate governance in the 
insider systems. That institution, as we have seen, cannot work by itself. It 
requires to support, and be supported by, a whole host of other attributes such as a 
stringent accounting and financial disclosure regime, whistle blowing 
mechanisms, a code of ethics, and even perhaps an open market for corporate 
control, just to name a few. The role of independent directors should also be 
supported by other gatekeeper functionaries such as accountants, investment 
bankers, corporate and securities lawyers, securities analysts, rating agencies and 
even the business press. The effectiveness of the independent directors also 
depends on other systemic factors. For example, it even requires courts in insider 
systems to be in a position to rule efficaciously on corporate and securities law 
aspects, set precedents for lower courts to follow and create a set of principles that 
imbue certainty in the functioning of independent directors as emissaries of 
enhanced corporate governance. Lastly, independence is not something that can 
entirely be ordained by the law. It is a matter involving ethics and integrity 
whereby independent directors have to put before themselves the interests of 
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those that they are to protect. That is a characteristic that should permeate into the 
corporate ecosystem in the insider systems if enhanced corporate governance is to 
be achieved. While law does play an important role in creating the conditions for 
institutions like independent directors to carry out their functions, the success of 
that institution also depends to a large extent on the individuals that occupy that 
position and the cultures and practices that are prevalent in those systems. 
7.7 Conclusion to the Chapter 
In this Chapter, I considered whether the institution of independent directors 
should be done away with in the insider systems. Having found that such a drastic 
approach is not necessary, I suggest various reforms to strengthen the institution, 
specifically given the majority-minority agency problem that is prevalent in the 
insider systems. I also found that while some of the requirements can be mandated 
through law, other matters must be left for the various corporate actors and peer 
review bodies to determine on the basis of given circumstances, as a “one size fits 
all” approach may fail.  
 It is necessary to mention a word of caution. The effect of strengthening 
the position of independent directors in the insider systems should not mean that 
such directors adopt a confrontational attitude towards management and 
controlling shareholders. That would result in disastrous consequences. Constant 
deadlocks in the boardroom would result in sub-optimal business performance, 
and in the end it will be the shareholders (minority included) who are likely to 
suffer adversely. The enhanced powers require individuals in the position to act 
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rationally and perhaps even empathetically to the insiders who are responsible for 
running the business of the company. Such individuals ought to act independently 
and impartially without opposing every proposal put forth by the insiders. The 
availability of extensive powers at hand, however, is important as they may be 
required to be exercised, albeit sparingly, if there are transactions that may likely 
benefit the insiders at the expense of the minority shareholders. Unless the legal 
regime confers sufficient powers, independent directors will be left immobilised. 
But, those powers are required to be exercised in the overall interest of the 
company. Ultimately, in the end analysis, all directors (including independent) 
have to strive to create value to the shareholders having regard to the interests of 
the other stakeholders as well. That basic objective cannot be compromised.  
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8. CONCLUSION: THE WAY FORWARD 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
8.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
8.3 Guidance for Further Research 
 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
In this dissertation, I examine a key question: what is the effect of transplanting a 
corporate governance norm, specifically the independent director, from the 
outsider systems (where it has originated) to insider systems? In doing so, I 
undertake in-depth studies of the independent director concept through a sample 
of two countries from the outsider systems, viz., the U.S. and the U.K., and two 
countries form the insider systems, viz., China and India. The U.S. and the U.K. 
are classic outsider systems, perhaps to the exclusion of all other countries,1027 
while China and India are emerging economies that are beginning to attract close 
attention, including in terms of their corporate governance norms. Using these 
samples, I conduct a qualitative analysis of the emergence, role and effectiveness 
of independent directors in these jurisdictions. After examining the differences 
between the outsider systems and the insider systems, I explore in Chapter 3 the 
theoretical foundations of independent directors and the rationale for their 
emergence in the outsider systems. I find that this is inextricably linked to the 
manager-shareholder agency problem in the outsider systems.  
                                                 
1027
  There continues to be a debate about whether other systems such as Japan, Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand also form part of outsider systems, but there is no serious doubt that lingers 
as far as the U.S. and the U.K. are concerned. 
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Looking at the insider systems of China and India, I find in Chapter 4 that 
there has been a selective transplantation of various independent director norms 
from the outsider systems into these insider systems. This was driven by the 
forces of globalisation and with a possible convergence towards the outsider 
model. The suggested rationale for this approach is the need for emerging 
economies of China and India to attract foreign capital, to a large extent from 
investors in outsider systems such as the U.S. and the U.K., which required them 
to structure their corporate governance regimes in a form that is familiar to 
investors from those countries. This brought about at least a formal convergence 
of independent director norms. However, delving deeper into the norms governing 
independent directors in China and India, I find that there are serious 
shortcomings that impede the effective functioning of independent directors. 
While independent directors are provided some stature in these norms, that is not 
sufficient for them to play a vital role in enhancing corporate governance by 
monitoring the activities of the insiders. Furthermore, these shortcomings 
manifest themselves in practice as well in a manner that is verifiable from an 
empirical standpoint (at least qualitatively, if not quantitatively). On this count, I 
find in Chapter 5 that independent directors have not, in practice, been able to 
make significant headway in enhancing corporate governance in the insider 
systems of China and India.  
That leads to the question as to why the norms relating to independent 
directors are not effective in the insider systems, or at least not as effective as they 
are in the outsider systems. Here, I proffer, in Chapter 6, several reasons due to 
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which such a position ensues. Specifically, it is due to the admixture of several 
constraints – structural, legal, cultural, political and perceptional – that prevent 
effectual institutional change in the insider systems of China and India so as to 
enable the independent director concept to seamlessly blend into their own 
systems. This raises an important question: should the concept be jettisoned in the 
insider systems owing to its failure? The answer, which I discuss in Chapter 7, is 
that such an approach would be counterproductive. The concept is well-
intentioned with sufficient potential to act as a check against abuse of minority 
shareholders by the insiders. But, what is required is a complete overhaul of the 
independent director norms as well as practices in China and India. Chapter 7 also 
contains some normative output that lists out some of the reforms required to 
embolden independent directors in these systems. 
Independent directors are here to stay. However, it is important to note 
that their roles in the outsider systems are very different from their roles in the 
insider systems. It is necessary for regulators, policy makers, courts and 
academics in these jurisdictions to recognise these differences and accept them. 
Merely emulating the concept from systems where it originated will result in 
abject failure, as we have seen. Nevertheless, insider systems should be hopeful of 
independent directors’ roles and work towards enhancing their positions and 
taking advantages of their roles and functions to improve corporate governance 
norms, so that the interests of constituencies such as minority shareholders 
become well-protected in these systems. 
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This dissertation began with the principal hypothesis1028 that the 
appointment of independent directors on boards of companies in the insider 
systems will entail a result that is different from the result of their appointment on 
boards of companies in the outsider systems. This hypothesis stands affirmed, as 
we have seen, due to the operation of different types of agency problems that 
operate in these two types of systems. While the independent director was 
conceived as a mode of resolving the manager-shareholder agency problem, its 
effectiveness has been found to be doubtful in tackling the majority-minority 
agency problem. This dissertation also finds considerable support for the ancillary 
hypothesis that the effectiveness of independent directors will be less in the 
insider systems compared to the outsider systems. At a conceptual level, a 
solution that was envisaged to deal with a particular problem cannot be expected 
to tackle another problem, as that is bound to result in failure. At an empirical 
level, although the qualitative and quantitative studies in the outsider systems and 
insider systems are not capable of an apples-to-apples comparison, the available 
evidence clearly indicates that while the success of the independent director 
concept in the outsider systems is at least equivocal, the overwhelming weight of 
evidence in the insider systems suggests a greater degree of failure. 
8.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
The outcome of the present research questions the efficacy of emerging 
economies “westernizing” their corporate governance requirements as there has 
                                                 
1028
  See supra Chapter 1, Section 1.3(B). 
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been a failure of legal transplant of the independent director concept into 
emerging economies. This significantly contributes to existing theory in corporate 
governance and board structure in establishing that independence of boards in its 
current form is not the solution for emerging economies in order to enhance 
corporate governance, and it is certainly not a substitute for regulation. In order to 
achieve desirable outcomes, there are several reforms required as discussed in this 
dissertation. Hence, apart from adding to doctrine and theory, the outcome of the 
research contributes to policymakers and regulators in emerging economies with 
prescriptive recommendations for changes in board structures and corporate 
governance systems so as to be in a position to achieve high levels of governance. 
This will not only assist in enhancing firm value (and thereby benefiting 
shareholders and stakeholders) but would also help boost the capital markets and 
corporate sector in these economies, and thereby trigger wider benefits. 
This dissertation adds to the literature in the area of comparative corporate 
governance in significant ways. It examines the implications of Western legal 
concepts in emerging economies where corporate governance norms are only 
beginning to take a prominent position more recently. While there is some amount 
of literature already in existence with reference to corporate governance and 
independent directors in China, that does not deal extensively with key issues 
pertaining to the majority-minority shareholder problem and issues associated 
with the nomination and appointment as well as the role and functions of 
independent directors in China. The present research seeks to fill that void, 
thereby highlighting the importance of those problems. As far as India is 
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concerned, there has been no extensive study at all of corporate governance and 
independent directors. While some empirical efforts do exist, that has not been 
synthesised to produce meaningful outcomes in terms of learning. The present 
dissertation seeks to undertake an in-depth academic study of independent 
directors in India, which has previously been unexplored.  
While existing literature does identify some of the differences between 
outsider systems and insider systems in corporate governance in general, there has 
been no systematic effort previously to study the implications of these differences 
on how the independent director concept would operate keeping in mind these 
differences. The present research contributes on that account. Finally, an 
important input of this dissertation is the discussion of various factors that impede 
the proper functioning of independent directors in the insider economies of China 
and India, which range from the legal to the cultural, all of which contribute to a 
legal analysis of the concept of independent directors and its functioning. 
 In addition, the present research makes additional contributions in further 
areas beyond those relating to independent directors. Due to an extensive analysis 
on allied areas of corporate governance, it sheds light on theoretical and practical 
considerations in allied areas such as, (i) understanding of the differences between 
outsider and insider models of corporate governance, (ii) implications of legal 
transplantation of a rule from one legal system to another, and (iii) general social, 
economic, political, cultural and legal factors affecting corporate governance in 
emerging economies such as China and India. Although the research itself is 
confined to the emerging economies of China and India, the outcomes of the 
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research can be adopted with local adaptations by other emerging economies as 
well, and to that extent the contribution of the research is expected to have a wider 
impact. 
8.3 Guidance for Further Research 
Since research of this kind will necessarily have to be circumscribed to deal with 
a specific question or questions, it would be foolhardy to be too ambitious and 
address several wider issues. Given this constraint, the outcome of this research 
will be well-served if it also acts as a platform for further work to be done in the 
area of independent directors and more generally in comparative corporate 
governance as a topic of study. While this dissertation deals with the transplant 
effect of independent directors from the outsider systems of the U.S. and the U.K. 
to the insider systems of China and India, it also provides some general guidance 
for the types of issues that may arise in the implementation of the concept in other 
insider systems, particularly those that are emerging economies. The countries of 
Brazil and Russia immediately come to mind, but there are several other countries 
as well. It is expected that this dissertation will provide a platform for researchers 
to conduct similar studies with respect to other economies that follow the insider 
system of corporate governance. This will help verify whether the findings in this 
dissertation are universal across all insider systems or whether they are due to 
factors that specifically play in China and India. 
 The findings in this dissertation throw open several questions for empirical 
research, particularly with respect to the subject countries of China and India. For 
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example, does the manner of appointment of independent directors (whether by 
controlling shareholders or otherwise) make a difference to firm performance? 
Does the voluntary adoption of an independent nomination committee for 
nomination of independent directors alter firm performance? Does the identity of 
independent directors (i.e., academics, government officials, business executives, 
and the like) matter to the effectiveness of the institution? Are the various 
constraints set forth in Chapter 7 measurable? For example, does the presence of 
executive sessions in companies (where independent directors meet without 
management) confer better results in decision-making as it helps overcome some 
of the cultural barriers present in the insider systems of China and India. These 
are just illustrations of topics for further empirical verification that emerge from 
this dissertation. There will surely be many more empirically testable hypotheses 
and questions that expert empirical researchers will be able to ferret out from the 
findings in this dissertation. 
 This dissertation deals with the transplant effect of independent directors 
from the outsider model to the insider model. However, independent directors 
also form part of corporate governance in countries that follow the “bank model” 
of corporate governance, particularly in continental European countries.1029 
Research of the present kind in those countries would verify whether the problems 
associated with independent directors discussed in this dissertation would apply 
equally (or not) in countries that follow the “bank model”. 
                                                 
1029
  Supra note 92. 
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 This Section summarises the conclusions of this dissertation, briefly 
discusses how the dissertation affirms the principal and ancillary hypotheses, 
identifies the contributions that it makes to current scholarship in this area, and 
provides some modest illumination of the path ahead for further work that can 
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In addition, reliance has also been placed on interviews with two independent 
directors of a Chinese conglomerate that were conducted in connection with 





General Corporate Governance Issues 
 
1. Do you believe the recent efforts to enhance corporate governance in 
India have been effective? 
 
2. How do you describe the ownership and control structure of 
companies in India compared to the more developed economies in the 
West? What are experiences in respect of companies with which you 
are associated? 
 




3. What is the broad representation of board of directors in Indian 
companies? Specifically, what is the trend in relation to ratio of 
executive vs. non-executive, promoter vs. independent directors? 
 
4. How are independent directors chosen for appointment on the board? 
Is there a nomination committee even though that is not mandatory? 
Are outside consultants engaged to conduct a search for independent 
directors? 
 
5. What is the extent of involvement of the promoters in the nomination 
of the independent directors? 
 
6. What is the typical term for an independent director? At the end of the 
term, are independent directors usually considered for reappointment? 
 
7. What is your view about the availability of competent professionals 
who are willing to act as independent directors? 
 
8.  
(a) Is the current definition and understanding of independence 
adequate? 
 
(b) Is it typical for companies to appoint independent directors who 
satisfy the technical requirements of the corporate governance 
code, but who may otherwise not be truly independent?  
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9. Do companies usually ascertain the availability of independent 
directors before considering appointment? For instance, do they 
consider the number of other boards on which the person is a director? 
What type of commitment do they obtain on time and availability? 
 
10. What is the typical remuneration paid to independent directors? Is that 
sufficient to attract high-level talent?  
 
11. Are independent directors also issued stock options? Do you believe 





12. Do independent directors meet without the management members 
being present? 
 
13. What is the extent of participation of independent directors on board 
meetings? Do independent have adequate time to prepare for board 
meetings? 
 
14. What is the extent of information that is communicated to independent 
directors in advance of meetings? Do the independent directors have 
access to company officials for further information, without routing 
their requests through senior management? 
 
15. Do they independent directors exercise their discretion in appointing a 
separate set of advisers, such as lawyers, accountants or investment 




16. What are the usual committees on which independent directors 
participate? What are the additional expectations of such directors?  
 
Effectiveness of Independent Directors 
 
17. Do they carry out a monitoring role or advisory/strategic role on the 
board? In order to carry out a monitoring role, do they possess enough 
expertise in areas such as audit, accounting, law and compliance? As 
regards strategic role, do they possess enough expertise on the area of 
business of the company? 
 
18. Is there a formal process for evaluation of independent directors? If so, 
what is the process for such evaluation? Are there external consultants 
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for conducting such evaluation? How are the results communicated to 
independent directors and what is expected of them in response? 
 





20. Are directors concerned about liability for themselves when deciding 
on corporate boards? 
 
21. Is it typical to obtain directors and officers insurance? If so, what are 
typical amounts of cover? Are there any significant exclusions?  




Comparison between Independent Director Opinion (China) and Clause 49 (India) 
 
Feature China (Independent Director 
Opinion) 
 





• 1/3rd of the board (from 30 
June 2003) 
• 1/3rd of the board if chairman 
is non-executive and not 
related to promoter 





• No relationship with 
company or majority 
shareholder other than as 
director 
• Specific exclusions relating 
to employment and other 
business relationships 
• Significant shareholders 
excluded 
 
• No material pecuniary 
relationships with company, 
promoters, directors or senior 
management 
• Specific exclusions relating to 
employment, business and 
other professional 
relationships 






• Minimum qualifications 
required by law 
• Understanding of business 
and industry 
• Work experience of 5 years 
• Mandatory training 
 
• No specific provision 




• Nomination by board of 
directors, supervisors or 
large shareholders 
• Verification of candidates 
by CSRC 
• Cumulative voting optional 
• No nomination committee 
 
• No specific provisions 
• Similar to appointment of 
other directors 
• Can be removed by 
shareholders’ resolution 
without “cause” 
• Proportional representation 
and nomination committee 
optional 
 
Tenure • Concurrent with other 
directors 
• Maximum renewal: 6 years 
• Resigning director to 
provide details 
• No specific provision 







• Good faith and diligence to 
company 
• Protect overall interests of 
company 
• Express opinion on matters 
harmful to minority interests 
 





• Acknowledge significant 
transactions with third 
parties 
• Other specified role 
• Primary role is for independent 
directors on audit committee 
• No specific role for 
independent directors on the 
board itself 
 
Committees • Only option requirement to 
constitute board committees 
with independent directors 
 
• Audit committee is mandatory 
• Remuneration committee is 
optional 
Enforcement • No specific provisions 
• Reputational sanctions 
possible 
• Penalty up to Rs. 250 million 
for breach 
 
 
 
